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 1
An Introduction to the Current 
State of Workers’ Rights








“Democracy cannot work unless it is honored in the factory as well 
as the polling both; [workers] cannot be truly free in body and in spirit 
unless their freedom extends into the places where they earn their daily 
bread.” This quote from Senator Robert Wagner in 1935 as he intro-
duced the bill that came to be known as the Wagner Act captures the 
importance of workers’ rights in our society. Yet in 2000, no less an 
authority than Human Rights Watch found that legal protections for 
the fundamental human rights of U.S. workers to form unions, bargain 
collectively, and strike fall woefully short of meeting the requirements 
of international law (Human Rights Watch 2000). The freedom to form 
a union has been formally recognized as a basic human right by the 
United Nations and its member states since the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights was ratified in 1948 (United Nations 1948). The inter-
national importance of freedom of association and the right to bargain 
collectively was reaffirmed in 1998, when the International Labour Or-
ganization (ILO), the tripartite United Nations body that is responsible 
for labor issues, designated the right to freedom of association and to 
bargain collectively as one of four workplace rights so universal and 
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fundamental that they must be honored by all member states, whether 
or not they have ratified all the relevant ILO conventions (ILO n.d.).1
Yet in the United States today, the freedom to form unions and bar-
gain collectively is heavily suppressed, and the law provides workers 
with little protection. According to Bronfenbrenner’s survey of 400 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections in 1998 and 1999, 
private sector employers oppose the efforts of their employees to form 
unions during 97 percent of all organizing campaigns (Bronfenbrenner 
2000). Firing or otherwise discriminating against a worker for trying to 
form a union is illegal but has become commonplace. The number of 
instances of discrimination, discharge, or other unfair labor practices 
against workers for union activity leading to a back-pay order by the 
NLRB skyrocketed from 1,000 per year in the early 1950s to 15,000–
25,000 annually in recent years, despite the fact that private employ-
ment in the United States during this period increased less than three-
fold (Human Rights Watch 2000; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics n.d. 
d). Almost without limit, employers can and do legally force workers 
to attend closed-door meetings during work time to dissuade them from 
forming unions. According to Bronfenbrenner (2000), private sector 
employers force workers to attend 11 such “captive audience” meetings 
during a typical organizing campaign. By contrast, unions have virtu-
ally no access to the workplace to present their case. Indeed, as political 
scientist Gordon Lafer recently concluded:
At every step of the way, from the beginning to the end of a union 
election, NLRB procedures fail to live up to the standards of U.S. 
democracy. Apart from the use of secret ballots, there is not a sin-
gle aspect of the NLRB process that does not violate the norms 
we hold sacred for political elections. The unequal access to voter 
lists; the absence of financial controls; monopoly control of both 
media and campaigning within the workplace; the use of economic 
power to force participation in political meetings; the tolerance of 
thinly disguised threats; the location of voting booths on partisan 
grounds; open-ended delays in implementing the results of an elec-
tion; and the absence of meaningful enforcement measures—every 
one of these constitutes a profound departure from the norms that 
have governed U.S. democracy since its inception. (Lafer 2005)
Under U.S. law, employers may lawfully “predict”—but not “threat-
en”—that the workplace will close or be moved if workers join a union. 
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The incidence of such “predictions” and (technically illegal but virtual-
ly unpenalized) threats that the workplace will close or move occurred 
in less than 30 percent of organizing campaigns in the mid-1980s, but 
more than half by the late 1990s—including more than 70 percent in the 
highly mobile manufacturing sector (Bronfenbrenner 2000, p. 18).
Employers who are so inclined may use NLRB procedures and le-
gal doctrines to create delays and make collective bargaining appear 
futile so that employees will eventually abandon their struggle to form 
a union.2 The bottom line: as Richard Freeman puts it, “the National 
Labor Relations Act . . . has institutionalized a process that effectively 
gives management near veto power over whether or not workers be-
come organized” (Freeman 2004, p. 75).3 The consequences have been 
devastating for workers’ rights. According to a February 2005 Peter 
Hart survey, among nonunion workers 53 percent—or some 57 million 
workers—want union representation in their workplaces but are unable 
to have it under current law (Hart 2005).
The economic consequences of suppressing workers’ freedom to 
form unions are severe. Union jobs paid 27.6 percent more than non-
union jobs in 2004—$781 per week versus $612 per week (U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 2005). Real wages of U.S. workers are 4.7 percent 
lower in 2004 than they were in 1971, although productivity increased 
at an annual average of 2.11 percent during that time period (U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics n.d. b,c). The absence of workplace democ-
racy and the right to negotiate for a share of this increased productivity 
has contributed to this gap. Indeed, the inability of workers to unionize 
may threaten middle-class jobs and the associated lifestyles. Collec-
tive bargaining raises wages for all workers, union and nonunion alike. 
One recent study found that, for workers with high school educations in 
the 1980s, the spillover effect of collective bargaining led to aggregate 
earnings increases for nonunion workers that were three-fifths as large 
as the aggregate of earnings increases received by union members as a 
direct result of collective bargaining (Mishel and Walters 2003).
As workers lose the freedom to form unions, race and gender pay 
gaps grow. For example, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (2005), in 2004, African-American workers who are members of a 
union made 29 percent more per week than their nonunion counterparts, 
and Latino workers who are members of unions earned 59 percent more 
per week in 2004 than nonunion Latino workers. Furthermore, the union 
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wage advantage was 34 percent for women workers. Numerous studies 
have found a link between the erosion of collective bargaining coverage 
and widening economic inequality (Card 1996, 2001; Card, Lemieux, 
and Riddell 2003; Mishel and Walters 2003).
Collective bargaining also makes a huge difference in workers’ ac-
cess to pensions, health insurance coverage, and paid time off the job. 
Union workers are nearly five times more likely to have guaranteed, 
defined benefit pension plan coverage (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
n.d. a) and are 53 percent more likely than nonunion workers to get 
health insurance benefits through their jobs (Buchmueller, DiNardo, 
and Valleta 2001). Nonunion workers are six times more likely to lack 
health insurance coverage than union members; the long-term decline 
in unionization and collective bargaining coverage is therefore a signifi-
cant cause of the growth in the number of uninsured Americans (Fron-
stin 2005). Thus, unions and collective bargaining are vital to prevent-
ing low-road employers from shifting the costs for health care of their 
employees to more responsible employers and the public (Maxwell, 
Temin, and Zaman 2002; Waddoups 2003).
In a period when the work/family time squeeze is high on the agen-
da of many social analysts, unions help to maintain a healthy work/life 
balance. Collective bargaining confers a 28 percent advantage in paid 
vacation time to union members as compared with nonunion workers 
(Mishel and Walters 2003).
Furthermore, unions make a huge difference in justice on the job. In 
99 percent of unionized workplaces, workers can be disciplined or fired 
only for a good reason related to work performance (Bureau of National 
Affairs 1995). By contrast, in virtually all nonunion workplaces in the 
private sector, workers are “employees at will” who can be disciplined 
or discharged for no reason at all. 
Suppressing the freedom to form unions also harms political par-
ticipation and weakens a vital component of countervailing power in 
society (Voos 2004). Radcliff (2001) estimates that each percentage 
point decline in union density triggers a 0.4 percentage point decline in 
voter participation. Perhaps most serious of all, workers are denied both 
a democratic voice in their workplace to shape their terms and condi-
tions of employment and a vehicle to use their expertise to improve 
organizational performance. This lack of voice harms not only workers 
and organizations, but, depending on the organization, also the general 
Blocketal.indb   4 3/2/2006   8:59:55 AM
An Introduction to the Current State of Workers’ Rights   5
public. For example, recent research indicates that heart attack survival 
rates are higher in hospitals where nurses are unionized than in hospi-
tals where nurses are not unionized (Ash and Seago 2004).
In October 2002, the School of Labor and Industrial Relations at 
Michigan State University and the AFL-CIO co-sponsored a confer-
ence on workers’ rights that aimed to encourage much-needed academ-
ic research on workers’ rights in the United States. The conference or-
ganizers believed that if we provided researchers in industrial relations 
and related disciplines a forum for new inquiries into workers’ rights, 
excellent research would emerge. 
This volume is an edited selection of 13 papers presented at the 
conference. The result is a wide-ranging examination of the state of 
workers’ freedom to form unions and bargain collectively in the United 
States. The book has a point of view: legal protection for workers’ rights 
in the United States is low, and this situation is adversely affecting the 
well-being of society as a whole. Justice, fairness, and widely shared 
prosperity are the watchwords of the papers in this volume.
The book is divided into five parts. Part 1 asks the following ques-
tion: How free are U.S. workers to form unions and bargain collec-
tively? In the first of three chapters in Part 1, James Gross takes an in-
ternational, values-based look at workers’ rights to bargain collectively 
in the United States. Gross argues that concepts of fundamental human 
rights must be applied not only to the individual vis-à-vis the state, but 
also the individual vis-à-vis the employer. Gross makes the argument 
that an employer can have an even greater effect on a person than does 
the state. Yet, in their status as employees—which is one of the most 
important aspects of life for the day-to-day existence of the average 
person—people are treated as little more than a physical asset allocat-
ed like any other asset. Such a view is values-based—there is nothing 
inherent in the nature of an economic system, including the capitalist 
system of private ownership of the means of production, that requires 
that citizens, in their status as employees, be denied such fundamental 
rights. The European Union (EU), for example, provides workers with a 
much broader set of legally protected rights than does the United States 
(Block, Berg, and Roberts 2003), yet the EU does not question private 
ownership of the means of production. Gross argues that it is the bal-
ance between employer rights and workers’ rights that is at issue. Gross 
points out that a conceptualization of workers’ rights as fundamental 
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rights would change the balance of our labor laws. More importantly, 
however, it would also change the nature of the employment system in 
the United States from one that is centered on property rights to one that 
balances property rights with human rights. Gross calls on us to rethink 
our views of the nature of the employment relationship, asking why 
we should consider property rights as fundamental for employers, but 
not consider organizing and bargaining rights—the right to a voice—as 
fundamental human rights for workers.
Taking this broad view of the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively as a fundamental human right, David Cingranelli examines the 
most widely known procedure by which workers form labor unions in 
the United States—the NLRB representation election—and compares 
it to democratic political elections. Using accepted international stan-
dards for democratic elections as a yardstick, standards that the United 
States has been active in promulgating, Cingranelli concludes that, by 
these measures, the NLRB representation election process is neither 
free nor fair. It is not free because workers are not free from interference 
or coercion, are not allowed by employers or the law to fully exercise 
free speech rights, are not free to assemble on company property, do 
not have free access to information about the union at the workplace, 
and do not have proper redress for election violations because of inade-
quate laws, poor enforcement, weak and ineffective remedies, and long 
delays. Representation elections are not fair because eligibility is not 
clearly defined, access to resources and information is inequitable, and 
the two parties are not treated equally. Cinganelli’s analysis thus calls 
into serious question whether the NLRB representation election process 
truly constitutes a free, fair, and democratic procedure for workers to 
determine whether or not they want to form a union. If it is not a demo-
cratic process, then the entire basis for our current system of employee 
choice, the NLRB election under “laboratory conditions” (Dana Corpo-
ration 314 NLRB No. 150 [2004]), is called into question. 
The next chapter examines the status of workers’ freedom to form 
unions and bargain collectively in the public sector. While public sec-
tor unionism has fared far better than private sector unionism (in 2004, 
36 percent of public sector workers were union members, compared 
to just 7.9 percent of private sector workers) (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2005), Donald Wasserman claims that these numbers mask 
some disturbing facts regarding the rights of public employees to bar-
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gain collectively. As Wasserman points out, states that permit collective 
bargaining among state and local government employees often do so 
with severe constraints. Moreover, Wasserman notes that “(a) majority 
of public employees in fully one-half of the states do not now have, 
and are unlikely to achieve, reasonable bargaining rights in the foresee-
able future.” Wasserman also cites a U.S. General Accountability Office 
study that estimates that roughly one-third of all public employees lack 
collective bargaining rights. Wasserman also notes the minimal scope 
of bargaining in the federal sector.
Importantly, Wasserman discusses the extent to which the Bush ad-
ministration and some governors have stripped their employees of even 
these narrow rights. In January 2005, the Bush administration adopted 
rule changes to increase management discretion and narrow the scope 
of collective bargaining in the Department of Homeland Security on the 
ground of national security, although we know of no serious scholarship 
that ties unionization to security risks. Additionally, new governors in 
Indiana and Missouri removed, by executive order, collective bargain-
ing rights from state employees (Lee 2005; Missouri, State of, 2005; 
National Treasury Employees Union et al. v. Tom Ridge and Kay Coles 
James;4 Office of the Governor [of Indiana] 2005; U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security and Office of Personnel Management 2005). In 
Kentucky, even the state’s obligation to meet and confer with public 
sector unions was abolished by the governor in January 2004 (Wasser-
man 2005). These actions indicate the precariousness of the status of 
collective bargaining for public employees, especially when that sta-
tus is at the discretion of the executive branch. The net result, Wasser-
man finds, is that—even in the relatively highly unionized public sec-
tor—the United States falls short of meeting international human rights 
standards with respect to protecting the freedom of employees to form 
unions and bargain collectively. 
In Part 2, the focus of the volume shifts from broad human rights 
doctrine to an examination of the social and economic importance 
of collective bargaining. Why does free worker access to collective 
bargaining matter? What does society gain from protecting workers’ 
rights? How do workers themselves, communities, and indeed, employ-
ers, benefit from collective bargaining? Thomas Juravich, Kate Bron-
fenbrenner, and Robert Hickey; Laura Dresser and Annette Bernhardt; 
and Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky provide insights into these ques-
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tions. The chapter by Juravich, Bronfenbrenner, and Hickey represents 
the first systematic scholarly analysis ever undertaken of the provisions 
included in the first contracts workers negotiate with employers after 
they organize a union. The authors find that three-quarters of the first 
contracts studied contained antidiscrimination and just-cause language, 
and 96 percent had a grievance procedure with third-party arbitration. 
Seniority is created in more than two-thirds of all agreements, but se-
niority is used primarily in layoffs, recall, and transfer. It is much less 
likely to be used as the primary criterion in promotions. Most of these 
provisions prevent management from taking arbitrary action. Thus, the 
chapter suggests that these first contracts represent significant gains for 
workers—both in terms of economic benefits and workplace rights. 
Given the difficulty workers face in securing first contracts over em-
ployer opposition—45 percent of initial contract negotiations fail to re-
sult in a first contract within two years, according to the latest Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service data—these are significant victo-
ries indeed (Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services 2004). 
The Dresser and Bernhardt chapter on unionization and the hotel 
industry addresses a broad range of workplace and unionization issues. 
From a societal point of view, however, the authors’ major contribution 
may be their focus on a sector that has a large number of low-wage, 
nonunion service jobs, often held by recent immigrants, which gener-
ally require limited formal education. From the late 1930s through the 
late 1950s, workers with little formal education were an important com-
ponent of the unionized workforce, for instance, in manufacturing and 
construction. In essence, unionization and collective bargaining helped 
move these workers into the middle class with all the implications for 
consumption and intergenerational mobility that went with middle-
class status. The decline of middle-wage, unionized manufacturing jobs 
available to workers with limited formal education, and the coincident 
increase in nonunion low-wage service jobs, means that there are fewer 
pathways into the middle class for such workers. This has serious im-
plications for upward social and intergenerational mobility and income 
growth and inequality in the United States. The substantial wage effects 
of unionization found by Dresser and Bernhardt, from 19 percent to 39 
percent, depending on the level of analysis, suggests the importance of 
enhancing workers’ freedom to form unions and bargain collectively 
if we wish to reverse the decline of living standards for workers with 
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relatively low levels of formal education, recent immigrants, and other 
workers who occupy a disadvantaged position in the labor market.
Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky examine the minority of employ-
ers who choose to respect their employees’ freedom to form unions by 
remaining neutral during organizing campaigns and/or voluntarily rec-
ognizing unions when a majority of their employees choose them. The 
authors find no inconsistency between employer success and employer 
choice to respect workers’ freedom to organize and bargain collectively. 
Indeed, in many cases, unions are perceived as aiding management in 
improving the workplace or product. In the auto parts industry, for ex-
ample, with the interest of the domestic automakers and the UAW in 
purchasing from unionized suppliers, unionization may actually gen-
erate business. More generally, avoiding the conflict and disruption 
typical of contested NLRB representation election campaigns can fos-
ter more positive labor-management relations and permit the relation-
ship between the parties to develop on the basis of mutual respect and 
trust. Thus, for these firms, and for the workers fortunate enough to 
be employed with them, respect for workers’ freedom to form unions 
and business success go hand-in-hand. The Eaton and Kriesky chap-
ter, when read against the backdrop of the antidemocratic deficiencies 
of the NLRB representation elections that Cingranelli’s chapter docu-
ments, strongly suggests that public policy should promote voluntary 
recognition agreements and employer neutrality as a valuable and con-
structive alternative to the contested, adversarial, and coercive NLRB 
representation election process (Dana Corporation, 341 NLRB No. 150 
[2004]; Brudney forthcoming). 
Part 3 focuses on legal obstacles to workers’ rights. While common 
sense suggests that statutory law matters a great deal, those who do not 
follow labor law developments closely may not realize the impact spe-
cific interpretations of statutory language can have. Steven Abraham, 
Adrienne Eaton, and Paula Voos; and Ganagram Singh and Ellen Dan-
nin examine the impact of interpretations of the NLRA in two areas: the 
exclusion of supervisors from being part of the union, and employers 
unilaterally implementing their proposals when bargaining for a con-
tract has reached an impasse. Abraham, Eaton, and Voos note that the 
U.S Supreme Court’s decisions in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community 
Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001) and NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement 
Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571 (1994) have increased the burden on 
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union organizing by encouraging delays in the representation process. 
Employer arguments that some employees are supervisors result in le-
gal disputes that increase the processing time in a case. Employers can, 
in fact, delay the process by weeks by making arguments about the 
supervisory status of workers even if the merit of the arguments is ques-
tionable. In addition, these cases have encouraged courts of appeals 
to remand cases to the board for further consideration. This increase 
in case processing time in representation cases generally decreases the 
probability that the employees will succeed in forming a union (Room-
kin and Block 1981). The increased time associated with remands in 
court cases further discourages employees from exercising their rights. 
Thus, Abraham, Eaton, and Voos demonstrate that board and court deci-
sions have an effect not only on the substance of the law, but on NLRB 
procedures as well. It appears that legal decisions, by creating ambigu-
ity in the law, create openings for litigation that cause delay. 
Singh and Dannin provide a unique perspective on a current inter-
pretation of the law of the bargaining process under the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA)—implementation at impasse. They asked a 
sample of business and law students to share their views of the relative 
bargaining power of the union and the employer under three regimes, 
including the current regime, which gives employers the right to imple-
ment their final pre-impasse proposal and to replace strikers. As these 
students knew nothing about the law and had no vested interest in any 
particular statutory structure, their situation was roughly akin to a Raw-
lsian “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971). The authors report that these 
disinterested, unknowing parties believed the current regime strongly 
favored employers, enhancing their bargaining power, and that a regime 
that permits no implementation at impasse and prohibits striker replace-
ment would enhance worker power. A compulsory arbitration regime 
favors neither party. Their work suggests that the current law strongly 
favors employer interests over worker interests.
Part 4 looks beyond U.S. labor law to international perspectives. 
Industrial relations in the United States often have been discussed in the 
context of “exceptionalism,” the notion that, in some way, the United 
States is different from other countries and should not be subject to in-
ternational scrutiny. It is difficult to understand the justification for this 
notion, especially in a world of globalized markets. Roy Adams and 
Richard McIntyre and Matthew Bodah analyze the role of the United 
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States in the tripartite ILO, the internationally recognized center for 
monitoring worker rights. They revisit the strained relationship between 
the United States and the ILO. Adams argues that the real purpose of 
the United States Council on International Business (USCIB), the U.S. 
employer representative to the ILO, is to limit the influence of the ILO 
on U.S. labor and employment practices by denying the very premise 
of the ILO, namely, that union representation and industrial democracy 
are the socially desired methods of determining terms and conditions of 
employment. Adams points out that the USCIB instead takes the posi-
tion that unions are outsiders and that employee interest in representa-
tion is indicative of poor management. This “bad management” prin-
ciple is used to justify many of the positions taken by the USCIB, such 
as that ILO principles apply to countries and not corporations, that the 
United States provides protection that is superior to ILO principles, and 
that ILO principles should apply outside—but not within—the United 
States. 
McIntyre and Bodah address the reasoning behind the United States’ 
refusal to ratify two specific ILO conventions on collective bargaining 
and freedom of association. They state that these conventions are part 
of the “delicate balance-consensus principle,” the principle that U.S. 
law conforms to the principles of freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining, and that the conventions are inconsistent with the U.S 
federal system. McIntyre and Bodah argue that there is no consensus 
among labor and management that U.S. labor laws are working well, 
that various international organizations have found that U.S. labor law 
does not comply with these conventions, and that complying with these 
conventions would not compromise the U.S. federal system. In other 
words, to McIntyre and Bodah, the reasons that have been brought for-
ward for the United States’ refusal to ratify the two conventions are not 
convincing.
The last section of the book, Part 5, focuses on alternative strategies 
for advancing workers’ rights. Charles Morris asks us to look within 
established labor law but through a new lens. He asks us to reconsider 
a fundamental principle of U.S. labor law: majority rule and exclusive 
representation. Morris argues that the NLRA requires both exclusive 
representation when a majority of employees in a bargaining unit select 
union representation and members-only representation when a union is 
unable to obtain the support of a majority of the employees in a unit. 
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Morris bases his conclusion on the legislative history of the NLRA, the 
text of the act, and the labor relations practices in existence in 1935 that 
Congress used as a reference for the act. Morris rejects the view that 
only single union exclusive representation is legal in the United States, 
concluding that this all or nothing system is incorrect as a matter of 
legislative intent and may have developed simply through assumption 
and acquiescence. 
Harris Freeman and George Gonos examine the growing labor mar-
ket role of staffing agencies and their general lack of regulation. They 
compare this deregulated environment with the detailed regulation of 
union hiring halls, noting that staffing agencies, in principle, serve a 
similar function, providing access to short-term employment for em-
ployees. Yet, they note that workers in the industry have little protection 
from such tactics as paying less than promised, exorbitant fees—which 
may increase the cost to user employers—and the absence of criteria 
for conversion to permanent status. The use of preferred arrangements 
restricts worker choice. They argue that the nature of these agencies 
is such that certain fair representation obligations should be placed on 
them. In essence, they ask us to reconceptualize the temporary staffing 
agency from an arm of the employer to a true labor market intermediary 
that represents the interests of both employers and employees. 
Finally, Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein proposes using existing workers’ 
capital in the form of pension funds as a vehicle for expanding workers’ 
rights. She points out that pension funds own approximately $10 trillion 
worth of U.S. stock, accounting for 26 percent of the equity in the Unit-
ed States. She argues that pension funds are “universal owners”; they 
own stock for the long run rather than for a fast return. Zanglein argues 
that as universal owners of many companies, workers, and the unions 
that represent those workers, have a financial interest in encouraging 
socially acceptable corporate behavior. Improper or illegal actions by 
one firm can cause the value of other stocks in the fund’s portfolio to 
drop, resulting in a loss to the fund. Reasoning that good conduct posi-
tively affects the long-term share prices of the stocks in the portfolio, 
and therefore the value of the portfolio, Zanglein argues for worker and 
pension activism vis-à-vis managers to assure that the managers behave 
responsibly. 
Taken together, the essays that make up this volume demonstrate 
that, on the 70th anniversary of the signing of the National Labor Re-
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lations Act on July 5, 1935, our system of laws designed to facilitate 
worker self-organization and access to collective bargaining is badly 
broken. But they do much more than that. For the first time, they begin 
to add up the costs to society of the suppression of our right to a voice 
at work, and they point toward what it will take to revive worker choice 
and worker voice. In the end, it will doubtless require major statutory 
reform to allow workers to organize relatively freely again.
We note that after our conference took place, a bill called the Em-
ployee Free Choice Act was introduced in the 108th Congress, and it 
was reintroduced in the 109th Congress by a bipartisan group of legisla-
tors led by Edward Kennedy and Arlen Specter in the Senate and George 
Miller and Peter King in the House. The legislation, which would pro-
vide for simple majority sign-up rather than election contests pitting 
workers against their employers, as well as first contract arbitration and 
meaningful penalties for violations of workers’ rights, has garnered a 
substantial amount of support, with 210 cosponsors in the House and 38 
in the Senate within a year of being introduced. 
But the history of the last 100 years suggests that it will take a 
broad social movement, supplemented by the sophisticated financial 
strategies Zanglein describes, for workers once again to find their col-
lective voice in the United States. And meaningful change will require 
much more research exploring both the mechanisms of worker rep-
resentation and its importance for creating a just and healthy society. 
While we hope this volume contributes usefully to the discussion of 
worker rights in the United States, we hope even more that it serves as 
a catalyst, helping to spawn a significant new wave of research on how 
workers win collective bargaining and the role it can play in creating 
a society of workplace democracy, social justice, and broadly shared 
prosperity. More than that, we hope this volume will contribute to the 
ongoing efforts to strengthen workers’ rights to bargain collectively 
so that the United States can move toward a more balanced, and more 
just, society. 
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Notes
 1.  The other three fundamental rights at work are the elimination of forced labor, 
the elimination of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination (ILO n.d.).
 2.  For example, on October 25, 2001, employees at Northern Michigan Hospital 
in Petoskey, Michigan, elected Teamsters Local 406 as their collective bargain-
ing representative. Due to a strike and legal procedures, as of April 5, 2005, no 
contract had been signed (Ray 2005).
 3.  Indeed, a recent NLRB decision made this “veto power” explicit for workers 
who are “jointly employed” by a temporary staffing agency and the employ-
er-customer of that agency. Such employees are generally hired by the staffing 
agency but assigned to work at the premises of, and are supervised by, the em-
ployer-customer of the staffing agency. In order for employees so employed to 
organize a union, both the staffing agency and the employer-customer must agree 
to permit the employees to organize (Oakwood Care Center 343 NLRB No. 76 
[2004]).
 4.  “Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief,” U.S. District 
Court for the Distric of Columbia, Case No. 1:05CV00201, January 27, 2005. 
http://www.afge.org/Documents/DHS%20COMPLAINT.pdf (accessed April 1, 
2005).
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How Free are U.S. Workers to Form 
Unions and Bargain Collectively?
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2
A Logical Extreme 
Proposing Human Rights as the Foundation 
for Workers’ Rights in the United States 
James A. Gross
Cornell University 
A few years ago, Summers (1998) deplored how a labor law that 
made it the public policy of the United States to “encourage the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining” and was intended to enable 
workers to participate in the decisions that affect their workplace lives 
had been turned into governmental protection of (even encouragement 
of) employers’ unilateral decision-making authority and hierarchi-
cal workplace control. Similarly, a recent Human Rights Watch report 
(2000) found that “workers’ freedom of association is under sustained 
attack in the United States.” Neither the Summers article nor the Hu-
man Rights Watch report revealed any previously unknown violations 
nor deficiencies. 
The power of these two works lies elsewhere: in Summers’s call for 
a new vision in deciding what rule changes are necessary to reaffirm the 
values of collective representation, and in Human Rights Watch’s use of 
international human rights standards to judge U.S. employers’ respect 
for workers’ rights and the government’s exercise of its responsibility 
to promote and protect workers’ rights. Inherent in Summers’s position 
is the understanding that the basic foundation of law is moral choice, 
whether that choice is made by legislators, judges, members of admin-
istrative agencies, arbitrators, negotiators of collective bargaining con-
tracts, or unilateral rule-makers in human resources departments. His 
position acknowledges, moreover, that there is an unavoidable and of-
ten powerful subjective component to decision makers’ choices among 
alternative rules. Consequently, it is simply not enough to know the 
rules of labor law and labor relations. Those rules must be probed care-
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fully and thoroughly because they embody value judgments concerning 
every vital aspect of labor relations, including the sources of worker 
and employer rights, which rights get priority when they conflict, and 
the nature of the relationship between employer and employee.
An honest reexamination of U.S. labor law and policy, therefore, 
must discuss values and moral choices. Moreover, the use of interna-
tional human rights principles as the standards for judging those choices 
constitutes a long overdue beginning toward the promotion of worker 
rights as human rights (Gross 2003). This combination of values analy-
sis and human rights standards provides the new vision or new perspec-
tive that Summers believed was necessary. 
This chapter addresses the implications of applying this new vision 
for, among other things, worker rights; labor law and policy; our un-
derstanding of the judicial, administrative and arbitral decision-making 
process; union-management strategies; and even the future character 
of industrial relations research. Recognizing worker rights as human 
rights, for example, means that property rights–based, “free” market va- 
lues will have to give way to the values of human rights that have not 
historically influenced U.S. labor law and policy despite the fact that 
the human rights values are most consistent with the nation’s professed 
democratic ideals. Consequently, this chapter will be specific concern-
ing the overall significance of this new vision and will discuss in more 
depth a few examples concerning the freedom of association, labor ar-
bitration and contract administration, human resources values, and the 
nature and role of labor organizations. 
Identifying and analyzing the values underlying labor relations rules 
and policy choices will also broaden the industrial relations research 
agenda and require new approaches to that research. This could make 
industrial relations research truly interdisciplinary because understand-
ing underlying value premises means understanding and applying his-
tory, law, philosophy, ethics, economics, religion, and the international 
and comparative aspects of all these disciplines. This will also require 
broadening the methodology of industrial relations research beyond 
quantitative techniques and opening for examination subjects previ-
ously not considered because they were not quantifiable. It would rein-
troduce concepts such as justice and injustice to a field that has come 
to disparage the “normative” as unscientific and subjective; ill-befitting 
the objective, value-free social scientist.
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This chapter does not aim to discuss the philosophical foundation 
of human rights or to justify worker rights as human rights. Suffice it 
to say, therefore, that the chapter accepts the propositions that human 
rights are a species of moral rights that all persons have simply be-
cause they are human, not because those rights are earned or acquired 
by special enactment or contractual agreements; that all human beings 
are sacred; and that the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR) as well as the International Covenant on Cultural 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) assert the interdependence of political and 
economic rights (Steiner and Alston 1996).
We study people at workplaces. If every person matters because 
every person has rights by virtue of being a human being, then it is time 
we begin in a serious and systematic way to include these human rights 
in our research.
THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights are the rights that all persons have simply because 
they are human. This is not the place to discuss the philosophic founda-
tions of human rights, which historically have their sources in many 
religious doctrines and theories of natural law that led to the Lockean 
natural rights theory—the theory most associated with modern human 
rights (Shestack 1998). More recently, the post–World War II revulsion 
against the horrors of the Holocaust, in which certain individual human 
beings counted as nothing, resulted in the 1948 adoption of the UDHR.1 
The UDHR, combined with the International Covenant on Cultural and 
Political Rights2 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights,3 constitute an International Bill of Rights (Don-
nelly 1989).
Those human rights, which include a wide range of personal, legal, 
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, are necessary not 
merely for life, but for a life of dignity (Donnelly 1989, p. 24). Viola-
tions of those rights deny a person’s humanity. It is generally under-
stood that legal rights arise from the law, contractual rights arise from 
special agreements such as collective bargaining contracts, and moral 
rights arise from accepted principles of righteousness. In ordinary cir-
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cumstances, however, human rights take priority over those “conven-
tional rights.”
For example, in the United States, the right not to be discriminated 
against now can be claimed as a constitutional right, a federal and state 
statutory right, a court decision–based right, or a contractual right in a 
collective bargaining agreement. At various times in this country’s his-
tory, however, the Constitution treated African Americans as less than 
fully human and permitted slavery, the Supreme Court upheld segrega-
tion based on race, state legislatures in particular ratified Jim Crowism, 
and collective bargaining agreements commonly contained provisions 
that discriminated against African Americans. Regardless of this wide-
spread legal, contractual, and “moral” approval of racial discrimina-
tion, the treatment of African Americans as if they were less than fully 
human was a violation of their most fundamental human rights. This 
underscores the fact that the existence of human rights does not depend 
upon the approval of legislatures, courts, other institutions, or the will 
of the majority. One has the human right in question, “whether the law 
is violated or not, whether the bargain is kept or not, whether others 
comply with the demands of morality or not” (Donnelly 1989, p. 12).
Persons are no less human beings with human rights when they be-
come employees and, as employees, they are no less entitled to respect 
for their human rights. Consequently, the employer–employee relation-
ship is more than economic in nature (see, for example, Werhane 1985). 
People can be rendered powerless and have their human rights violated 
not only by governments but also by employers who have more power 
to affect people’s lives on a daily basis than do governments. Yet, while 
assertions of individual rights and freedom are commonly made against 
the exercise of power by the state, persons are routinely required to 
leave their rights and freedom outside factory gates and office build-
ings with barely a murmur of protest. Consequently, too many workers 
stand before their employers not as adult persons with human rights 
but as powerless children or servants totally dependent on the will and 
interests of their employers (Gross 1998).
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WORkER FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
A full human life requires the kind of participation in the politi-
cal, economic, and social life of the human community that enables 
people to have an influence on the decisions that affect their lives. That 
means people must have sufficient power, individually and collectively, 
to make the claims of their human rights both known and effective so 
that respect for their rights is not dependent solely on the interests of 
the state, their employers or others. Servility, or what some call power-
lessness, is incompatible with human rights. Consequently, the freedom 
of association, which includes the right to organize, to bargain collec-
tively, and to strike, is so essential that it is commonly accepted as the 
“single human rights standard by which all regimes, all societies, all 
countries can be judged” (Kahn 1998).
Article 20 of the UDHR issued by the United Nations in 1948 as-
serts the right to freedom of association, including in Article 23 (4) the 
right to form and join trade unions. The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which the United States ratified in 1992, incorpo-
rates in Article 22 the language of the Universal Declaration: “Every-
one shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including 
the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his inter-
ests.” Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which the United States has not signed, also affirms the 
“right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his 
choice.” The International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) 1948 Conven-
tion Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise (Convention 87) and 1949 Convention Concerning the Appli-
cation of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collec-
tively (Convention 98) address in great part the exercise of the freedom 
of association rights set forth in the International Covenants. Another 
major international consensus document is the ILO’s 1998 Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which obligates all ILO 
members (the United States is a member) to promote certain core labor 
rights, the first of which is the freedom of association.
The application of the underlying values–human rights standard ap-
proach to the old U.S. issue of employer speech in union representation 
election campaigns and organizer access to employer property provides 
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a good illustration of the implications of utilizing this new perspec-
tive. The current general rules are well established: An employer may 
express views about unionization as long as those views contain “no 
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit”; (Section 8(c) of the 
Taft-Hartley Act)4 an employer may require employees to attend, on 
company time, “captive audience” meetings during which antiunion 
speeches are made, whereas a union has no right to reply on company 
time;5 employees may orally solicit for a union in working and non-
working areas but only on the employees’ own nonwork time6 and may 
distribute union literature only in nonwork areas on their own time;7 
and nonemployee union organizers have no right of access to employ-
ers’ property for organizing purposes.8 
These rules are much more than “the law”; they ought to be seen as 
value choices. In this country, historically rooted principles of employer 
property rights still override the basic right of freedom of association. 
The value choices in the current rules are the antithesis of what the 
Wagner Act and early NLRB decisions intended. Rights clash—here 
the right of freedom of speech, property rights, and the right of freedom 
of association—and, when rights conflict, choices must be made. The 
Wagner Act established the most democratic procedure in U.S. labor 
history for the participation of workers in the decisions that affect their 
workplace lives (Gross 1998). At its core was the promotion and protec-
tion of the freedom of association. The Wagner Act was not neutral; the 
law declared it to be U.S. policy to encourage collective bargaining and 
to protect workers in the exercise “of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment and other mutual aid and protection.”9 The Wagner Act was 
a moral choice against servility. Wagner also understood, however, that 
government encouragement and protection are essential to the exercise 
of participatory rights at the workplace.
The rulings of the first NLRB, for example, were most consistent 
with the protection and promotion of the freedom of association be-
cause they required employers to remain strictly neutral in regard to 
their employees’ organizational activities. It was convinced that any 
antiunion statement by an employer to employees who depended on 
that employer for their livelihoods was bound to carry an implied threat 
of economic reprisals for disregarding the employer’s wishes. For the 
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same reason, early NLRBs held that captive audience speeches were in 
themselves unfair labor practices regardless of the content of the speech 
delivered (Gross 1995, pp. 104–107).
Labor never came close to achieving the system of workplace de-
mocracy envisioned by Wagner. As many experts correctly predicted 
at the time, the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act became 
law in 1947, the language asserting the right to refrain from collec-
tive bargaining (Section 7),10 the addition of several union unfair la-
bor practices (Section 8(b)),11 and the provision asserting employers’ 
right of “free speech”12 would be read as a statutory justification for 
employer resistance to unionization and collective bargaining. More 
than 50 years after Senator Wagner warned it would happen,13 Sum-
mers (1998, p. 1806) pointed out that “employer speech has become the 
primary instrument used by employers to discourage unionization and 
collective bargaining.” The dominant hierarchy of rights established by 
these rule-makers and subsequent rule-interpreters has given employer 
speech and property rights priority over employees’ rights of freedom 
of association.
Human rights are standards more fundamental than statutory or even 
constitutional standards. Consequently, the fundamental human right of 
freedom of association outweighs employer property and speech rights 
at the workplace. In 1992, the United Food and Commercial Work-
ers and the AFL-CIO filed a complaint with the ILO’s Committee on 
Freedom of Association against the U.S. government, charging that the 
Supreme Court’s Lechmere14 decision gave private property “absolute 
priority over rights of freedom of association, whenever [nonemployee] 
union organizers are involved” (Gross 1999).
The Freedom of Association Committee, in its recommendations, 
requested the U.S. government “to guarantee access of trade union rep-
resentatives to workplaces, with due respect for the rights of property 
and management, so that trade unions can communicate with workers 
in order to apprize them of the potential advantages of unionization” 
(Gross 1999). That recommendation has been ignored. This could be ac-
complished, however, without unfairly limiting or damaging legitimate 
employer interests simply by granting nonemployee union organizers 
access to employer property to meet with employees in nonwork areas 
on nonwork time. That is the recommendation of the Human Rights 
Watch report (2000, p. 20), which also advocates “more free speech for 
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workers not less speech for employers” rather than repeal of Section 
8(c).
The Human Rights Watch recommendation is less persuasive when 
applied to employer election campaign speech in general and captive 
audience speech in particular. Employer speech is a powerful weapon 
that promotes the coercion of employees in their human rights to union-
ize, and has resulted in an increase in union losses in representation 
elections and a decline in union strength and union membership as a 
percentage of the labor force (Block and Wolkinson 1986). Even al-
lowing more employee speech and union access would not offset the 
inherently coercive effect of employer speech. What justification can 
there be for permitting employers to continue to resist, discourage, and 
coerce those workers who exercise their human right of freedom of as-
sociation?
The application of this perspective—the combination of values 
analysis and human rights standards—to the old issue of employer 
speech and union representation election campaigns makes it clear that 
the rules currently in place are the result of deliberate moral choices 
that violate a fundamental human right: workers’ right of freedom of 
association. Understood in that context, this becomes a more powerful 
indictment more likely to be effective in bringing about change.
It is a fact that Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act set forth employees’ 
right to refrain from representation and collective bargaining. It is also 
a fact that the UDHR says that no one may be compelled to belong to 
an association. It is also a fact that in the United States workers have 
routinely been denied a free and uncoerced choice concerning represen-
tation and collective bargaining.
Even if workers had a free and uncoerced choice concerning the 
exercise of their freedom of association right, however, there are, as Ad-
ams (2003) argues, “some choices that result in conditions so morally 
repugnant that they cannot be allowed.” Using the ILO’s core Principles 
and Rights at Work as a model, Adams points out that we do not per-
mit people to sell themselves into slavery or states to choose apartheid, 
or children to prostitute themselves. From a human rights perspective, 
because freedom of association is a fundamental human right, the issue 
to be decided is not whether there ought to be democratic participation 
by employees at their workplaces but “rather what form democratic 
participation ought to take” (p. 153).
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LABOR ARBITRATION
When the exercise of the right of freedom of association is suc-
cessful, however, and collective bargaining produces a written labor-
management contract, the protection and promotion of workers’ rights 
depend in great part on the values of those decision makers, particularly 
labor arbitrators, who interpret and apply those agreements. This has 
led to the acceptance and repeated application of rules—what arbitra-
tors often call the common law of arbitration—without questioning, or 
knowing, or caring about a rule’s origin or what the rule assumes about 
the “oughtness” of the power and rights relationship of employees and 
employers or whether a rule needs to be reexamined, reevaluated, mod-
ified, or rejected. 
Substantive rules are ways of looking at the workplace—in other 
words, whether we see the workplace through the eyes of employees on 
the shop floor, in offices or classrooms, or from the perspective of those 
who manage the enterprise. It is a question of who is benefited and 
who is burdened by a particular rule or standard. Arbitrators, as well as 
courts and administrative agencies, have been the creators, choosers, 
appropriators, and implementers of these substantive rules. These rules 
or doctrines go far beyond the rules unions and employers negotiate 
into their collective bargaining agreements.
Related research demonstrates that labor arbitrators have embraced 
the generally conservative values of common law but have resisted ap-
plying the principle of external law, have rarely utilized constitutional 
principles, and have ignored human rights concepts. Arbitral common 
law shows a commitment to extracontractual doctrines of private prop-
erty rights; employer hierarchical authority and control; management 
freedom to operate the enterprise most efficiently; and the need to disci-
pline employees whose actions were considered challenges to manage-
ment’s order and control (Gross 1988a,b; Gross and Greenfield 1985). 
These embody value judgments that, as Rabin (1985) has put it, “reflect 
the interests of the dominant power in the work relationship.”
The value choices arbitrators make in deciding cases involving em-
ployee refusals to work for reasons of health and safety provide good 
examples. The controlling rule in these cases is the long-established 
arbitrator-created principle: work first, grieve later. As a consequence of 
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labor arbitrators’ almost universal value judgment that management’s 
freedom to operate the enterprise and direct the workforce is superior 
to all other rights, including workers’ right to a safe and healthful work-
place, they treat these cases as insubordination cases and do not except 
unusual health hazards from the obey first, grieve later rule.15
The insubordination orientation to these cases, moreover, relegates 
workers’ safety and health claims to that of an affirmative defense to the 
insubordination charge. Arbitrators, consistent with their value choices 
in these cases, also place upon these workers the heaviest possible bur-
den of proof, namely, to submit objective evidence of an unhealthful 
and unsafe workplace. Although employers carry the burden of proof 
in discipline cases, the practical effect of these value choices is to shift 
this burden on the decisive issue (health and safety) to the discharged 
or otherwise disciplined employee. This maximizes an employer’s con-
trol of employee discipline and thereby minimizes employee interfer-
ence. The management rights framework used in these cases results in 
decisions that place property rights and other factors such as profits, 
efficiency, cost–benefit considerations, management authority, and eco-
nomic progress over human rights. 
The “obey first, grieve later” rule itself is value laden. It favors 
management control and the need for efficiency, maintenance of disci-
pline and order at the workplace, and private property ownership and 
prerogatives over union and worker protests about working conditions. 
The notion that management acts and the union reacts gives employ-
ers the right of initiation as well as broad discretion in deciding how 
to assert its own interpretation of the contract. Employees and a union, 
however, may not use self-help when they seek to assert their interpre-
tation of the contract. In addition, the employee who may not exercise 
self-help at the workplace has recourse only to the grievance-arbitration 
process where an arbitrator will apply the same management rights and 
authority value judgments that underlie the obey first, grieve later rule.
Some are favored by this rule and some are disfavored. The rule 
favors management authority and objectives but often confronts em-
ployees with an unfair dilemma—in safety and health cases, for ex-
ample, to obey and risk their health and safety or to refuse to work and 
risk their jobs. Recognizing workers’ rights to refuse hazardous work 
without retaliation would enable them to take control over and protect 
their own lives when confronted with threats to their safety and health. 
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But the current value scheme treats workers as children, or as prisoners, 
or students, or members of the armed forces, who, if not controlled, will 
act irresponsibly (Atleson 1985). 
Many international declarations, covenants, and treaties, such as the 
ILO constitution, the Declaration of Philadelphia, the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the ILO’s Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention, and various regional treaties and trade agreements recog-
nize workplace safety and health to be a human right.16 In commenting 
on the “inexplicable” exclusion of worker safety and health from the 
ILO’s Fundamental Principles of Rights at Work, Spieler (2003, p. 94) 
writes the following:
It can be argued that postponing the improvement of health and 
safety until market forces can effect change is analogous to post-
poning the release of political prisoners who may die in prison un-
til a despotic government is replaced through democratic elections. 
It is in fact the right to life that we are talking about when we talk 
about workplace safety . . . The right to life is deeply imbedded in 
every human rights declaration and it is presumed in these decla-
rations that individuals’ lives must be protected from those who 
wield unequal power. This is precisely the issue in occupational 
safety and health.
As Spieler says, workplace safety and health are essential com-
ponents of the right to life. A value judgment that would make work-
ers’ right to a safe and healthful workplace paramount would place the 
highest value on a life, or a limb, or an eye and give absolute priority 
to individual rights over institutional and economic interests. It comes 
down to the fact that the dignity and human rights of workers must lie at 
the center of any industrial relations system (Javillier 1996). As former 
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz (1971) told the National Academy of 
Arbitrators over 30 years ago, “The individual as the owner of rights 
and interests—job rights, personal rights, human rights—[is] at least 
as much entitled to protection as a piece of real estate or machinery.” 
He added that the individual is “somebody the system is designed for 
instead of the other way around.”
Application of the human rights standard to refusal to work for rea-
sons of health and safety cases would require a reordering of values 
so that workers’ human right to workplace safety and health would be 
Blocketal.indb   31 3/2/2006   8:59:57 AM
32   Gross
given priority over employers’ freedom to operate the enterprise and 
direct the workforce. The major change in the arbitral approach to these 
cases would be in the recognition that worker self-help is essential. That 
would release them from the unfair work and risk their safety and health 
or refuse to work and risk their job dilemma.
HUMAn	ReSoURCe	MAnAgeMenT:	VALUeS,	objeCTIVeS,	
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Personnel management, as it was known in a less sophisticated time, 
consisted of management activities that were employee oriented, such 
as recruitment, training, and staffing. Personnel managers were seen 
as “people persons,” employee advocates, management’s conscience, 
described by one as the “in-house Socialist[s] focused on feel-good 
events” (Ellig 1997, p. 273). 
Regardless of the accuracy of those perceptions, even the old-style 
personnel administrators managed employees with the ultimate objec-
tive of increasing their productivity. Still, many academics, particularly 
in industrial sociology, human relations, and personnel administration, 
vigorously defended their research against critics who charged that it 
was intended to help management achieve its objectives. In the last de-
cade, however, human resources academics and practitioners openly 
advocate that human resources professionals become strategic partners 
in executing business strategy (moving “planning from the conference 
room table to the marketplace”); working to increase employee com-
mitment to the organization; and becoming change agents, enabling 
the business to shift, move and adapt while constantly decreasing costs 
and improving efficiency (Ulrich 1998). The overwhelming number of 
employees have no advocates at the workplace. Human resources de-
partments cannot be advocates for employees when their primary re-
sponsibility is defined as “deliver[ing] the behaviors needed to realize 
business strategy” (Beatty and Schneier 1997). As respected academic 
Thomas Kochan put it, “Tilting too far in the direction of becoming an 
advocate for employee concerns would do little other than re-marginal-
ize the function within the management structure” (Kochan 1997).
Blocketal.indb   32 3/2/2006   8:59:57 AM
A Logical Extreme   33
What being an “employee champion” really means is developing 
employee assets in order to achieve competitive advantage and win in 
the marketplace. That requires making the employer’s goals the person-
al goals of each employee. That objective is best achieved by attracting 
and retaining people who share an employer’s core values and purposes 
and letting those who do not share those values go elsewhere (Collins 
and Porras 1998).
Loyalty and commitment, however, run in only one direction. The 
human resources literature is full of references to the new “psychologi-
cal contract,” which makes employees responsible for their own em-
ployability and gives them no job security. A leading textbook, granting 
that many see “employee separations” negatively, points out several 
benefits, including the possibility that “a persistently low turnover rate 
may have a negative effect on performance if the workforce becomes 
complacent and fails to generate innovative ideas” (Gomez-Mejía, 
Balkin, and Cardy 1995). One prominent authority refers to downsiz-
ing as “clearing debris” and “yard work” (Ulrich 1998). To ensure that 
employers avoid any commitment to their workers, they are advised to 
include at the end of employee handbooks a declaration that employees 
can be discharged for any reason or no reason and that the handbook is 
not an employment contract. The objective, the textbook explains, is to 
avoid any restriction on an “employer’s freedom to discharge employ-
ees without cause” (Gomez-Mejía, Balkin, and Cardy 1995, p. 435).
Clearly, it is not only the state that has the power to violate people’s 
rights; employers in many ways have even more direct power over indi-
viduals’ lives. Judged against a human rights standard, it is an injustice 
that human beings are treated as things or resources for others to use. A 
human being has the right to be free from domination regardless of the 
source. Judged by a human rights standard, moreover, human resources 
personnel and other managers in a business organization would be held 
accountable for manipulating human beings and subordinating their 
rights to the interests of the organization. As Shue (1980, p. 78) writes, 
“to enjoy something only at the discretion of someone else, especially 
someone powerful enough to deprive you of it at will[,] is precisely not 
to enjoy a right to it.” If the boss giveth, then the boss can taketh away, 
and victims will have no defense without established forms of partici-
pation available to them. Inducing workers to see the world through 
their employer’s frame of reference to legitimize and maintain employ-
Blocketal.indb   33 3/2/2006   8:59:57 AM
34   Gross
er control of the workplace without changing the power relationship of 
superior employer and subordinate employee constitutes manipulation 
that is an affront to human beings and human rights.
This critique of human resources values, methods, and objectives 
using a human rights standard for judgment echoes the critics of the 
so-called Mayo School of Human Relations of a half-century ago. They 
rejected the belief that workers needed to submerge self in a business 
organization and to accept their employer’s goals “in order to find 
freedom” (Landsberger 1958). They also objected to the perception 
of workers as means to be manipulated to bring about acceptance of 
management’s purposes. They charged that the basic conflict of interest 
between management and labor had been ignored, as had the associ-
ated issues of conflict resolution, which they said had been reduced to 
ways for employees to blow off steam without changing the hierarchi-
cal authority structure or permitting employees to share that power. Fi-
nally, these critics accused the Mayo School of an active antiunionism, 
demonstrated in part by excluding unions as sources of worker power 
and participation and considering them only as external intrusions on 
management authority and flexibility or as symptoms of deficiencies in 
internal management.
It is still human resource doctrine, for example, that unionization 
is caused by bad management; that unionization is the misfortune that 
befalls an employer with flawed human resources policies and practices 
(Adams 2006). That completely ignores the fact that people’s right to 
participate in the decisions that affect their lives is one of the most fun-
damental human rights principles as well as one of the most fundamen-
tal principles of democracy. Regardless of the quality of management 
or a firm’s “good” or “bad” employee relations, exercise of the freedom 
of association at the workplace is necessary to give workers the op-
portunity to secure their own rights and interests through participation 
in workplace decision making and to eliminate the vulnerabilities that 
leave them at the mercy of others.
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ConCLUdIng	obSeRVATIonS
The U.S. labor relations system is dominated by employer power 
premised on the inequality and helplessness of most workers and rooted 
in values that justify the possession and exercise of that power. In this 
chapter, the application of a new vision—the combination of values 
analysis and human rights standards—to the freedom of association, la-
bor arbitration, and human resources of U.S. workplaces demonstrates 
that employer power has been used to violate the fundamental human 
rights of workers in this country. A just society would not permit this or 
tolerate anything less than the end of these violations.
The adoption and application of human rights standards to U.S. la-
bor relations would require more than marginal adjustments or fine-
tuning; it would require an explicit restatement of property rights as 
subordinate to human rights, including the human rights of workers. It 
would also require a major change in the priority given to the rights and 
interests of the parties in conflict; a major redistribution and sharing of 
power at the workplace; a major reevaluation of the values currently 
influencing dispute resolution in judicial, administrative agency and ar-
bitral hearing rooms, and at bargaining tables; as well as major changes 
in many other areas, such as exclusive representation, the permanent 
replacement of economic strikers, and the exclusion of workers from 
laws intended to protect the right to organize and bargain collectively, 
including the exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act of agri-
cultural and domestic workers. There will be no lack of labor-manage-
ment conflict here mainly because power will be at stake as well as 
basic and irreconcilable values. No pretension of unitary goals could 
keep a lid on that conflict.
It has been argued, correctly in my opinion, that only the people 
whose rights are at stake can force a government or a private enter-
prise to respect human rights. Both union leaders and members need 
to become educated in human rights. Unions must do more than orga-
nize workers; they will need to understand that they are human rights 
organizations because human rights such as freedom of association, 
collective bargaining, safe and healthful workplaces, and discrimina-
tion-free workplaces are at the core of what unions seek to secure. The 
labor movement will need to be more than just another interest group 
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protecting its members regardless of the cost to others if it is to appeal 
to the poor and vulnerable people most in need of organization. Instead, 
unions will need to develop alliances with other social movements such 
as civil rights groups, women’s rights organizations, environmental 
groups, immigrant worker support groups, and religious organizations. 
Until now, human rights principles have been disseminated from the 
top-down by a privileged elite in governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations. Organized labor could be a powerful mass human rights 
movement spreading those principles from the bottom-up. This, of 
course, will require union leaders and members to determine the extent 
to which they have accepted the values underlying the current labor 
relations system. Human rights values also impinge upon the power 
and authority of unions and their leaders. For many reasons, it is easier 
to evade moral imperatives, especially when, in this country, the right 
of freedom of association has been respected only for brief periods of 
time.
It is not unrealistic to believe in and work for change. The civil 
rights and women’s rights movements in this country are among the 
precedents that justify some optimism and hope. No matter how dis-
couraging the prospects for fundamental change in our labor relations 
system, it would be even more irresponsible to fail to act. Change can 
begin with the ability of challengers to redefine a policy issue. New 
perspectives on the employer–employee relationship, such as the new 
vision advocated in this chapter, can bring about major changes in the 
way people respond to that relationship.
What is certain, however, is that human rights talk without action is 
hypocrisy in the form of self-righteous posturing pretending that human 
rights violations occur only somewhere else. An honest reexamination 
and reassessment of U.S. labor relations values using human rights 
standards would be a long overdue beginning toward the promotion 
and protection of worker rights as human rights.
Notes
 1.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) of Dec. 10, 1948, UNGAOR, 3d. SESS., Resolutions, U.N. 
Doc. A/810 at 71.
 2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
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 3.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 UNTS (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
 4.  29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1947).
 5.  Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 NLRB 400 (1953).
 6.  Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
 7.  Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962).
 8.  Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
 9.  Pub. L. No. 74–198, 49 Stat. 449–50 (1935) [codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 141–44, 167, 171–87 (1947)].
 10.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
 11.  29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1947).
 12.  29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1947).
 13.  Robert Wagner, “The Wagner Act—A Reappraisal,” 93 Cong. Rec. A895, A896 
(1947), reprinted in 2 LMRA Legis. Hist. 935, 938.
 14.  Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
 15.  For an expanded discussion of the value judgments inherent in arbitral doctrine 
on employee refusals to work for reasons of health and safety, see Gross (2004), 
which provides the basis for the discussion of arbitration of health and safety 
disputes in this chapter. 
 16.  ILO Conventions are available on the ILO Web site: http://www.ilo.org/.
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International Elections Standards 
and NLRB Representation Elections 
David L. Cingranelli
State University of New York and
Binghamton University 
Many workers’ rights, including the right to freedom of association 
at the workplace and the right to bargain collectively with employers, 
are recognized in international human rights agreements, including the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United 
Nations 1948; 1966). Many, if not all, workers’ rights recognized in 
international human rights law were preceded by the passage of Con-
ventions or Recommendations by the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) on the same subjects (ILO 2003, p. 2). The ILO’s Declara-
tion of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work requires all ILO 
member states to “respect, to promote, and to realize in good faith” five 
core rights, which are considered fundamental human rights. They are 
1) freedom of association, 2) the right to collective bargaining, 3) the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, 4) the effective 
abolition of child labor, and 5) the elimination of discrimination in re-
spect to employment or occupation (ILO n.d.).
In the United States, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
representation election is the primary means by which private sector 
workers exercise their rights to choose to be represented by a union. 
Because the “win rate” for unions in NLRB elections has declined over 
the past 50 years, and because increasingly smaller percentages of em-
ployees voting in these representation elections select unionization, 
observers have raised questions about the fairness and the conduct of 
these elections. Implicit standards for the conduct of democratic elec-
tions have existed for a long time. It is only since the end of the cold 
war, however, that international organizations have developed explicit 
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best practices that can be directly applied to evaluating the fairness of 
NLRB representation elections. 
This chapter argues that the new international standards for national 
political elections prove that NLRB representation elections, as cur-
rently implemented, are not free or fair. The lack of free and fair NLRB 
representation elections deprives workers of their rights to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining at the workplace.
THE NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTION PROCESS
The basic procedure U.S. workers must use to exercise their right 
to freedom of association is found in the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA). The procedural details have been filled in through the admin-
istrative regulations issued by the NLRB. 
The process usually starts, however, outside the structures of the 
NLRA. The workers in a facility talk among themselves and decide that 
they would be better off if they joined a union. In most cases, workers 
call a local union office for help. If the workers can find a union that has 
an organizer available, the union will usually agree to send an organizer 
to meet with some of the workers. If, after talking with the initiating 
workers, the organizer believes that the prospects for a successful or-
ganizing drive are good, the union may agree to help organize workers. 
The following steps outline a typical process for organizing a union:
 1) Meetings are held before or after work, usually at a worker’s 
home, to discuss the benefits of forming a union and the strat-
egy and tactics of organizing.
 2) The union organizer and committed workers distribute cards to 
other workers to sign if they are interested in joining a union.
 3) After at least 30 percent of workers in a bargaining unit sign 
the cards, workers can petition the NLRB to hold a secret ballot 
election. In modern practice, union organizers usually collect 
cards from 60 to 70 percent of the workers in the bargaining 
unit before proceeding to the next step (Compa 2000). At this 
point, the employer can choose to recognize the union without 
proceeding further. 
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 4) If voluntary recognition does not occur, there is a four- to 
eight-week-long election campaign. During this preelection 
period there is vigorous campaigning on both sides (Roomkin 
and Block 1981). 
 5) NLRB agents conduct a secret ballot election at the workplace, 
allowing all workers to vote during work time. In the past sev-
eral years, workers have chosen union representation in about 
half of all elections held (Compa 2000). However, in the past 
few years, only about 20 percent of workers who have joined 
unions have done so as a result of the election process (Swee-
ney 2003). 
 6) Either party may file an objection to the election with the 
NLRB, claiming unfair practices by the other side. 
 7) If the NLRB certifies the election as fair and finds that a ma-
jority of those casting ballots prefer union representation, the 
employer is required by law to recognize the union and to col-
lectively bargain with workers over the terms and conditions 
of their work “in good faith.”
There is nothing inherently undemocratic about these steps. Having 
an election campaign to inform voters and using a secret ballot election 
to determine whether workers freely choose to join a union seems, on 
the surface, fair. Over the years, however, there have been numerous 
disputes between unions and management over the details of the imple-
mentation of the preelection, election campaign, and postelection rules. 
When adjudicating these disputes, the federal courts and the NLRB 
have given greater weight to the private property and free speech rights 
of employers than they have to the rights of free speech, freedom of as-
sociation, and collective bargaining for workers. The cumulative effect 
of these rulings has been to change the rules, allowing management in-
creasingly greater influence over the process by which workers choose 
to join a union (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996; Gross 1999). 
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ARE THE NLRB ELECTION PROCEDURES DEMOCRATIC?
Scholars have used a variety of approaches to demonstrate that 
NLRB representation election procedures are not democratic:
 1) summarizing the testimony of workers concerning the dis-
crimination they have faced when attempting to form a labor 
union (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996; Bronfenbrenner 1998; 
Compa 2000); 
 2) comparing NLRB representation elections with U.S. election 
procedures (Becker 1998; Levin 2001; Weiler 1997) and with 
ILO standards (Adams 2001; Compa 2000); 
 3) linking changes in representation election rules to higher win 
rates for the antiunion party (Block and Wolkinson 1985; 
Roomkin and Block 1981); and
 4) presenting survey results showing a high unmet demand for 
unionization (Freeman and Rogers 1999). 
Testimony before the U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations in 1993 
indicated that many workers felt that it has become increasingly dif-
ficult to form unions using NLRB representation election procedures 
(Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). The workplace, which is the princi-
pal location of the election campaign, is not a neutral forum where the 
costs and benefits of unionization are discussed openly and freely. In-
stead, employers have a near-monopoly over access to voters. Employ-
ers have learned how to use procedures under the NLRA to delay the 
election, thus extending the time in which they can use their campaign 
advantage. Weak penalties for unfair labor practices under the NLRA 
encourage employers to push their advantage to the boundary of pos-
sible permissibility. Long delays in NLRB adjudication of cases of un-
fair labor practices against employers mean that the penalties, when 
administered, are usually hollow victories for workers (Block, Beck, 
and Kruger 1996). 
Many have claimed that U.S. national political elections would be 
widely condemned as unfair if they were run like NLRB representa-
tion elections (Becker 1998; Levin 2001; Sweeney 2003; Weiler 1997). 
There are, however, no explicit U.S. federal election rules of procedure 
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that provide best practices for conducting elections. The U.S. Constitu-
tion and election laws let individual states decide on most of the details 
of election procedure. Thus, even U.S. election laws do not provide a 
set of best practices against which NLRB representation elections can 
be explicitly compared. After the experiences in the 2000 presidential 
election, some, including former President Carter, think a statement of 
democratic principles in U.S. elections is needed (Davis 2001).
Workers’ freedom of association in the United States also comes 
up short when compared against ILO standards for national policies 
protecting this right (Adams 2001; Compa 2000). The main problem 
with using ILO Conventions and Recommendations for making the 
argument that NLRB representation elections in the United States are 
not democratic is that ILO enactments, like U.S. federal laws, do not 
directly address the best practices for conducting democratic elections. 
The dictates of the ILO were drafted to assist all governments of the 
world, the vast majority of which do not use bargaining-unit elections 
as a way for workers to express their choices about whether to join a 
labor union. 
Even if the ILO provided such guidance, it is unlikely that employ-
ers and Congress would accept the ILO’s judgement as constituting the 
appropriate yardstick for measuring labor policies and practices in the 
United States. Potter and Youngman (1995) argue that ILO standards 
reflect a European view. European norms and procedures, they argue, 
do not transfer well to the U.S. context because of differences in con-
stitutions, history, customs, and institutions. Thus, it is not surprising 
that out of 143 Conventions passed by the ILO, the United States has 
ratified only 7, declaring the remainder to be within the jurisdiction of 
the states (Henkin et al. 1999). The U.S. government has, on occasion, 
even threatened to withdraw from the ILO, arguing that 1) there are 
too many nondemocratic members, 2) the ILO is critical of the United 
States and a handful of other states but ignores worse labor laws and 
practices elsewhere, and 3) the ILO has become increasingly politicized 
(Henkin et al. 1999). 
Still others have argued that the low and declining level of union 
density in the United States and the increasing avoidance of NLRB rep-
resentation elections as a way for workers to join unions is evidence of 
unfair NLRB representation election rules (Sweeney 2003). There is 
a substantial literature showing the economic benefits of union mem-
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bership in the United States (see, for example, Buchmueller, DiNardo, 
and Valletta 1999; Fay 1998). Yet, the current unionization rate among 
private sector employees is approximately 9 percent, and 80 percent of 
those who join unions do not join by participating in NLRB representa-
tion elections, they join by accepting a job with a unionized employer 
(Sweeney 2003). Is this low level of union density the result of union 
representation election procedures that are biased against workers who 
wish to join a union? 
To answer this question, one must consider the results of surveys 
showing what workers want. In their now well-known survey of U.S. 
workers, Freeman and Rogers (1999) asked nonunionized workers in 
the private sector, “Would you vote for or against a union in an NLRB 
election at your workplace?” They also asked nonunion workers how 
they thought their colleagues would vote in such an election. Putting 
those numbers together, Freeman and Rogers estimated that one-third 
of nonunionized workers in the private sector wanted a union and be-
lieved that, were an election to be held, workers at their firm would sup-
port a union. According to a national survey by Peter D. Hart Research 
Associates conducted for the AFL-CIO in 2002, half of nonmanage-
ment workers who do not already have a union say they would join a 
union tomorrow if given the chance. This was a full 8 percentage points 
higher than in 2001. Among all workers—including union members—
54 percent said that they would vote for a union tomorrow (Sweeney 
2003). 
There is also some supporting research linking specific bad results 
for the pro-union party to changes in NLRB interpretations of election 
rules (Block and Wolkinson 1985). For example, research demonstrates 
that employers commonly prolong the election campaign phase of the 
process. Based on an analysis of 45,000 NLRB representation elections 
occurring between 1972 and 1978, Roomkin and Block (1981) found 
that the longer the election campaigns, the greater the rate of employer 
victories. They also found that nonparticipation increased with delay, 
suggesting that the campaign itself discouraged participation.
Some argue that surveys and signed authorization cards are use-
less as indicators of demand, because workers lack the information 
necessary to make an informed decision about whether they want to 
be represented by a union, and they can only get that information in an 
election campaign (Greer 2003; Potter and Youngman 1995). By im-
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plication, longer campaigns result in more employer victories, because 
longer campaigns allow voters to receive more information about the 
disadvantages of unions. Moreover, a secret ballot election, they assert, 
is a fundamental device in any democratic system and is the best way 
to allow workers to freely choose whether to join a union (Greer 2003; 
Potter and Youngman 1995).
Critics of the “bad results” arguments claim that they provide an 
unconvincing critique of the fairness of NLRB representation elections. 
After reviewing a wide variety of surveys on worker attitudes toward 
unions, Farber and Krueger (1993) concluded that almost the entire de-
cline in union membership between 1977 and 1991 was due to a decline 
in demand for union representation. This decline in demand for union 
representation has been caused by the steady expansion of federal and 
state laws protecting workers, more enlightened management practices, 
and increased vulnerability of U.S. workers to global competition (Em-
ployment Policy Foundation 1998; Potter and Youngman 1995). Con-
trolling for these and other factors contributing to the declining demand 
for unionization among U.S. workers, studies have shown that manage-
ment opposition has virtually no effect on union density (Employment 
Policy Foundation 1998; Moore and Newman 1988). But these issues 
are essentially irrelevant to the question of eliminating bias from NLRB 
representation election procedures. If, as critics of the “bad results” 
view argue, the demand for union representation has declined, workers 
would continue to vote against union representation even in unbiased 
elections. 
NEW INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR DEMOCRATIC 
POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
As noted, the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that NLRB 
representation election procedures do not even meet recently developed 
minimum international standards for what constitutes a free and fair 
democratic national political election. The new international standards 
were designed to provide an explicit set of best practices for achieving 
free and fair democratic elections in countries with a wide variety of in-
stitutional arrangements and economic endowments. Since they address 
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elections specifically, they can be applied directly to the evaluation of 
the fairness of NLRB representation elections. They are particularly 
useful in this context because it is hard to argue that these standards are 
biased in any way or alien to U.S. culture. 
The new international standards are free of bias because they were 
produced in settings relatively free of the ideologically infused, self-in-
terested, conflict-based politics of the usual debates over proper public 
policy regulating management–labor relations. They are not region-
ally biased either. Whether the particular statement of standards was 
developed in Latin America, Europe, or Africa, the same or at least 
very similar elements are present. They are the kinds of standards for a 
democratic election that might have been produced if experienced and 
informed people came together to set union election rules under what 
political theorist John Rawls (1999) calls the “veil of ignorance.” In the 
union election context, the veil of ignorance is a hypothetical situation 
where those who develop the election procedures must do so before 
they know what roles they will play—employer or worker—once the 
rules have been established. 
Most important, the international standards cannot be criticized as 
alien to U.S. culture, because the U.S. government has been a leader—
perhaps the leader—in the setting of international standards for national 
political elections. In 1976, the Commission on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, an independent U.S. government agency, was created to 
address and assess democratic, economic, and human rights develop-
ments in the 55 countries participating in the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The commission consists of nine 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives, nine from the U.S. Sen-
ate, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense, and 
Commerce. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights is the lead agency in Europe in the field of election observation. 
It coordinates and organizes the deployment of thousands of observers 
every year to assess whether elections in the OSCE area are in line with 
international standards for democratic elections and other democratic 
political institutions.1 
Of course, international standards for democratic elections are not 
objective in the sense of being “value free.” They are unabashedly de-
signed to promote democratic practices around the world. Therefore, 
they are useful and impartial for the purpose of evaluating the NLRB 
Blocketal.indb   48 3/2/2006   8:59:58 AM
International Elections Standards and NLRB Elections   49
representation election process in the United States as long as it is 
agreed that NLRB representation elections should be as democratic as 
possible.
WHy	nLRb-SUPeRVISed	UnIon	RePReSenTATIon	
ELECTIONS ARE NOT FREE
According to international standards for political elections, a “free” 
electoral process is one where fundamental human rights and freedoms 
are respected. The following criteria are necessary for a free, demo-
cratic election:
Freedom from violence, intimidation, or coercion. According to 
the NLRA’s Section 8(a)(3), any discrimination against workers by em-
ployers for concerted activity, including union activity, is prohibited. 
Nonetheless, according to Compa, “Firing a worker for organizing is 
illegal but commonplace in the United States” (2000, p. 18). According 
to Bronfenbrenner (2000), 25 percent of employers illegally fire at least 
one worker for union activity during organizing campaigns, and 52 per-
cent of employers threaten to call the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service during organizing drives that include undocumented employ-
ees. After studying 407 union representation campaigns in 1998 and 
1999, Bronfenbrenner found that, in 51 percent of the campaigns, em-
ployers threatened to close or move if the pro-union party won. Thus, it 
is no surprise that workers in a nonunionized, private sector workplace 
are usually afraid to openly support the pro-union party. Intimidation of 
members of the pro-union party is illegal, but the law is not vigorously 
enforced. 
Freedom of speech and expression by voters, parties, candi-
dates, and the media. Unfortunately, limiting workers’ free speech 
rights in the workplace is both common and legal. During many, if not 
most, union election campaigns, workers are subjected to mandatory 
captive audience meetings and mandatory one-on-one meetings with 
supervisors in their workplaces (Bronfenbrenner 2000). These mea-
sures are allowed under Section 8(c) of the NLRA, the 1947 “employer 
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free speech” clause. Bronfenbrenner (2000) also found that 78 percent 
of employers force employees to attend one-on-one antiunion meetings 
with managers and 92 percent force their employees to attend manda-
tory antiunion presentations. In contrast, workers can be and usually are 
prohibited from engaging in pro-union speech in the workplace during 
work times (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). 
Freedom of assembly to hold political rallies and to campaign. 
Technically, workers have this right but have difficulties exercising it 
because it is illegal for pro-union workers to assemble on company 
property, even during nonworking hours, without the permission of the 
employer. Workers who favor forming unions are limited to contact-
ing their colleagues outside the workplace or during breaks and lunch 
periods (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). Many low-wage workers, 
who need union representation the most, do not own a car, so attending 
meetings in a location different from the workplace may be difficult 
(Ehrenreich 2001). There are no similar obstacles to freedom of as-
sembly by the employer, because the employer may use work time to 
present its message.
Freedom of access to and by voters to transmit and receive 
political and electoral information messages. While workers are al-
lowed to receive information from union advocates in nonwork areas 
and on nonwork time within the workplace (Block, Beck, and Kruger 
1996), the worker access of pro-union workers is far less than that of 
the employer, who controls the workers’ work day and who can use that 
control to deliver its antiunion message. Moreover, the union may not 
enter the employer’s property unless the workers live on the property 
(Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). 
Freedom to question, challenge, and register complaints or ob-
jections without negative repercussions. This freedom is crucial to 
ensuring respect for all the other freedoms. Individuals do not really 
have any right unless it is recognized in law, and there is an effective, 
speedy, legal remedy for those who feel that the right guaranteed to them 
under law has not been respected. The labor relations law does allow for 
legal avenues of appeal by workers who feel that their rights were not 
respected during an NLRB union representation election. However, the 
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long delays in the U.S. labor law system, coupled with weak penalties 
for employers who eventually are found guilty of an infraction, make 
the exercise of this right fruitless. If a terminated worker appeals to the 
NLRB for help, the appeal usually takes years, and the potential reward 
for the persistent worker is small (reinstatement with back pay). For 
many employers, this penalty is a small price to pay to destroy a work-
ers’ organizing effort by firing its leaders (Compa 2000, p. 18). 
WHy	nLRb-SUPeRVISed	UnIon	RePReSenTATIon	
ELECTIONS ARE NOT FAIR
According to international standards for political elections, a “fair” 
electoral process is one where the playing field is reasonably level and 
accessible to all voters, parties, and candidates. Therefore, the follow-
ing criteria are required in a fair democratic election:
Clearly	defined	universal	suffrage. The question of who should 
vote in a union election is often a matter of dispute. The NLRB deter-
mines which workers make up the bargaining unit and which do not. 
Employers work hard to influence this part of the process, often claim-
ing that pro-union groups of workers should not be included in the vote. 
Although unions also try to influence the definition of the bargaining 
unit too, perhaps the biggest impact of the dispute of the definition of 
the bargaining unit is delay. Delay prolongs the election campaign, 
which, in turn, helps the employer because of the employer’s access 
advantages (Block and Wolkinson 1986; Roomkin and Block 1981).
equitable	access	to	financial	and	material	resources	for	party	
and candidate campaigning. In the union representation election con-
text, there is rarely “equitable access to financial and material resourc-
es” by the pro-union and antiunion parties. The employer almost always 
has an overwhelming resource advantage. Logan (2002) estimates that 
during 75 percent of union representation campaigns, employers hire 
high-priced, experienced, professional, antiunion consultants to help 
them conduct their antiunion campaign. The pro-union “party” is al-
most always financially overmatched. 
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Equitable opportunities for the electorate (workers) to receive 
election-relevant information. Becker (1998) argues that the abilities 
of the pro-union and antiunion parties to communicate with workers 
are so unequal that many “workers vote against representation because 
they have never heard the union’s arguments” (p. 101). As noted, the 
substantial workplace-access advantage of the employer makes it im-
possible for the workers to receive as much information from the union 
as from the employer. 
Equitable treatment of voters (workers), candidates, and par-
ties,	by	elections	officials	(the	nLRb),	the	government,	the	police,	
the military, and the judiciary. While the most important reason for 
the inability of workers to exercise their freedom of association at the 
workplace has been determined opposition by employers, government 
agencies have played their part too. Gross (1999) writes the following 
about government support for freedom of association rights, particularly 
over the past 30 years: “The White House, no matter who the occupant, 
has either been hostile or non-committal; Congress has also been hos-
tile, finding it more politically profitable to run against the NLRA than 
to be for it; the courts, including the Supreme Court, have issued deci-
sions freeing employers from the constraints of the law” (p. 80). Thus, 
although there is no evidence that the NLRB staff that administers elec-
tions are biased against workers, it is clear that there is little support at 
higher levels of government for workers’ rights to unionize.
CONCLUSION
As this chapter shows, the procedures under which NLRB represen-
tation elections are conducted violate international standards for free 
and fair elections. Our conclusion concerning the undemocratic nature 
of NLRB representation elections supports most previous research on 
the subject. It contributes to previous research findings because it is 
based on a different, arguably neutral, and more explicit standard for 
what elements should be present in a democratic election. The law 
should be changed to make it easier for workers to exercise their right 
to freedom of association at the workplace. Workers should have the 
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freedom to make their own choices about joining a union without in-
terference from management. While a free and fair election campaign 
can provide useful information to voters, NLRB representation election 
campaigns are not free or fair. The election procedures and remedies 
permit employers to intimidate voters, thereby frustrating the desire of 
workers at many workplaces to join a union and to have a collective 
voice at work. 
In all societies, employers inherently have more power than unor-
ganized workers because unorganized workers are dependent on the 
employer for their livelihoods. If the U.S. federal courts and the NLRB 
had wanted to level the playing field, they would have developed union 
representation election procedures that gave more weight to the im-
portance of workers’ freedom of speech, freedom of association, and 
right to collective bargaining than they did to employers’ property and 
free speech rights. Because the courts and NLRB took a different path, 
too many biased preelection and postelection practices have accumu-
lated and have become entrenched in U.S. labor law. Compa (2000) 
contends that the broken election procedures can be fixed by tinkering 
with the existing rules. Unfortunately, it would take decades, perhaps 
generations, to undo the harm that has been done. Union representation 
election procedures, therefore, for all practical purposes, are beyond 
repair. 
Note
 1.  The benchmark standards used in this paper are based on international standards 
for free and fair elections that have been developed and promulgated by gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental organizations. See, especially, OSCE (1990, 
2003), and Inter-Parliamentary Union (1994). International nongovernmental 
organizations have promulgated similar principles, such as the guidelines de-
veloped by the International Foundation for Election Systems (http://www 
.ifes.org); Common Borders (http://www.commonborders.org); and the Admin-
istration and Cost of Elections Project (http://www.aceproject.org). Information 
about election standards also can be found on the Web sites of the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance at http://www.idea.int; and the 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs at http://www.ndi.org.
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Rights in the Public Sector
Promises and Reality
Donald S. Wasserman
American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees (Retired)
When the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 
1935, unions in the public sector were virtually nonexistent, with a few 
notable exceptions. This was also true in many private sector indus-
tries, such as services and retail trade. Nevertheless, no private sector 
nonagricultural industry meeting interstate commerce standards was 
excluded, unless already covered by the Railway Labor Act. The fram-
ers of the NLRA did not consider covering public employees because 
at the time it was unthinkable to mandate that the sovereign (federal or 
state) bargain with its workforce. Until the 1960s, public workers were 
excluded from coverage of all worker protection and labor standards 
legislation enacted during the New Deal and beyond. 
The legislative history of the NLRA lacks any suggestion that there 
was discussion concerning coverage of public employees (NLRB 1949). 
The only reference to this matter is a letter from a company president to 
New York Senator Robert Wagner stating that the exclusion of govern-
ment workers may be reasonable in government agencies that perform 
purely governmental functions, but that the exclusion should not apply 
“where these governmental divisions are engaged in pursuits compet-
ing with private enterprise” (NLRB 1949, p. 325). The letter went on 
to cite several examples of such competing activity in federal and local 
government.
Almost a quarter of a century elapsed between the passage of the 
NLRA and Wisconsin’s adoption of the first state collective bargaining 
statute in 1959, which provided bargaining rights to local government 
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employees. A subsequent statute enacted in 1966 extended limited bar-
gaining rights to state employees. This was followed by legislation in 
other states (Schneider 1988).
In 1962, President Kennedy issued the landmark Executive Order 
10988, which for the first time established a process for union recogni-
tion and extended a very limited form of collective bargaining to federal 
employees in the executive branch. Most importantly, it mandated the 
federal government to confer with unions and it stamped the federal 
government’s imprimatur on unions of public employees at all levels of 
government. President Nixon’s Executive Order 11491 in 1969 and the 
1978 Civil Service Reform Act, with its Federal Service Labor-Man-
agement Relations Statute (FSLMRS), further codified the right of fed-
eral employees to a limited form of collective bargaining (Schneider 
1988).
These limited and belated developments stand in contrast with In-
ternational Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 87, adopted in 1948, 
and Convention 98, adopted in 1949 (ILO n.d.). Convention 87 covers 
the freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, while 
Convention 98 deals directly with the right to organize and bargain col-
lectively. It was left to each nation to decide how these conventions 
applied to police and the armed forces. Apart from a few narrow excep-
tions, the rights of all public sector workers were protected by these 
conventions. In 1978, Convention 151 on Labor Relations in the Public 
Sector made it clear that employees covered by Convention 98’s exclu-
sion of those “engaged in the administration of the state” applied only 
to “high-level public employees” (ILO n.d.).
Although the United States has not ratified any of these conventions, 
it has submitted annual reports to the ILO that purport to demonstrate 
adherence to them (ILO 2001). As will be discussed below, however, 
U.S. practice with respect to providing legal protection for public sector 
workers’ freedom to form unions and bargain collectively falls far short 
of the requirements of international law. During the Bush administra-
tion many more federal employees have lost or risked losing bargaining 
rights, based on stated concerns about national security, management 
flexibility, and efficiency. By early 2005 the rollback of legal protection 
spilled over to the states as Republican governors in Kentucky, Indiana, 
and Missouri issued executive orders rescinding collective bargaining 
rights for state employees.
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Given this legal framework, unionization rates in the public sector 
remained relatively strong through the 1990s and into the early 2000s, 
staying high relative to the unionization rate in the private sector. Since 
1992, the average public sector unionization rate has been four to five 
times larger than the private sector unionization rate. In 2004, only 
7.9 percent of private nonagricultural employees were represented by 
unions, while the union representation rate in the public sector was ap-
proximately 36 percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005). 
Yet, when one looks underneath these data to the structure sup-
porting public sector bargaining, the situation for the rights of public 
employees to bargain collectively is far less healthy than one might 
believe. Public sector unionization is declining. Although the rate of 
decline is far less than the rate in the private sector (between 1992 and 
2004 the private sector rate declined by 31.5 percent, while the public 
sector rate declined by only 5.7 percent), the rate has declined steadily 
since 1994 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005).
Looking beyond the numbers, there is wide variation in the scope 
of bargaining rights provided to public employees. In addition, events 
in the past five years have demonstrated the precariousness of legal pro-
tection for public employee bargaining rights. This chapter will address 
these latter two issues in the context of examining bargaining in the fed-
eral government, and then bargaining in state and local government.
THE FEDERAL SECTOR 
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute 
(FSLMRS) protects collective bargaining rights for a large majority of 
nonpostal federal employees. The FSLMRS declared that “labor orga-
nizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public 
interest” (FSLMRS 1978). The scope of bargaining allowed by this law, 
however, is limited to conditions of employment. Any matter covered 
by federal statute is also outside the scope of bargaining including all 
of Title V of the United States Code, which covers many of the condi-
tions of employment for federal employees. Moreover, no collective 
bargaining agreement provision may be contrary to a governmentwide 
regulation. The statute’s management rights provision is very broad and 
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prohibits statutory management rights from being bargained away, even 
for the duration of a collective bargaining agreement. 
This limited legal protection for workers’ rights has been further 
eroded since 9/11. The Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA)1 in 
November 2001 and the Homeland Security Act (HSA)2 in November 
2002 provided the Bush administration with virtually complete author-
ity and flexibility in the management of these agencies and in estab-
lishing conditions of employment, including authority over the right to 
bargain.3 ATSA provides for the establishment of a new Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) in the Transportation Department. The 
HSA provides for the establishment of a new Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) (Greenhouse 2002; Shimabukuro 2002).
In January 2003, the TSA stripped collective bargaining rights from 
airport screeners (Lee and Goo 2003). In March 2003, the TSA was 
transferred to the DHS. Both the ATSA and the HSA authorized the 
removal of employees from Title V coverage. This legislation was en-
acted despite the fact that Section 7112 of the FSLMRS provides the 
president with the authority to exclude from bargaining rights employ-
ees “engaged in intelligence, counter-intelligence, investigative, or se-
curity work which directly affects national security” (FSLMRS 1978). 
Bush administration representatives have resisted permitting these 
employees to have bargaining rights, opposed bargaining rights for em-
ployees of the proposed DHS, and spoke against federal sector unions 
and the alleged inflexibility of collective bargaining (Greenhouse 
2002). The administration took these positions despite the fact that the 
FSLMRS gives the president and/or agency heads sufficient authority to 
exclude from bargaining rights employees whose work directly affects 
national security. Additionally, Section 7103 (b)(1) specifically empow-
ers the president to “issue an order excluding any agency or subdivision 
thereof from coverage under this chapter if the president determines 
that a) the agency or subdivision has as a primary function intelligence, 
counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work, and b) the 
provisions of this chapter cannot be applied to that agency or subdi-
vision in a manner consistent with national security requirements and 
considerations.” Section 7103 also gives the president authority to “is-
sue an order suspending any provision of this chapter with respect to 
any agency, installation, or activity located outside the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia, if the president determines that the suspension is 
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necessary in the interest of national security.” Finally, the same section 
excludes all employees of the CIA, FBI, and NSA from coverage under 
the statute. (FSLMRS 1978).   
The administration’s position is that ATSA gives the TSA director 
sole and exclusive discretion to determine screeners’ conditions of em-
ployment, including collective bargaining rights (DHS v. American Fed-
eration of Government Employees 2003). In early January 2003, faced 
with representation petitions filed by screeners at 14 major airports, 
the TSA director declared that collective bargaining “is not compatible 
with the flexibility required to wage war against terrorism” (DHS v. 
American Federation of Government Employees 2003). In early July a 
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) regional director ruled that 
the TSA director, by then part of the DHS, had unfettered discretion 
to deny the screeners bargaining rights (U.S.Department of Homeland 
Security v. American Federation of Government Employees 2003). 
When Congress debated the plan to create a Department of Home-
land Security with 176,000 employees, President Bush threatened to 
veto any such government reorganization that did not give him the au-
thority to strip the right of representation from workers who historically 
had these rights, as well as prevent new employees, such as screeners, 
from achieving collective bargaining rights (Greenhouse 2002). The 
Homeland Security Act, adopted soon after the 2002 elections, gave the 
president authority to act as final arbiter in disputes over which DHS 
employees will be entitled to or denied collective bargaining rights. In 
January 2005, the Bush administration used this authority to introduce 
a new system that further reduced the matters about which unions could 
bargain beyond even the limits in the FSLMRS (Lee 2005). At the same 
time, the administration said it would propose similar legislation cover-
ing all agencies (Lee 2005). In February 2005, rules similar to the DHS 
rules were proposed for the Department of Defense (DOD) (Kauffman 
2005).
The potential for damage to federal workers’ collective bargaining 
rights from these policies is illustrated by a recent FLRA decision. In 
that case, the FLRA granted a request from the Social Security Admin-
istration (SSA) to exclude from a bargaining unit—and therefore from 
collective bargaining—certain workers on the grounds that the posi-
tions were related to the security of the Social Security database (SSA 
v. American Federation of Government Employees 2003). Thus, using 
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incrementalism, national security is now being defined to include not 
only alleged terrorism, through the DHS, and foreign threats, through 
the DOD, but now identity theft and the productive capacity of the na-
tion, through the SSA. 
On August 12, 2005, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court of the District of Columbia ruled, in a suit brought by a group 
of unions representing DHS employees, that the collective bargaining 
regulations issued by the DHS were illegal and therefore could not be 
implemented (National Treasury Employees Union et al. v. Chertoff et 
al. 2005). After being given “extraordinary authority” by Congress to 
rewrite employee bargaining rights, the administration exceeded that 
authority, according to Judge Collyer’s ruling. Moreover, as noted, be-
cause the DOD proposed similar rules, it is likely that the DOD rules 
would fare no better in front of Judge Collyer than the DHS rules. 
Judge Collyer is no stranger to labor law. President Ronald Rea-
gan appointed her as General Counsel of the National Labor Relations 
Board in 1984 and she served until 1989 in that capacity, and Presi-
dent Bush appointed her to the federal bench in 2002 (Federal Judicial 
Center n.d.). Her decision stated in part that “significant aspects of the 
HR system fail to conform to the express dictates of the Homeland Se-
curity Act.” As it specifically concerns collective bargaining, Collyer 
wrote, “Collective bargaining has at least one irreducible minimum that 
is missing from the HR System; a binding contract.” She continued that, 
“Collective bargaining agreements would no longer be legally binding 
on the Secretary or enforceable by the Unions if management exercised 
its unreviewable discretion to declare some aspect of a contract inimical 
to the Department’s mission.” The judge also wrote that, “[w]hile DHS 
may be required to bargain in good faith, there is no effective way to 
hold it to that bargain . . . Under such circumstances, a deal is not a deal, 
a contract is not a contract, and the process of collective bargaining is 
a nullity.” Also of interest is her upholding of the unions’ complaint 
that the DHS regulations would dictate the role of the FLRA. The DHS 
had no authority to in effect direct the work of that agency. The Bush 
administration may appeal this decision (see, for example, Associated 
Press 2005). 
An opportunity to rationalize federal sector labor relations in the 
1990s through President Clinton’s Executive Order 12871, issued in 
1993, was revoked by President Bush in 2001 (Masters and Albright 
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2002; Olson and Woll 1999; U.S. National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration n.d.). The Clinton executive order and its call for partner-
ship set forth the blueprint for the parties to move to a more mature, 
collaborative, and mutually productive relationship. The unfulfilled 
promise of the executive order was that it provided a structure in which 
the parties could actually engage in problem solving outside of negotia-
tions of the collective bargaining agreement. Executive Order 12871 
afforded unions an opportunity to become involved on a predecisional 
basis, in subject matter otherwise considered permissive or outside the 
scope of bargaining. 
In sum, the legal structure for federal sector collective bargaining is 
in need of repair. Although approximately 35 percent of federal sector 
employees were represented by unions in 2004 (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2005), a very high percentage relative to the private sector, 
this number masks a very narrow Scope of bargaining and collective 
bargaining “rights” that, increasingly, may be exercised only at the 
discretion of the employer. Furthermore, the proportion of the federal 
workforce for which even these limited rights are protected is declin-
ing. 
PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING AT THE STATE  
And	LoCAL	LeVeL
Table 4.1 provides a summary of state-level public sector laws and 
provides a clear picture of the unevenness of current arrangements. 
Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have comprehensive 
laws that provide broad scope bargaining for a majority of state and 
local government employees. For purposes of this analysis, states with 
comprehensive statutes are those states with one or more laws that 
cover a substantial majority of public employees (excluding managers, 
supervisors, and confidential employees). Such statutes provide proce-
dures for unit and representation determination and exclusivity; estab-
lish the duty to bargain on wages, hours and conditions of employment; 
and define unfair labor practices. These laws also provide for a neutral 
independent administrative agency, as well as procedures for resolving 
grievances and negotiating impasses.4 
Blocketal.indb   63 3/2/2006   9:00:00 AM














Alabama Firefighters Meet and confer No Wages and conditions 
of employment
None
Alaska All  (unless local 
government opts out)
Collective bargaining Alaska Labor 
Relations Agency
Wages, hours, 





California State civil service  
and Dept. of 
Education teachers
Collective bargaining 






and conditions of 
employment
Mediation
Local Collective bargaining 
(law states meet and 
confer)
PERB or local agency Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation
School district and 
community college 
employees
Collective bargaining PERB Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Employees of UC, 
Hastings College of 
Law, and California 
State University and 
colleges
Collective bargaining 
(law states meet and 
confer)
PERB Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Table 4.1 State and Local Collective Bargaining Arrangements Provided by State Statute, Civil Service Law, or 
    Executive Order
B
locketal.indb   64





ights in the Public Sector   65
Colorado None
Connecticut State Collective bargaining State Board of Labor 
Relations (SBLR)
Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, arbitration
Local Collective bargaining SBLR Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, arbitration
Teachers Collective bargaining State Board of 
Education; SBLR
Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, arbitration
Delaware State and local  
(cities of under 100 
employees must opt in 
to be covered)
Collective bargaining PERB Wages, hours, 







Teachers Collective bargaining PERB Conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Police officers and 
firefighters
Collective bargaining PERB Wages, hours, 





All Collective bargaining PERB Wages, hours, 
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Georgia Firefighters (pop. 
20,000+)
Meet and confer No Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Fact-finding
Atlanta Rapid Transit 
Authority
No Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Hawaii All Collective bargaining Hawaii Labor 
Relations Board
Wages, hours, 




Idaho Firefighters Collective bargaining No Wages and conditions 
of employment
Fact-finding
Teachers Collective bargaining No Wages and conditions 
of employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Illinois State and local  
(employing 35 or 
more)
Collective bargaining Illinois (local) labor 
relations boards
Wages, hours, 
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Collective bargaining PERB Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
None
Iowa All Collective bargaining PERB Wages, hours, 




Kansas State and local 
government that opt in
Meet and confer PERB State: hours and 
conditions of emp. All 
others: Wages, hours, 
and conditions of emp.
Mediation, fact-finding
Teachers Collective bargaining No Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Kentucky State employees 
(executive order)
Meet and confer No Wages, benefits, terms 




300,000 if city opts in)
Collective bargaining Kentucky State Labor 
Relations Board
Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Police (pop. 300,000 
with merit system)
Collective bargaining No Wages, hours, 
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Maine State Collective bargaining Maine Labor Relations 
Board (MLRB)
Wages, hours, 




Local and teachers Collective bargaining MLRB Wages, hours, 




University employees Collective bargaining MLRB Wages, hours, 




Judicial employees Collective bargaining MLRB Wages, hours, 




Maryland State employees Collective bargaining State Labor 
Relations Board (not 
independent)
Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
None
Higher education Collective bargaining Higher Ed. Labor 
Relations Board
Wages, hours, 
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Teachers Collective bargaining No Wages, hours, 





Collective bargaining No Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Park and planning 
commission police 
Collective bargaining No Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Massachusetts All Collective bargaining Labor Relations 
Commission
Wages, hours, 




Michigan State by civil service 
regulations
Collective bargaining Employment Relations 









Local and university 
system
Collective bargaining Michigan Employment 
Relations Comm.
Wages, hours, 




Minnesota All Collective bargaining Bureau of Mediation 
Services
Wages, hours, 
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Missouri All (except law 
enforcement and 
teachers)
Meet and confer Board of Mediation Wages and conditions 
of employment 
None
State (executive order) Collective bargaining 
(Exec. order states 
meet and confer)
Board of Mediation Wages and conditions 
of employment
Mediation, arbitration
Montana All (except nurses) Collective bargaining Board of Personnel 
Appeals
Wages, hours, 




Nurses Collective bargaining Board of Personnel 
Appeals
Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
None
Nebraska Local and county 
employees (except 
teachers)
Collective bargaining Commission of 
Industrial Relations
Wages, hours, 
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Nevada Local and county 
employees










All Collective bargaining Public Employee 
Labor Relations Board 
(PELRB)
Wages, hours, 




New Jersey All Collective bargaining PERC Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding




All Collective bargaining PELRB Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, arbitration
New York All Collective bargaining PERB or local board Wages, hours, 







Teachers and school 
administrators




and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Ohio All Collective bargaining State Employment 
Relations Board
Wages, hours, 
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Oklahoma Teachers and non-
certified school 
employees
Collective bargaining No Conditions  of 
employment
Fact-finding
Police and firefighters Collective bargaining PERB Wages, hours, 




Oregon All Collective bargaining Employment Relations 
Board
Wages, hours, 




Pennsylvania All Collective bargaining Pa. Labor Relations 
Board
Wages, hours, 




Rhode Island State employees Collective bargaining State Labor Relations 
Board (SLRB)
Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Fact-finding, arbitration 
Local employees Collective bargaining SLRB Wages, hours, 
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Police and firefighters Collective bargaining SLRB Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Arbitration
Teachers Collective bargaining SLRB Wages, hours, 




South Dakota All employees Collective bargaining South Dakota 
Department of Labor 
(not independent)
State: Hours and 
conditions of emp. All 
others: Wages, hours, 
and conditions of emp.
Conciliation 
Tennessee Teachers Collective bargaining No Wages and conditions 
of employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Texas Police and firefighters 
if approved by voters
Collective bargaining No Wages, hours, 








and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Local employees Collective bargaining VLRB Wages, hours, 
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Vermont Teachers Collective bargaining None Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Judiciary Collective bargaining VLRB Wages, hours, 




Washington State and state 
universities 
Collective bargaining PERC Wages, hours, 
and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Local  and state police 
(except for wages)
Collective bargaining PERC Wages, hours, 




Teachers Collective bargaining PERC Wages, hours, 





Collective bargaining PERC Wages, hours, 
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and conditions of 
employment
Mediation, fact-finding
Local employees Collective bargaining WERC Wages, hours, 
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Sixteen states and the federal government have statutes that protect 
collective bargaining or meet and confer rights for 1) only specific oc-
cupations (police, fire fighters, teachers, or nurses) or classes (public 
safety or education); 2) only a specific level of government (munici-
palities).5 Nine states have no legislation protecting either collective 
bargaining or meet and confer rights for any employees.6 
Thus, this legal framework shows that a majority of public employ-
ees in half of the states lack reasonable bargaining rights and are un-
likely to achieve them in the foreseeable future. Moreover, rights to 
only meet and confer provide employees with much less than rights 
to bargain collectively, most specifically the right to negotiate wages, 
hours and other economic terms of employment.
Overall, state and local government arrangements are problemat-
ic, largely because workers in so many states are denied meaningful 
bargaining rights. During the 1960s and 1970s, states demonstrated a 
diversity of responses in how they addressed or ignored public employ-
ees’ interest in the right to unionize and bargain collectively, a right 
that was available to almost all private sector workers. In the 1960s 
several state administrations and legislatures debated and resolved the 
so-called sovereignty issue as well as issues revolving around impasse 
resolution. A handful of states permitted a limited right to strike while 
other states opted for fact-finding or arbitration provisions in their col-
lective bargaining laws (Schneider 1988).
Frustrated by the slow pace of enactment of state legislation, public 
sector unions initiated efforts to secure federal legislation in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. This effort was deflected, in part, when many 
scholars and writers as well as public employers embraced the idea of 
states as “laboratories of experimentation.” Part of the rationale was 
the diversity of the 80,000 governments across the nation (Colosi and 
Rynecki 1975). These observers did not foresee that 35 years later fully 
one-half of the states would not provide meaningful bargaining rights 
to a majority of public workers. 
In the last 20 years, only three states have enacted new compre-
hensive bargaining statutes covering state and local government em-
ployees: Illinois and Ohio in 1983, and New Mexico in 1992 and then 
again in 2003. (In 1999, the New Mexico law was effectively repealed 
as a result of a governor’s veto of the legislature’s attempt to extend the 
statute’s sunset period.) Washington passed a bargaining law for state 
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employees in 2001, thereby joining the list of states with comprehensive 
coverage. In 2003, however, the governor of Kentucky acted to cancel 
an executive order providing for union representation and limited bar-
gaining rights for state employees (Wolfe 2003). Additionally, in 2005, 
however, two states, Missouri and Indiana, stripped state employees of 
collective bargaining via gubernatorial executive order (Access Indiana 
2005; Missouri, Governor of, 2005). 
In 1990, the AFL-CIO filed a complaint with the ILO protesting the 
failure of the U.S. government to protect public employee (including 
federal employees) rights. The aforementioned Conventions 87, 98, and 
151 formed the basis of the complaint (ILO 1990). The ILO accepted 
the complaint and requested that the U.S. government supply informa-
tion with respect to bargaining rights in the states. The government did 
respond in both 1992 (Bush administration) and 1993 (Clinton admin-
istration). The 1992 response claimed that “a majority of public sector 
employees are workers which the ILO would view as being engaged in 
the administration of the state” (ILO 1990). The ILO Committee of Ex-
perts reminded the U.S. government that not only should governments 
give priority to collective bargaining in the fullest sense possible, but 
they also emphasized that bargaining which excludes wages and other 
benefits and monetary items does not meet the requirements of the prin-
ciple of voluntary collective bargaining (ILO 1990).
In reality, the government’s own estimates do not justify exempting 
more than a small fraction of public employees from coverage on these 
grounds. In October 1992, The U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
reported to the U.S. Census Bureau that about 7.2 percent of all federal 
employees were involved in administration. Even adding those employ-
ees “not elsewhere classified” would bring the proportion to only 12.6 
percent. For state and local employees the comparable figure was just 
under 7 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 1994). A 2002 study by the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (USGAO) estimates that more than a third 
of the public sector employees in the United States do not have legally 
protected collective bargaining rights. According to the USGAO, close 
to 1 million of these are federal employees whose entire agency is ex-
empt from FSLMRS or who are managers or supervisors, while roughly 
6 million state and local government workers are without legally pro-
tected rights (USGAO 2002).   
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A Legislative Proposal
In the 10 years since the U.S. government’s response to the ILO, 
only fire and police unions have initiated the introduction of federal bar-
gaining legislation in Congress, most notably in the post–9/11 period. 
This proposed legislation has been limited to public safety workers. In-
deed, it has been more than 30 years since the need for uniform national 
legal protection of public sector workers’ freedom to form unions and 
bargain collectively has been seriously considered.
What might federal legislation look like? One principle worthy of 
consideration may be to think about the uniformity of process rather 
than of substance. It may be broadly applicable across states as a frame-
work for public sector labor relations. Such a federal statute need not 
be comprehensive in its detail. Rather, it could establish standards for 
assessing the acceptability of a comprehensive law. States that opt to 
enact a law that conformed to the standards would be authorized to 
administer their statute. Some observers might view this as another ex-
ploration of the experimentation–diversity argument. Perhaps this is so 
with respect to details of its substance, but not as to the mandated basic 
elements of a statute. Alternatively, a state could opt to be covered by 
the federal standards, administered by a federal board that would be the 
arbiter of conformity, as well as maintain oversight authority. Certainly, 
this is not revolutionary or even an entirely new concept. However, it 
would extend to public employees in the United States the kind of legal 
protection of their fundamental human right to form unions and bargain 
collectively that they deserve—and which international law requires. 
CONCLUSIONS
Collective bargaining rights of public employees in the United States 
have a much shorter history than collective bargaining rights of private 
sector employees. While broad-based collective bargaining rights of 
private employees in the United States can be traced to the NLRA of 
the 1930s, it was not until the mid-1960s that substantial numbers of 
public employees won protection for such rights. 
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The collective bargaining rights of federal sector employees have 
always been limited to a small number of issues. Relevant statutes and 
executive orders provide the administration with a great deal of control 
over collective bargaining coverage. Since 9/11, the Bush administra-
tion has attempted to use this control to remove collective bargaining 
rights from segments of the federal workforce in the interest of national 
security, without a definition of “national security” and without dem-
onstrating that collective bargaining for employees engaged in national 
security (however defined) would compromise national security. That 
this can happen indicates the fragility and tenuousness of collective bar-
gaining for federal sector employees, with “coverage” dependent on the 
administration in office and perceived policy needs. 
Turning to the states, public sector state workers in Indiana and 
Missouri lost collective bargaining rights with a stroke of their gov-
ernors’ pen early in 2005; Kentucky state workers lost their meet and 
confer rights at the end of 2003. For more than two decades prior, there 
had been but a minimal expansion of bargaining rights for state and 
local workers nationwide. Today, public employees in roughly half of 
the states lack meaningful protection of their fundamental right to col-
lective bargaining. 
Legal protections for workers’ rights to collective bargaining in the 
public sector in the United States are clearly out of step with inter-
national benchmarks, as established by the ILO. The only reason for 
this gap appears to be ideology and political will. The rights of public 
employees to bargain collectively should not depend on the prevailing 
political winds.  
Notes
 1.  Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub.L.107-71, codified as 49 
U.S.C. § 114.
 2.  Homeland Security Act (HSA), Pub.L.107-296, codified as 6 U.S.C. § 101. 
 3.  Federal Labor Relations Authority Boston Regional Director, Department of 
Homeland Security Border and Transportation Administration (Agency) and 
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (Labor Organiza-
tion/Petitionor), July 7, 2003.
 4.  The 25 states are Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
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sylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin.  Admittedly, Mary-
land does not meet the “comprehensive” test. Not all of its statutes provide for 
an independent administrative agency or impasse procedures; local government 
employees in most municipalities and counties are provided collective bargain-
ing rights by charter or ordinance not state statute; teachers and other education 
employees in most counties are covered by state statute as are employees of the 
state universities. In sum, a large majority of Maryland public employees do 
have the right to genuine collective bargaining through de jure arrangements; 
hence its qualified inclusion. New Mexico is the only state with a comprehensive 
statute that was effectively repealed, despite not being ruled unconstitutional. 
The law’s sunset provision was extended by the legislature but failed to override 
the governor’s veto in 1999. Subsequent to the 2002 election of Governor Rich-
ardson, New Mexico adopted an almost identical statute in March 2003.
 5.  Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Ne-
vada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyo-
ming. The breadth of coverage, scope of rights, and degree of comprehensive-
ness of these statutes vary widely and are set forth in the table. For example, the 
statutes in Kansas, Missouri and South Dakota cover almost all employees but 
the scope of meet and confer rights differ not only between these states but with-
in each state. A common thread is that local government workers are extended 
broader rights than state employees. For example, local government employees 
can negotiate wages, while state employees in Kansas and South Dakota cannot. 
In Kansas, however, local governments must opt in to be covered. Kansas also 
has a separate statute for teachers. Georgia and Texas are at the other end of this 
spectrum. The Georgia statute gives meet and confer rights to fire fighters only 
in those cities of over 20,000 population that opt in by ordinance. A Texas statute 
provides “consultation” rights to teachers only. A second Texas law extends bar-
gaining rights to police and fire fighters only in those local governments where 
the union is able to meet the standard required to petition for an election open to 
all qualified voters in that local government. The union then must be successful 
in that election to achieve recognition and bargaining rights. The broadest Texas 
statute however, prohibits a public employer from recognizing a union as bar-
gaining agent and prohibits collective bargaining by public employers. Arrayed 
elsewhere on this spectrum, Indiana has a bargaining statute covering teachers. 
Kentucky has a statute applicable to fire fighters in cities of at least 300,000 
population (only Louisville) or to any other city that petitions for coverage by 
the law. Another statute covers police in counties of at least 300,000 population 
and which also have a merit system. Statutes covering fire fighters and/or police 
and/or teachers or education employees have been adopted in Alabama, Idaho, 
Kansas (as mentioned above), North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah and 
Wyoming. Nevada’s statute covers only municipal employees.
 6.  Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. Even among these states the legal frame-
work is not simple. A North Carolina law forbids an employer from bargaining or 
making an agreement with a union. The law also prohibits employees from join-
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ing a union, which is clearly unconstitutional. A 1977 Virginia Supreme Court 
decision ruled that the state or local governments could not recognize a union as 
exclusive representative or negotiate an agreement. Prior to this decision local 
governments and school boards in several parts of the state had actually adopted 
collective bargaining ordinances. A subsequent 1993 statute, in effect, codified 
the earlier Supreme Court decision.
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Part 2
What’s at Stake: Why Freedom 
to Form Unions Matters to 
Workers and Communities
Blocketal.indb   85 3/2/2006   9:00:01 AM




An Analysis of Union First Contracts
Tom Juravich





After two decades of massive employment losses in heavily union-
ized sectors of the economy and exponential growth of the largely unor-
ganized service sector, the U.S. labor movement is struggling to remain 
relevant. Despite new organizing initiatives and practices, union orga-
nizing today remains a tremendously arduous endeavor, particularly in 
the private sector, as workers and their unions are routinely confronted 
with an arsenal of aggressive legal and illegal antiunion employer tac-
tics. This vigorous opposition to unions in the private sector does not 
stop once an election is won, but continues throughout bargaining for 
an initial union agreement, all too often turning organizing victories 
into devastating first-contract defeats (Bronfenbrenner 1997b, 2001).
Despite these overwhelming obstacles, workers still organize and 
win—through certification elections and voluntary recognition cam-
paigns in both the private and public sectors. And each year unions suc-
cessfully negotiate thousands of first contracts in the United States, pro-
viding union representation for the first time to hundreds of thousands 
of new workers. This research takes an in-depth look at what unions 
achieve in these initial union contracts. Why, when confronted with such 
powerful opposition, do unorganized workers continue to want to be-
long to unions and newly organized workers want to stay union? What 
do these first contracts provide that makes the struggle worthwhile? 
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To explore these questions, we analyze and evaluate union first 
contracts along four primary dimensions. First, we inventory the basic 
workers’ rights provided by these contracts, which go beyond the very 
limited rights provided by federal and state labor law under the “em-
ployment at will” system. Second, we evaluate how first contracts pro-
vide workers and their unions with the institutional power to shape work 
and the labor process on a day-to-day basis. Third, we explore how first 
contracts codify the presence and power of unions in daily work life, 
and we evaluate which institutional arrangements provide a meaningful 
role for workers and their unions in their workplaces. Fourth, we exam-
ine the kinds of workplace benefits that are codified and supplemented 
in first contracts, gaining important insights into the types of human 
resource practices that exist in newly unionized workplaces. Finally, by 
examining the interactions among these four dimensions, we explore 
the limitations of what first contracts have been able to achieve in the 
current organizing environment, and what it would take for unions to 
improve the quality of first contracts. 
PReVIoUS	ReSeARCH	on	FIRST	ConTRACTS
There is a growing body of literature on organizing in both the pri-
vate and public sectors (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Milkman and Voss 
2004). However, only a small portion of this research extends to first-
contract campaigns (Bronfenbrenner 1996, 2001; Hickey 2002; Hurd 
1996). Collective bargaining agreements are regularly evaluated for 
patterns, outcomes, and emerging basic language, yet this work rare-
ly distinguishes between first and subsequent agreements (Bureau of 
National Affairs 1995; Kumar 1989). A series of studies evaluates the 
financial impact of unionization and first contracts on employers (Di-
Nardo and Lee 2004; Freeman 1981). 
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) regularly gathers data 
on the wage differential between the union and nonunion sectors of 
the economy (BLS 2003a,b). But, here too, little effort has been made 
to look specifically at the impact of union first contracts. Furthermore, 
it is inadequate to focus only on the financial rewards of unionization. 
Nonfinancial issues such as dignity, fairness, and workplace control are 
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often the key issues in organizing campaigns and remain central in the 
development of initial union contracts (Bronfenbrenner 1996; Bronfen-
brenner and Hickey 2004). Comparing firms where organizing did or 
did not take place, Freeman and Kleiner (1990, S8) found only moder-
ate wage gains through unionization but suggest that “newly organized 
workers made significant gains in the areas of grievance procedures, job 
posting and bidding, and seniority protection.” To date, however, there 
is no detailed quantitative assessment of these nonfinancial yet crucially 
important aspects of first agreements.
RESEARCH METHODS
This research is based on a content analysis of 175 union first con-
tracts in both the public and private sectors. The contracts were as-
sembled as part of Bronfenbrenner’s previous research on private sec-
tor first-contract campaigns (1997a) and on research on public sector 
first-contract campaigns by Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1995) and 
Juravich and Bronfenbrenner (1998).1 We recognize that these contracts 
from 1987 through 1996 are less than current, but they draw from the 
only existing national random samples of first contract campaigns in 
both the public and private sectors. A review of first contracts collected 
as part of Bronfenbrenner’s most recent first-contract study (2001) sug-
gests no major changes in the nature and extent of first contracts in the 
last decade. 
Because of the lack of prior research on first-contract content, we 
were forced to develop an entirely new research typology to evaluate 
the multiple dimensions of first-contract gains.2 For all 175 first con-
tracts, we evaluated each contract along 296 parameters, measuring the 
extent and nature of various contract provisions.3 Unfortunately, due 
to the absence of previous research in this area, there are no analogous 
earlier data to which our findings can be compared. Thus, our hope is 
that this research typology will provide a baseline upon which future 
union contracts can be compared and will encourage further research 
in this area.
Table 5.1 provides baseline information on our sample. The first 
contracts are almost equally divided between the private and public 
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Number of contracts 175 1.00 94 0.54 81 0.46
Average contract duration (in months) — 28.50 — 30.30 — 26.30
Signatories
  Local 144 0.82 82 0.87 62 0.78
  Region/district 4 0.02 2 0.02 2 0.03
  International 3 0.02 2 0.02 1 0.01
Unit scope
  All employees 25 0.14 11 0.12 14 0.17
  Regular full-time employees only 19 0.11 15 0.16 4 0.05
  Regular full-time and all part-time
employees
63 0.36 37 0.39 26 0.32
  Regular full-time plus some part-time 35 0.20 22 0.23 13 0.16
  Part-time, per-diem, and/or temporary 5 0.03 1 0.01 4 0.05
Number of workers covered under contracts 27,651 159 11,453 123 16,198 200
Unit type
Blue collar 45 0.26 37 0.39 8 0.10
White collar 10 0.06 4 0.04 6 0.07
Professional/technical 21 0.12 7 0.07 14 0.17
Professional/technical 21 0.12 7 0.07 14 0.17
Service and maintenance 54 0.31 19 0.20 35 0.43
    Table 5.1  Characteristics of the Sample
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Wall-to-wall 26 0.15 15 0.16 11 0.14
Other 18 0.10 11 0.12 7 0.09
Industry 
Manufacturing 32 0.19 32 0.34 0 —
Communications and utilities 5 0.03 5 0.05 0 —
Construction 2 0.01 2 0.02 0 —
Retail 5 0.03 5 0.05 0 —
Transportation 6 0.04 6 0.06 0 —
Health care (both public and private) 31 0.18 29 0.31 2 0.03
Social, business and other services 13 0.08 13 0.14 0 —
City/county government 36 0.21 0 — 36 0.44
Public education (including higher 
education)
43 0.25 0 — 43 0.53
Bargaining unit demographics
At least 50% workers of color 57 0.33 44 0.47 13 0.16
No workers of color in the unit 37 0.21 12 0.13 25 0.31
 Proportion of workers of color in the unit — 0.31 — 0.43 — 0.18
At least 50% women workers 104 0.59 38 0.40 66 0.82
     No female workers 10 0.06 10 0.11 0 —
     Proportion female workers in unit — 0.52 — 0.38 — 0.67
At least 25% part-time workers 42 0.24 18 0.19 24 0.30
     No part-time workers 91 0.52 49 0.52 35 0.43
B
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sectors. The vast majority (82 percent) of the contracts were negoti-
ated on a local level, with an average duration of slightly more than 
two years. In the private sector the major industries represented include 
manufacturing (34 percent) and health care (31 percent). Blue-collar 
units represent the largest proportion (39 percent) of the private sec-
tor contracts, followed by service and maintenance units, wall-to-wall 
units, and professional/technical and white-collar units. In the public 
sector the contracts are concentrated in service and maintenance units 
(43 percent) and professional/technical units (17 percent), primarily in 
education (53 percent) and municipalities (44 percent). 
A majority of the workers covered under these agreements are 
women. This is especially true in the public sector, where women aver-
age 67 percent of the unit compared to 38 percent in the private sector. 
Workers of color are more concentrated in private sector units, where 
they represent the majority in almost half the units. 
BEyOND EMPLOyMENT AT WILL
Table 5.2 summarizes the basic workplace rights provided for in first 
contracts. Most of these protections are already “guaranteed” by federal 
and state legislation. Yet, contractual antidiscrimination language is im-
portant for two reasons. First, it demonstrates to the employer, union 
members, and the broader community that the union is concerned about 
these issues. But equally important, it provides an enforcement mecha-
nism that involves significantly less effort, cost, and time than claims 
filed under state or federal law. 
As we can see from Table 5.2, nearly three-quarters of the contracts 
in our sample contained a discrimination clause, with about two-thirds 
covering a range of types of discrimination including race, gender, na-
tional origin, religion, age, and disability. Of the units with at least 25 
percent women, 63 percent had gender discrimination language, while 
73 percent of the units with at least 25 percent workers of color had 
language covering race discrimination. Fewer than 25 percent of the 
contracts cover other types of discrimination, such as sexual orienta-
tion, political affiliation, and veteran status. Only 6 percent had sepa-
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rate sexual harassment language, and 1 percent had separate pay equity 
language. 
For nearly all the most common antidiscrimination protections, the 
percentage of public sector contracts including these protections was 
10–20 percent lower than the private sector contracts. This may result 
from the fact that many public sector workers may be covered by state 
and local discrimination laws that provide them a more streamlined 
process for filing antidiscrimination suits than federal protections. 
Seventeen percent of the first contracts go beyond basic workplace 
rights to include specific contract language that requires management 
to treat employees with respect and dignity. Respect and dignity is-
sues are often core elements of successful organizing campaigns, and 
these clauses provide an opportunity for the union to file grievances and 
publicly question management’s reputation, even when other contract 
clauses have not been violated. 
As is clear in Table 5.2, in a significant departure from the nonunion 
employment-at-will environment, nearly three-quarters of the contracts 
we examined require discipline and discharge to be based on just cause, 
thus constraining management’s ability to play favorites or to intimidate 
and threaten workers who challenge them. Nearly 40 percent of first 
contracts also codify Weingarten rights for union members to obtain 
union representation when they believe that they will be disciplined, 
and 13 percent expand on those rights by requiring the employer to no-
tify the employee of his or her right to union representation before the 
disciplinary meeting begins.
Virtually all the contracts in our sample (96 percent) create a griev-
ance procedure with third-party arbitration. Employers, who before the 
first contract was settled retained sole authority to make decisions in 
the workplace, become bound by a system that allows for independent 
third-party review of disputes between management and employees. 
This due process language is the most widespread provision in this 
study, and provides the enforcement mechanism that guarantees all the 
other clauses in the first agreement. A quarter of the contracts permit 
class-action grievances where the remedies apply to all those affected 
by the violation.
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Antidiscrimination protections 128 0.730 80 0.85 48 0.59
Union activity 101 0.58 51 0.54 50 0.62
Racea 123 0.70 (0.73) 75 0.80 (0.78) 48 0.59 (0.62)
Genderb 122 0.70 (0.63) 74 0.79 (0.74) 48 0.59 (0.54)
Age 112 0.64 66 0.70 46 0.57
Disability 92 0.53 52 0.55 40 0.49
National origin 118 0.67 72 0.77 46 0.57
Family status 8 0.05 2 0.02 6 0.07
Marital status 48 0.27 17 0.18 31 0.38
Sexual orientation 31 0.18 19 0.20 12 0.15
Political affiliation 38 0.22 14 0.15 24 0.30
Religion 115 0.66 68 0.72 47 0.58
Veteran status 26 0.15 20 0.21 6 0.07
Separate sexual harassment clause 10 0.06 5 0.05 5 0.06
Pay equity 2 0.01 1 0.01 1 0.01
Compliance with all state, local, and federal
laws
9 0.05 9 0.10 0 —
Respect and dignity clause 29 0.17 25 0.27 4 0.05
Discipline and discharge
Just cause 122 0.70 67 0.71 55 0.68
    Table 5.2  Workplace Rights Provided by First Contracts
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Specified progressive discipline procedure 48 0.27 19 0.20 29 0.36
Grievable Weingarten rights (notification) 22 0.13 14 0.15 8 0.10
Grievable Weingarten rights (no
notification)
42 0.24 16 0.17 26 0.32
Grievance procedure
Grievance procedure with 3rd party
arbitration
168 0.96 93 0.99 75 0.93
Expedited grievance procedures 50 0.29 25 0.27 25 0.31
Class-action grievances permitted 47 0.27 11 0.12 36 0.44
aNumbers in parentheses report the proportion of units with 25% or more workers of color that have no race discrimination language.
bNumbers in parentheses report the proportions of units with 25% or more female workers that have gender discrimination language.
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UNION RESTRICTIONS ON MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
In addition to these basic rights, first contracts contain language 
outlining a system of rational and equitable rules and procedures for 
workplace practices, restraining unilateral decisions by management. 
As we can see in Table 5.3, seniority plays a key role in developing con-
sistent, nonarbitrary procedures for promotions, layoffs, recall, trans-
fers, and vacation and overtime scheduling. However, seniority is less 
of a feature in public than in private sector agreements because in many 
cases it is already codified in civil service law. 
It is important to note that none of the seniority clauses in the first 
contracts in our sample include affirmative action language to protect 
women and workers of color from being “last hired, first fired.” This is 
a relevant issue for the labor movement, particularly since women and 
workers of color continue to make up the majority of new workers or-
ganized. This lack of language on affirmative action may not just be the 
result of bargaining. Over the past decade we have seen an increasing 
number of legal challenges to affirmative action, which has made many 
public entities hesitant to sign on to these types of provisions. 
The first contracts we examined also contain language laying out 
the process for promotions and the filling of vacancies beyond basic 
seniority rights. More than three-quarters of agreements in both sec-
tors provide for the posting of vacancies. In 40 percent of the contracts 
internal candidates are given priority in hiring. More than one-third of 
the contracts provide for provisional transfer to newly posted positions. 
However, very few contracts provide opportunities for part-time em-
ployees to bid on full-time work.
Thirty-eight percent of the contracts go beyond state and federal 
wage and hour laws to require overtime pay after 8 hours and 6 percent 
provide overtime for work beyond an employee’s regularly scheduled 
hours. This is particularly important for part-time workers, who other-
wise are frequently asked to work additional hours but not enough to 
reach the legislated threshold of 40 hours a week. 
While expanded hours and mandatory overtime are an increasing 
problem in today’s workplaces, virtually none of the contracts set limits 
on mandatory overtime. These provisions mirror contract negotiations 
in general, where even after long strikes few unions have succeeded 
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in eliminating 12-hour days or cutting back on mandatory overtime 
(Franklin 2001).
A number of contracts in our sample, particularly those in the pri-
vate sector, where weekend and evening shifts are more common, have 
clauses that codify and/or expand upon shift differentials (supplemental 
pay) for those employees who work outside of the regular workday or 
workweek. Nearly one-half of private sector first contracts guarantee a 
shift differential for evening work, while a smaller percentage establish 
differentials for weekend work.
One-third of private sector contracts and 51 percent of public sec-
tor contracts have language outlining work schedules and hours. Many 
contracts also require the posting of schedules and notice of, or protec-
tion from, changes outside workers’ regularly scheduled hours. These 
clauses are important because they provide workers predictability and 
control over their work schedules. Workload and minimum staffing, 
serious issues in almost every workplace, are addressed in only 7 per-
cent of first agreements. This reflects the fact that most employers ag-
gressively oppose any inclusion of staff and workload protections in 
the contract and frequently argue that these are absolute management 
rights. 
Health and safety is another area that dramatically distinguishes 
union from nonunion workplaces. Forty-two percent of all contracts 
and 55 percent of private sector contracts have grievable health and 
safety clauses. Thirty-one percent include language requiring employ-
ers to provide protective equipment, and 30 percent establish a joint 
health and safety committee. Only a small number (6 percent) give 
workers the right to refuse unsafe work, and only 5 percent guarantee 
workers and unions the right to health and safety information. 
Unions have not been very successful in gaining significant job se-
curity protections in first contracts, despite the increasing importance 
of such language in a climate of corporate restructuring, technological 
change, privatization, and capital mobility. As described in Table 5.3, 
approximately one-third of private sector first agreements include some 
language governing restrictions on successorship, restricting the use of 
temporary workers, subcontracting, and supervisors doing bargaining-
unit work. Much less common are provisions relating to new owners 
honoring the agreement, union notification of closure, and technologi-
cal change. 
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Overtime 36 0.21 27 0.29 9 0.11
   Layoff 132 0.75 79 0.84 53 0.65
   Recall 116 0.66 70 0.75 46 0.37
   Transfer 48 0.27 35 0.37 13 0.16
   Promotions where minimum qualifications are met 16 0.09 10 0.11 6 0.07
   Promotions where equally qualified 72 0.41 51 0.54 21 0.26
   Shift assignments 10 0.06 6 0.06 4 0.05
   Holidays 3 0.02 3 0.03 0 —
   Vacation 63 0.36 46 0.49 17 0.21
   Prorated for part-time employeesa 18  0.10 (0.07) 7 0.07 (0.11) 11 0.14 (0.04)
   Full seniority for part-time employeesa 7 0.04 (0.05) 4 0.04 (0.06) 3 0.04 (0.04)
Layoffs or reduction of hours
   Long-term layoff notice 74 0.42 41 0.44 33 0.41
   Average minimum number of days notice — 17 — 9.9 — 23.7
   Short-term layoff without seniority consideration 9 0.05 8 0.09 1 0.01
   Bumping rights 81 0.46 46 0.49 35 0.43
Severance pay 7 0.04 6 0.06 1 0.01
   Retraining 4 0.02 4 0.04 0 —
   Recall rights 142 0.81 82 0.87 60 0.74
Table 5.3  Union Restrictions on Management Rights
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Promotions and filling of vacancies
   Posting of vacancies 140 0.80 75 0.80 65 0.80
   Internal candidates first priority 70 0.40 40 0.43 30 0.37
   Opportunity of temporary trial/return 65 0.37 42 0.45 23 0.28
   Part-timers can bid for full-timea 7 0.04 (0.10) 5 0.05 (0.11) 2 0.03 (0.08)
Overtime
   Overtime for over regularly scheduled hours 10 0.06 6 0.06 4 0.05
   Overtime pay for over 40 hours per week 24 0.19 22 0.23 2 0.03
   Overtime pay for over 8 hours 67 0.38 43 0.46 24 0.30
   Overtime equalization 32 0.18 21 0.22 11 0.14
   No mandatory overtime 3 0.02 0 — 3 0.04
   Limits on mandatory overtime 9 0.05 8 0.09 1 0.01
   Premium pay for over 12 hours work 6 0.03 6 0.06 0 —
   Premium pay for over 6 days a week 4 0.02 3 0.03 1 0.01
Shift and other pay differentials
    Evening differential 60 0.34 46 0.49 14 0.17
 Saturday differential 24 0.14 15 0.16 9 0.11
 Sunday differential 35 0.20 25 0.27 10 0.12
 Relief in higher classification 63 0.36 33 0.35 30 0.37
Schedules, hours of work, and minimum
    staffing/workload
Hours and scheduling specified in the contract 72 0.41 31 0.33 41 0.51
   Posting of schedules required 39 0.22 29 0.31 10 0.12
   Minimum staffing/workload 13 0.07 8 0.09 5 0.06
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aNumbers in parentheses report the proportion of units with at least 25% part-time workers.














   Right to refuse unsafe work 10 0.06 7 0.07 3 0.04
   Employer provided protective
equipment
54 0.31 33 0.35 21 0.26
   Health and safety committee 52 0.30 36 0.38 16 0.20
   Right to information 8 0.05 7 0.07 1 0.01
   Grievable health and safety language 73 0.42 52 0.55 21 0.26
   Employees will alert employer of
safety concerns
7 0.04 5 0.05 2 0.03
Job security and protecting bargaining
    unit work
Subcontracting rules 40 0.23 21 0.22 19 0.24
   Restrictions on the use of temporary
workers
28 0.16 25 0.27 3 0.04
Restrictions on supervisors doing
bargaining unit work
41 0.23 33 0.35 8 0.10
   Successorship language 35 0.20 30 0.32 5 0.06
Purchaser must honor contract 11 0.06 7 0.07 4 0.05 
Union notified, request purchaser to
honor agreement
6 0.03 6 0.06 0 —
   New technology language 8 0.05 8 0.09 0 —
    Table 5.3  (continued)
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UNION RIGHTS AND PRACTICES UNDER 
FIRST CONTRACTS
Table 5.4 presents data on how union rights and practices become 
codified and institutionalized after the signing of an initial union agree-
ment. First contracts lay out the parameters by which unions operate 
on a day-to-day basis. Nearly two-thirds of all the first contracts in our 
sample have an agency or union shop, thereby laying a foundation upon 
which the union can more easily establish and maintain its presence 
in the workplace. For those with open shops, 91 percent of the private 
sector contracts and 69 percent of the public sector contracts were in 
right-to-work states, where open shops are required. Union security is 
further strengthened in the three quarters of the first contracts that allow 
for dues check-off—where union dues and/or agency fees are automati-
cally deducted from workers’ paychecks. 
Another essential element of union representation is language guar-
anteeing staff and officers access to the workplace and to bargaining-
unit members. Forty-five percent of private sector first contracts and 25 
percent of public sector first contracts have liberal union access policies 
allowing union representatives to meet with employees in the work-
place without having prior authorization from the employer or being 
restricted to certain times and certain areas. This is less of an issue in 
the public sector, however, because a combination of open meeting and 
public access laws provides union representatives, as members of the 
public, equal access to any public areas or public meetings. 
Nearly one-half of first contracts provide stewards release time to 
investigate grievances, although this is more prevalent in the private 
sector than in the public sector. Approximately one-third grant stew-
ards paid release time to investigate grievances on company time. Fifty-
eight percent of first contracts grant stewards release time for grievance 
processing, and almost half allow this to take place on paid company 
time. Less than 10 percent of the contracts in both sectors have contract 
language allowing for new member orientation, despite the importance 
of such language in recently organized units, where everyone is new to 
the union. 
More than one-third of the contracts provide union leave for of-
ficers and 25 percent provide union leave for members to attend union 
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Union 61 0.35 57 0.61 4 0.05
   Agency 51 0.29 12 0.13 39 0.48
   Open 34 0.19 21 0.22 13 0.16
   Proportion of open shops in right-to-work states 28 0.82 19 0.91 9 0.69
Dues check-off 128 0.73 67 0.71 61 0.75
Union staff access to workplace
   Liberal 62 0.35 42 0.45 20 0.25
   Restricted 50 0.29 33 0.35 17 0.21
   No access specified in contract 63 0.36 19 0.20 44 0.54
Union access
   Union bulletin board for union postings 142 0.81 82 0.87 60 0.74
   Union right to information 17 0.10 12 0.13 5 0.06
Officer/steward rights
Stewards’ time to investigate grievances 78 0.45 53 0.56 25 0.31
Paid release time to investigate grievances 56 0.32 32 0.34 24 0.30
Stewards’ time to process grievances 102 0.58 62 0.66 40 0.49
Paid release time to process grievances 83 0.47 44 0.47 39 0.48
Paid release time for other meetings with management 44 0.25 13 0.14 31 0.38
Union orientation 14 0.08 7 0.07 7 0.09
   Union leave for officers to conduct union business 15 0.09 6 0.06 9 0.11
Table 5.4  Union Practice after First Contracts
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   Union leave for officers to attend meetings conventions 64 0.37 28 0.30 36 0.42
Paid union leave to attend meetings/conventions 29 0.17 5 0.05 24 0.30
   Unpaid leave for officers to take higher union office 33 0.19 22 0.23 11 0.14
   Paid leave for members to process grievances 11 0.06 10 0.11 1 0.01
   Union leave for members to attend meetings/conventions 43 0.25 21 0.22 22 0.27
Paid leave to attend meetings/conventions 18 0.10 3 0.03 15 0.19
B
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meetings and conventions. Only a few of the contracts in our sample (9 
percent) provide union leave for officers to conduct union business out-
side the workplace, while 19 percent provide for union leaders to take 
union-funded positions, protecting their right to return to the bargaining 
unit. 
BENEFITS IN NEWLy ORGANIzED WORkPLACES
Table 5.5 summarizes the workplace benefits provided by the first 
contracts in our sample. Health insurance, pension plans, leaves of ab-
sence, pay systems, training, and continuing education are fundamen-
tal concerns for unorganized workers, and are areas that have shown 
a substantial differential between union and nonunion workplaces. 
For example, according to BLS data, 72 percent of unionized work-
ers are covered by defined benefit pension funds compared to only 15 
percent of nonunion workers, while 60 percent of unionized workers 
have medical care benefits compared to 44 percent of nonunion workers 
(BLS 2003a,b). Beyond ensuring basic rights, fair and equitable stan-
dards, and an institutional presence already discussed, these workplace 
benefits help to create and protect a certain quality of life for workers 
and their families. The extent and nature of these contract clauses also 
inform us about the kinds of human resources practices in operation 
in newly organized workplaces, some of which existed before the or-
ganizing campaign but then were codified and guaranteed in the first 
agreement. 
Overall, 89 percent of the first contracts provide contractual guar-
antees for some form of health insurance. Yet, reflecting the spiraling 
costs of health care that had begun to escalate during the period these 
contracts were negotiated, only 10 percent provide fully paid health 
insurance for workers and dependents. This is a significant departure 
from union contracts a generation ago, when many newly organized 
workers were brought into master agreements, which provided fully 
paid family health insurance and union health and welfare plans. 
Pension plans are provided for in only 39 percent of first agree-
ments, with employer-sponsored saving plans offered in an additional 
12 percent and retiree health benefits offered in only 8 percent. Here, 
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too, we see a significant departure from the kinds of retirement benefits 
that once were a common element of large industrial and public sector 
agreements reflecting, in part, the growing efforts by U.S. employers to 
cut costs and long-term liabilities by shifting to a more contingent and 
less costly workforce. 
Nearly three-quarters of the first contracts provide for some sick 
leave benefits. Sick leave benefits are much more prevalent in the pub-
lic sector than in the private sector, but are more likely to be prorated 
for part-time workers in private sector units with significant numbers 
of part-time workers. In approximately one-third of the contracts, sick 
leave may be taken for sick children and other sick dependents.
Unlike sick leave, vacation and holiday benefits are slightly less 
common in the public sector, partly because most public sector holidays 
are set by law and, for public school employees, vacations are often 
taken outside of the nine-month employment period. Seventy-two per-
cent of private sector contracts provide at least five paid holidays and 83 
percent provide at least one week of vacation, while only 42 percent of 
public sector contracts provide a minimum of five paid holidays and 62 
percent provide at least one week’s vacation. A variety of other leaves 
are provided for in first contracts as well, with the majority of contracts 
including leaves for jury duty, bereavement, military service, and per-
sonal days.
Table 5.5 also presents data on the kinds of pay systems established 
by first contracts. Almost two-thirds of agreements provide for step sys-
tems. Given the arbitrariness of most nonunion pay systems that fre-
quently involve wages being negotiated on a person-by-person basis, 
step systems are a significant accomplishment. In contrast, only 2 per-
cent of the contracts had merit pay systems, which are the systems that 
dominate the nonunion environment. At the same time, cost-of-living 
adjustments are provided in only 2 percent of first contracts. 
Training benefits are limited, with only one-quarter of agreements 
specifying job training or in-service training provided for by the em-
ployer. Finally, employee involvement clauses were included in 28 per-
cent of the first contracts we examined. However, most of these clauses 
lack union protections. Particularly with the growing management in-
terest in joint programs, unions clearly need bargaining language that 
ensures that these programs are indeed joint and do not undermine the 
union or the contract.
Blocketal.indb   105 3/2/2006   9:00:04 AM
106   Juravich, B
ronfenbrenner, and H
ickey








Health and other insurance
Health insurance 156 0.89 85 0.90 71 0.88
Full individual only 12 0.07 8 0.09 4 0.05
Full individual plus full family 17 0.10 4 0.04 13 0.16
Full individual and part family 24 0.14 14 0.15 10 0.12
Dental insurance 90 0.51 45 0.48 45 0.56
Short-term disability 38 0.22 27 0.29 11 0.14
Long-term disability 31 0.18 14 0.15 17 0.21
Employer contribute to union health and
welfare plan
11 0.06 8 0.09 3 0.04
Life insurance 106 0.61 59 0.63 47 0.58
Vision insurance 18 0.10 6 0.06 12 0.15
Drug insurance 22 0.13 8 0.09 14 0.17
Workers compensation provision 55 0.31 24 0.26 31 0.38
Retirement	benefits
Pension plan 68 0.39 36 0.38 32 0.40
Employer-sponsored savings plan 21 0.12 20 0.21 1 0.01
Retirement health plan 14 0.08 5 0.05 9 0.11
Leaves of absence
Sick leave 122 0.70 50 0.53 72 0.89
At least 10 sick days a year 72 0.41 14 0.15 58 0.72
				Table	5.5		benefits	in	newly	organized	Workplaces
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Average number of days veteran employees — 11.61 — 9.71 — 12.44
Prorated for part-time workersa 43 0.25 (0.29) 21 0.22 (0.44) 22 0.27 (0.17)
Apply to sick children 63 0.36 13 0.14 50 0.61
Apply to other sick dependents 57 0.33 9 0.10 48 0.59
Sick bank 84 0.48 27 0.29 57 0.70
Vacation 132 0.75 82 0.87 50 0.62
At least one week vacation shutdown a year 128 0.73 78 0.83 50 0.62
Average number of days new employees — 6.60 — 6.60 — 6.59
Average number of days veteran employees — 19.84 — 18.53 — 22.02
Prorated for part-time workersa 47 0.27 (0.26) 31 0.33 (0.44) 16 0.20 (0.13)
Mandatory vacation for plant shutdown 9 0.05 9 0.10 0 0
Holidays 152 0.87 92 0.98 60 0.74
At least five holidays a year 102 0.58 68 0.72 34 0.42
Average number of days new employees — 7.83 — 7.89 — 7.77
Average number of days veteran employees — 10.52 — 9.44 — 11.33
Prorated for part-time workersa 33 0.19 (0.17) 16 0.17 (0.28) 17 0.21(0.08)
Premium pay 106 0.61 71 0.76 35 0.43
Parental leave 50 0.29 9 0.10 41 0.51
Bereavement leave 137 0.78 80 0.85 57 0.70
Education leave 27 0.15 11 0.12 16 0.20
 Medical/disability leave 76 0.43 48 0.51 28 0.35
 Personal leave of absence 114 0.65 65 0.69 49 0.61
 Military leave 106 0.61 54 0.57 52 0.64
 Jury leave 142 0.81 76 0.81 66 0.82
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aNumbers in parentheses represent proportion of units with at least 25% part-time workers.














Step 106 0.61 57 0.61 48 0.61
Merit 3 0.02 1 0.01 2 0.03
Combination of step and merit 5 0.03 4 0.04 1 0.01
COLA step 3 0.02 0 — 3 0.04
Rate set in contract, not necessarily step 48 0.27 30 0.32 18 0.22
Regular bonuses granted 15 0.09 11 0.12 4 0.05
Profit or gain-sharing 5 0.03 5 0.05 0 —
Training
Job training/in-service training paid by
employer
40 0.23 19 0.20 21 0.26
Continuing education 30 0.17 9 0.10 21 0.26
Tuition paid 45 0.26 15 0.16 30 0.37
Tuition for children/spouse 5 0.03 0 — 5 0.06
Employee involvement 
Labor/management committee 49 0.28 25 0.27 24 0.30
Equal number of union and management 27 0.15 13 0.14 14 0.17 (0.58)
No discussion of contractual issues 9 0.05 8 0.09 1 0.01 (0.04)
Service/product quality committee 5 0.03 4 0.04 1 0.01
Drug insurance 22 0.13 8 0.09 14 0.17
Workers compensation provision 55 0.31 24 0.26 31 0.38
Table 5.5  (continued)
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HoW	CoMPReHenSIVe	ARe	FIRST	ConTRACTS?
In order to assess just how comprehensive these first contracts are, 
we also examined whether and how these individual provisions cluster 
together. While there are a number of methods that could be used to 
evaluate the comprehensiveness of initial union agreements, we evalu-
ated the contracts in our sample based on whether they contained what 
we would consider a core set of provisions. This core includes anti-
discrimination clauses, grievance and arbitration, steward rights in in-
vestigating and processing grievances, union access, and seniority for 
layoff.4 While many contracts include important individual contract 
clauses, only 14 percent of the contracts in our sample contain all five of 
these core provisions. These data suggest that, while unions have made 
important strides in first contracts, considerably more work is necessary 
to achieve strong basic agreements. 
We need to recognize that good contracts, like organizing victories, 
don’t just happen. Given the increasing level of employer opposition to 
unions, extending all the way through the first-contract process, win-
ning first contract requires much more than simply good bargaining 
skills. As previous research has shown, unions can win first contracts 
only when they utilize a comprehensive, multifaceted, union-building 
strategy throughout both the organizing and the first-contract campaign 
(Bronfenbrenner 1996; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004). 
In the final analysis, the quality of the first contract that a union 
achieves is a direct product of their power—the power to stop or slow 
production, to interfere with companies’ profit centers, growth strate-
gies, or key relationships, or to bring influence to bear on the key deci-
sion makers of a larger employer. In the context of growing employer 
opposition, it is not enough to infer this power at the bargaining tables. 
Instead, unions that have successfully achieved stronger first agree-
ments have continued to use the same kind of comprehensive grassroots 
tactics inside and outside the workplace and in the broader community 
that helped them first achieve a union victory in the certification elec-
tion or card check recognition process and then throughout the first-
contract bargaining campaign that follows. These direct expressions of 
members support and activism—whether it be wearing union buttons or 
t-shirts, or holding solidarity days, community events, or mini-job ac-
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tions—combined with more indirect but still member-intensive lever-
age strategies involving customers, suppliers, regulators, or investors, 
are clear reminders to management of union power and are fundamental 
in achieving positive results.
Indeed, a cursory analysis of the data here suggest that, in those 
units where the union runs a moderately aggressive organizing cam-
paign, the likelihood that any of the five core elements will be included 
in a first contract rises between 5 and 20 percentage points. More ag-
gressive and strategic organizing and first-contract campaigns not only 
increase the probability of winning the organizing campaign and set-
tling the first contract, but also improves the quality and strength of the 
first contracts themselves.
Clearly, more energy and attention need to be devoted to develop-
ing and implementing more comprehensive and strategic first-contract 
campaigns. In addition to running more aggressive first-contract cam-
paigns, unions need to work together to share hallmark first-contract 
language and to explore creative contract language. One of the dis-
couraging findings of this research is that few contracts contained lan-
guage addressing job loss, staffing, mandatory overtime, technological 
change, privatization, and plant closing—crucial issues facing workers 
today. While these are difficult issues to take on even in mature bargain-
ing relationships, unions need to begin addressing these issues in first 
agreements.
It is also important to recognize that first-contract language is sim-
ply that—language—until and unless the union does what it takes to 
implement and enforce what it has negotiated in the agreement. Anti-
discrimination language is worthless if members of a local union are too 
intimidated to file and follow through on grievances, or the local leader-
ship fails to take discrimination violations seriously. Seniority and bid-
ding language are meaningless if the union turns a blind eye when less 
senior workers are moved into higher-paying jobs. 
While we have not gathered data on the operation and effectiveness 
of the local unions where these first contracts were negotiated, we sug-
gest that the shape and scope of the organizing and first-contract cam-
paign is a major predictor of a local’s ability to use and enforce a first 
contract to its fullest. Campaigns that develop and utilize representative 
rank-and-file leadership, and that start acting like a union long before 
the first contract is reached, are much more likely to already have in 
Blocketal.indb   110 3/2/2006   9:00:04 AM
Significant Victories   111
place the leadership structure and membership involvement necessary 
to make the most of the first-contract language they negotiate. When 
both organizing and first-contract campaigns are weak, it not only leads 
to weaker first-contract language, but also to less capacity to utilize and 
enforce that language once the first contract is won.
CONCLUSIONS 
As we have seen, first contracts constitute significant victories 
for workers and their unions. These contracts provide important basic 
rights that go far beyond employment-at-will and institute a grievance 
procedure that allows for the enforcement of these rights. They also 
contain important restrictions on management rights, substituting se-
niority and equitable systems for the assignment of work, promotions, 
and layoffs, for arbitrary employer control. In addition, they establish 
an institutional presence for the union and the rank-and-file leadership 
in the workplace. Finally, first contracts establish, codify, and expand 
health insurance, pensions, and substantial paid leave benefits.
While some unions are more successful in some areas than oth-
ers, clearly these contracts provide the foundation for a fundamentally 
different employment relationship than that which existed prior to the 
union organizing campaign. We must remember that these agreements 
are only the first in what typically become stronger agreements over 
time. The establishment of a grievance system, just cause, union access, 
and stewards’ rights is an enormous accomplishment for workers and 
unions confronting employers who for decades clung to their absolute 
“right to manage” and who fought the union organizing effort with ev-
erything they could. Even if less than comprehensive, these agreements 
make significant inroads into management prerogatives and, in future 
negotiations, leave room to strengthen and expand these inroads into 
management control. 
Our findings also suggest that union first contracts could be more 
comprehensive. While this does not diminish the significant victories 
that the first contracts we studied represent, it reminds us of the promise 
and potential for strong first contracts and the strong unions that go with 
them. Workers risk so much to bring a union into their workplace; it is 
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imperative that the labor movement do everything in its power to ensure 
that the contracts they achieve, and the unions they build, make those 
risks worthwhile. 
Notes
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Ian Campbell, Chad Apaliski, David Turner, and Robert Glase for research assistance. 
We would also like to acknowledge the editorial assistance of Beth Berry.
 1.   The 55 contracts in the first private sector study were based on the 119 elections 
won in a random sample of 261 organizing campaigns that took place between 
July 1986 and June 1987. Copies of the first contracts were collected from 55 
(69 percent) of the 80 negotiators who returned surveys in units where the first 
contract was reached (Bronfenbrenner 1996). The 39 contracts collected in the 
second private sector study were based on 155 elections and 18 voluntary recog-
nitions won from a random sample of 525 NLRB organizing campaigns that took 
place from 1993 to 1995 (Bronfenbrenner 1997b). First contracts were collected 
for 39 (59 percent) of the 69 returned surveys from campaigns where a first 
contract was won. The 81 contracts collected in the third study were based on 
the 149 elections won from a random sample of 250 state and local certification 
elections in 1991 and 1992. First contracts were collected in 81 (63 percent) of 
the 129 cases in our sample where the election or voluntary recognition was won 
(Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1998).
 2.   Anyone interested in a copy of the instrument we developed to conduct the 
content analysis should contact the authors at juravich@lrrc.umass.edu or 
klb23@cornell.edu.
 3.   We did not include wage gains in these data because we were unable to obtain 
reliable information on the pre-organizing campaign base wage rate, since so few 
unorganized workplaces had established wage scales and employers frequently 
grant illegal wages increases during the course of the union campaign (Bronfen-
brenner 2001).
 4.  These five fundamentals are defined as follows: race and gender discrimination 
plus at least one of the following antidiscrimination clauses: union activity, age, 
sexual harassment, sexual orientation, family status, handicap, or national ori-
gin; just cause; steward release time to investigate and process grievances (paid 
or unpaid); at least some union access (liberal or restricted); and seniority for 
layoffs.
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Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law 
Any serious observer of the U.S. economy will notice the growth of 
low-wage jobs. Concentrated in the service sector, these jobs are marked 
not only by low wages but also by fluctuating and low hours, few or no 
benefits, few opportunities for upward mobility, and little worker voice. 
Welfare reform and its failure to reduce poverty have increased policy 
attention to this set of jobs. But solutions that truly address and improve 
job quality in the service sector are elusive. Minimum wage increases 
and living-wage campaigns get at part of the problem, but even if fully 
implemented they simply are not enough—they raise the wage floor 
but have no direct influence on what happens above it, or on dimen-
sions other than wages. Absent any truly revolutionary changes in the 
nation’s other labor market institutions, unions may be the most promis-
ing institution for the improvement of these bad jobs. 
At the same time, any serious observer of the U.S. labor movement 
will notice plummeting membership and declining union density. Typi-
cally strong in the manufacturing sector, unions have watched as the 
economy has literally grown away from them. With private sector union 
density down to 8.2 percent in 2003, the challenges for labor movement 
are clear. And while solutions must be developed at a number of levels, 
the baseline answer of organizing is equally clear, with one principal 
target: low-wage service jobs. 
In this chapter we discuss some of the evidence about low-wage 
service work, what unions do for these jobs, and whether there is a real 
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future for the labor movement in these industries. We draw especially 
on in-depth field work conducted on the hotel industry and the main 
union representing hotel workers in major metropolitan areas. 
THe	“bAd	jobS”	PRobLeM	In	THe	SeRVICe	SeCToR
The deterioration of the U.S. wage structure over the past three de-
cades has been well documented, but it is important to take a closer 
look at some of the dynamics involved. Figure 6.1 looks at job growth 
between 1973 and 1999, and documents the clear shift toward service 
industries that offer both low wages and low union density. 
But these industries and the jobs they contain are quite diverse. Ta-
ble 6.1 lists some of the key service industries that have high concentra-
tions of low-wage jobs, as well as examples of some of the occupations 
and wages involved. Note the high percentages of low-wage workers, 
using both a stringent and a more generous definition; the very low rate 
of unionization, with the exception of grocery stores; and the complete 
absence of median wages in the double digits. 
In the United States, low-wage jobs also generally come with a set 
of other negative attributes. Especially in the service sector, they tend 
to be short term and high turnover, meaning that yearly earnings are 
forced down by both bad pay and insufficient hours (Lane 2000). More-
over, those hours tend to change frequently and include night shifts and 
other awkward hours. Low-wage jobs are also much less likely to offer 
health care and pension benefits. In 2000, just 33 percent of the lowest-
paid fifth of workers received employer-provided health insurance, and 
only 18 percent had some form of employer-provided pension; these 
rates of coverage are less than half those of median workers (Mishel, 
Bernstein, and Boushey 2003). Training is an additional area where 
low-wage workers are at a clear disadvantage. In 1995, just 22 percent 
of workers in the bottom quintile received training from their employ-
ers, compared with 40 percent of top quintile workers (Ahlstrand et al. 
2001). Similarly, a low-wage worker’s chances for upward mobility are 
severely limited and have become even more so in recent years. Bern-
hardt et al. (2001) document a substantial increase over the past three 
decades in the share of white male workers stuck in “low-wage careers” 
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Figure 1. U.S. Job Growth, 1973-2001, and Wages, 2001
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Figure 6.1  U.S. Job Growth, 1973–2001, and Wages, 2001 (with 2001 union density in parentheses)
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Examples of low-wage 
occupations Median wage ($)
Retail food stores 50.0 89.2 19.0 Cashiers 6.97
Stock clerks and order 
fillers
7.93
Retail nonfood stores 44.4 85.6 2.1 Retail salespersons 7.56
Cashiers 6.87
Eating and drinking 
places
68.5 94.6 1.9 Food preparation and 
serving workers
6.43
Waiters and waitresses 6.38
Building services 40.4 86.5 8.5 Janitors and cleaners 7.39
Maids and housekeeping 
cleaners
7.29
Personnel supply and 
other business services
24.3 73.2 14.3 Telemarketers 8.34
Mail clerks (except 
postal service)
8.56
Repair services 27.5 79.5 3.8 Parking lot attendants 7.37
Taxi drivers and  
chauffeurs
8.17
Table 6.1 Examples of Service Industries with High Percentages of Low-Wage Workers, 2001
B
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Hotels, motels, etc. 46.5 88.3 11.7 Maids and housekeeping 
cleaners
7.09
Hotel, motel, and resort 
desk clerks
7.84
Beauty and barber 
shops 






Entertainment and  
recreation services







Nursing and personal 
care facilities
35.5 85.6 12.0 Nursing aides, orderlies, 
and attendants
8.61
Maids and housekeeping 
cleaners
7.43
Social services 37.4 81.1 6.8 Child care workers 7.15
Personal and home care 
aides
7.83
NOTE: Poverty line used here is the official federal poverty line for a family of four.
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group files, 2001.
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over the long term, rising from 12 percent of the 1960s and 1970s, to 
close to 30 percent in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, and perhaps worst 
of all, low-wage workers usually get very little respect and have no 
voice in their jobs.
Bad jobs are a premier American problem. More than a quarter of 
workers earn poverty wages, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
projects substantial growth in service jobs that require at most a high 
school degree. It is clear that devising strategies around this sector is 
one of the great challenges of the twenty-first century. Will unions be a 
significant force in this effort?
THE HOTEL INDUSTRy RESEARCH
For our discussion of what unions can do for low-wage jobs, we 
rely principally on our own research on the hospitality industry. Ber-
nhardt, Dresser, and Hatton (2003) discuss research methods, general 
industry trends, and findings in greater detail. Briefly, the core of our 
research consists of in-depth case studies of eight hotels in four U.S. 
cities. These cities are major business, convention, and urban tourist 
markets and rank in the top 30 hospitality markets nationwide. They 
also are all characterized by strong competition, an expanding hotel 
sector, a rapidly changing labor pool, and wage trends that mirror na-
tional changes over the past several decades. In each city, we selected 
one union hotel and one nonunion hotel for our case studies, with two of 
the cities having high union density in the hotel industry, and the other 
two having low density.1 
Our choice of hotels was restricted to high-end, full-service “Class 
A” hotels that cater to the business, convention, and tourist markets. 
Partly, this ensures comparability and simplifies design. Additionally, 
Class A hotels typically have high profit margins, averaging between 20 
and 40 percent in our case studies. If there is any potential for the “high 
road” in this decidedly low-wage industry, it will be found here. 
We focused our field work on those departments where the majority 
of low-wage and lesser-educated workers are employed: the housekeep-
ing department (responsible for the cleaning of rooms and public areas), 
and food and beverage services (restaurants, banquets, and room ser-
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vice). These jobs embody the archetype of low-wage, dead-end service 
jobs—room cleaners, dishwashers, bussers, cooks—with the exception 
that they are more back-breaking than many.
HOTEL INDUSTRy RESTRUCTURING 
Hospitality is an $86.5 billion a year industry that employs roughly 
1.9 million workers in over 40,000 establishments nationwide. It is a 
highly urban industry (metropolitan areas account for about two-thirds 
of the rooms) and, until recently, a fast-growing one (employment al-
most tripled between 1970 and 2000). Like almost every sector of the 
economy, the industry has undergone pronounced changes over the past 
several decades in terms of competition, industry concentration, market 
segments, the organization of production, and corporate governance. 
And, as is the case with a number of other service industries, these 
changes have been largely domestic—they cannot be explained by ei-
ther globalization or technology, perhaps the two most commonly iden-
tified reasons for changes in low-wage jobs. Globalization is not the 
core issue for the obvious reason that much of what hotels do is firmly 
rooted in time and place: the rooms and casinos themselves aren’t mov-
able, and neither are the workers who make the beds and dice the vege-
tables. To the extent that globalization has had a direct impact, the large 
influx of less-educated immigrant workers in recent years has clearly 
enabled some low-wage business strategies (see Cranford 1998). Nor 
has technology significantly affected frontline work. The bread and but-
ter services of hotels—cleaning rooms, preparing and serving food and 
beverages—remain, at heart, labor-intensive processes.2 
The real change in hospitality has been the increasing emphasis on 
cost cutting. On the ground, intensifying competition and performance 
pressures have resulted in organizational restructuring to cut costs and 
increase revenue flows. Industry analysts explain this effort to “trim 
the fat” as a response to the overbuilding and overindulgence of the 
1980s, when hotels were built without regard to demand and amenities 
were offered without regard for price (Bernstein 1999). The prevailing 
dictum in the industry today is “do more with less” (Gillette 1995). Yet 
at the same time, there has also been a push to provide more and better 
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quality service (Marinko 1991). This obvious tension is rarely solved 
successfully. At present, most hotels seem to be focusing on cutting 
costs first and improving service quality second. 
As a result of the drive to reduce costs, the hotel industry has un-
dergone many of the negative trends in job quality and workplace reor-
ganization that have been documented in other service industries: stag-
nant wages, increased workloads, growing use of subcontracting and 
outsourcing, lack of voice, and so forth. These trends have been borne 
largely by frontline workers in the housekeeping and food and bever-
age departments, in jobs that require at most a high school degree and 
that have few characteristics, such as “skills,” that can yield leverage 
in negotiating over job quality and the reorganization of the workplace. 
Have unions been able mitigate the effect of firm restructuring on work-
ers, and if so, under what conditions?
WHAT UNIONS DO FOR WORkERS IN THE  
HOTEL INDUSTRy
Hospitality offers a perfect industry for studying the potential of 
unions in the service sector.3 Mirroring the national declines, coverage 
in the hotel industry has fallen substantially over the last two decades, 
though at 12 percent it still exceeds the national private sector rate of 
less than 10 percent. Metropolitan areas in particular have relatively 
high unionization rates; in 2000, metro-area hotel union membership 
was 13.8 percent (see Table 6.2) and, in a number of large business and 
tourist destinations, unionization rates can exceed 50 percent. Yet in 
other comparable cities, only a small handful of hotels are organized. 
As described at the outset, we explicitly captured this variation in our 
research design, studying both union and nonunion hotels, in both high- 
and low-density cities.4 
The question, then, is whether unions have been able to mediate 
the form that hotel restructuring has taken, under which conditions, and 
along which dimensions. As summarized in Table 6.3, we focus on the 
following key aspects of industry restructuring: wages, work intensity, 
hours and scheduling, subcontracting, and career ladders. We examine 
each in turn and analyze the role that unions have played in negotiat-
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ing the issue in the context of high and low union density, as well as 
union and nonunion hotels. Taken altogether, we find that unions have 
been able to make significant progress on some but not all fronts, and 
that very often their success is a function of hotel union density in the 
region.
Wages
First and foremost, unions matter in this industry because they in-
fluence wages. In 2000, overall unionized hotel workers in metropoli-
tan areas earned 17 percent more per hour than nonunionized workers 
(see Table 6.2). If we narrow the scope to frontline workers (the focus 
of our study), the union wage effect grows even larger, to 30 percent. 
For full-time, year-round workers, the union wage advantage provides 
more than $4,900 dollars of annual income: at $10.37 per hour, full-
time union hotel workers earn $21,570, while their nonunion counter-
parts earning $8.00 bring in just $16,640 per year. It is noteworthy that 
the union’s wage effect is strongest for the lowest-paid occupations. 
Janitors and food preparers stand to gain the most from representation, 
with a national union wage premium of 39.5 percent and 36.0 percent 
in 2000, respectively. For bartenders and baggage porters, who earn sig-
nificantly more, the premium was 19.1 and 19.4 percent, respectively 
(Hirsch and Macpherson 2001).
1983 1989 1995 2000
Percent union members 14.5 15.0 14.8 13.80
All workers
Union median hourly wage ($) 8.87 9.73 9.04 10.50
Nonunion median hourly wage ($) 7.79 7.65 7.91 9.00
Union/nonunion wage ratio 1.14 1.27 1.14 1.17
Nonmanagerial workers only
Union median hourly wage ($) 8.82 9.73 9.04 10.37
Nonunion median hourly wage ($) 7.09 7.30 7.35 8.00
Union/nonunion wage ratio 1.24 1.33 1.23 1.30
Table 6.2  Unions and Wages in the Hotel Industry,  
U.S. Metropolitan Areas
NOTE: All wages in 2000 dollars.
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group 
files.
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Dimension of restructuring Union effect? Degree of effect Relevant conditions
Wages Yes Within markets, union wages higher by 
$0.25 to $1.70 per hour.
Union density matters more than union 
presence—high-density wages $3.00 
higher than low-density wages.
Work intensity Some Work intensity is at the forefront of labor-
management relations.
Some union hotels have lower workloads 
(as measured by room quotas).
Some hotels make sure that workers get 
paid for the added work (in the case of 
cross-training). 
Strongest effects are seen in high-density 
cities, but not always apparent even there.
Hours and scheduling Some Hours and scheduling are at the forefront 
of labor–management relations.
Successful protection of full-time jobs 
seen in some cities.
Strongest effects are seen in high-density 
cities.
Union attention and priority to this area 
critical.
Subcontracting Some, but 
weak
In some cities, subcontracting of restau-
rants has been resisted and/or effects on 
workers have been mitigated through ne-
gotiations. Most other forms of outsourc-
ing are unchallenged. 
Strongest effects are seen in high-density 
cities, especially where unions are mak-
ing this a priority.
Career ladders Little Not relevant. Only in germination stage where density 
is high. 
Table 6.3  The Effect of Unions on Firm Restructuring in Eight Case Study Hotels
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Among our case study hotels, union wages were higher than non-
union wages, but just slightly so (the premium within any one city ranged 
from 25 cents per hour to $1.70). Far more important was union density. 
As a vice president of hotel operations for a major hotel observed, “In 
a union town, you pay if you’re nonunion. In a nonunion town, you 
pay if you’re union.” The highest-paying hotels in our study, whether 
unionized or not, were located in high-density cities. In these hotels, 
housekeepers start at well over $10.00 per hour (and in one city, both 
union and nonunion hotels pay over $13.00). By contrast, the worst-
paying hotels in our study were located in a low-density city, where 
housekeeping wages started between $6.00 and $7.00 per hour, regard-
less of whether the hotel was unionized or not.5 Our case study finding 
on the important wage effect of union density also echoes Waddoup’s 
(1999) research on the effects of union density on Las Vegas nonunion 
wages in hotels, and more representative studies across industries (Bel-
man and Voos 1993; Neumark and Wachter 1995). 
That unions matter for wages may seem a mundane point. But in 
this low-wage, heavily immigrant service industry, it is clear that many 
workers still see this as the principal role and benefit of the union. Union 
leaders themselves consistently pointed to higher wages as their key 
contribution to the workforce, and they were consistently cited as a top 
priority in future contract negotiations. In fact, one union leader pointed 
out that the importance of wage demands in bargaining is increased 
by the diversity of hotel union membership: only the housekeepers 
(generally one-half or less of total union membership) care about room 
quotas, while only food and beverage workers care about restaurant 
subcontracting, but all workers can rally around wage increases. As a 
result, for both unions and their members, higher wages remain the cen-
tral benefit and priority of the union.6
Work Intensity
Since restructuring has often resulted in increased workloads for 
many frontline hotel workers, the issue has become a critical focal 
point for both unions and their workers. For example, housekeepers 
have witnessed a bewildering increase in amenities in recent years, 
from in-room coffee pots to the ever more elaborate bedding and pil-
low schemes. We found that workers in union hotels had a much higher 
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sense of awareness about increasing workloads and their rights in this 
process. Most union workers we interviewed could automatically recite 
the contract rules on workload, and could remember precisely when 
certain amenities were added and how conflicts over their addition were 
resolved. This sense of history and awareness was clearly less present 
at nonunion hotels. 
However, in the end, it is not clear the extent to which unions and/
or union density have been able to stop the speed-up of work. For ex-
ample, all of the hotels we studied required between 14 and 17 rooms 
per housekeeper per day. Still, 3 rooms a day can make a big difference, 
and it is no coincidence that the low quota (14 rooms) was posted by a 
union hotel in a high-density city, and the high quota (17 rooms) was 
posted by a nonunion hotel in a low-density city. But all the other hotels 
in our study required 16 rooms per day. 
Similarly, the main work intensity issue in kitchens is cross-train-
ing, and unions have generally not been able to staunch the inroads 
of this practice. However, they have been able to ensure that workers 
get compensated fairly when assigned to another job (that is, get paid 
a higher rate when working a higher level job), which is often not the 
case in nonunion hotel kitchens. For example, one worker at a nonunion 
hotel expressed intense frustration that he, classified as a basic cook, is 
often required to do the same work as an advanced cook but is paid $4 
less an hour. 
Unions have had the most success in bringing issues of workload 
to the forefront of labor–management relations, ensuring that speed-up 
is at least negotiated and duly compensated. In a few cases (all in high-
density cities), unions have successfully forestalled attempts to increase 
workload altogether. There are also signs that this issue will gain priority 
in the future: several hotel locals we interviewed have begun to conduct 
their own time studies of different housekeeping and food-prep tasks in 
order to prepare stronger arguments against workload increases.
Hours and Scheduling
For both workers and managers in our hotels, the issues of hours, 
scheduling, and staffing level are all closely intertwined. A predominant 
image of the past is that hotels kept staff around even in slack times, 
assigning busy work and deep cleaning. But as firms have pushed to 
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cut costs and increase productivity, staffs are kept leaner to begin with, 
and workers who may have once waited idle during slow times are now 
sent home without pay. At the same time, firms are searching for ways 
to increase the efficiency of the staff that remain on site. It is not sur-
prising, then, that scheduling and hours of work are central concerns 
of all workers in the industry, and ones in which unions have played a 
critical role. 
In general, the scheduling strategy at union hotels has been to as-
sign work hours, shifts, and stations on the basis of seniority. This tra-
ditional structure allows the most senior worker to take all the work 
she is interested in (up to 40 hours), and on down the seniority list 
until the necessary work for the week is filled. Obviously, this system 
secures full-time, year-round employment for the most senior workers. 
By contrast, nonunion hotels employ much looser systems for schedul-
ing. Tenure matters in nonunion hotels, but managers report that they 
try to get their “best workers” the shifts they need and appreciate the 
flexibility that their own system allows. At these hotels, workers do not 
pay as much attention to the rules of shift, hour, and station assignment, 
as it is simply an area of management prerogative; although a number 
of workers we interviewed found fault with this system, often claiming 
favoritism, it had never occurred to them that it could be changed. 
The union’s long history of negotiating over scheduling issues has 
also aided its fight against another recent trend in the hotel industry: 
the conversion of full-time jobs into part-time jobs. Recent contracts 
in cities with high union density have begun to shape the definition of 
“part-time” and the rules for employment of (as well as the numbers of) 
part-time workers. One contract, for example, required that everyone 
working two shifts or more a week would qualify for full-time benefits, 
to a large degree eliminating the advantages of converting full- into 
part-time jobs. In another city, the union contract contains explicit lan-
guage about the percentage of the workforce that can be classified as 
full-time, part-time, and “on call.”
Subcontracting
Subcontracting and outsourcing are ubiquitous in the hotel indus-
try, and unions have largely been unable to stop the trends, though in 
some instances they mitigate the effect of those trends on members. The 
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hardest subcontracting trend to fight has been the outsourcing of labor-
intensive kitchen tasks, such as baking, cleaning and chopping produce, 
and making stocks and sauces. The purchasing of prepared foods has 
become such a fundamental business strategy in the industry that it has 
been almost impossible for unions to stop it. In the end, the economics 
of using preprepared food are simply too compelling, and because the 
outsourcing is usually done piecemeal, the union would have to fight 
over just one or two jobs at a time. However, when the numbers of jobs 
involved are bigger and the economic advantages are less clear—for 
example, subcontracting an entire laundry unit—unions have been able 
to focus their efforts and have had somewhat more success, slowing or 
limiting the process. 
Additionally, unions in high-density cities have largely been able 
to resist the otherwise prevalent trend of subcontracting hotel restau-
rants.7 And sometimes, even in low-density cities, they have been able 
to negotiate the terms of the subcontracting. In one such instance, an 
interesting hybrid emerged: the hotel’s restaurant was subcontracted but 
the staff remained employees of the hotel and members of the union. 
In another example, a union hotel wanted to reduce staff and operation 
hours of its upscale restaurant. Union leadership negotiated a transi-
tion process, where the number of restaurant staff decreased over time 
through attrition and reassignment. While restructuring was not stopped 
in these instances, from the perspective of workers, this type of “man-
aged change” was a vast improvement over the way that subcontracting 
normally proceeds, most often with the dismissal of large numbers of 
workers.
Career Ladders
In theory, the dismal working conditions and wages described so 
far could be tempered by a strong system of internal promotion, so that 
entry-level workers quickly moved out of these bad jobs to good ones. 
But upward mobility in the hotel industry has always been, and remains 
today, severely circumscribed. 
The large majority of workers enter hotels via the housekeeping 
or food and beverage departments, where mobility opportunities are 
quite slim. Entry-level workers comprised a full 93–96 percent of the 
housekeeping department’s staff. Food and beverage departments are 
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not quite as heavily weighted toward the bottom but are also quite flat. 
In both divisions, frontline supervisors comprise only 1–5 percent of 
the staff, and senior managers only 1–3 percent. Moreover, while the 
job structure in the hotel industry has always been flat, in recent years 
there has been a trend toward eliminating many supervisory positions. 
For example, in seven of our eight hotels, the position of inspectress, a 
supervisory position, had been eliminated.
This grim lack of mobility opportunity, unfortunately, is character-
istic of both union and nonunion hotels; there simply are not many ca-
reer ladders in this industry, and the mere presence of a union does not 
create more middle-tier jobs. However, some hotel unions in high-den-
sity cities are beginning to focus on, and find ways of chipping away at, 
structural barriers to mobility. In one innovative program, for example, 
housekeepers are trained and employed as kitchen workers or servers 
during the winter season, when room occupancy is low, thus potentially 
opening up routes to promotion. However, this is in fact quite rare in the 
industry and is found only in several very high-density cities. 
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE HOTEL ExAMPLE?
Given the pervasive eulogies for the American labor movement, it 
is important to reiterate several basic lessons. First, in some settings 
unions have turned bad service jobs into much better jobs, providing 
better wages and benefits and improving workers’ understanding of the 
rules and power dynamics that affect their workplace. Second, union 
density matters, especially for establishing higher regional wage floors 
and improving other basic measures of job quality, such as workload. 
Third, unions can become a leading voice for immigrants, the fastest-
growing constituency of low-wage workers. 
In short, unions can play a substantial role in improving bad service 
jobs. Indeed, in the hotel industry, unions may stand as the single most 
effective institution for increasing the pay and quality of the jobs. Next 
we discuss factors that account for this success. 
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Density is Destiny
Like many service industries, hotels compete in local markets. In 
such situations, union density is absolutely critical for establishing 
worker-friendly wage, benefit, and workload norms. Where density is 
low, it is difficult if not impossible to move the few union hotels toward 
high wages by themselves. Nonunion hotels set the industry norm, and 
unions struggle to move much above those norms; the contracts they 
negotiate are often relatively weak. Where union density is high, a com-
pletely different dynamic emerges. Unions define the norm. Nonunion 
properties come close to (and sometimes even exceed) union contract 
wages in order to compete for workers and to convince their own staff 
that a union won’t have much effect. As in other sectors where com-
petition is local, high density in the hotel sector takes wages out of 
competition. 
The most successful hotel union locals across the United States 
have focused relentlessly on gaining and maintaining high density in 
their regional markets. In fact, both of the low-density cities we studied 
had actually been high density in the 1970s; but as the cities expanded, 
industry growth decimated density and unions moved from the center 
of wage determination to the periphery. But only in the cities where the 
hotel union maintains high density in the market do those unions set 
work standards.
Moreover, as we saw above, high union density allows progress on 
fronts other than simply wages and benefits. Once they have captured 
significant market share, unions can begin to address issues such as 
workload, cross-training, subcontracting, and the reorganization of job 
titles. And thus emerges a reinforcing cycle: density grows, unions be-
come more deeply engaged in the industry’s workforce and economic 
development, which more thoroughly cements labor’s role as a perma-
nent actor at the table. In the best cases, the union and union proper-
ties become allied in the project of strengthening and unionizing the 
industry. 
If density really is destiny, then low union representation in most 
cities and most sectors presents a substantial challenge. The observation 
should, however, support the idea of moving against multiple targets 
in a single region at once (a strategy Justice for Janitors among others 
has pursued), rather than diffuse “hot shop” approaches. Even within 
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regions, it argues for developing clear focus on the segments of an in-
dustry that can really deliver “density,” or the power to reshape the 
regional labor market. The point is that unions often measure success 
in membership, but securing the fruits of density requires more careful 
thinking about who the members and their employers are. 
Smart Organizing Strategies
The only way to get density, of course, is to organize. But in the 
hotel industry, organizing today looks different than it did 30 years ago. 
To preserve their density and vitality, successful locals have developed 
innovative strategies for organizing and expansion. The first of these 
strategies—bargaining to organize—uses leverage provided by existing 
labor–management relationships to extend union representation to oth-
er properties in the corporate chain. Interestingly, this strategy derives 
power from the increasing concentration of ownership in the hotel in-
dustry (a trend often regarded as negative). In fact, some union leaders 
we interviewed actually expressed a preference for more concentrated 
ownership because it provides leverage for expanding the union.
A second innovative strategy has been the involvement of hotel 
unions in the politics of the development of new properties. In fact, 
hotel unions are getting involved in development decisions as aggres-
sively as construction unions, and they are showing willingness to use 
labor’s political muscle to help promote organizing. In recent years, 
unions representing hotel workers have conditioned their political sup-
port for a specific development on the basis of guaranteed “card check” 
rules on organizing the property once it is running. From state federa-
tions, central labor councils, and a variety of internationals, the message 
is clear that union labor must not only build the property, but also work 
in it when it is complete. In many cities, getting such broad labor move-
ment consensus and support remains difficult, but strong leadership in 
some cities has made this possible. 
A third way that hotel unions, especially the Hotel Employees and 
Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE), have succeeded in 
organizing is through their efforts to connect in new ways with their in-
creasingly immigrant members.8 One way has been through increasing 
work with community groups on issues outside the workplace that face 
the community. The most obvious example is HERE’s early leadership 
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in encouraging amnesty for Mexican workers. Another example is one 
of the union contracts we studied, which provides for a set number of 
paid days off for workers to deal with immigration status problems. But 
perhaps the best illustration of sustained community involvement is the 
Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, where HERE worked with 
a number of local groups in passing the city’s living-wage law and a 
community-based development agreement.
Partnerships That Serve Labor and Management Alike
In several cities, successful hotel union locals have used their con-
nections with multiple properties to bring together regional partnerships 
that take on the key industry problems of recruitment, retention, train-
ing, leadership, and communication. For example, the San Francisco 
Hotels Partnership Project was formed to provide job security and solid 
compensation to workers, while also allowing for increased competi-
tiveness by the hotels. The Partnership achieves these ends through a 
“living contract,” which establishes an unprecedented structure to facil-
itate labor–management collaboration. The Partnership provides train-
ing and support to labor–management problem solving teams. To date, 
those teams have developed solutions to work restructuring issues, in-
creased training and skills for frontline workers, founded a pilot project 
to create career ladders in the industry, and built the communications 
and leadership skills of workers and managers at member properties.
In Las Vegas, the hotel union local has created the Culinary and 
Hospitality Academy (CHA) with a group of local hotel casinos. The 
academy provides skills training for all union workers, as well as class-
es in ESL, GED, and customer service skills. Since its inception, more 
than 16,000 workers have graduated from the academy and over 70 per-
cent have been placed in jobs. The training is cost-effective and highly 
tailored to the industry. Many hotels in Las Vegas treat the training cen-
ter as their main source of entry-level workers—even nonunion hotels 
hire the academy trainees. CHA has been able to secure this important 
role because it solves two critical problems facing the hotel and gaming 
industry in Las Vegas. First, it has solved severe recruitment and reten-
tion problems by providing a steady stream of workers to union hotels. 
Second, by successfully training recent immigrants and welfare leavers, 
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CHA has addressed the problems of lack of skills and work experience 
in the new workforce. 
Hotel unions, in both high- and low-density cities, have begun to 
look to these partnership strategies as another part of the complex pack-
age that can make their organizing and member services effective. No 
union leader hopes that the partnership strategy alone could possibly 
be enough. However, the opportunity to play a positive role in training 
and work restructuring is appealing because strength in this area can be 
leveraged for power in more contentious discussions. 
BARRIERS TO ExTENDING THE HOTEL MODEL
It is clear that some hotel union locals have significantly improved 
the quality of entry-level jobs in their industry. It is equally clear that 
such cases are the exception, not the rule. Can these model examples be 
usefully applied to the rest of the hotel industry as well as to other key 
service industries? To the extent that the successes described earlier are 
the result of a renewed focus on organizing and density as the driving 
engines of union power, the answer is yes. At the same time, there are 
several key barriers to extending the lessons described above to the rest 
of the service sector. 
First, many service industries are distinguished by small firms and 
small units, unlike the core of the hotel industry, where large properties 
and large chains dominate. In big cities, organizing 20 major hotels can 
get you substantial density; organizing 20 restaurants is a drop in the 
bucket. In recognition of this problem, The Service Employees Inter-
national Union (SEIU) got to critical density in LA’s home health care 
market by forcing the public sector, which funded home health services, 
to admit to and act as the employer of record in the sector. So it is clear 
that there are some solutions to the problem; but the route to high den-
sity in many sectors remains mired with the problem of so many small 
units.
Second, workforce turnover is a substantial service sector prob-
lem and one that makes organizing notoriously difficult. While hotels 
complain about having 30 percent turnover, the turnover rates in retail, 
restaurants, and health care (specifically certified nursing assistants) of-
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ten exceed 100 and even 200 percent. In these sectors, high turnover 
reduces the solidarity of staff, impedes the development of frontline 
union advocates, and makes getting to a vote, or predicting the result of 
that vote, difficult. Unions are challenged to find ways to break into the 
dynamic before they can even get the firm organized.
Third, hotel unions have focused on the high end of the market, 
where profit margins can run 20–40 percent and can therefore sustain 
wage increases. But in a number of key service industries, margins are 
much smaller. The margin problem is most acute in caregiving sectors. 
Consider child care, an industry with very low profit margins, where 
many businesses already commit more than 70 percent of gross rev-
enues to wages, and where customers (parents) are unlikely to be able 
to afford higher costs. Or take health care, where the flow of funds for 
home health and nursing home work is constrained by the government, 
which pays for the services through Medicare and Medicaid. In both of 
these cases, the service being provided is qualitatively different from 
hotels: it is a high-cost public good, and resolving the chronic problems 
in job and care quality will ultimately require increased (perhaps even 
comprehensive) public funding and will not be solved by organizing 
alone.
These problems for union organizing in the service sector are often 
observed. But the fact that some union locals in hotels, health care, 
building services, and telecommunications have found a way around 
these problems should inspire confidence that innovative forms of or-
ganizing can be developed throughout the service sector. For example, 
public money is central to child care and health care, and quality care 
is clearly linked to the quality of jobs. Leveraging public money and 
public interest could potentially replicate SEIU’s success in Los An-
geles across the country. Large corporate chains are found not only in 
hotels but in other service industries as well, and are often the drivers 
of industry standards. But it is clear that one size of organizing won’t fit 
all service industries and all regions. Unions will have to come up with 
a variety of strategies if they hope to get membership and density to 
levels that will allow them to influence the quality of jobs in the service 
sector. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is clear potential to build a mutually beneficial relationship 
between service workers (in what are usually bad jobs) and the labor 
movement (which can improve those jobs). Under a regime of firm re-
structuring that is systematically undermining job quality at the front 
line, unions are one of the few institutions that actually make real con-
tributions in terms of wages and work organization. It is also the case 
that unions have little choice in the matter: the U.S. labor movement is 
dead unless it aggressively pursues and succeeds in organizing bad ser-
vice jobs. The good news is that there are plenty of jobs to work with, 
and that some strategies seem to be bearing fruit in terms of organizing 
success. A dismal legal and legislative climate notwithstanding, the ball 
is firmly in the organizing court.
Notes
The authors would like to thank the Rockefeller and Russell Sage Foundations for their 
generous support of this project. Our collaborators, Deborah Moy, Erin Hatton, and 
Helen Moss, contributed an enormous amount of insight and direction at every stage 
of the research. Matt Zeidenberg and Pablo Mitnik have provided important assistance 
on the analysis of service sector jobs. For their invaluable comments the authors would 
also like to thank Eileen Appelbaum, Rose Batt, Thomas Kochan, Eric Parker, Jeff 
Rickert, Joel Rogers, Jeffrey Waddoups, Howard Wial, and Erik Olin Wright, as well as 
the numerous participants in our case study research.
 1.  Specifically, hotels with unions representing the frontline workforce were identi-
fied as “union hotels.” In each of the four towns, the Hotel Employees and Res-
taurant Employees International Union (HERE) represented the workers at the 
union hotels.
 2.  The only place where technology appears to have had a substantial labor effect 
is in recent advances in the packaging, refrigeration, and delivery of precut foods 
(Baumann 1997). These new systems have enabled a rather pronounced shift in 
the hotel industry to buying prepared foods (e.g., diced onions, soup stock, sliced 
meats), rather than making them from scratch in house. This shift has clearly 
moved frontline jobs to subcontractors.
 3.  This section draws heavily on Bernhardt, Dresser, and Hatton (2003, pp. 57–
63).
 4.  In each city, we worked with union leadership to identify geographic boundaries, 
the numbers of workers, hotels, and rooms in each market segment, and finally, 
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the union/nonunion breakdown on each count. We do not here present the exact 
density estimates (again to protect the anonymity of the cities and their hotels), 
but on all measures, two of the cities have high hotel union density and two have 
low hotel union density.
 5.  Authors’ analysis of these data shows that wages do not simply reflect differ-
ences in the cost of living in these cities. 
  6. Furthermore, these higher wages may also indirectly benefit the hotels them-
selves by reducing turnover rates (which some industry insiders estimate costs 
the hotel $5,000 per employee [see Worcester 1999]). As the president of a large 
hotel corporation observed: “Unions buy long-term commitment. Once they’re 
in, [the employees] generally stick around.” 
 7.  Both of our unionized hotels in high-density cities had no subcontracted restau-
rants.
 8.  When we did this research, HERE was a distinct union. In July 2004, HERE and 
The Union of Needletrades, Textiles and Industrial Employees (UNITE) merged 
to form UNITE HERE.
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Dancing with the Smoke Monster
Employer Motivations for Negotiating 





Heads would spin on some of the old local managers who had 
spent years opposing the union. But there have been many con-
versions to the new philosophy. The horror of unionization wanes 
with the reality of it. It turns out to be a smoke monster, not a real 
monster.
 —Manager describing internal reaction to the negotiation of a   
 neutrality and card check agreement.
For decades the labor movement in the United States, along with 
many industrial relations and legal scholars, has argued that the union 
recognition procedures provided under national labor law do not suf-
ficiently protect workers’ rights to join, form, or assist unions. In par-
ticular, the requirement of an election, the procedures leading up to an 
election, and the timing of those procedures allow employers to un-
dertake extensive antiunion campaigns that at best undermine worker 
free choice and at worst violate the law. This was not always so. Under 
section 9(c) of the original National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the 
National Labor Relation Board (NLRB) was permitted to certify unions 
using “secret ballot elections or utiliz[ing] any other suitable method.” 
Until a board policy change in 1939, the method most often used was 
the simple process of evaluating cards signed by workers indicating 
they wanted the union to represent them. If a majority of the workforce 
signed such cards, the board certified the union. The Taft-Hartley Act 
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took away the board’s discretion as to the method used to verify major-
ity status. However, employers may still recognize a union voluntarily 
based on cards.
Referencing this earlier experience in the United States, the use of 
similar procedures in several Canadian provinces (Thomason 1994; 
Thomason and Pozzebon 1998), and the chilling effect of legal and il-
legal management resistance in this country, some proposals for com-
prehensive labor law reform call for a return to card check recognition 
procedures (for the most recent discussion see Godard [2003]). In the 
absence of this or any other reform, unions have increasingly negoti-
ated agreements directly with employers to use card check recognition 
procedures as well as to remain neutral on the subject of union organiz-
ing. In a recent study (Eaton and Kriesky 2001), we conclude that these 
types of agreements, particular those calling for card checks, substan-
tially reduce management campaigning—including illegal tactics such 
as firing union supporters—and produce much greater rates of union 
success. For example, across organizing campaigns under all types of 
organizing agreements, we estimate a union win rate of 67.7 percent 
compared to an NLRB election win rate of 45.6 percent over roughly 
the same time period.1 Thus, these agreements have the potential to en-
hance the exercise of workers’ rights to collective bargaining and free-
dom of association. 
This chapter serves as a follow-up to Eaton and Kriesky (2001). 
While the sources for that study were primarily interviews with union 
representatives and the review of contract language, this study focuses 
on management’s experience with these agreements. In interviews with 
representatives of 34 employing organizations, we explore the reasons 
management has agreed to negotiate neutrality and card check agree-
ments (N/CC), their impact on management campaigning, and reactions 
to N/CC from the employer’s own management team and the broader 
management community. We use these interviews to shed light on two 
overarching questions. Do these agreements actually encourage greater 
management respect for workers’ rights to freely decide whether or not 
they want union representation, or are employers who agree to N/CC 
softer in their opposition to unions to start with? To what extent is the 
source of managerial antiunionism economic and rational, as some of 
the literature suggested (Freeman and Kleiner 1990; Kleiner 2001), and 
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to what extent is it rooted in management values, ideology, and culture 
(Jacoby 1991) that deny workers’ rights?  
The chapter is organized as follows. We first provide a description 
of the sample of employers interviewed. Next we present a comprehen-
sive discussion of the reasons respondents gave for negotiating these 
agreements. This discussion follows the logic of earlier studies of em-
ployer opposition to union organizing, in assuming employers make 
cost/benefit analyses in deciding whether or not to accept N/CC lan-
guage. We follow with a section on the impact of these agreements on 
managerial campaigning. Next we look at reactions to the negotiation 
of these agreements from both the internal and external management 
communities. Finally, we conclude with an analysis of the broader 
meaning of these results for the nature of managerial antiunionism in 
the United States. 
SAMPLE AND METHODS
The sample was drawn from the same companies that were in our 
original survey (Eaton and Kriesky 2001).2 There was substantial at-
trition from our original list of about 130 agreements from various 
sources, including the merger or failure of companies and bad contact 
information.3 Elimination of these categories brought us down to 69 
organizations. Of these, 10 refused outright, 20 refused passively by 
failing to reply to our repeated attempts to contact them, and 5 told us 
they either never had or no longer had an organizing agreement, leav-
ing us with 34 interviews, some only partially done. This constitutes a 
response rate of about 50 percent. 
Based on our previous research, the industries represented in this 
employer-based study correspond fairly closely to the industries in 
which these agreements have been concentrated (see Table 9.1). The 
bulk of the interviews (19) were conducted with representatives from 
steel, hotel and gaming, telecommunications, and auto assembly and 
supply. Most respondents were high-level human resource or labor re-
lations executives, often at the vice president level. In some cases, we 
talked instead to lower-level, facility-based labor relations managers. 
Most often, the level of the manager interviewed was the individual 
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whose scope of responsibility included oversight or implementation 
of the organizing agreements within the organization. Interviews were 
conducted over the phone and lasted from 30 to 90 minutes. 
Table 9.2 presents data regarding unionization in the sample orga-
nizations. Research in the 1980s provided evidence that labor relations 
strategy, specifically union avoidance, was explained in part by union 
density: high density employers were less likely to pursue active avoid-
ance strategies (Cooke and Meyer 1990; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 
1986, p. 60). Thus, we would expect companies that have agreed to 
neutrality and card check to also have high union density. Indeed, our 
sample tilts toward heavily unionized companies dominated by a single 
union perceived to have a great deal of bargaining power. Still, almost 
a quarter of the companies have low union density (0–25 percent), in-
dicating that unions are pursuing neutrality and card check as both a 
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growth strategy (expanding into new employers and markets) and a de-
fensive strategy (maintaining representation among traditionally orga-
nized employers and businesses). 
Some observers have argued that it is important to look beyond gen-
eral density to concentration of union power, most often indicated by 
centralization of representation by a single union.4 Table 9.2 also in-
cludes data on the percentage of unionized workers represented by the 
single largest union. It is interesting to note that in the 14 cases where 
overall density is 50 percent or below, there is still a single dominant 




















Dominant union has a great deal of  
   bargaining power
Strongly agree or agree 22.0 68.8
Neutral 7.0 21.9
Strongly disagree or disagree 3.0 9.4
Table 9.2  Unionization Levels in the Sample Organizations
a This is the current percentage. But in most cases, the agreements have not led to 
major increases in density.
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union in all but two, suggesting that concentration of union representa-
tion may be a more important factor in winning organizing agreements 
than overall density. At the same time, the very low-density cases are 
also those with the weakest and most ineffective language.
Given union motivations for negotiating these agreements, we 
found it surprising (and not quite credible) that the majority of our re-
spondents claimed that unionization rates had been stable in their or-
ganizations at the time they first agreed to N/CC. Less surprising is the 
final result in Table 9.2: that employers consider the unions, to whom 
they have had to concede organizing agreements, to have a great deal of 
bargaining power. Interestingly, the most frequently mentioned sources 
of that bargaining power were the density of the union within the firm 
or organization and the union’s political connections.
NEGOTIATIONS
It is difficult to quantify the motivations for bargaining organiz-
ing agreements. Relying on existing industrial relations literature, we 
use a cost/benefit framework to organize the issues employers reported 
considering in deciding whether to agree to some form of organizing 
language.5 We extend the cost side of the discussion by using a con-
ventional framework for analyzing bargaining power, which weighs 
the projected cost of not agreeing to an opponent’s proposal against 
the projected cost of agreeing to that proposal. Although in each case, 
the parties weigh their particular cost and benefit estimates in deciding 
whether to enter into a neutrality agreement, below we summarize the 
sample as a whole on the benefits and two types of costs. The specific 
costs and benefits reported are listed in Table 9.3. 
benefits	of	Agreeing
The majority of respondents emphasized that in negotiating orga-
nizing agreements, they were attempting to avoid costs. However, a 
significant minority emphasized instead the benefits of agreeing. Most 
of the benefits anticipated focus on the value that unions can add to the 
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business or to a particular business strategy. There were several differ-
ent specific examples of unions adding value. 
In two cases, respondents emphasized union–management partner-
ship as their dominant strategic goal in negotiating organizing agree-
ments. In both, these employers had decided to pursue business strate-
gies that were tied to embracing a strong role for unions and employees 
in management decision making. To establish such significant partner-
ing required recognizing the union’s legitimate interest in representing 
workers’ rights in the workplace and in their own institutional survival 
and growth. Other employers engaged in partnerships, particularly those 
involving the United Steelworkers of America, also talked about part-
nership, formal or informal, and union willingness to negotiate more 
flexible agreements. This includes the recognition in new bargaining 
Table 9.3 Employer Objectives in Negotiating Organizing Agreements
Benefits of agreeing
Union willing to add value to the business
Labor–management partnership 
Assistance in increased funding for nonprofits
Assistance in obtaining qualified, skilled labor
Assistance in attracting business/customers
Maintenance of good relations with workforce
Ability to shape organizing campaigns 
Costs of not agreeing
Work stoppage (18)
Loss of specific, needed concessions
Organizational picketing





Increased wages and benefits (13)
Decreased attractiveness as takeover/merger target
Loss of flexibility
Loss of employee rights
Loss of cooperative, nontraditional work culture
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agreements that new business lines might not be able to support the 
same wage levels or work rules as in the traditional businesses. Specific 
examples of this union response are detailed in the section on costs of 
agreeing.
One company, an auto parts supplier, observed that the UAW had 
become a force in sourcing decisions for the Big Three and was advo-
cating for increasing business with unionized suppliers. Thus, welcom-
ing unionization could secure or expand customers. A group of Mas-
sachusetts residential care facilities were motivated to reach organizing 
agreements by the potential for the union involved, SEIU, to extract 
increased funding from the legislature: “Anybody who could help bring 
more money, better working conditions, more respect, we were willing 
to accommodate their needs.”6 These employers also hoped to be able 
to establish a constructive, nontraditional relationship with the union 
once organized. In yet another set of cases, the value added by the union 
was in supplying qualified, skilled labor. Representatives of casinos in 
one of the large, unionized markets reported (as did the union repre-
sentatives in the earlier study) that when the casinos originally opened, 
they were desperate for skilled labor. The unions (Hotel Employees 
and Restaurant Employees International Union and the building trades) 
could supply that labor. Further, the unions continue to add value to the 
industry in this way today, which is one reason the language endures. 
In some interviews, managers reported that the give and take of 
bargaining over organizing language provided an opportunity to reach a 
specific, high priority management bargaining goal in negotiations with 
currently organized workplaces. The specific issues mentioned in these 
cases included restrictions on subcontracting, the length of the contract, 
wage reductions, and other concessions to cope with bankruptcy.
Beyond adding value to the business, employers realized addi-
tional benefits through the bargaining over the details of the organizing 
agreement itself. This bargaining offers management the opportunity to 
shape how organizing is conducted. This was especially important to 
employers who believed organizing was going to take place whether or 
not there was language addressing it. As one employer put it:
Other companies may be dealing with unions that aren’t factual 
and therefore feel the need to be able to respond factually. But this 
kind of problem can be handled in the language. For instance, if 
you think home visits are coercive, use the neutrality agreement to 
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ban them. Employers need to realize they can shape the campaign 
through the give and take in negotiating these agreements.
Costs of Not Agreeing
As described earlier, our analysis of costs incorporates two elements 
relevant to the bargaining environment in which neutrality and card 
check is established. These are the costs of not agreeing to the language 
and the cost of agreeing. They are evaluated in turn below. Despite the 
fact that most aspects of neutrality and card check have been typically 
understood to be permissive subjects of bargaining and the strike has 
been widely viewed as waning in power, the principal projected cost 
of not agreeing for more than half (18) of our respondents was an an-
ticipated work stoppage. Though in most cases, the threat sufficed. One 
large and well-known telecommunications employer took and lost a 
strike widely reported to have hinged in substantial part on this issue.7 
Respondents cited other projected costs of not agreeing aside from 
work stoppages.8 In one case, a partially organized chain of stores 
agreed to neutrality language to avoid picketing that would potentially 
damage their business. In other cases, the union used action(s) of a third 
party to impose (or threaten to impose) costs on the employer. These 
third parties included a primary employer’s clients, municipalities pro-
viding financial support to a business, union pension funds (a potential 
source of investment), or religious and other community groups. These 
third parties imposed costs by either withholding investment dollars or 
withholding business as customers. 
Campaigns involving multiple pressure points to move employers 
to agree to neutrality and card check are not always successful. Indeed, 
one company reported that it always carefully weighs the business case 
for opening an operation in a particular market against union or in-
vestor pressure when responding to a demand for N/CC. Another re-
spondent successfully resisted union pressures involving “politicians, 
negative PR, and sit-ins at referral agencies.”9 The evidence presented 
here makes clear that, contrary allegations notwithstanding, employ-
ers do have choices to make about organizing agreements, and that the 
decision to agree to organizing language is often, at root, a business 
decision, with employer concerns about workers’ rights playing at best, 
a secondary role.10  
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Costs of Agreeing
Twenty-eight respondents supplied information about their per-
ceived costs of agreeing to some type of organizing language. Of these, 
a significant majority (20) projected some additional costs, although 
about a third of these (7) thought the costs would be low. 
The respondents reporting either no costs (6) or low costs (7) can 
be lumped together for analytical purposes. A significant portion of 
this group had low-cost expectations because they expected either no, 
or a very low level of, organizing. For some, most covered workers 
were already organized and the company was either not planning to 
expand or was actually downsizing. As one put it, “If we get to the 
point of opening new facilities, that will mean we have succeeded and 
that will be great.” Others simply expected little successful organiz-
ing, in some cases because they had negotiated weak language. Others 
expected costs to be low because of their good relationship with the 
union and the union’s flexibility. One manufacturer in this category is 
involved in an extensive union–management partnership, including a 
joint effort to redesign work and provide a more rapid response time 
to customers, therefore presumably increasing market share. Thus, any 
increases in wages and benefits would be offset by reduced production 
costs and increased sales. Several respondents in this category indicated 
that the union was willing to reach “an innovative, lower-cost agree-
ment” in new facilities. One final employer in this group expected the 
union to organize successfully and labor costs to increase. However, 
they also expected that many, if not most or even all, of their competi-
tors would also be organized so that there would be little competitive 
consequence.11 
The largest single group (13) stated that they did expect success-
ful organizing and therefore increased labor costs. A few companies 
within this group indicated that, as stated earlier, because the union had 
shown a willingness to negotiate “nontraditional,” flexible labor con-
tracts, at least some of the wage and benefit increases were offset by 
looser work rules. Two respondents identified costs related to mergers 
or takeovers. A couple of respondents reported that the neutrality and 
card check agreement made the company a less attractive merger or 
takeover target. 
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It is important to note that many respondents weighed differently 
the costs of including “core” or “strategic” occupations within the N/
CC agreement from those with newer, more competitive business lines. 
In these cases, the potential costs of agreeing were seen as outweighing 
the costs of not agreeing.12 Respondents reported that they either would 
resist or had actually resisted coverage of these employees. These in-
clude, in particular, salaried workforces, especially in manufacturing 
companies, and gaming occupations (dealers, slot attendants, etc.) in 
gaming establishments. As one employer put it, “Neutrality and card 
check covers traditional union occupations, not [occupations labeled 
as management]. [We] are definitely not neutral about whether these 
should be union. This seems to be an irritant to the union, but they are 
not pushing hard to change it.”
For other employers, the issue is the competitiveness of particu-
lar lines of business. For instance, large, diversifying manufacturing 
companies need to protect new lines of business from what they per-
ceive to be noncompetitive labor costs and work rules: “[Union] wages 
would kill [our noncore/nontraditional] businesses.” But, as discussed 
earlier, other companies have successfully sought the union’s recogni-
tion that some lines of business need sheltering and have thus been able 
to agree to more comprehensive coverage: “The union has been willing 
to reach nontraditional types of contracts . . . If you’re honest, you as-
sume unionization is going to make for higher costs. But this doesn’t 
necessarily have to be true. [Nontraditional business unit] managers are 
happy with their contracts.”
Although most respondents defined costs in financial and economic 
terms, two suggested difficult-to-quantify costs. One hospitality em-
ployer suggested a cost was in “giving up employee rights [under fed-
eral labor law].” A nonprofit human service agency feared the loss of a 
cooperative, nontraditional work culture.
In sum, then, although some employers did see the potential for 
higher labor costs resulting from these agreements, that view was cer-
tainly not universal. Some saw these costs offset by some benefit. Oth-
ers simply found that these costs of agreeing were less than the costs 
of not agreeing. Finally, with rare exceptions, management did not per-
ceive these agreements as jeopardizing workers’ rights. In the cases in 
which respondents implied that these rights were an issue, it was re-
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flected in concern for the crafting and enforcement of language, rather 
than whether or not language would exist. 
Indeed, although our respondents emphasized the cost/benefit rea-
soning for their decision, several respondents also mentioned what 
might be called a consistency argument for neutrality. Many employers, 
particularly those working in partnership with a union, found it difficult 
to argue with this logic: “[The union] said, ‘How can you talk out of 
both sides of your mouth at once?’ The [nonunion property] is literally 
attached by a tunnel—joined at the hip with a union property and it just 
didn’t make sense.” In short, some managers agreed to neutrality or 
card check to be consistent in their approach to their relationship with 
the union. 
IMPACT	on	MAnAgeMenT’S	beHAVIoR	In	CAMPAIgnS
We looked at the impact of N/CC agreements on employers in two 
ways. We asked about 1) management campaign behavior before and 
after the agreement, and 2) management behavior in organizing cam-
paigns covered by the agreement versus campaigns among work groups 
not covered by the agreement. Overall, employers found these ques-
tions odd and were surprised that anyone would think that the agree-
ments don’t make a difference.13 
Twenty-six respondents answered the question about whether there 
had been organizing before the agreement. Only 4 said there had not 
been. Of the 22 indicating there had been organizing, 17 (81 percent) 
said that they responded differently after the agreement than before. 
Some employers just indicated that they used to respond “traditionally” 
and now do not. Others were more specific. One employer said, “Prior 
to the organizing agreement, we had a design called ‘Fully Informed 
Employee Choice.’ We presented pros and cons of unionization. Man-
agers were free to express opinions either way. Now—full neutrality.” 
Another responded, “Now we’re limited. Before we showed videotapes, 
had meetings, hired consultants. Now we do none of these.”
Several employers indicated that they did use a softer approach to 
organizing prior to the agreement, but that that approach had been fur-
ther toned down by the organizing agreement. One employer respond-
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ed, “We never ran a Southern-style campaign, with real mud-slinging, 
‘[The] Union’s going to come into town in Cadillacs, steal your money 
and your women’ kind of campaign . . . After [the agreement] we are 
much more careful.” Three respondents indicated that their response to 
organizing had not changed.14 
Twenty-nine respondents answered our question about coverage of 
the agreement, all but one indicating that there are union-eligible em-
ployees who are not covered. Of these, only 17 answered the question 
about whether or not the response to organizing is different for cov-
ered employees than noncovered. (Many could not answer this question 
because there had been no organizing among noncovered employees.) 
Here again, the majority (88 percent) of those answering indicated that 
they respond to organizing by covered employees differently than non-
covered: 
[For noncovered employees, we run t]raditional campaigns—lim-
ited access to associates, we communicate much more: the com-
pany is the point of information. In [neutrality/card check] cam-
paigns, we give the union access, allow the union to be the visible 
point of information. The company remains in the shadows.
[For noncovered employees, we run] very typical [campaigns]—6 
weeks of communications so that employees can make informed 
decisions. We hire consultants, run full tilt campaigns, the works.
However, some indicated that there is a kind of spill-over from the 
organizing agreement even to those not covered and that the campaigns 
they ran were not as intense as they would otherwise have been:
The [union] made a play for salaried workers in one plant. We 
were a little more aggressive, but still high road. There was a dif-
ference in what we could say . . . with this group, we could say we 
preferred to remain nonunion.
While we cannot conclude from these results that these companies 
were not “soft” campaigners to start with, we can say that the agreement 
has changed, specifically softened or even eliminated their campaign 
behavior. Some respondents clearly viewed themselves as soft cam-
paigners, but it is not clear that unions perceive these same employers 
as “soft” in their tactics. 
An additional indicator of the impact on management behavior is 
management’s desire to change the language. The respondents split al-
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most evenly on this question. Twelve individuals thought their language 
either worked well or had been in place so long that it would cause more 
trouble to change than to retain. 
Among the 13 managers who indicated that they wanted to change 
the language, a second notable division occurred. About half of this 
group suggested specific revisions, including more employer latitude to 
talk to employees and more controls on the union’s behavior, especially 
home visits. The other (approximately) half of this group stated clearly 
that, although it was not currently possible, they would like to be rid of 
the neutrality or card check language. 
This result is further supported by data recorded on a more hypo-
thetical question. Near the end of the survey, we asked participants, 
“Recognizing that you might prefer to pursue both options . . . if your 
company was forced to choose, would it prefer to keep as much of the 
company nonunion as possible, or build a cooperative relationship with 
existing unions?” Fifty-five percent answering the question indicated 
that preserving nonunion status where possible was preferable. This 
level of resistance is remarkable. 
REACTIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT COMMUNITy
Initial Internal Management Reaction
It was not surprising that a strong majority (75 percent) of the re-
spondents answering these questions described strong opposition with-
in the managerial hierarchy. Some respondents talked about general 
dissatisfaction within management ranks, citing no specific pockets of 
opposition: 
But most managers think [neutrality and card check] is foolish. 
They are still thinking in the old model—that the union is an ob-
stacle rather than in the new model where the unions can help them 
manage and meet their goals.
The majority were opposed but as long as the CEO was for it, no 
one was going to say anything.
Blocketal.indb   152 3/2/2006   9:00:08 AM
Dancing with the Smoke Monster   153
In a handful of cases, virtually everyone appeared to oppose the 
language:
We were pariahs—we’d failed. Nobody thought it was worthwhile. 
There were no supporters within management.
But in many cases, particular management types stood out in their 
opposition. The largest single group mentioned was managers of newly 
developed and/or nonunion businesses within larger diversified organi-
zations. In some cases, these managers were used to operating in largely 
or entirely nonunion companies that had been purchased or merged into 
more unionized companies: 
There are deep cultural and philosophical differences. [The merged 
company] was largely nonunion and managers from that world 
don’t understand. 
Some junior department heads—say, 25 percent—couldn’t accept 
it. They came from down the street [in nonunion businesses] and 
just didn’t understand the give and take in the union environment 
and why this was the right thing to do. They were philosophically 
opposed.
Less commonly mentioned were particular functional groups within 
management. Some respondents specifically mentioned that their law-
yers, either internal or external counsel, were opposed to language that 
the company was willing to accept, a phenomenon that raises questions 
about the role of lawyers in labor relations strategy: 
The lawyers were outraged—said it was stupid. 
Management Compliance
In our earlier study (Eaton and Kriesky 2001), union representa-
tives reported that many of the problems relating to employer compli-
ance with neutrality and card check agreements occurred in large, cen-
tralized bargaining relationships. In these relationships, unions often 
complained that lower-level managers, for a variety of reasons, did not 
adhere to the organizing agreement. Thus, we asked our management 
respondents about whether they “encountered obstacles in getting local 
managers to comply,” and if so, what they did about it.
The sample was evenly divided on this question, with 11 reporting 
problems and 12 reporting no problems or only minor ones.15 Some of 
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those reporting problems have found some lower-level managers to be 
a major headache:  
I’ve had some knock-down, drag-out fights. ‘What do you mean I 
can’t do x!??!’ . . . They also fight over control [of the campaign].
As with the initial reactions described above, compliance was most 
difficult for managers habituated to a nonunion environment:
It’s been very, very tedious in one area that has been entirely non-
union.
Regardless of the compliance problems encountered, the means of 
ensuring ultimate compliance were similar. Some managers focus on 
education to secure compliance:
[We have] a certain amount of complaints with noncompliance 
with the design. [We respond] with education—so the problems 
are more from misunderstanding than real resistance. Education is 
the best remedy.
Local managers want advice on how to do it. They don’t want to 
screw up. They look to HR and legal to explain it, define the mean-
ing. They’re not happy, but they want to do it right.
At times, pointed messages about the organizational consequences 
have been necessary. Some companies have resorted to either the threat 
of or actual individual consequences in the form of discipline:16 
The owners were very serious and managers were under threat of 
losing their jobs . . . [T]he company hired private investigators to 
investigate [union] charges and actually transferred or put manag-
ers on leave.
Some thought they could say publicly, ‘Yes sir!’ but continue op-
position . . . People got in trouble. The message was clear.
Maybe 25 percent of lower-level managers couldn’t ever accept 
[it], couldn’t catch on and had to leave.
There would not be [obstacles from local managers], because we 
take this very, very seriously. No ifs, ands, or buts . . . For local 
managers, the stakes are very high if they don’t comply.
Freeman and Kleiner (1990) present evidence that union opposition 
is rational at the level of the individual manager—managerial careers 
often suffer following a successful union organizing drive. As the above 
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comments suggest, the environment in some organizations had changed 
with neutrality/card check such that managerial careers will suffer from 
failure to abide by the organizing agreement. This appears to be a cru-
cial aspect of the implementation of these agreements from the per-
spective of union activists who argue that workers are afraid to support 
unionization because of management reprisals for doing so. 
Reactions in External Management Community
To determine how employers willing to engage in neutrality or card 
check were viewed by their business colleagues, we asked: “To the 
best of your knowledge, has the company been criticized within the 
management community for signing this agreement?” If necessary, we 
prompted respondents to think in terms of their particular industry or 
geographical region. Although a handful couldn’t answer the question, 
most did answer. Among those who answered, a majority (about 60 per-
cent) said they had not been criticized. Most of these respondents came 
either from industries like steel or telecommunications, where some 
form of organizing agreement has become common practice, or where 
operations are located in metropolitan areas that are heavily unionized. 
As one put it, “This is standard practice in the industry.”
Still, in these industries, the employers who had agreed to the lan-
guage most favorable to the union came under fire:
Yes, within [our] industry. I hear that [the union] throws [our agree-
ment] in other company’s faces regularly. So, I do hear [criticism] 
in the [industry] labor relations community.
When there was criticism, it is typically from within the industry: 
Yes, the [industry] community feels very threatened. They don’t 
necessarily agree [with our strategy]. Traditionalists are saying, 
‘Oh, my God. What would happen to me, to [the industry] if we 
lose control?’
To some extent, within [the] industry, but we get criticized for a lot 
of stuff . . . In certain cities, if the facility becomes union, similar 
facilities locally would criticize the local management.
Indicative of the strong antiunion sentiments permeating employer 
circles across the country, some respondents experienced criticism in 
either industry-based or locally based social relationships:  
Blocketal.indb   155 3/2/2006   9:00:08 AM
156   Eaton and Kriesky 
I’d walk into a room and get the cold shoulder.
I’ve been called a Communist.
The local management will hear it from other managers at local 
business group meetings.
At the local level, within local business communities, we have 
definitely been criticized, called a cancer. We have ‘abandoned’ 
everyone else. This doesn’t come from within the . . . industry. It 
is local.
Some respondents suggested the pressure is especially intense in 
the South:
Yes, particularly within some communities. For instance, with one 
acquisition in South Carolina, [we heard, ‘You] are welcome but 
please don’t bring the union along with you.’
This is the South and there have been a lot of threats of customers 
to pull out [business] if the union wins, which is a real concern.
ANALySIS AND CONCLUSIONS
There is clear evidence from these interviews that most organiz-
ing agreements make a difference in employer campaign behavior. Em-
ployers themselves report that their campaign behavior changes in the 
face of these agreements, even in some cases in the face of weak agree-
ments. Although it remains possible that these employers were not the 
most aggressive antiunion campaigners to start with, these agreements 
are still having an effect on their conduct. As such, these interviews pro-
vide further evidence that these agreements serve to enhance workers 
rights to free choice and to engage in collective bargaining.
The interviews also make clear, however, that employers remain 
extremely reluctant to engage in these agreements. This finding is clear-
ly consistent with the emerging legislative efforts by the HR Policy As-
sociation (formerly the Labor Policy Association) and others to prohibit 
card check recognition (see Eaton and Kriesky 2003). Further, these 
agreements represent a privatization of rights and rights enforcement. 
The enhancement of rights through these agreements comes about 
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through union bargaining power. The use of power to enforce the right 
to unionization and collective bargaining is precisely what the Wag-
ner Act sought to avoid. Thus, while N/CC agreements expand worker 
rights, they cannot ultimately substitute for comprehensive labor law 
reform. 
Beyond these observations, the interviews also tell us something 
about employer antiunionism, perhaps the single most important factor 
undermining workers rights to collective action in the United States. 
We see considerable evidence for the Freeman and Kleiner (1990) view 
that the employer decision to oppose unionization (or in this case, not 
to oppose it) is rooted in economic rationality. In their terms, union 
campaigns to win organizing language have focused both on increasing 
the cost of opposition and, at least in several cases, decreasing the cost 
of unionization, the costs involved with organizing itself, or other costs. 
Further, employers clearly had their eyes on their competitors when 
deciding what to do about N/CC; employers in industries where the 
negotiation of organizing agreements has become commonplace were 
less concerned about the consequences and reported less of a negative 
reaction. 
There is evidence for motivations beyond economic rationality, 
however. In particular, the strong opposition to the extension of N/CC 
to and unionization of salaried and other strategically located occupa-
tional groups appears to result from a desire to maintain managerial con-
trol. Of course, most respondents recognized that a significant source 
of union bargaining power is the union’s density within the firm. Many 
further worried that agreeing to N/CC would increase the union’s den-
sity. This increase in union power and control could ultimately translate 
into higher costs as well.
Finally, we close by noting that there are also indicators of the irra-
tional or cultural/ideological component of the decision as well (Jacoby 
1991), revealed through our interview process. For instance, there is 
evidence that some managers cling to their antiunionism past the point 
when it is rational for their career with a particular employer. Further, 
there is often a strong negative reaction in the external management 
community and among external counsel. While Freeman and Kleiner 
argue that it is economic rationality that sends employers to antiunion 
consultants and law firms, it appears to us that those consultants and 
law firms may themselves not always be acting in the employer’s eco-
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nomic interest—recommending opposition to unionization even when 
the employer has concluded that there are sound business reasons not 
to do so. This suggests that further research into the balance between 
rational economic choices and power relations and ideology is in order 
to fully understand the decision-making process about union opposition 
in general and neutrality and card check agreements in particular.
Notes
 1.  See Eaton and Kriesky (2001) for a full explanation of the comparability of these 
statistics.
 2.  That original sample was assembled from a variety of sources. We developed 
the initial list through a short survey sent to representatives of all U.S. unions 
with over 100,000 members; the survey asked respondents about the types of 
organizing agreements they had negotiated. We added to this group agreements 
identified by a review of legal and popular business publications. Finally, when 
we conducted more thorough interviews with union representatives about each 
agreement, we asked them to identify additional agreements that they were aware 
of, a process known as snowball sampling. For more information, see Eaton and 
Kriesky (2001).
 3.  We also did not attempt to contact employers for whom we had not been able to 
obtain contract language, who were very small, or who the union asked us not to 
contact. The sample size was further reduced by the merger of multiple agree-
ments into a single entity. We were unable to find contact information for the 
handful of multiemployer associations in the original sample. We were able to 
do an interview with a representative from a multiemployer association that was 
not in the original database. That interview is not included in the results reported 
here.
 4.  Indeed, this argument is at the center of SEIU’s current proposals for reorganiz-
ing and rationalizing the labor movement.
 5.  We emphasize that we recount here what managers told us about the bargaining 
process. While these reports are no doubt filtered through the lenses of the re-
spondents, there are few, if any, major differences in the stories told by manager 
and union respondents about the same case. If anything, managers may have 
emphasized union bargaining power to a greater extent than the union represen-
tatives did. 
  6.  For a published account of these negotiations, see Green (1997).
  7.  In another case, an employer was motivated by a union’s prolonged and ulti-
mately successful campaign to win neutrality and card check from a nonunion 
competitor: “We all saw [our competitor] go through a long, expensive battle to 
remain nonunion and then succumb.”
  8.  Given that the dynamics of bargaining are complicated and multifaceted, some 
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of the strike threat cases referred to above also involved these other forms of 
pressure. 
  9.  This case remains in the sample because the end result was extremely weak 
language about organizing—so weak that, until recently, the union chose not to 
attempt organizing at this employer. Unions who obtain very weak language do 
so for a variety of reasons, including saving face with members and observers 
and the possibility that the language will serve as a “foot in the door” and can 
later be improved upon.
10.  For an example of the argument that management is so bullied that it abrogates 
its responsibility to protect workers’ rights, see Yager, Bartl, and LoBue (1998).
11.  It is interesting to note that this mass organizing did not come to pass: “The own-
ers had thought the whole industry would fall . . . Instead, there has been no other 
successful organizing.”  
12.  Sometimes explicit but often implicit in these discussions was the belief that 
the union was unwilling to push hard by imposing costs to cover nontraditional 
employee groups. 
13.  This reaction is consistent with anecdotal evidence that the same multinational 
employer will deal differently with unions in different countries, suggesting that 
at least part of the difference is conditioned by different regulatory regimes.
14.  Two of these involved a neutrality-only agreement with a weak definition of 
neutrality and claim that the agreement has made no difference in how they re-
spond to organizing. The other was a successor employer who indicated that their 
response thus far had been to deny coverage of the agreement but even if that 
failed they would still not change their negative approach. 
15.  This is the one substantial difference in the overlapping findings from the origi-
nal union study and the employer study. 
16.  In one case, an organizing agreement that called for neutrality and non-NLRB 
elections provided for arbitration if the union alleged a pattern of noncompliance. 
If the union won the arbitration, the agreement called for card check as a blanket 
remedy. Our respondent told us that local managers were asked “if they really 
wanted to shoulder the responsibility for provoking a card check imposition on 
the whole corporation?” This was quite effective in modifying their behavior. 
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Registered nurses (RNs) have become attracted to union representa-
tion in recent years, and by 2003, 16.9 percent were union members (in 
contrast to 15.6 percent in 1985). Licensed practical nurses (LPNs) had 
a 10.8 percent unionization rate in that same year. Health care is clearly 
a major arena in which many professionals and technicians are now 
attempting to organize.1 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) ex-
plicitly defines professionals as employees and grants them organizing 
and collective bargaining rights. The Supreme Court, however, has in-
terpreted U.S. labor law in a way that puts barriers in the path of health 
care professionals who seek to join unions.2 
Supervisory employees are excluded from coverage in the statute 
itself, and managerial employees have been excluded by judicial in-
terpretation of the act. On the other hand, professionals often act in a 
supervisory or managerial capacity at times, insofar as they direct the 
work of less-skilled employees (e.g., nurses often direct nursing assis-
tants). Thus, the NLRB and the courts have struggled with where to 
draw the line with regard to which professionals are employees whose 
rights to organize are protected by the law. In the last 10 years, the 
Supreme Court has reduced the number of health care professionals 
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who have such protection in two decisions, NLRB v. Kentucky River 
Community Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001) and NLRB v. Health Care and 
Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571 (1994). Both decisions find 
certain groups of nurses to be supervisors and hence not employees 
with protected organizing rights. While these decisions were widely de-
cried by the labor movement and clearly had an impact on the nurses 
in the two facilities concerned, their wider impact is less certain. In this 
chapter, we assess the effect of the more recent Kentucky River decision 
on organizing, with a primary focus on nurses and related health care 
professionals. We look at two different types of evidence: interviews 
with union organizers and attorneys and post–Kentucky River legal de-
cisions.
THe	deFInITIon	oF	SUPeRVISoRS	ACCoRdIng	To	THe	
NLRA AND THE SUPREME COURT 
While the NLRA provides certain protections to workers (e.g., the 
right to join unions, the right to strike), those protections only apply to 
“employees,” as defined by Section 2(3) of the act. According to that 
section, “The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . but shall 
not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor (29 U.S.C. 
§152(3) (2001).” Thus, an individual employed as a “supervisor” as 
defined in section 2(11) is not considered an employee and is therefore 
not entitled to the act’s protections. However, professional employees 
are expressly included as employees in section 2(12).3
The terms employee, supervisor, and professional employee are de-
fined by the text of the NLRA itself, but the Supreme Court has fur-
ther defined their meanings in a number of decisions, two of which 
have been especially important in the field of health care. The first was 
NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America, a case that be-
gan with employer discipline of four LPNs in the context of an organiz-
ing drive. In response, the LPNs filed unfair labor practice charges with 
the NLRB.
Initially, the administrative law judge (ALJ) and the board had found 
that the nurses were not supervisors (Health Care and Retirement Corp. 
of America, 306 NLRB 63, 1992). In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ 
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and the board relied on “patient care analysis” (see Keller [1996] and 
Straight [1999] for a fuller discussion). To be considered a supervisor 
under section 2(11) of the act, a person has to exercise 1 of the 12 super-
visory functions in the interests of the employer.4 Patient care analysis 
drew a distinction between “the interests of the employer” and “the in-
terests of the patient.” According to patient care analysis, when a nurse 
utilized independent judgment in connection with his (her) professional 
judgment, (s)he would be considered a professional employee and not 
a supervisor. In applying that analysis, the ALJ held that the four LPNs 
were entitled to protection under the NLRA because their work did “not 
equate to ‘responsibly . . . directing’ the aides in the interest of the 
employer” and that “the nurses’ focus [was] on the well-being of the 
residents rather than [that] of the employer” (306 NLRB at 70).
In its 5–4 decision upholding the Sixth Circuit Court’s reversal of 
the board and determining that the LPNs were supervisors, the Supreme 
Court noted that there is a three-part test for determining whether indi-
viduals are supervisors: Individuals are deemed to be “supervisors” if 
1) they hold the authority to exercise 1 of the 12 supervisory functions 
listed in section 2(11); 2) their exercise of such authority is not of a 
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent 
judgment; and 3) their authority is held “in the interest of the employ-
er.” Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concluded 
that the board impermissibly distorted the statutory language in trying 
to distinguish between “the interest of patients” and “the interest of the 
employer.” Kennedy stated
 . . . the Board has created a false dichotomy—in this case, a di-
chotomy between acts taken in connection with patient care and 
acts taken in the interest of the employer. That dichotomy makes 
no sense. Patient care is the business of a nursing home, and it fol-
lows that attending to the needs of the nursing home patients, who 
are the employer’s customers, is in the interest of the employer. 
(511 U.S. at 577)
The second case in which the Supreme Court held that nurses were 
supervisors and therefore not entitled to the NLRA’s protections was 
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care Inc., et al. In Kentucky River, 
the Kentucky State District Council of Carpenters petitioned the NLRB 
in 1997 to represent a unit of professional and nonprofessional employ-
ees. The employer objected to the inclusion of six registered nurses in 
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the bargaining unit, arguing that they were supervisors under the act. 
The regional director found that the employer had not carried its burden 
of proof demonstrating that the nurses were supervisors—hence, he in-
cluded them in the bargaining unit. The union won the election and was 
certified as the employees’ bargaining representative.
The board held that the nurses involved were employees and not 
supervisors because they did not exercise “independent judgment.” In 
its brief before the Supreme Court, the board stated 
[t]he National Labor Relations Board has long held that an employ-
ee does not exercise “independent judgment” that triggers super-
visory status under Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations 
Act when he uses ordinary professional or technical judgment in 
directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance 
with employer-specified standards. That interpretation, which the 
Board has applied to a variety of industries and employees, is en-
titled to deference because it is rational and consistent with the 
Act. (Citations omitted; NLRB brief to Supreme Court at 11.)
In other words, the board made a distinction between independent 
judgment, which the board found as warranting supervisor status, and 
ordinary professional or technical judgment in accordance with employ-
er specified standards, which the board found to be not supervisory.
The Supreme Court, however, in another 5–4 decision, affirmed an-
other Sixth Circuit reversal of the NLRB. Justice Antonin Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, found the board’s distinction to be without basis 
in law.
The Board, however, argues further that the judgment even of em-
ployees who are permitted by their employer to exercise a suf-
ficient degree of discretion is not “independent judgment” if it is 
a particular kind of judgment, namely, “ordinary professional or 
technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver 
services.” (Brief for Petitioner 11.) The first five words of this in-
terpretation insert a startling categorical exclusion into statutory 
text that does not suggest its existence. The text, by focusing on 
the “clerical” or “routine” (as opposed to “independent”) nature of 
the judgment, introduces the question of degree of judgment that 
we have agreed falls within the reasonable discretion of the Board 
to resolve. But the Board’s categorical exclusion turns on factors 
that have nothing to do with the degree of discretion an employee 
exercises. (532 U.S. at 714)
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Acknowledging that the board has the discretion to determine the 
degree to which an employee’s exercise of judgment places her within 
the exemption, Scalia nonetheless pointed out that the text of section 
2(11) focuses on the clerical or routine nature of the judgment, not 
whether it is professional or technical. “What supervisory judgment 
worth exercising, one must wonder, does not rest on professional or 
technical skill or experience?” he asked (532 U.S. at 714). These two 
cases, combined with the ongoing reorganization of nursing work to 
include more supervisory duties in the job of the typical nurse, raise 
questions about whether or not nurses will be able to avail themselves 
of their rights granted by the NLRA. 
OPINIONS OF UNION ORGANIzERS, ORGANIzING 
DIRECTORS, AND UNION LEGAL COUNSEL 
We began to investigate the impact of Kentucky River by interview-
ing practitioners who are in a position to evaluate what effects, if any, 
the ruling is having on nurse organizing. We talked to union staff in-
volved in organizing or supporting organizing from groups that repre-
sent nurses in two states and one metropolitan area: California, Illinois, 
and greater New York City. The purpose was not to do a statistically 
valid survey but rather to explore what effects, if any, Kentucky River 
may be having “on the ground” in three major geographic areas that 
have seen a great deal of interest in representation among nurses. 
We talked to eight individuals in the following organizations: Unit-
ed American Nurses, California Nurses Association, New York State 
Nurses Association, Illinois Nurses Association, Health Professionals 
and Allied Employees/AFT and the Service Employees (the interna-
tional and two of its California locals); we also received a brief e-mail 
response from the Steelworkers, who stated that they were organizing 
nurses primarily in other states. The specific questions we posed varied 
somewhat depending on the main responsibility of the individual to 
whom we were speaking, but questions focused primarily on whether or 
not the union had seen an increase or decrease of interest in organizing 
among nurses in the 18 months following the Kentucky River decision, 
whether or not the union had witnessed a change in employer tactics as 
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a result of the decision, whether or not the union had changed what it 
was doing to organize in light of the decision, and whether or not the 
union was involved in litigation as a result of Kentucky River.5 
Most union staff stated they had not see any diminution of interest 
in representation on the part of nurses. Some claimed that, if anything, 
interest in unionization has increased, as a result of the workload pres-
sures on nurses occasioned by the shortage of nurses and continued 
cost-cutting by hospitals affecting staffing levels.6 Others argued that, 
although Kentucky River appears to have had little impact on interest 
in organizing among nurses, there has been some diminution of interest 
in the recent period due to the increased individual bargaining power 
of nurses stemming from the nursing shortage, the efforts of hospitals 
to avoid unionization by granting large increases in wages and ben-
efits, and the rise of opportunities to work desired hours as an agency 
nurse.7
No organization has changed the groups that it was targeting for or-
ganizing as a result of the Kentucky River decision; organizations were 
not shifting organizing resources from the private to the public sec-
tor, from one type of health care worker to another, or from one type 
of health care provider (acute care, long-term care, etc.) to another. In 
at least one case, this was because a sector was already union-satu-
rated (the public sector in the New York City metropolitan region), so 
sectoral shifts were not possible. Interestingly, in this case, the earlier 
Health Care Retirement decision had caused a shift away from organiz-
ing RNs in nursing homes and toward nurses in hospitals; Kentucky 
River, however, has made little difference.8
Naturally, all the union staff saw the Kentucky River decision as 
problematic, but its effects on employer tactics, on union tactics, and 
on the ultimate ability of nurses to organize were seen as being incre-
mentally negative rather than as disastrous. Several staff pointed out 
that employers began contending that nurses are supervisors well be-
fore the decision. Kentucky River deepened the problem but did not 
fundamentally change the situation. A number of organizers did report, 
however, that Kentucky River has lengthened delays in elections and/or 
first contract bargaining. This is potentially a serious problem in that 
election delays have long been associated with union losses (Roomkin 
and Block 1981).
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Some organizers reported that Kentucky River has lengthened 
delays because it has increased the ability of hospitals to challenge 
bargaining units before the election on the grounds that charge nurses 
are really supervisors. New York State Nurses Association organizer 
John O’Conner spoke of two hospitals in the New York City area 
that have done this and said, “I believe the employer, in both cases, 
used the supervisory status as a stall-tactic based on the Kentucky 
River decision.” SEIU Associate General Counsel Diana Ceresi also 
emphasized the problems that were being caused by uncertainty over 
whether or not individuals would be considered supervisors and the 
accompanying delay:
Nurses are organizing because of real concerns about their working 
conditions—systematic understaffing resulting in forced overtime, 
floating out of specialty areas and lack of adequate time for indi-
vidual patients. Instead of welcoming nurse input, some employers 
go to great lengths to instill fear and fight the nurses’ organizing 
efforts. In one case, they have gone so far as to claim that every 
nurse in a hospital is a supervisor . . . Even if the argument is a 
losing one in the end for the employer, hashing out the supervisory 
questions through the various levels of appeal results in months if 
not years of delay before nurses can even get to the table to negoti-
ate for simple workplace changes.
As suggested by this quote, the delay can come after a successful 
representation election but before bargaining. Nicole Fefferman, a staff 
organizer for SEIU Local 121 in Los Angeles, cited the situation at one 
employer subsequent to the decision. This employer refused to come 
to the bargaining table for a unit that contained charge nurses, even 
though the NLRB earlier had found them to be eligible to vote in an 
election when the employer challenged their eligibility at that time. The 
uncertain legal situation, in her opinion, was adding to the delay. This 
view was echoed by Beth Kean of the California Nurses Association, 
who stated, “If unions get caught up in the Kentucky River legal trap, 
union recognition and first contracts could be delayed for many, many 
years, with the continued uncertainty during that time about charge 
nurse/team leader eligibility and even whether or not recognition will 
ever happen at all.”
Unions are finding ways to cope with this difficult environment, 
however. Several organizations told us that they were responding by 
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applying community pressure on the employers involved. For instance, 
the CNA said that it was getting groups of charge nurses who want 
union representation to step down from their charge positions into regu-
lar staff positions before the eligibility cutoff date to ensure their eligi-
bility. This happened, for example, at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Eureka, 
California, where a 300-RN unit refused the extra pay and responsi-
bilities of the charge nurse position. Kean claimed that, after this, an-
other hospital in the same chain did not challenge the charge nurse/team 
leader union eligibility at all, apparently deciding that it did not want 
to receive the bad publicity accompanying the Eureka job action. Simi-
larly, Andrew Strom, Associate General Counsel for the SEIU in Los 
Angeles, stated that, in at least one case, his organization attempted 
to mount community pressure rather than turn to litigation as a way to 
counteract employer claims that charge nurses were supervisors. John 
O’Connor of the New York State Nurses Association talked about a cur-
rent campaign where the health care agency had claimed many nurses 
to be supervisors:
Our strategy will be to apply community pressure on the employer. 
We plan to picket the hospital board members’ businesses and we 
have obtained the support and participation from other community 
organizations . . . We plan to use the militancy of the nurses to get 
what they want. In addition, we plan to educate the nurses on their 
collective bargaining power in the workplace.
It would appear that Kentucky River is reinforcing a tendency 
among labor organizations to utilize community organizing strategies 
and membership-mobilization in order to counteract the general prob-
lems occasioned by the current legal process for representation.
Attorney Andrew Strom, of the SEIU in Los Angeles, pointed out 
that the Kentucky River decision is having ramifications for other types 
of workers besides nurses:
The issue goes beyond the nurses and hospitals. We have a group 
of security officers who are organizing. Every building has a lead 
person. The existence of a lead person could cause the employer to 
push the issue of supervisory status. I don’t think it was the inten-
tion of the act to turn ‘lead’ people into supervisors.
It is interesting to note that Strom’s opinion is borne out by the case 
analysis that we conducted for this study, which demonstrates as much 
impact of Kentucky River outside health care as within that sector.
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IMPACT OF KentucKy RiveR ON SUBSEqUENT  
LEGAL DECISIONS
We assessed the importance of Kentucky River on subsequent legal 
decisions by reading every opinion that mentioned the case after the Su-
preme Court’s decision and evaluating the extent to which the Court’s 
decision in Kentucky River influenced the outcome. We used Lexis to 
locate all cases that mentioned Kentucky River for the period from the 
decision until November 1, 2004. Our goal was not to do a statistical 
analysis of cases but rather to gain an understanding of how Kentucky 
River is affecting subsequent decisions by the NLRB and the courts. 
We also were interested in determining whether or not the effects of 
Kentucky River are being felt in other industries besides health care and 
by other occupational groups besides nurses. 
Court of Appeals Cases
According to Lexis, Kentucky River has been cited in 14 court of 
appeals decisions and in a 15th case by the dissenting judge. Table 7.1 
lists all 15 decisions. According to our reading of these decisions, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion does seem to be of some import at the circuit 
court level. While it is too early to determine with certainty just how 
much the case has mattered, it is clear that Kentucky River is influenc-
ing the decisions of the circuit courts. Two of the 14 decisions in which 
Kentucky River was cited involved health care. In both, the NLRB had 
found certain nursing professionals to be employees protected by the 
act but the court reversed and remanded the cases back to the board 
to reconsider its decision in light of Kentucky River. One recent deci-
sion involving a health care facility was rendered in Evergreen New 
Hope Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. NLRB, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10644 
(9th Cir. May 27, 2003), a case that has been very heavily influenced by 
Kentucky River throughout. An election was held in a bargaining unit 
that included “[a]ll full-time and regular part-time licensed vocational 
nurses, nurses aides, certified nursing assistants” and a small number of 
registered nurses. Since the regional director had found that to be an ap-
propriate unit prior to Kentucky River, the board, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision, granted the employer’s request for review. Following 
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Industry; employees Effect of Kentucky River (KR)
Circuit court cases
Albertson’s v. NLRB, 301 F. 3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002) Grocery; n/a None. Procedural citation.
Beverly Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc. v. NLRB,  
266 F 3d 785 (8th Cir. 2003)
Health care (nursing home); 
RN/LPN
Some. Remanded to NLRB.
Brusco Tug & Barge v. NLRB, 247 F 3d 273 
 (DC Cir. 2091)
Inland shipping; mates None.
Coastal Lumber v NLRB, 117 L.R.R.M 3215  
(4th Cir. 2001)
Lumber; n/a Some. Remanded to NLRB.
Coursen v. United States Postal Serv., 256 F. 3d 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)
Postal service; postal worker None.
Entergy Gulf States v. NLRB, 253 F. 3d 303  
(5th Cir. 2001)
Elec. power; operations 
coordinator
Probably none. Reversed NLRB but KR 
not important.
Evergreen New Hope Health & Rehab. Cr., 2003 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 10644 (9th Cir. 2003)
Health care; charge nurses Matters. Court reversed NLRB citing KR.
Multimedia KSDK, Inc. v. NLRB, 271 F.3d 744  
(8th Cir. 2002)
Television; editors/producers None.
NLRB v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10788 (6th Cir. 2003)
Vegetable packing; 
maintenance leads
None. Cited on burden of proof.
NLRB v. Interstate Builders, 351 F. 3d 1020 
 (10th Cir. 2003)
Iron works; n/a None. Cited on procedural issue on 
dissent.
NLRB v. Quinnipiac College, 256 F 3d 68  
(2nd Cir. 2001)
College; sec. officers and 
shift supervisors
Probably none. Reversed NLRB but KR 
not important.
Nathan Katz Realty LLC v. NLRB, 251 F 3d 981  
(DC Cir. 2001)
Real Estate; apartment 
supervisors
None. Cited on burden of proof.
Table 7.1  Appellate Court Cases Referring to Kentucky River
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Public Service Co. v. NLRB, 271 F.3d 1213 
(10th Cir. 2001)
Utility; transmission workers Matters. Refused to enforce bargaining 
order. Because of KR; remanded to NLRB.
Webco Industries, Inc. v. NLRB 90 Fed. Appx. 276  
(10th Cir. 2003)
Steel manufacturing; trainer None. Cited on burden of proof.
Westchester Iron Works v. NLRB, 2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 20755 (DC Cir. 2002)
Iron works; n/a None.
California appellate court case
Rodney Lee Roth et al., Bice, et al.2002 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 3368
Construction; foremen None. Would have been supervisor prior 
to KR.
Arizona court of appeals
Smith v. Cigna Health Plan of Arizona, 2002 Ariz. 
App. LEXIS 120
Health care; chief of staff 
(MD)
None. Clearly supervisory before KR.
B
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a hearing on remand, the regional director issued a supplemental deci-
sion and direction of election in which he, applying Kentucky River, 
reaffirmed his finding that the employer had failed to establish that its 
registered nurses were statutory supervisors. On September 21, 2001, 
the board denied the employer’s request for review of this supplemental 
decision. When the 9th Circuit heard the case, however, it reversed the 
decision and remanded the case to the regional director, ordering him 
to review his finding on the supervisory status of the registered nurses, 
stating:
That these decisions rely on the charge nurses’ professional train-
ing and experience does not mean that it is not also an exercise 
of independent judgment . . . There is substantial evidence in the 
record that the charge nurses exercise independent judgment and 
that they are ‘responsibly to direct’ the other employees. There 
is not substantial evidence in the record to support the regional 
director’s conclusion that the charge nurses are not ‘supervisors’ 
as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10655 
at p. 5) (citations omitted) 
Similarly, in Beverly Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc. v. NLRB, 266 F.3d 
785, (8th Cir. 2001) the 8th Circuit remanded the case to the board for 
reconsideration in light of Kentucky River. This case became one of the 
three lead cases designated for decision by the board in July, 2003, and 
has yet to be determined by the board on remand. It will be discussed 
further below.
Kentucky River also has had an impact on court of appeals decisions 
outside of health care. In two cases at this level, the courts specifically 
relied on Kentucky River in reversing an NLRB decision. The clearest 
negative outcome for employee rights came in Public Service Company 
of Colorado v. NLRB, 271 F. 3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2001), a case in which 
the 10th Circuit Court refused to enforce the board’s bargaining order 
or even remand the case:
[The Board’s] decision specifically traces the standard that it ap-
plies to the line of charge nurse cases overturned by Kentucky River. 
Rather the finding was by necessity based on the very categorical 
distinction struck down by the Supreme Court. Hence the Board’s 
erroneous interpretation of “independent judgment” precludes us 
from enforcing its order in this case. Accordingly we reverse the 
Board’s entry of summary judgment, vacate its bargaining order di-
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recting the Company to negotiate with a Union bargaining unit that 
includes the transmission employees, and deny enforcement. The 
Board’s request for remand is also denied. (271 F/ 3d., p. 1218)
Similarly, in Coastal Lumber v. NLRB, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 
23424; 24 Fed. Appx. 120 (4th Cir. 2001), the NLRB had certified a 
bargaining unit in 2001, but the employer appealed to the 4th Circuit, 
contending that six employees in the unit were supervisors and there-
fore not entitled to organize and bargain collectively. The board cross-
petitioned for enforcement of its order. The Circuit Court remanded 
the case to the board for reconsideration in light of Kentucky River, 
“[b]ecause the decision in this case can be read to have been premised 
in part on an incorrect legal standard” (24 Fed. Appx., p. 121). Here 
again, Kentucky River was the basis for a court of appeals’ refusal to en-
force a bargaining order.9 In this case however, the remand to the board 
may or may not result in an ultimate change in the board’s decision as 
to the supervisory status of the employees.
In the remaining court of appeals decisions, the courts cite Kentucky 
River in a routine way, as the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement on 
supervisory status. The outcomes in these cases do not appear to turn on 
Kentucky River, however. 
NLRB Cases
In examining the impact of Kentucky River at the NLRB level, we 
divide our discussion into two periods. On July 24, 2003, the NLRB 
invited the parties and interested amici to file briefs addressing supervi-
sory issues in light of the Kentucky River decision for three lead cases: 
Oakwood Healthcare, Beverly Enterprises–Minnesota, d/b/a Golden 
Crest Healthcare Center, and Croft Metals. This announcement sig-
naled a decision by an NLRB increasingly dominated by appointees 
of President Bush, as opposed to those appointed by President Clinton, 
to reexamine its approach to the entire question of supervisory status. 
While the NLRB has not issued a decision or ruling in these three lead 
cases upon completion of this chapter in late 2004, its general coun-
sel, Arthur F. Rosenfeld, filed an amicus brief on September 18, 2004 
and the perspective espoused in this brief may well be adopted by the 
NLRB, in whole or in part. Since the board’s notice in July 2003 may 
well indicate a shift in its views, we discuss this brief and the few cases 
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in the area decided by the board after July 2003, separately from our 
discussion of its position up to July 24, 2003.
Cases prior to July 24, 2003
According to LEXIS, Kentucky River was cited in 39 NLRB deci-
sions prior to July 24, 2003.10 Table 7.2 contains the cases for this peri-
od. Ten of the cases involve the health care industry, broadly construed 
to include hospitals, long-term care facilities/nursing homes, medical 
clinics, group homes, and home health care workers. In most of these 
cases, the supervisory status of nurses is at issue, although two involve 
doctors and one involves the program managers of group homes for the 
developmentally disabled. Further, outside health care, there are some 
major industrial/occupational groupings that have been analyzed under 
the rationale announced in Kentucky River: a number of cases involve 
mates, pilots, and captains in boats/casinos operating in inland water-
ways, and another group involves coordinators for electric utilities. We 
divide our discussion by industry beginning with health care.
Throughout this period, the board generally continued to classify 
nurses as employees rather than supervisors despite Kentucky River, 
even in cases that had been remanded to the board after the Supreme 
Court decision. The board reached this conclusion by focusing on the 
nonindependent nature of the nurses’ decisions, rather than on their pro-
fessional nature—and in nursing, direction of nurses’ aides and other 
employees is often carried out in accord with detailed guidelines es-
tablished by the employer. For example, Nurses United for Improved 
Patient Healthcare, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 319 (2002), dealt with a clini-
cal coordinator’s eligibility for inclusion in a bargaining unit over the 
employer’s contention that she was a supervisor. Despite Kentucky 
River, the ALJ found her to be an employee, stating: “The degree of 
discretion which O’Roark exercises is simply too minimal for her to be 
considered a supervisor” (2002 NLRB LEXIS 319 at p. 11). Similarly, 
in Norton Health Care, Inc. 2003 NLRB LEXIS 96 (NLRB Mar. 14, 
2003), the board conducted an extensive analysis on the status of two 
clinical coordinators (charge nurses) in light of Kentucky River and still 
found them to be employees, protected by the act. 
Kentucky River influenced the outcome in several cases at the board 
outside of health care during this period, however. In two cases, the 
Court’s decision in Kentucky River caused an ALJ to issue a “supple-
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mental decision on remand” reversing an earlier decision that had found 
several people associated with a shipping company to be employees 
rather than supervisors. (Marquette Transportation/Bluegrass Marine, 
2001 NLRB LEXIS 655 (2001) and American Commercial Barge Line 
Co., 2001 NLRB LEXIS 591 [2001]). These cases were part of a larger 
group of cases, all arising from a multiemployer recognition strike by 
a pilots union. In two of these cases, the ALJ had decided that the pi-
lots were supervisors and, although Kentucky River was decided in the 
interim, the board affirmed the ALJ decision without any reliance on 
the new decision. In both Marquette and American Commercial Barge, 
a different ALJ had come to the opposite conclusion—that the pilots 
were employees (the original decisions were (Marquette Transporta-
tion/Bluegrass Marine, 1999 NLRB LEXIS 462 [1999] and American 
Commercial Barge Line Co., 1999 NLRB LEXIS 662 [1999]. After the 
Court’s decision in Kentucky River, the board remanded these cases to 
the ALJ who, after reconsidering the evidence, found the same people 
to be employees. While Kentucky River was cited in the new decisions, 
however, the ALJ actually relied more on an earlier line of cases in the 
maritime industry. The board itself, in affirming the second ALJ deci-
sion in American Commercial Barge, more clearly relies on Kentucky 
River (2002 NLRB LEXIS 355). Thus, in these cases, Kentucky River 
was clearly the stimulus for reconsideration of an earlier decision, but 
appears to have been less important in the actual substance of the new 
decisions. At the same time, the ultimate outcome was the loss of jobs 
and rights by all these pilots.
Similarly, in Majestic Star Casino, 335 NLRB No. 36 (2001), the 
regional director had determined that the mates on the employer’s riv-
erboat were employees rather than supervisors, and the employer ap-
pealed the regional director’s finding to the NLRB. In August 2001, 
the board remanded the case to the regional director, stating: “In light 
of Kentucky River, the Board has decided to remand this proceeding to 
the Regional director to reopen the record on the issue of whether the 
Employer’s mates ‘assign’ and ‘responsibly direct’ and on the scope 
and degree of ‘independent judgment’ used in the exercise of such au-
thority” (335 NLRB No. 36, at p. 9).
The large number of cases in our sample in which Kentucky River 
is merely cited on burden of proof or in which it merely results in a re-
mand for reconsideration either by the board or the ALJ may be reflect-
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Industry; employees Effect of Kentucky River (KR)
Health care cases
Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 335 NLRB 
No. 54
Long-term care; LPN None
Franklin Hosp. Med. Ctr d/b/a Franklin Home 
Health, 337 NLRB No. 132
Health care; staff nurses None
Ken-Crest Services, 335 NLRB No. 63 Health care; program manager None
Lutheran Home at Moorestown, 334 NLRB No. 47 Long-term care; RN & LPN None
Maui Medical Group, Inc., 2002 NLRB LEXIS 125 Clinics; nurses None
Norton Health Care Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 96 Hospital; clinical coordinator None
Nurses United for Improved Patient Health care, 
2003 NLRB LEXIS 107
Home health care agency; IV clinical 
coordinator
None. Cited on burden of proof.
St. Barnabas Hosp., 334 NLRB No.125 Hospital; doctors None
Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 2001 LEXIS 519 Hospital; charge nurse None. Cited on burden of proof.
Wilshire at Lakewood, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 301 Long-term care center; RN Probably none. Probably would 
have been supervisor prior to KR.
Non–health care cases
Adriana Distributors, Inc., 2001 LEXIS 551 Pharmaceutical distributor; general 
manager
None
Alter Barge Lines, Inc, 336 NLRB No. 132 (2001) Inland shipping; pilots None. Ingram Barge is key.
American Commercial Barge Line Co., 2001 LEXIS 
591
Inland shipping; pilots Matters. ALJ reversed decision.
Arlington Masonry Supply 2003 NLRB LEXIS 398 Building materials; maintenance 
supervisor
Matters. NLRB reversed ALJ 
decision.
Table 7.2  NLRB Cases Referring to Kentucky River before July 24, 2004
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B&A Associates, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 267 Building management; service manager None
Bay Harbour Electric, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 577 Construction; foremen None. Cited on burden of proof.
Brad Snodgrass, Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 157 Construction; foremen None
Chardon Rubber Company, 335 NLRB No. 92 (2001) Rubber; production and maintenance 
workers
None. Cited on burden of proof.
Citywide Corporate Transportation, 2002 NLRB 
LEXIS 537
Limo service; driver None
Clock Electric, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 123 Construction; project manager None
David Van Os & Assocs. PC, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 16 Law firm; attorney and administrative 
staff
None
Dist. No. 1, Marine Engrs Ben. Asso., 2003 NLRB 
LEXIS 36
Shipping; licensed assistant marine 
engineers
Unclear. Possibly some. Union 
used to support case.
Dole Fresh Vegetables 2003 NLRB Lexis 395 Cannery; maintenance leads None. Cited on burden of proof
Ducommun Aerostructures, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 312 Aerospace mnfg; leadmen None
Dynamic Science, Inc., 334 NLRB No. 57 (2001) Military contractor; artillery test leaders None
E.C. Waste, Inc., 2001 LEXIS 718 Waste collection; customer service 
reps.
None. Cited on burden of proof
Ferguson Enterprises, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 504 Construction supply; foremen None
Freeman Decorating Co., 336 NLRB No.1(2001) Construction; carpenters None. Procedural cite.
Fuji Foods US, Inc., 2002 NLRB LEXIS 313 Meat processing; quality control 
assistant
None. Cited on burden of proof
GFC Crane Consultants, Inc., 2002 NLRB LEXIS 
121
Crane repair; port engineers None
Ingram Barge Co., 336 NLRB No. 131 (2001) Inland shipping; pilots None
Inter-con Security Systems, Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 
329
Guard services; various None. Cited on NLRB determines 
degree of discretion.
B
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Industry; employees Effect of Kentucky River (KR)
Non–health care cases
Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 335 NLRB No. 36 (2001) Riverboat casino; mates Some. NLRB remanded to ALJ.
Marquette Trans/Bluegrass Marine, 2001 NLRB 
LEXIS 655
Inland shipping; pilots Matters. ALJ reversed decision.
New York Law Publishing Co, 336 NLRB No. 93 
(2001)
Publishing; production & editorial None
Quality Mechanical Insulation, 2003 NLRB Lexis 
367
Insulation contractor; foreman in 
warehouse
None. Cited on burden of proof.
Rhee Brothers, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 3 Food warehouse; assistant & section 
managers
None. Cited on burden of proof.
Sheet Metal Wkrs Local U 102 & 105, 2003 NLRB 
LEXIS 270
Construction; jobsite foreman None.
Williamette Industries, 336 NLRB No. 59 (2001) Manufacturing; leadmen None. Cited on burden of proof.
Table 7.2  (continued)
B
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ing the recentness of the decision given the length of time that it takes 
cases about supervisory status to go through the NLRB and the courts. 
More recently, in Arlington Masonry Supply, 339 NLRB No. 99 
(2003), the board overturned an ALJ decision that a “maintenance su-
pervisor” was not a supervisor under the act in a case that hinged on the 
degree of independent judgment that was involved. The board found 
that the individual in question used independent judgment because he 
assigned work—“a primary inidicia of supervisory authority” accord-
ing to the board. In overturning the ALJ, the board stated (339 NLRB 
No. 99, footnote 9 at p. 717): “In Kentucky River, supra, the Supreme 
Court rejected the rationale relied on by the hearing officer here that 
judgment involving assignment and direction of work which is based 
on technical skill and experience does not constitute ‘independent judg-
ment’ within the meaning of Sec. 2(11).” 
CHANGE IN THE NLRB’S APPROACH TO 
SUPeRVISoRy	STATUS?
As mentioned earlier, on July 24, 2003, the NLRB invited parties 
and interested amici to file briefs addressing supervisory status issues 
in light of Kentucky River for three “lead cases,” Oakwood Healthcare, 
Beverly Enterprises–Minnesota, d/b/a Golden Crest Health Care Cen-
ter and Croft Metals. Clearly the board is reconsidering its approach 
to the question of supervisory status in light of Kentucky River, and 
nurses are especially likely to be affected; two of the three cases involve 
nurses—RNs acting in a charge nurse capacity in a hospital (Oakwood) 
and charge nurses (both RNs and LPNs) in a long-term care facility 
(Beverly Enterprises). The third case involves “leadmen” and “load su-
pervisors” in a manufacturing facility. All three cases turn on the degree 
of “independent judgment” used by the individuals in question in as-
signing work and/or directing other employees (the issue in Kentucky 
River) and all are cases in which ALJs and regional directors, applying 
the earlier criteria of the NLRB, found individuals not to be supervisors 
under the act. While the board has not yet issued its decisions in these 
three cases, it would seem fairly certain that it will attempt to apply 
similar standards to health care and other employees.
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Given that the NLRB could rule at any moment, we will discuss 
these cases only briefly. Our discussion will necessarily be specula-
tive—only time will tell what the Bush NLRB will decide is sufficient 
“independent judgment” for an individual to be considered a supervi-
sor under the act. We view the brief filed by General Counsel Arthur F. 
Rosenfeld (Rosenfeld 2003) as likely giving an indication of the direc-
tion of the board, but it is not evident that its recommendations will be 
adopted in their entirety.
Oakwood Healthcare is a case involving charge nurses at a Min-
nesota acute-care hospital. While a few charge nurses fill the position 
on a continuing basis, most are RNs who rotate into the job temporarily 
once or twice every two weeks; while they function in that capacity 
they earn an additional $1.50 per hour. The charge nurses have vari-
ous responsibilities, including meeting with a doctor if the doctor has 
an issue with a particular nurse or patient, meeting with a patient or a 
patient’s family if they have a complaint, and filling out an incident 
report if there is an error or an accident (like a fall). Most importantly, 
the charge nurse assigns staff nurses to work with individual patients. 
Much of the assignment, however, is done in accordance with detailed 
written hospital policies to equalize workloads and maintain continuity 
of care from one day to the next. The ALJ ruled and the regional direc-
tor agreed, that this level of independent judgment did not make these 
nurses supervisors—but the board’s ruling in Arlington Masonry Sup-
ply and the Rosenfeld brief indicate that NLRB may be about to change 
its standard in this area. Rosenfeld proposes, “The Section 2(11) power 
to assign with independent judgment is demonstrated by evidence that 
the alleged supervisor has discretion to assign work of differing degrees 
of difficulty or desirability on the basis of his or her own assessment of 
an employee’s ability or attitude” (Section 2a).
Beverly Enterprises involves RNs and LPNs acting as charge nurs-
es in a skilled nursing facility. As far back as 1999, a union sought an 
election in a unit of LPNs and RNs, but the employer sought to exclude 
as supervisors all 8 RNs and 11 of the 12 LPNs who served as charge 
nurses. In March 1999, the regional director issued a decision and di-
rection of election in which he included all of the disputed personnel in 
the unit, finding that they possessed no indicia of supervisory authority. 
Eventually, the cases was appealed to the 8th Circuit, which, as men-
tioned above, remanded the case to the board because it had “employed 
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an improper legal standard in finding that the nurses were not statutory 
supervisors.” The board further remanded the case back to the regional 
director to examine whether the nurses in question utilized “indepen-
dent judgment” under the standard adopted by the Court in Kentucky 
River. Then, in a decision rendered in August 2002, the regional direc-
tor again found the nurses to be employees rather than supervisors. The 
bulk of his decision turned on whether or not they “exercise indepen-
dent judgment to assign and responsibly direct other employees.” In 
concluding that they did not, he relied on the fact that their judgments 
“are so circumscribed by existing policies, orders and regulations of the 
Employer that they do not exercise independent judgment within the 
meaning of Section 2(11).”
It is difficult to predict how the board will decide Beverly. In rul-
ing that the nurses were not supervisors in his most recent decision, 
the regional director took great pains to point out the minimal amount 
of independent judgment they exercise in making their decisions. For 
example, he pointed out that many of their decisions are dictated by a 
collective bargaining agreement, while others must be approved by the 
director of nursing or her assistant. On the other hand, the employer 
argued that the charge nurses can make changes in the room and floor 
assignments of the certified nursing assistants. While the regional direc-
tor found the employer had not met the burden of proof in this regard, 
the board may disagree.
Croft Metals involves “lead persons” at a facility manufacturing 
aluminum and vinyl doors and windows. One group of lead persons 
are load supervisors. Load supervisors work with three others who load 
merchandise onto trucks. In addition to counting and scanning the mer-
chandise, the load supervisor instructs the other employees on where 
and how to place the material in the truck, which is dictated largely by 
the delivery schedule. Other lead persons work in particular areas in 
the plant, like the tool room, or ensure that production lines run prop-
erly, for instance, by calling maintenance if a machine needs a repair.11 
The ALJ and regional directors found that the employer had not met its 
obligation, under Kentucky River to prove that the independent judg-
ment of these individuals is sufficient to render them supervisors. While 
we cannot be certain what the NLRB will do with this case, it seemed 
to us that the extremely low level of authority and judgment involved 
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makes it likely that that the board will uphold the earlier decisions of 
the agency.
CASES DECIDED By THE NLRB AFTER JULy 2003
The NLRB cited Kentucky River in 36 decisions between July 24, 
2003, and November 1, 2004,12 and while NLRB may be signaling a 
change in its approach to supervisor status, as evinced by its call for 
briefs in the three cases discussed above, we do not see a significant 
change in the board’s approach as of yet. In other words, the board has 
not expanded its interpretation of who is a supervisor to date. For ex-
ample, the most recent board decision as of this writing was Wilshire at 
Lakewood, 343 NLRB No. 23, (September 30, 2004). One of the issues 
in that case was whether an RN who acted as a weekend supervisor was 
a supervisor, and in 2002, relying on Kentucky River, an ALJ had found 
that she was. In 2004, however, the board, in a 2–1 decision, reversed 
the ALJ and found her to be an employee, not a supervisor. It may be 
interesting to note, however, that the one dissenting board member was 
Chairman Battista, a Bush appointee. 
United Cerebral Palsy of New York City, Inc., 343 NLRB No. 1, is 
another health care case involving supervisory status. The procedural 
history in that case alone is worthy of note. In 2001, a regional director 
found that certain personnel were employees but on February 15, 2002, 
the respondent filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending 
that in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kentucky River, the 
board should find that all the individuals in the two voting groups (teach-
ers, rehabilitation specialists, developmental specialists, and pool coor-
dinators) are statutory supervisors. By unpublished order dated October 
29, 2002, the board denied both the general counsel’s and respondent’s 
motions and ordered the region to reopen the record in the case for fur-
ther consideration of whether the disputed employees are supervisors in 
light of Kentucky River. On August 6, 2003, the acting regional director 
issued a supplemental decision, again finding that the disputed employ-
ees were not supervisors. On September 2, 2003, the respondent filed a 
request for review of the supplemental decision, which the board denied 
by unpublished order dated May 28, 2004. Thus, while Kentucky River 
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led the board to reconsider the status of various employees in light of 
the Court’s decisions, and the resulting delay hurt employee’s chances 
of unionizing, the legal outcome was unchanged. In fact, in none of the 
36 cases decided between July 24, 2003, and November 1, 2004, does it 
appear that persons who might have been found to be employees prior 
to Kentucky River were found to be supervisors because of the Supreme 
Court’s decision.
FInAL	obSeRVATIonS
The U.S. courts have, over time, reduced the number of persons 
who are deemed to have rights under the NLRA by gradually expanding 
the supervisory exclusion, and by making it applicable to those profes-
sional employees who direct the work of less-skilled employees. The 
decision of the Supreme Court in Kentucky River initially struck us as 
being potentially very damaging to nurses who were attempting to orga-
nize. Arguments about the actual degree of independent judgment used 
by nurses (many of whom operate in a work environment characterized 
by detailed written employer standards for care), however, have been 
persuasive to numerous ALJs and regional directors of NLRB. To date, 
Kentucky River, has not caused a sea-change in NLRB rulings regard-
ing the status of nurses as employees under the law. Rather, it appears 
to be one more case in a long line of cases that gradually have eroded 
the rights of certain individuals to choose whether or not they wish to 
be represented by a labor organization. 
The case has been important in adding to delays in numerous rep-
resentation cases—delays that decidedly harm employees who want 
union representation. Unions are finding tactics to counteract employ-
ers’ use of the law to delay and to block collective bargaining for nurses 
and other health care professionals, but the problem persists. Unions in 
health care, like unions elsewhere, are trying to pressure employers to 
both enforce and expand rights under the NLRA through the negotia-
tion of neutrality and card check agreements.
Things are likely to get more problematic in the next few months, 
with a more conservative NLRB and with a judiciary that is quite will-
ing to find tugboat pilots and other relatively low-level employees to 
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be without the right to organize simply because they direct the work 
of other employees and in so doing exercise a degree of independent 
judgment. While it is unclear how the NLRB will rule in each of the 
three “lead cases” discussed in this chapter, it is clear that the board will 
apply the same standard in health care as it has in other industries, most 
likely to the detriment of some nurses. 
Ultimately, labor law needs to be changed in a number of respects; 
one particularly problematic aspect of the law that is ripe for reconsid-
eration is its narrow coverage. It is not clear why the right to organize 
on the part of nurses, tugboat pilots, and electrical transmission employ-
ees should even be subject to hair-splitting legal contention. Kentucky 
River made it harder for such employees to organize, but as yet has not 
made a major change in the existing legal situation. It may provide the 
excuse for a major change in policy on the part of the Bush-appointee- 
dominated NLRB.
Notes
 1.  In 2003, 18.1 percent of all professionals were union members, in contrast to 
12.9 percent of all wage and salary workers. Recently there has been a marked 
increase in interest in unionization among pharmacists (McHugh and Bodah 
2002) and physicians (9 percent of pharmacists and 5 percent of physicians are 
now members). See Hirsch and MacPherson (1996, 2001) for detailed occupa-
tion unionization rates based on the Current Population Survey), or the Web site 
maintained by them at http://www.unionstats.com/. Data here were obtained 
from that site on November 18, 2004.
 2.  Particularly important decisions include NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Tex-
tron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) and NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 
(1979). 
 3.  Section 2(12) provides, that “The term ‘professional employee’ means (a) any 
employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character 
as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involv-
ing the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of 
such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be 
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of 
an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a pro-
longed course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of 
higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education 
or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, 
manual, or physical processes; or (b) any employee, who (i) has completed the 
courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) 
of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of 
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a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as 
defined in paragraph (a).
 4.  Section 2(11) of the act states, “The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual 
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay 
off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, 
or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to rec-
ommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such 
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment.” 
 5.  Interviews were conducted by a University of Illinois graduate student, Lisa 
Roan, who is a registered nurse, as part of an independent study on her part. We 
thank her for her persistence and dedication in exploring these issues with union 
staff.
 6.  Beth Kean, Director of Organizing, California Nurses Association; telephone in-
terview. L. Roan, June 19, 2002.
 7.  Mike Slott, Education Director, HPAE/AFT, New Jersey; conversation. P. Voos, 
August 2, 2002.
 8.  See previous note.
 9.  Of course, we cannot say with certainty that the bargaining order in either of 
these cases would have been enforced in the absence of Kentucky River.
10.  Two authors read each case and made an assessment of whether or not Kentucky 
River made a difference in the outcome of the case; if the two readers disagreed 
(an unusual outcome), then the third author read the case and we talked in order 
to come to a consensus on our understanding of the impact of Kentucky River. 
11.  In earlier years, a different labor organization than the one petitioning for repre-
sentation represented some employees at this same manufacturing facility. Lead-
men were included with other plant employees in one bargaining unit at that 
time.
12.  Mays Elec. Co., 343 NLRB No. 20 (Sept. 30, 2004); Duer Constr. Co., 2004 
NLRB LEXIS 594 (NLRB Sept. 30, 2004); Valley Slurry Seal Co. And Constr. 
And General Laborers’ Local 185, 343 NLRB No. 34 (Sept. 30, 2004); Wilshire 
at Lakewood, 343 NLRB No. 23 (Sept. 30, 2004); United Cerebral Palsy of 
N.Y. City, Inc., 343 NLRB No. 1 (Sept. 28, 2004); K. W. Elec., Inc., 342 NLRB 
No. 126 (Sept. 24, 2004); John T. Jones Constr. Co., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 536 
(NLRB Sept. 24, 2004); Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 NLRB No. 101 
(Sept. 10, 2004);Wackenhut Corp., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 493 (NLRB Sept. 7, 
2004); Deffenbaugh Disposal Servs., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 443 (NLRB July 30, 
2004); Taylor, 2004 NLRB LEXIS 387 (NLRB July 13, 2004); Sara Lee Bakery 
Group, 342 NLRB No. 12 (June 25, 2004); Kelly Bros. Sheet Metal, Inc., 342 
NLRB No. 9 (June 21, 2004); Donaldson Bros. Ready Mix, Inc., 341 NLRB 
No. 124 (May 19, 2004); K. W. Elec., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 252 (NLRB May 
18, 2004); Volair Contrs., Inc., 341 NLRB No. 98 (Apr. 30, 2004); Serv. Spring 
Corp., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 196 (NLRB Apr. 29, 2004); Trane, an Operating Div. 
of Am. Std., Emplr., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 124 (NLRB Mar. 19, 2004); Mays 
Elec. Co., 2004 NLRB LEXIS 73 (NLRB Feb. 20, 2004); Solvay Iron Works, 
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Inc., 341 NLRB No. 25 (Feb. 17, 2004); Safe Disposal Sys., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 
814 (NLRB Dec. 29, 2003); Allied Mech., Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 810 (NLRB 
Dec. 19, 2003); Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local Unions 102 & 105, 340 
NLRB No. 149 (Dec. 11, 2003); Sara Lee Bakery Group, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 
776 (NLRB Dec. 2, 2003); L.A. Water & Power Emples. Ass’n, 340 NLRB No. 
146 (Nov. 28, 2003); Flat Dog Prods., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 743 (NLRB Nov. 24, 
2003); Jewish Home for the Elderly of Fairfield County, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 
745 (NLRB Nov. 21, 2003); Quality Mech. Insulation, Inc., 340 NLRB No. 91; 
Int’l Transp. Serv. (ITS), 2003 NLRB LEXIS 604 (NLRB Sept. 10, 2003); Kelly 
Bros. Sheet Metal, Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 527 (NLRB Sept. 3, 2003); Barstow 
Cmty. Hosp., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 536 (NLRB Aug. 29, 2003); Univar USA, 
Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 528 (NLRB Aug. 28, 2003); Solvay Iron Works, Inc., 
2003 NLRB LEXIS 471 (NLRB Aug. 20, 2003); Lenawee Long Term Care, 
Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 459 (NLRB Aug. 14, 2003); Arlington Masonry Sup-
ply, Inc., 339 NLRB No. 99 (July 21, 2003); Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 2003 
NLRB LEXIS 395, 339 NLRB No. 90 (July 17, 2003); Quality Mech. Insulation, 
Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 367 (NLRB July 7, 2003); Inter-Con Sec. Sys., 2003 
NLRB LEXIS 329 (NLRB June 23, 2003).
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An Experiment to Test  
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Labor law reform is passionately debated among union activists 
and officials, labor economists, and industrial relations scholars. Some 
who are concerned that the decline in union membership in the United 
States threatens workers’ rights and working conditions believe labor 
law is an impediment to union success. Others believe that changes 
in employment structures and innovations in human relations methods 
mean unions and collective bargaining are no longer needed by today’s 
workers.
In addition, for decades most of the focus of labor law reform has 
been on organizing, with scant attention given to collective bargaining. 
Organizing new members is important, but organizing campaigns alone 
cannot succeed in increasing union membership. Workers join unions to 
improve their working conditions. Improved working conditions come 
from collective bargaining. The fact is that organizing does not matter 
if unions have no bargaining power. Furthermore, increased union bar-
gaining power should make unions more attractive to the unorganized. 
Union success at the bargaining table affects organizing success, and 
the degree of organization affects bargaining success.
These debates are passionate despite—or perhaps because of—the 
lack of empirical evidence as to how a law reform proposal would oper-
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ate. We believe that there is a great deal to be gained by using empiri-
cal methodology as one way to examine how a proposed labor law is 
likely to work, and that there should be more focus on the relationship 
between law and collective bargaining.
We have used an experiment here in order to explore one discrete 
aspect of collective bargaining to examine whether law affects percep-
tions of bargaining power. We first discuss how law can be used by 
unions and employers as a resource to bolster bargaining power. We 
then outline the methodology we used to test whether different legal 
regimes affected perceptions of the bargaining power of unions and em-
ployers. We end the chapter with a discussion of our results and conclu-
sions.
LAW AS A RESOURCE
Many laws—both statutory and judge-made—control or potentially 
affect collective bargaining. We hypothesize that the laws that deter-
mine how bargaining impasses are handled have a shadow effect on 
parties’ conduct preceding impasse. In other words, impasse laws are 
more than mere rules on how to handle deadlock. Each party will have 
taken a measurement of how and whether an impasse helps or hinders 
it and its bargaining partner. While that consideration will include eco-
nomics and the parties’ continued relationship, it will also depend on 
how the law treats an impasse. The parties will adjust their behavior 
based on their actual or perceived relative bargaining power based on 
the law. Furthermore, experienced bargainers will also shape their con-
duct based on their bargaining partner’s anticipated assessment and re-
sponse.
There are many different theories about the constituents and opera-
tion of bargaining power. Among the many factors that can collectively 
affect bargaining power are its economic context, state of the indus-
try, bargainers’ knowledge and abilities, degree of union organization, 
community sentiment and support, and law. Each can be seen as a re-
source, unevenly distributed between the bargainers in any one negotia-
tion. Although some resources, such as degree of union solidarity, that 
strengthen one side will weaken the other, not all factors will have that 
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effect. Unlike commercial bargaining, collective bargaining concerns 
parties whose fates are profoundly intertwined. Thus, a poor economy 
or a decline in an industry may weaken both parties. Strong leadership 
may lead to better outcomes for both sides. Engaging in a scorched 
earth policy may destroy both sides. Bargainers can potentially enlist 
these resources through strategies to make the best use of each in order 
to achieve their individual and mutual goals. Having more resources 
strategically employed should increase a party’s bargaining power. 
Having fewer resources or an inability to make use of one’s resources 
should decrease bargaining power. Certainly, the call for labor law re-
form manifests a belief that law plays an important role in bolstering or 
undermining union power. 
We have taken up that challenge by setting up a social science ex-
periment to explore some discrete aspects of the question whether law 
matters to collective bargaining, specifically, features of law that can 
affect bargaining power. The results reported here are only part of a 
larger experiment, and that experiment is the first part of a multiphase 
study. Results from that larger experiment are reported in Dannin and 
Singh (2004).
Three Impasse Regimes: Implementation on Impasse, Interest 
Arbitration, and Economic Power
We tested three regimes with different ways of resolving bargaining 
impasses based on the current private sector system (Regime A); inter-
est arbitration, commonly used in the public sector and advocated as 
a reform for the private sector (Regime B); and the bargaining system 
created under the National Labor Relations Act before judges created 
the doctrines of striker replacement and implementation upon impasse 
(Regime C).
We chose these three legal regimes for a number of reasons. First, 
we theorized that if law affects the process and substance of collective 
bargaining, these laws are sufficiently distinctive that we should see dif-
ferent responses, including different perceptions of bargaining power.
We also chose these legal regimes because each currently presents 
unique practical and theoretical issues connected with collective bar-
gaining. Therefore, an examination of these three methods for resolving 
impasses should be helpful as an initial step toward law reform. Briefly, 
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Regimes A and B currently are laws affecting actual bargaining. Re-
gime C provides an interesting alternative to Regime A, if the NLRA 
were stripped of judicial amendments and returned to the way Congress 
initially intended the NLRA operate.
Regime A (permanent striker replacement and employer implemen-
tation on impasse) is based on current private sector impasse law. The 
NLRA was enacted with no provisions concerning the specifics of how 
to conduct bargaining. It said nothing about the use of weapons or how 
to resolve impasses. The courts almost immediately began to create le-
gal doctrines that applied to bargaining and to the weapons employers, 
employees, and unions were allowed to use (Budd 1996; Dannin, Wagar, 
and Singh 2001; McClatchey Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026 
(D.C. Cir 1997; Sam M. Jackson, 34 NLRB 194 (1941); Westchester 
Newspapers, Inc. 26 NLRB 630 (1940)). Employees were forbidden 
from using partial strikes and sit-down strikes; and employers were per-
mitted to permanently replace strikers and to implement their final of-
fers upon reaching an impasse. Judges have added to and tinkered with 
the use of these weapons over the years (Dannin 1997, 2004).
Regime A focuses on the two key private sector impasse methods 
created by judicial decisions: the employer’s right to permanently re-
place strikers and the employer’s right to implement its final offer when 
the employer and union reach an impasse in bargaining. The latter doc-
trine is not as widely explored in industrial relations research but has 
been described in Dannin (1987, 1997). The doctrines of implementa-
tion upon impasse and striker replacement have been criticized as viola-
tions of human rights (Dannin 2004; Dannin, Wagar, and Singh 2001; 
Human Rights Watch 2000).
Under Regime A, at impasse, an employer may implement its final 
offer. No party is required to make concessions. If a union strikes, the 
employer may hire permanent replacements but may not fire strikers. 
When a strike ends, strikers may be recalled as positions become avail-
able. If an employer bargains in bad faith, the penalty is to be ordered 
to bargain in good faith (Dannin 1987, 1997; Dannin and Singh 2002; 
Dannin and Wagar 2000; Stolzenburg 2002).
We theorize that an employer in Regime A is likely to behave in a 
particular strategic way. When unemployment is high and/or if there 
is low employee solidarity, an employer is likely to assert an extreme 
position and not concede any demand. The employer has an incentive 
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to reach impasse, because then it can implement its final offer, perma-
nently replace strikers, and, perhaps, de-unionize. The union’s strategy 
is to make concessions to avoid impasse and thus implementation and a 
strike, and to accept poor offers because other alternatives are so unap-
pealing. Thus, a union is likely to move toward the employer’s position 
but not vice versa. As a result, the law moves the union’s bargaining 
power a notch lower than it would otherwise be in given economic or 
social circumstances (cf. Regime C). We propose, therefore, that under 
Regime A the employer’s bargaining power is strengthened and that of 
the union is weakened.
Regime B (interest arbitration) is based on public sector bargaining 
law. Strikes and lockouts are illegal. At impasse, the parties submit final 
offers to interest arbitration. The arbitrator chooses the best proposal 
based on the evidence offered. Interest arbitration is significant for law 
reform because it is being proposed to resolve first contract impasses in 
the private sector (U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-Manage-
ment Relations 1994).
We hypothesize that, with strike and lockout leverage removed, 
both parties must rely on persuading the other to accede to a proposal. 
Part of that persuasion is an awareness of how an arbitrator will react. 
Thus, both the employer and union are encouraged to make propos-
als that will be seen as reasonable and move toward the middle. We 
propose, therefore, that under Regime B, neither the employer nor the 
union is favored in terms of bargaining power.
Regime C (economic power) is Regime A without implementation 
or striker replacement. Strikes and lockouts are legal, but replacements 
may not be hired. At impasse no terms can be changed until agreement 
is reached. Regime C provides a method for resolving impasses that 
gives the employer and union the same or reciprocal rights when an 
impasse is reached. It also can be argued that this is the method closest 
to that originally enacted, without the judicial interpretations of striker 
replacement and implementation upon impasse that have transformed 
its operation. Regime C leaves it to each party to resolve impasses by 
deciding whether the proposals made are satisfactory to it.
We theorize that, under Regime C, the role law plays is to make 
negotiation more attractive than strategies such as trying to reach an 
impasse and avoid negotiation. Under Regime C the parties have un-
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fettered and equal use of strikes and lockouts as resources to create 
bargaining power. 
We predict that under Regime C employers and unions will frame 
their strategies based on their perceptions of their own and their bargain-
ing partner’s bargaining power. So if the employer sees union power as 
low because unemployment is high, its strike fund is depleted, and there 
is low union solidarity, the employer will be less likely to make con-
cessions. If, on the other hand, the employer sees the union as having 
high bargaining power because unemployment is low, the strike fund 
is adequate, and there is high solidarity, the employer is more likely to 
believe the union will stick to its demands, so the employer will make 
concessions to avoid a strike. The union should make similar calcula-
tions. The Regime C employer cannot count on reaching impasse to get 
its way, and the union would not have to make concessions solely to 
avoid an impasse, since only agreement would change the status quo. 
Thus, we propose that neither the employer nor the union would be 
favored in bargaining strength as a result of the law. 
One way of thinking about the degree to which each legal regime 
would affect bargaining power is to consider the following scenario. If a 
party was told to maximize its chances of attaining its bargaining goals 
and could choose to be either an employer or a union and also choose 
which regime to bargain under, we argue it would chose to be an em-
ployer under Regime A (EA). Put another way, if a party could choose 
the role it most wanted to avoid in order to minimize the chances of not 
being able to achieve its bargaining goals, it should choose to avoid be-
ing a union under Regime A (UA). Or if one rank ordered the six roles 
based on degree of bargaining power, the end points would be EA and 
UA. All other roles and regimes would be somewhere in the middle. 
METHODOLOGy
Subjects were 120 students who were attending a large public uni-
versity and a small private law school on the West Coast of the United 
States. Our sample consisted of 43 business and 77 law students. Forty 
males and 80 females participated in the study. The average age of the 
respondents was 27 years old (s.d. = 7.52). Twenty-eight percent of the 
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students who participated in the study had previous negotiation experi-
ence, although not collective bargaining or labor law experience.
The administration of the study followed the guidelines of the 
Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects (at both institutions), 
which mandated voluntary participation, informed consent, and subject 
anonymity. All subjects received remuneration of $30 each for the two 
hours they participated. The recruitment message invited students to 
participate in a two-hour research project on collective bargaining. It 
was e-mailed to the law students and read to a random selection of 
business classes (management, accounting and finance, and marketing). 
Nothing specific about the research project was mentioned in the adver-
tisements. The studies were administered in groups of approximately 
20–30 participants in each session.
When participants arrived at their scheduled session, they were ran-
domly assigned to a two-person group. In a few cases, when we had an 
odd number of participants, we had a three-person group. Each caucus 
was seated some distance from other caucuses, so they could not over-
hear other discussions. 
Each group was randomly assigned to one of six different caucuses: 
union caucuses UA, UB, or UC, or employer caucuses EA, EB, or EC. 
The participants were first told to read a one-page sheet. The sheet for 
all caucuses contained the following information:
Owen Corporation produces computer components. It is about 
to begin negotiating a collective bargaining agreement with the 
United Employees Association. The UEA represents hourly pro-
duction, plant clerical, quality control, shipping, warehouse, and 
clerical workers—approximately 256 employees. Employees are 
exposed to many chemicals used to produce the computer com-
ponents. The union is concerned that these may be hazardous and 
may cause health problems. Several workers compensation claims 
are now pending involving cases of pancreatic, throat, and lung 
cancer and various respiratory and skin aliments. In addition, this 
past year, several workers had babies with serious defects.
The union proposes 1) an across-the-board raise of 2 percent a year 
in each of the next three years, 2) installing a system to monitor levels 
of toxic substances in the workplace, 3) establishing a joint employer-
union health and safety committee, and 4) improved health insurance. 
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The employer takes the position that health problems are the result 
of improper use of safety devices and employee alcohol or drug abuse. 
The employer proposes 1) subcontracting the most hazardous work in 
the plant, 2) implementing random drug testing, and 3) making hazard-
ous work voluntary and paying a premium for it. 
All union caucus information sheets contained the following ad-
ditional information: 
You are meeting in a union caucus to discuss your strategies for 
bargaining. You are aware that you have the following individu-
als among your membership. Some employees may be HIV posi-
tive and would not want this known. Several are members of the 
Libertarian Party. Sixty percent of the workforce is female. Sev-
enty-three percent of the workforce is of child-bearing age. Your 
strategies must accommodate your constituents’ interests, your 
predictions as to your opponent’s strategies, and your plan to deal 
with those strategies. Keeping all this in mind, what strategy will 
put the union in the strongest position possible? Strongest means 
what will get the union the most possible. 
All employer caucus information sheets contained the following ad-
ditional information: 
You are meeting in an employer caucus to discuss your strategies 
for bargaining. You are aware that your managers, supervisors, and 
employees include individuals with diverse interests and views. 
The union has provided attorneys for all employees who have filed 
workers compensation claims and has informed you that it will be 
considering grievances and further legal action concerning work-
place health and safety.
You have been solicited by the president of a company which per-
forms both drug testing and assists in applicant screening and who 
hopes to gain your business. In fact, this is what first interested 
the company in testing. There has been news recently about other 
companies which ran into trouble because of drug use by employ-
ees.
Your strategies must accommodate your constituents’ interests, 
your predictions as to your opponent’s strategies, and your plan to 
deal with those strategies. Keeping all this in mind, what strategy 
will put the employer in the strongest position possible? Strongest 
means what will get the employer the most possible.
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Finally, each caucus had information about the way its legal regime 
resolved bargaining impasses. The information sheets for employer and 
union caucuses in Regime A (EA and UA) stated:
If a union and employer reach an impasse in bargaining, the em-
ployer may implement its final offer. There is no requirement to 
make concessions. If the union strikes, the employer may hire per-
manent replacements to take the jobs of the strikers but may not 
fire them. At the strike’s end the strikers are placed on a recall 
list and will be recalled if and as positions become available. If 
the employer bargains in bad faith, the only penalty is an order to 
bargain in good faith.
Regime A is based on the law that currently controls bargaining in 
the private sector in the United States as a consequence of various ju-
dicially developed doctrines permitting implementation upon impasse 
and striker replacement.
The information sheets for employer and union caucuses in Regime 
B (EB and UB) stated:
Strikes and lockouts are outlawed. When impasse is reached, the 
parties must submit their final offers to “final offer interest arbitra-
tion.” This means that each side will present evidence to support 
its proposals to an arbitrator at a hearing. The arbitrator will then 
choose the best proposal based on the evidence offered.
Regime B is based on interest arbitration, a method commonly used 
to resolve impasse in many public sector collective bargaining laws, 
and it is usually the case that strikes and lockouts are illegal in the pub-
lic sector.
The information sheets for employer and union caucuses in Regime 
C (EC and UC) stated:
Strikes and lockouts are legal. When impasse is reached, no re-
placement workers may be hired in either a strike or lockout 
situation. No terms may be changed until an agreement has been 
reached.
Regime C is a scenario that emphasizes the parties’ use of the equal 
economic weapons of strike and lockout and that appears to be congru-
ent with the law contemplated by the drafters of the NLRA.
After the participants had finished reading the information sheet for 
that caucus, they were told to develop a strategy for reaching the most 
favorable bargaining outcome for their side. After 15 minutes, the par-
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ticipants were told to switch positions—that if they were originally an 
employer, they should begin to develop a strategy from a union point of 
view, and if they were a union, they should begin to develop a strategy 
from an employer point of view. After another 15 minutes, they were 
told to return to their original identities and develop their final strate-
gies. Then after 10 minutes, they were told to begin writing down their 
strategies.
When all groups completed their strategies, we administered a sur-
vey that each participant was to fill out individually. When they were 
finished, we administered a survey that each caucus was to answer by 
group consensus. We then held a debriefing session during which we 
discussed the various caucuses’ laws and solicited participant reactions. 
The participants were not aware until the debriefing session that there 
were different legal regimes. Finally, we administered an individual 
questionnaire that permitted participants to add information or reac-
tions they wanted to report as a result of the debriefing.
No actual bargaining occurred, although the participants believed 
throughout the study that they would be bargaining. We did not define 
the term impasse but rather let the participants use their own sense of its 
meaning, one that is close to the various legal definitions without neces-
sitating an understanding of the legal complexities of the doctrine. The 
results discussed here rely on two of the three surveys—the individual 
level response and caucus level response.
In evaluating and drawing any implications from our results, we 
have borne in mind that there are important limitations in using this 
research methodology, although there are also advantages. The advan-
tages are those inherent in any modeling that first simplifies a complex 
system by limiting variables and then is used to examine and predict 
the workings of that more complex system (Roth 1995). Here, we have 
constructed a controlled environment in which to examine and contrast 
a limited number of features of the negotiation processes preceding im-
passe procedures. The subjects were given only a handful of issues to 
consider, although they were ones likely to be included in real negotia-
tion.
The primary disadvantage is that the exercise was not real. The sub-
jects had virtually no experience with collective bargaining law or with 
bargaining. They faced no losses and no real risks and thus were likely 
to have little invested in the process. The subjects had no opportunity to 
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learn from past negotiations and apply that experience nor to have been 
trained—things one would expect with real negotiators. Severe time 
limits meant emphasizing quick assessments and reactions. Finally, 
they never bargained but rather simply formulated strategies.
We were aware of all these problems and therefore tried to construct 
this social science experiment in a way that minimized as many of these 
problems as possible. In order to inject greater realism into the process, 
we chose bargaining issues that are commonly encountered in bargain-
ing and have ramifications the subjects could easily grasp. We provided 
the subjects with information about their respective constituents’ in-
terests in order to help them gauge how their proposals and strategies 
would likely be received. To help them behave more like an experi-
enced and sophisticated bargainer, we had subjects temporarily shift 
sides and act in the role of their bargaining partner. This was intended to 
help them appreciate potential strategies and the other side’s reactions 
and then reconsider their own strategies in light of that experience. In 
fact, during the sessions we heard them actually reacting in this way 
when they progressed through the session, as they realized what their 
bargaining partner’s limitations or strengths were. 
In addition, we recruited participants who lacked experience with 
collective bargaining and labor law so we would have reactions to the 
law that would be as untainted by bias and disinterested as is possible. 
We realize, of course, that law and business students do not come to 
a collective bargaining exercise with no opinions concerning unions, 
collective bargaining, or employers. Labor and collective bargaining 
are highly contested, and proposals for law reform are highly partisan. 
The participants in this exercise were therefore in the unique situation 
of having some practical experience with collective bargaining while 
being relatively nonpartisan in their responses and in having no real 
stake in the outcomes. 
Finally, we stopped short of collective bargaining because we want-
ed to retain a focus on the law and participants’ reactions to it. The 
give and take of real negotiating, especially with unsophisticated bar-
gainers, might have muddied their responses and made interpretation 
more difficult. In addition, we were concerned that we have sufficient 
participants to have statistically reliable results. Sessions of sufficient 
length to include bargaining would have drastically reduced our pool 
size. Time was limited to two hours total so we could include a larger 
number of subjects.
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This is the first part of a long-term, phased study to measure the op-
eration of discrete aspects of law with regard to bargaining. In this ini-
tial phase, we measured the impact of impasse law in a fairly unsubtle 
way. This makes it more likely to get a clear cut answer to the question 
whether law in general—and impasse law in particular—has an effect 
on bargaining. In this chapter we examine only the question of whether 
law has an impact on bargaining power. We use the participants’ percep-
tions of their power versus the power of their bargaining partner in their 
regime as a proxy for actual bargaining power. The ultimate measure 
of power would be a study of actual or simulated bargaining. How-
ever, perceptions of one’s own power relative to the party one bargains 
with can translate into real power. Therefore, measuring perceptions of 
power also measures a component of bargaining power.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Participant responses confirmed our overarching theory: different 
legal regimes resulted in different perceptions of bargaining power (Ta-
ble 8.1). First, using the individual level responses, in general we found 













AU 23 1 6 17
AE 17 3 4 16
BU 4 11 11 4
BE 8 4 7 6
CU 9 6 13 1
CE 2 10 15 0
AU+E 40 4 10 33 E: 36/U: (23)
BU+E 12 15 18 10 E: (3)/U: 8
CU+E 11 16 28 1 E: (5)/U: 27
Table	8.1		A	Preliminary	View	of	bargaining	Strength	(Individual	
Response)
NOTE: The raw score does not add up to 120 since we did not include “no effect” and 
“did not answer” in this table. Parentheses indicate a negative value.
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power as net 59 points stronger than the union’s. Under Regime B, the 
participants rated the union’s bargaining power as net 5 points stronger 
than the employer’s, essentially a tie. Under Regime C, the participants 
rated the union as net 22 points stronger than the employer. Each re-
gime has a different pattern of perceptions of bargaining power. These 
differences are confirmed in other data from this study reported in Dan-
nin and Singh (2004).
While our general theory that law affects perceptions of bargaining 
power is supported by the data, our theories as to individual regimes 
were only partly supported. Thus, in two cases (Regimes A and B), our 
hypotheses were confirmed, and in one (Regime C) they were not. The 
detailed data on which those conclusions are based are included be-
low.
In Regime A individual responses, the union participants thought the 
law weakened the union (23 percent union stronger versus 65 percent 
union weaker), and saw the law as greatly strengthening the employer 
(89 percent employer stronger but 4 percent employer weaker). The 
employer respondents agreed that the law strengthened the employer 
(77 percent employer stronger versus 14 percent employer weaker) and 
weakened the union (18 percent union stronger but 73 percent union 
weaker) (Tables 8.2A and 8.2B).
The caucus level responses were in the same direction but more 
highly skewed. Union respondents saw Regime A as weakening the 
union (8 percent union stronger to 83 percent union weaker) and as 
strengthening the employer (92 percent employer stronger to 8 per-
cent employer weaker). Employer respondents also saw the regime as 
weakening the union (0 percent union stronger versus 82 percent union 
weaker) and strengthening the employer (82 percent employer stronger 
to 9 percent employer weaker) (Tables 8.3A and 8.3B).
In short, these results support the hypotheses as to Regime A with 
respect to bargaining strength. The participants saw the law as creat-
ing a highly unbalanced bargaining structure, with employer bargaining 
power from three to four times greater than the union’s. Such skewed 
bargaining power could destabilize or undermine collective bargaining 
to such a degree that it recreates the power relations the NLRA was 
enacted to rebalance (Dannin 2004). These results were in accord with 
other data from this study that found strong dislike for Regime A among 
the participants. They saw the law as highly unbalanced. Far more of 
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the participants wanted to alter the law of Regime A to make it more fair 
(Dannin and Singh 2005).
The results of Regime B show a very different pattern. The indi-
vidual responses from union respondents saw the law as tending to 
strengthen the union (52 percent union stronger and 19 percent union 
weaker, and 29 percent no answer or no effect) and weaken the em-
ployer (19 percent employer stronger, 52 percent employer weaker, and 
29 percent no answer or no effect). Employer respondents, however, 
tended to see the law as strengthening the employer (50 percent em-
ployer stronger, 25 percent employer weaker, and 25 percent no effect 
or no answer), while having a more neutral impact on the union (44 
percent union stronger versus 38 percent union weaker and 19 percent 
no answer) (Tables 8.2A and 8.2B).
The caucus level results were similar. Union caucuses saw the law 
as strengthening the union (67 percent stronger versus 11 percent union 
weaker and 22 percent no response or no effect) and weakening the em-
Table 8.2B  The Effect of Caucus on the Strength of your Partner’s 
Bargaining Position (Individual Response, %)
UA UB UC EA EB EC Total
Strengthened 88.5 19.0 52.9 18.2 43.8 83.3 51.7
Weakened 3.8 52.4 35.3 72.7 37.5 33.3
Did not affect 5.6 0.8
No answer 7.7 28.6 11.8 9.1 18.8 11.1 14.2
N 26 21 17 22 16 18 120
NOTE: Chi-square = 55.36; d.f. = 15; and p < 0.01.
UA UB UC EA EB EC Total
Strengthened 23.1 52.4 76.5 77.3 50.0 11.1 47.5
Weakened 65.4 19.0 5.9 13.6 25.0 55.6 32.5
Did not affect 9.5 12.5 3.3
No answer 11.5 19.0 17.6 9.1 12.5 33.3 16.7
N 26 21 17 22 16 18 120
Table 8.2A  The Effect of Caucus on the Strength of your Own 
Bargaining Position (Individual Response, %)
NOTE: Chi-square = 48.31; d.f. = 15; and p < 0.01.
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ployer (11 percent employer stronger versus 44 percent employer weak-
er and 44 percent no response). However, the employer caucuses saw the 
law as strengthening the employer (62 percent employer stronger versus 
38 percent weaker) and having no effect on the union’s bargaining power 
(50 percent union stronger and 50 percent union weaker). These results 
support our hypothesis that neither Regime B employer nor union is 
favored in terms of bargaining strength (Tables 8.3A and 8.3B).
Certainly, the perception of Regime B’s impact on bargaining 
strength differs markedly from that of Regime A. Both Regime B unions 
and employers saw the law as more likely to strengthen themselves and 
weaken their partner. Obviously this cannot reflect reality. What it may 
suggest is that each saw the law as treating them fairly and as providing 
ways to increase their bargaining power. This overall satisfaction with 
Regime B suggests resolving private sector impasses through interest 
arbitration could be more acceptable to both employers and unions than 
the current system (U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-Manage-
ment Relations 1994). 
UA UB UC EA EB EC Total
Strengthened 91.7 11.1 33.3 50.0 100.0 47.4
Weakened 8.3 44.4 55.6 81.8 50.0 40.4
Did not affect 9.1 1.8
No answer 44.4 11.1 9.1 10.5
N 12 9 9 11 8 8 57
Table 8.3B  The Effect of Caucus on the Strength of your Partner’s 
Bargaining Position (Caucus Response, %)
NOTE: Chi-square = 46.43; d.f. = 15; and p < 0.01. 
UA UB UC EA EB EC Total
Strengthened 8.3 66.7 88.9 81.8 62.5 11.1 51.7
Weakened 83.3 11.1 9.1 37.5 77.8 37.9
Did not affect 11.1 1.7
No answer 8.3 11.1 11.1 9.1 11.1 8.6
N 12 9 9 11 8 9 58
Table 8.3A  The Effect of Caucus on the Strength of your Own 
Bargaining Position (Caucus Response, %)
NOTE: Chi-square = 36.29; d.f. = 15; and p < 0.01.
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Of course, experience with actual interest arbitration might alter this 
attitude. There is a well-known concern that interest arbitration creates 
dependency and weans employers and unions away from real collective 
bargaining (the “narcotic effect”) (Kochan and Katz 1992). Certainly, 
anyone who pays attention to public sector collective bargaining knows 
that the availability of interest arbitration has not brought about labor 
relations nirvana.
Nonetheless, given the study results, it seems worthwhile to rethink 
potential uses for interest arbitration in the context of private sector col-
lective bargaining. For example, it is widely believed that private sector 
bargaining is undermined by the weak remedy of a bargaining order 
when an employer has engaged in bad faith bargaining. This is seen as 
giving an employer who is determined to engage in bad faith bargaining 
a virtual license to continue this conduct. The NLRA says nothing about 
bargaining orders and certainly does not mandate them as a remedy for 
bad faith bargaining. What the NLRA does require under §10(c) is that 
remedies effectuate the policies of the NLRA. Section 1 states: “It is 
hereby declared to be the policy of the United States . . . [to encourage] 
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining . . . for the purpose 
of negotiating the terms and conditions of [workers’] employment . . .” 
If interest arbitration is more likely to promote the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining than an order to bargain in good faith, 
then it might make sense for the NLRB to order interest arbitration in 
appropriate cases (Dannin forthcoming).
The point is that an employer who faced an order to interest arbitra-
tion if it engages in bad faith bargaining might be more interested in 
reaching a negotiated agreement than in having an arbitrator impose 
terms. The results of this study and other survey answers by Regime B 
participants not discussed would support such a remedy (Dannin and 
Singh 2002, 2004, 2005). 
Regime C responses demonstrate yet a third pattern. Individual 
union negotiators saw the law as greatly strengthening union bargaining 
power (77 percent union stronger, 6 percent union weaker, and 20 per-
cent no answer or no effect), and also as generally enhancing employ-
er bargaining power (53 percent employer stronger versus 35 percent 
union weaker, and 12 percent no answer). Employers, however, saw 
the law as greatly strengthening union bargaining power (83 percent 
union stronger and 17 percent no effect or no answer) while weakening 
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employer bargaining power (11 percent employer stronger versus 56 
percent employer weaker, and 33 percent no answer) (Tables 8.2A and 
8.2B).
The caucus level response for Regime C shows a similar pattern. 
Union participants saw the law as greatly strengthening union bargain-
ing power (89 percent union stronger and 11 percent no answer) and 
tending to weaken employers (33 percent employer stronger and 56 
percent employer weaker, with 11 percent no answer). Employer partic-
ipants again saw the law as giving unions overwhelming strength (100 
percent union stronger) and greatly weakening employers (11 percent 
employer stronger versus 78 percent employer weaker, with 11 percent 
no answer) (Tables 8.3A and 8.3B).
We had theorized that Regime C would have a fairly neutral impact 
on bargaining strength since both employers and unions had the eco-
nomic weapons of lockout and strike but no others. Put in economic 
game theory terms, we saw it as akin to an ultimatum game with pun-
ishment. That is, if a party made an unacceptable offer, the offeree’s re-
fusal to accept would mean that neither received the benefits of change. 
Furthermore, the parties could use the strike and lockout weapons to 
punish the other for an unacceptable offer.
The results, however, did not support our predictions that the law 
in Regime C would have a neutral effect. Participants did not see the 
law as neutral. They perceived it as strongly increasing union bargain-
ing power. It is possible the participants, who had little experience with 
collective bargaining, felt the strike was a very strong weapon (Fossum 
2002). In addition, at the time the sessions were run, unemployment 
was low and the economy so strong that it was well known that employ-
ers were having trouble finding workers. As a result, the environment 
was one in which employers had relatively low leverage. It is also pos-
sible that the participants felt that employers should control workplace 
terms or that employees and unions were likely to behave irresponsibly. 
Yet another possibility is that the participants thought that Regime C 
would let even a weak union in poor economic conditions hold negotia-
tions hostage.
Again, turning to economic game theory, Regime C is an ultimatum 
game with punishment except that, in some cases, the punishment does 
not fall equally on both. A party can use punishment to give itself a 
reward. It gives a party who lacks the strength to use economic weap-
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ons the power to hold up changes the other party needs or desires by 
simply refusing to agree. It may also disproportionately reward a party 
who is happy with the status quo. Unlike Regime A, Regime C does 
not pick winners and losers. That is, it will not always be the union or 
the employer who wants to hold up change. For example, an employer 
who did not want to increase wages could simply refuse to agree, and 
a union that opposed subcontracting or other structural changes could 
easily retain the status quo.
Of course, over time, the parties would develop strategies to nego-
tiate their way out of impasses. A union might accede to changes that 
harmed employees if it believed this was preferable to harming the com-
pany and losing all jobs, and an employer might accept wage increases, 
because it would be better to give workers a bigger slice of the pie than 
have no pie at all. In other words, the “dog in the manger” phenomenon 
that lurks in this scenario might be overcome, because we can trust the 
parties to create a fair structure over time. If not, it may be useful to 
consider lessons from economic bargaining experiments and provide 
some sanction for a non-cooperator. Imposing interest arbitration as a 
remedy for overly long and destructive impasses could be a sanction 
that would resolve the impasse and push the parties to bargain.
On the other hand, if these results reveal how such a law would 
work in reality, it could lead to deep employer grievance, essentially 
the mirror image of what unions feel under private sector law now. The 
question this raises for law reform is whether it is possible to alleviate 
the employer sense of unfairness without making unions feel deeply 
aggrieved. These results are particularly interesting, given the advocacy 
for a system of collective bargaining based on economic weapons (Troy 
1999).
CONCLUSION
In this study, we found that each law had a different impact on par-
ticipants’ perceptions of bargaining strength. The scenarios were the 
same with the exception of the law that applied to impasse resolution. 
The results show that this fact alone had a powerful effect on the partici-
pants’ perceptions of bargaining power, and that these perceptions im-
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bued the entire process of bargaining and not only to the single event of 
reaching an impasse. The study therefore provides support for the basic 
theory that collective bargaining law should properly be seen as a re-
source that, along with other resources, can affect bargaining strength. 
Thus, the results suggest that theories about bargaining power that fail 
to include law will lack predictive power.
The results also confirm theoretical and anecdotal contentions that 
the judicially created doctrines of permanent striker replacement and 
implementation of the employer’s final offer upon impasse serious-
ly weaken union bargaining power relative to the employer (Dannin 
2005).
The study design provided a fertile way to test how specific laws 
operate. Given the nature of social science experiments in general and 
of these in particular, we interpret our results with caution. The way we 
use them is if our predictions were not confirmed or were found not to 
exist in the study context, then this would not prove that the effects did 
not exist in actual labor negotiations, but such a result would suggest 
caution in assuming they would. On the other hand, if predicted effects 
are found, this does not mean they will be found in actual labor negotia-
tions, but it makes the expectation more plausible and provides insights 
and a baseline for comparing what actually happens.
In addition, the results provide guidance as to how discrete aspects 
of the law affect bargaining power and the formulation of bargaining 
strategy. Ultimately these ought to affect collective bargaining out-
comes. The results also provide some evidence whether common sense 
instincts about a regime’s effects are reflected in human behavior. 
Finally, we think it is important to emphasize that we examined 
the reactions of nonpartisan, disinterested participants to different col-
lective bargaining regimes. For this reason, their responses provide a 
special window into the operation of the law. Most of those who com-
ment on labor law are highly partisan and self-interested. Therefore, the 
intensity and unanimity of the views of both those who took the roles 
of employer and union negotiators in their caucuses as to impasse reso-
lution in the private sector deserves special attention. The NLRA was 
enacted to promote equality of bargaining power between employers 
and employees. The study participants, however, perceived a law that is 
highly unbalanced. The participants saw the judicially created doctrines 
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of striker replacement and the employer’s right to implement its final 
offer upon impasse as heavily skewing power toward the employer. 
The NLRA was enacted because Congress concluded that law— 
corporate law at the time—so unbalanced bargaining power that work-
ers had lost the ability to bargain as equals with their employers. As a 
result, wage rates and the purchasing power of workers were depressed, 
leading to industrial strife and unrest. The results of this study sug-
gest that at least in the private sector, law—in this case, judge-made 
law—has so unbalanced bargaining power that private sector worker 
rights are again in danger.
Note
Funding for this study was provided by the California Western School of Law and the 
College of Business Administration, San Diego State University. However, the opinions 
presented are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the funding sources.
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Within North America there is a school of thought that holds that 
unions have no place in well-managed enterprises. From that point of 
view, remaining “union free” and “union avoidance” are legitimate ob-
jectives of corporate policy. Maintaining a union-free environment not 
only relieves corporate management from the necessity of dealing with 
a potentially disruptive influence, it is also a public symbol suggesting 
that good human resource practices and business practices are in place. 
Thus, from this perspective, unionization of a nonunion enterprise or 
facility suggests poor management.1 
The International Labour Organization (ILO), on the other hand, 
promotes a philosophy that is completely at odds with union-free prin-
ciples. The vision of the ILO is that of an industrial relations system 
whose basic elements are those of social partnership—with worker rep-
resentatives and employer representatives as the partners—and social 
dialogue in which the partners discuss and negotiate a broad range of 
issues of mutual interest. Unions are seen to be the major institutions 
through which workers are able to participate in employment decision-
making. So that social dialogue may take place, unions and collective 
bargaining are to be encouraged rather than discouraged as indicated by 
union-free philosophy.
The ILO is a tripartite agency affiliated with the United Nations. 
Representatives from governments, trade unions, and the business com-
munity from most of the world’s countries meet once a year in Ge-
neva to legislate international standards for workers around the globe. 
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Employer and union representatives are appointed by their national 
governments. At a minimum one might expect those representatives to 
respect and help to foster acceptance of the ILO’s mission. If so, with 
regard to the employer representatives from the United States, that ex-
pectation would not be met. Instead, the U.S. Council on International 
Business, the organization delegated the responsibility for dealing with 
the ILO, pursues policies that have the effect of thwarting acceptance 
of ILO philosophy in the United States while accepting and sheltering 
adherents of the union-free philosophy. 
THe	UnIon-FRee	MoVeMenT	In	noRTH	AMeRICA
The fundamental tenets of the union-free philosophy may be sum-
marized as follows:
•  Unions are unnecessary if workers are fairly treated and well 
managed.
•  Unions are disruptive and frequently result in poor enterprise 
performance.
•  Because of one and two above, managers have a responsibility to 
the enterprise to institute policies that will maintain a union-free 
environment.
•  Unions are “outside organizations” standing disruptively be-
tween enterprise management and its employees.
As Kaufman (1993) has demonstrated, union-free philosophy has 
long had a strong following within the ranks of U.S. management. In 
the first decades of the twentieth century the labor problem was a major 
sociopolitical issue as workers protested their conditions of work and 
demanded that they be treated with respect and dignity rather than as 
soulless commodities. One answer to this social issue was good “per-
sonnel management” unilaterally instituted by employers with as much 
or as little employee input as the benevolent employer deemed to grant. 
As Kaufman (1993, p. 41) notes: 
PM [personnel management] advocates held labor unions in low 
regard. While they were prepared to admit that workers are all too 
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often driven to seek a union by autocratic, exploitative employ-
ers, they thought unions are not only incapable of solving the un-
derlying problem (poor management) but often saddle the firm, 
and workers with restrictive work rules, inflated wage demands, 
strikes, and international political intrigues.
Moreover, 
(t)hey also believed that labor unions are run by outsiders whose 
self-interest is served by fomenting conflict.
Among the organizations most firmly supporting this position was 
and continues to be the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). 
Throughout the twentieth century it consistently backed initiatives de-
signed to check the growth of unions and collective bargaining. In the 
1970s it organized the Council For a Union-Free Environment, whose 
mission is explicitly to foster union-free philosophy and behavior (Der-
ber 1984, p. 105). The council and the NAM continue to be closely 
interconnected, and the NAM actively circulates material produced by 
the council designed to aid employers intent on remaining union free.2 
The philosophy has been embraced not only by organizations whose 
major purpose is to thwart the advance of unionism, but also by human 
resources academics who have accepted “union substitution” as a legiti-
mate corporate goal. Consider the following comments that appear in a 
popular Canadian human resources text. In order to effectively imple-
ment a union-substitution strategy, “Human resource managers need 
to apply the ideas discussed in earlier chapters of this book. Failure 
to implement sound human resource policies and practices provides 
the motivation for workers to form unions” (Schwind, Das, and Wagar 
1999, pp. 661–662).
THE ILO AND ITS PHILOSOPHy OF  
EMPLOyMENT RELATIONS
The ILO was formed at the end of World War I. Its mission was to 
promote “social justice” as an essential condition for a lasting peace 
(Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston 1996). Its annual 
labor conference, attended by delegates not only from states but also, 
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as noted above, by representatives of labor and management, was con-
ceived of as a kind of World Parliament of Labor (Kaufman 2004, 
p. 205). Its function was to establish, by the passage of conventions and 
recommendations, basic standards applicable globally. A professional 
bureau was created with a permanent professional staff whose job was 
to promote the standards and culture of the organization. One of its 
major missions was to pressure, cajole, or otherwise convince member 
states to make ILO conventions and recommendations part of their do-
mestic labor legislation and to foster practices that are consistent with 
ILO principles. 
Except for a period in the 1970s, when it withdrew as a protest 
against what it perceived to be undue influence of the Soviet Union, 
the United States has been a major supporter of the ILO and its mission 
(Kaufman 2004, p. 552; McIntyre and Bodah 2006). Indeed, although 
its enforcement capacity is limited by both custom and constitution, 
one reason for the considerable amount of success that the ILO has had 
over the years (see, e.g., Valticos 1998) is that the United States pres-
sures nations depending on it for trade and development aid to institute 
labor practices consistent with ILO standards (see Compa and Diamond 
1996). The flaw in this arrangement is that there is no world power 
strong enough to ensure that the United States itself abides by the stan-
dards it fosters elsewhere. 
Over the years the ILO has adopted nearly 200 conventions. Al-
though they establish the standard for all nations, most of them do not 
become binding unless ratified by the legislature of each state individu-
ally. A small subset, however, addresses “fundamental human rights.” 
These deal with freedom of association, collective bargaining, discrimi-
nation, forced labor, and child labor. The failure of any state to institute 
practices consistent with the principles inherent in these instruments is 
considered to be improper and offensive to the international order. 
Recently, in its Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, the ILO affirmed its support for the human rights nature of 
the core set of labor standards (ILO 2000). Labor, business, and state 
representatives from the United States all supported and voted in favor 
of this declaration. 
With respect to unions and collective bargaining, the ILO’s philoso-
phy is embedded in two major conventions—numbers 87 (Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention) and 98 
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(Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention). It is further 
elaborated in the jurisprudence of the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of 
Association, which hears complaints and issues public opinions which 
have accumulated into a body of international case law (Bartolomei de 
la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston, 1996, pp. 102–107). Whether 
they have ratified conventions or not, all member states of ILO are re-
quired, as a constitutional condition of membership, to institute poli-
cies consistent with the ILO’s interpretation of the meaning of the term 
Freedom of Association. Through its opinion on specific cases, it is the 
job of the Committee on Freedom of Association to give the concept 
concrete substance.
A review of relevant documents reveal the ILO philosophy on 
unions and collective bargaining to have the following basic tenets:
•  As stated in Article 2 of Convention 87, “All workers without 
distinction whatsoever, shall have a right to establish and . . . to 
join organizations of their own choosing.”
•  All workers have the right to select representatives of their own 
choosing (Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston, 
1996, p. 192).
•  Legitimately selected worker representatives have the right to 
be recognized by employers and other relevant authorities. As 
stated in Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston 
(1996), “The general principle is that employers, including gov-
ernmental authorities in their capacity as employers, should rec-
ognize for collective bargaining the organizations that represent 
the workers employed by them” (pp. 219–220).
•  Employers have a responsibility both to recognize and negotiate 
with legitimately selected worker representatives. As Bartolomei 
de la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston (1996) put it, “Without 
recognition of the right to negotiate the rest of the guarantees in 
the Convention (no. 87) are meaningless” (p. 228).
•  Member states have a responsibility, not merely to permit but 
rather to “promote” collective bargaining. As stated in the Decla-
ration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
“all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in 
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of member-
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ship in the Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize in 
good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles 
concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those 
Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining.” (ILO 2000, An-
nex 1)
• Budd’s (2004, p. 13) statement that “participation in decision 
making is an end in itself for rational human beings in a demo-
cratic society” is an almost perfect expression of fundamental 
ILO philosophy.
The ILO’s position on worker representation is well expressed in 
the report of the Director General to the 87th Session of the Internation-
al Labour Conference in 1999 entitled Decent Work (Somavia 1999). 
Somavia says, “The ILO is a forum for building consensus. Its tripartite 
structure reflects a conviction that the best solutions arise through social 
dialogue in its many forms and levels, from national tripartite consul-
tations and cooperation to plant-level collective bargaining.” He goes 
on to announce an initiative to “strengthen employers’ organizations, 
workers’ organizations and the government authorities that deal with 
labor.” A key objective of the programme is to “stress the importance 
of building strong bipartite and tripartite institutions.” In short, decent 
work for all is the central objective of the ILO and a collective voice for 
all workers is a keystone element of decent work. 
Union-free philosophy and that of the ILO are clearly irreconcil-
able. The ILO’s mission is to promote acceptance of unionism and the 
use of collective bargaining. The object of the union-free movement is 
to highlight the negative side of unionism and to encourage employers 
to take steps that will dissuade employees from unionizing and bargain-
ing collectively.
U.S.	eMPLoyeR	RePReSenTATIVeS	And	THe	ILo
In 1980, when the United States rejoined the ILO, it invited the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce to appoint a representative for employers. The 
Chamber refrained but instead turned the task over to the U.S. Council 
of the International Chamber of Commerce, which later became the 
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U.S. Council on International Business (USCIB) (Derber 1984, p. 105). 
That organization continues to represent the interests of the U.S. busi-
ness community at the ILO. In general, the USCIB, like the U.S. gov-
ernment, has supported efforts by the ILO to promote its mission in 
countries outside of the United States. With respect to the United States, 
however, it has instituted policies that have the effect of hindering the 
mission of the ILO and protecting adherents of union-free philosophy.
One of the major affiliates of the USCIB is the NAM, an organiza-
tion that, as noted earlier, has been promoting union avoidance since 
early in the twentieth century.3 Although the USCIB has not taken such 
an active role in the United States in promoting union-free philosophy, 
its activities at the national and international level have been consistent 
with those of the NAM.
A keystone element of USCIB strategy is the assertion that ILO 
standards apply only to states and not to corporations.4 Within the ILO 
(where consensus is a prime operating principle), they and their inter-
national employer colleagues have insisted on that interpretation. As a 
result, to achieve its mission, the ILO secretariat is, for the most part, 
limited procedurally to work through the aegis of domestic legislation 
rather than through direct pressure on labor organizations and employ-
ers. Nevertheless, according to recent legal research on international 
human rights law, that employer position is untenable with respect to 
a subset of ILO standards that have been heralded to be fundamental 
human rights. 
Until recently the ILO had not “found it necessary to adopt an official 
position designating some conventions as those covering ‘fundamental 
human rights’” (Bartolomei de la Cruz, von Potobsky, and Swepston 
1996, p. 129). But in the context of globalization and concerns about 
the negative effects of expanding global trade on labor conditions, it has 
recently taken steps to clarify that certain core rights are human rights 
and, as such, are subject to the same respect and obligations as pertain 
to other universally accepted human rights. These core labor human 
rights are, according to the ILO’s recent Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, the right to be free from discrimination, 
slavery, and child labor; the right to freedom of association; and the 
right to organize and bargain collectively one’s conditions of work. Un-
derlying these rights are eight ILO conventions and a body of case law, 
which define the behavior required for compliance with the standards 
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(ILO 2000). Although ordinary standards and conventions respecting 
them apply only to states, human rights standards apply universally. 
According to Paust (2002), international human rights standards 
apply not only to states but also to individuals including corporations, 
which, at law, are simply juridic persons. In the words of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (quoted by Paust), international human rights 
are obligatio erga omnes. They apply not only to states but instead are 
“owing by and to all humankind.” 
This interpretation was recently supported by a United Nations Sub-
commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which 
produced a report entitled Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights. With regard to corporations, the subcommission, com-
posed of human rights experts from around the globe, stated that 
even though States have the primary responsibility to promote, se-
cure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human 
rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, as 
organs of society, are also responsible for promoting and securing 
the human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.5 
Freedom of association is prominently mentioned in the Univer-
sal Declaration, and the ILO and its organs (such as the Committee on 
Freedom of Association) are considered by the international commu-
nity to be the appropriate vehicles for interpreting that right (see, for 
example, OECD 1996). 
Not surprisingly some employer representatives found fault with 
the report. As an article at the USCIB’s Web site noted: 
The International Chamber of Commerce and the International Or-
ganisation of Employers have opposed adoption of the Norms [by 
the full Human Rights Commission], contrasting the dichotomy of 
this compulsory approach to company behavior with the voluntary 
‘good-practices’ approach of other UN initiatives, most impor-
tantly Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Global Compact. (USCIB 
2003)
After hearing from various stakeholders, in February 2005 the UN’s 
High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report on “The respon-
sibilities of transnational corporations and related business enterprises 
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with regard to human rights.”6 In the report, the high commissioner 
suggests that business has three types of responsibilities with respect 
to human rights: to respect and support human rights and to make sure 
they are not complicit in human rights abuses. Respect requires “busi-
ness to refrain from acts that could interfere with the enjoyment of hu-
man rights.” With regard to complicity, she notes “one definition of 
‘complicity’ states that a company is complicit in human rights abuses 
if it authorizes, tolerates, or knowingly ignores human rights abuses 
committed by an entity associated with it, or if the company knowingly 
provides practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial 
effect on the perpetration of human rights abuse.” 
After noting that the responsibilities of corporations are not as ex-
tensive as those of states, the high commissioner goes on to consider the 
human rights that are most relevant to business. Among them she iden-
tifies freedom of association and the right to organize. Rather than draw 
firm binding conclusions, the high commissioner called for continu-
ing dialogue with a view toward better clarifying the responsibilities 
of business. Nevertheless, it seems clear from the high commissioner’s 
comments that business does have human rights responsibilities and in 
some areas those responsibilities are obvious. Labor relations would 
appear to qualify as one of those areas. Active attempts by companies to 
dissuade their employees from evoking their right to organize and bar-
gain collectively surely “interfere with the enjoyment of human rights” 
and thus constitute human rights violations.7
Since the right to organize and to bargain collectively is a funda-
mental human right, behavior with respect to it is subject to the standard 
laid out by Paust (2002). U.S. employers who put in place policies in-
tended to maintain union-free status do not offend contemporary U.S. 
labor relations norms. They do, however, offend international human 
rights law. And, by insisting that the ILO promote its agenda through 
governments rather than directly, the USCIB shelters U.S. employers 
from criticism for implementing union-free strategy and thereby reneg-
ing on their human rights obligations. 
Below is a quote from a document of the International Organisation 
of Employers (the organization, of which the USCIB is a constituent, 
whose primary role is representing employer interests at the ILO and 
in other international forums) interpreting the Global Compact which 
incorporates the declaration:
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The Global Compact is not a code of conduct nor is it a prescriptive 
instrument . . . Instead, the Compact creates a forum for learning 
and sharing experiences in the promotion of the nine principles. 
Through the Global Compact, companies demonstrate to their em-
ployees and communities how they are being responsible corpo-
rate citizens. How, or even whether, a company seeks to display 
this commitment is a matter of choice. (International Organisation 
of Employers 2001, italics added)
In other words, it is the employer representative position that it is 
perfectly acceptable for corporate members of IOE-affiliated employer 
associations, such as the USCIB, to ignore or offend the principles in-
cluded in the compact, even when they publicly endorse it and even 
though some of those principles deal with fundamental human rights 
and thus are subject to international human rights law. This stance has 
led one international trade union official to wonder whether employer 
strategy with respect to this issue has more to do with image manipu-
lation than with making an honest behavorial commitment to comply 
with international standards (Baker 2004). 
Although it supports ILO work with respect to the behavior of other 
countries, many aspects of U.S. law do not comply with ILO princi-
ples. The United States has ratified neither of the two basic conventions 
(numbers 87 and 98) having to do with freedom of association, unions, 
and collective bargaining. This failure is due in part to opposition by the 
USCIB despite endorsement of those principles by its Geneva represen-
tatives who voted in favor of the Declaration of Fundamental Principles. 
Its rationale for doing so is its position that, although many U.S. laws 
fail to conform to the letter of international labor law, the body of U.S. 
law, nevertheless, provides protection equivalent to or better than inter-
national norms. U.S. workers are, it is claimed, better off than those in 
most other countries and so the details of how that is accomplished are 
unimportant (Morehead 2003; Potter 1984). 
A recent study by Human Rights Watch (2000), which reported 
research indicating that denial of basic labor rights is rampant in the 
United States, found great difficulty with the position that U.S. law 
and practice conforms to international standards. McIntyre and Bodah 
(2006) are also critical of that position. The notion that the United States 
has the right to institute laws it considers to be adequate, even if they 
are inconsistent with ILO requirements, makes a mockery of the prin-
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ciple that all of the world’s workers should enjoy certain common stan-
dards. It is also offensive to the basic democratic notion that all (nations 
in this case) are equal under the law. Nevertheless, that position is used 
by U.S. governments, supported by U.S. employer representatives, to 
justify their failure to ratify core ILO human rights conventions, while 
at the same time insisting that other countries conform to them.
One way in which U.S. law may be technically in line with ILO 
jurisprudence has to do, oddly enough, with union recognition. Recent 
research by Morris (2005, 2006) suggests that policies intended to pre-
serve union-free status offend existing U.S. law. Building on previous 
legal analysis by Summers (1992), Morris demonstrates that U.S. em-
ployers have a legal duty under the National Labor Relations Act and 
the U.S. constitution to recognize and negotiate with representatives 
chosen by their employees whether or not those representatives have 
been certified by the National Labor Relations Board. If no union has 
exclusive representation, then the employer responsibility is, voluntari-
ly, to recognize and deal with the legitimately chosen bargaining agent 
of any group of employees. 
The ILO standard with respect to union recognition is identical to 
the Morris/Summers interpretation of U.S. law. According to the au-
thors of a recent review of ILO collective bargaining principles: “If no 
union covers more than 50 percent of the workers, collective bargaining 
rights should be granted to all unions in this unit, at least on behalf of 
their own members” (Gernigon, Odero, and Guido 2000, p. 38). 
The Morris/Summers interpretation of U.S. labor law arrived as a 
surprise to many academics and practitioners. In practice, U.S. employ-
ers commonly refuse to deal with any union other than exclusive rep-
resentatives who have been certified by the state and the norm is for 
employers vigorously to oppose certification. That practice has gone on 
for some time, without challenge, so it is still a matter of legal opinion 
whether or not the courts would uphold the Morris/Summers position. 
It is clear, however, that refusal to recognize and deal with minority 
unions is a violation of ILO human rights standards, and thus of interna-
tional human rights law binding on all. In short, failure to recognize and 
deal with a minority union is a human rights offense of the same order 
as engaging in overt discrimination or employing child labor. 
Another element of USCIB strategy, as already mentioned, is to op-
pose ratification of ILO standards by the United States. One of the main 
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justifications for doing so is the assertion that many U.S. laws would 
have to be altered as a result. There is differing legal opinion about the 
validity of that assertion (McIntyre and Bodah 2006). Nevertheless, it is 
certainly beyond doubt that many laws regulating labor relations in the 
United States are offensive to the letter and spirit of ILO standards.
Edward E. Potter has long been one of the USCIB’s main spokes-
persons at the ILO. In the mid-1980s he wrote a monograph entitled 
Freedom of Association, the Right to Organize and Collective Bargain-
ing (1984). His avowed purpose in doing so was to elaborate the Ameri-
can employer view that ratification of basic ILO conventions would 
have a disruptive effect on the United States by requiring changes 
to many U.S. laws. The document was, in fact, a compendium of in-
stances in which U.S. law fails to comply with international standards. 
For example, while ILO standards require governments to “encourage 
and promote the full development and utilization of the machinery for 
voluntary negotiations between employers or employers’ associations 
and workers’ organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment by means of collective agreements,” in the 
United States “a number of states . . . do not provide collective bargain-
ing rights for all or some categories of employees and, in Virginia, col-
lective bargaining has been determined by the courts to violate the state 
constitution” (Potter 1984, pp. 58–59). To one formally committed to 
seeing the standards of the ILO implemented globally, bringing U.S. 
law up to international standard might seem to be the obvious solution 
to this situation. Instead, the USCIB defends the continuation of prac-
tices clearly offensive to ILO philosophy.
Not only does the USCIB shelter the union-free movement by op-
posing ratification by the United States of ILO human rights conven-
tions and insisting that ILO standards apply to governments but not cor-
porations, it also has recruited outspoken union-free advocates to serve 
as ILO representative. Morehead (2003) made the following statement 
at a meeting on human rights in employment, to which he was invited 
because of his role as an employer representative at the ILO:
I was bemused at the naiveté in one part of the Human Rights 
Watch Report (2000) where as evidence of management hostility 
to unions they cited a study by Professors Freeman and Rogers 
that a majority of managers would oppose any unionization ef-
fort in their workplace, and at least one-third of them said it could 
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hurt their advancement in the company if employees they manage 
formed a union. Of course it is going to hurt their advancement. If I 
have learned one thing in over 30 years of dealing with unions, it is 
managements—not unions—which organize a workplace. I should 
add bad management at that, so of course it will reflect badly on 
them. In hundreds of conversations with local union leaders over 
the years, it was never wages or benefits that got them interested in 
a union: it was their treatment by management. 
The statement is an excellent example of union-free philosophy at 
work.
CONCLUSION
Union-free philosophy is irreconcilable with international human 
rights standards and the philosophy of employment relations advocated 
by the ILO. The two cannot coincide with integrity. The union-free phi-
losophy is offensive to the human right of workers to organize and bar-
gain collectively. Union-free philosophy must be rejected by everyone 
who supports the international human rights consensus and the work of 
the ILO. It follows then that the appropriate course for the agency cho-
sen to designate representatives and develop employer strategy within 
the ILO is to reject it. America’s employer representatives at the ILO 
should be expected to embrace the standards and philosophy of that 
organization and work toward its vision of ethical industrial relations. 
If the USCIB is unwilling to commit to that project, the U.S. govern-
ment should appoint another, more progressive organization to fulfill 
that task.
Notes
 1. This view is well articulated in the management manual of a large, nonunion 
U.S. firm and in the seminar materials of a law firm advertising itself as spe-
cializing in “union avoidance.” Both of these documents are available from the 
author on request. 
 2. See http://www.nam.org/s_nam/doc1.asp?CID=22&DID=201891 and http://
www.cueinc.com/about_us/overview.asp?id=0&tkn=0.
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 3. The president of the NAM serves as a USCIB trustee (see the USCIB Web site, 
at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=742, accessed December 10, 
2004).
 4. Interviews and written exchanges with ILO officials, including Lee Swepston 
and Ed Potter. Potter has long been a key member of the USCIB’s team of repre-
sentatives to the ILO. Most of these exchanges took place during 2002. 
 5. See http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html.
 6. Available online at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Home.
 7. In July 2005 the UN appointed John Ruggie of the United States, an expert on 
human rights and one-time UN official, Special Representative on Business 
Enterprise and Human Rights. Ruggie’s prime mandate is to clarify the human 
rights responsibilities of corporations. He is expected to issue an interim report 
in 2006 and a final report in 2007.
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The United States and 
ILO Conventions 87 and 98
The Freedom of Association and  
the Right to Bargain Collectively
Richard McIntyre
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Matthew M. Bodah
University of Rhode Island
Opposition to the international criminal court, the refusal to sign the 
Kyoto agreement on global warming, the unwillingness to join a global 
ban on land mines, and the war in Iraq are only a few examples of the 
United States’ reluctance to heed world opinion or join multilateral hu-
manitarian efforts. This chapter focuses on another example of Ameri-
can “exceptionalism”: the U.S. record on ratification of International 
Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. 
To date, the United States has ratified only 14 of the 184 conven-
tions adopted by the ILO1 and only 2 of the 8 core conventions2 (ILO 
2002). Only 23 of the 175 ILO member nations have ratified fewer 
conventions; none of these nations is western or industrialized (ILO 
2002).3 Until 1988, the United States had ratified only one convention 
that did not concern a maritime issue, a purely administrative matter 
that switched the ILO’s affiliation from the defunct League of Nations 
to the newly formed United Nations. There has been a spate of activity 
in the past 15 years, but of the 6 conventions ratified since 1988, half 
concern administrative or technical matters.4 
We examine U.S. reluctance to ratify the ILO conventions concern-
ing the freedom of association and right to bargain collectively: Con-
vention 87 and Convention 98.5 Both conventions were adopted by the 
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ILO in the late 1940s, and while Convention 87 was recommended for 
ratification by the Secretary of Labor in 1949 and by the Solicitor of 
Labor in 1980 (U.S. Department of Labor 1980; U.S. Senate 1949), no 
legislative action has been taken on either. 
The United States offers three principal reasons for not ratifying 
Conventions 87 or 98. First, national labor policy is well established, 
insures a delicate balance between the interests of business and labor, 
and should not be upset to accommodate the wishes of an international 
agency. Second, based on the recent ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work (ILO 1998), as well as long-standing 
ILO policy,6 the United States has a responsibility as a member of the 
ILO—and regardless of whether it has ratified the conventions or not—
to uphold the spirit of Conventions 87 and 98. Since the United States 
largely fulfills that responsibility, actual ratification is superfluous (ILO 
2000; U.S. Department of Labor 1997a,b; U.S. Senate 1985). Third, our 
federal system, which reserves certain rights to the states, impedes rati-
fication since the conventions would affect the employees of state and 
local governments and others who fall outside the coverage of federal 
labor statutes.7 We dispute all three claims.
HISTORICAL BACkGROUND
The United States was instrumental in both establishing the ILO 
and assuring that its constitution took into account the concerns of fed-
eral states (Tayler 1935). After weeks of difficult negotiations with sev-
eral European delegates, the United States was successful in including 
language in Article 19 of the ILO constitution that protects the interests 
of such states by allowing them to treat a draft convention “as a recom-
mendation only” (Tayler 1935, p. 62). In fact, when the United States 
joined the ILO in 1934, the congressional resolution supporting admis-
sion cited the provision (Tayler 1935, p. 150). However, legal scholars 
immediately raised questions as to whether the federal state proviso 
would apply to the United States based on a 1920 Supreme Court deci-
sion.8 Further, business interests were wary of ILO goals: the adoption 
of Conventions 87 and 98 so soon after the passage of the Taft-Hartley 
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Amendments only increased their suspicion that the ILO might override 
U.S. labor law (Galenson 1980, p. 27; Lorenz 2001, p. 171). 
With this concern over the power of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies, Senator John Bricker proposed a constitutional 
amendment in 1951 that would have limited the executive branch’s 
treaty-making power. During hearings on the Bricker Amendment, the 
ILO came in for particularly harsh treatment.9 No version of the Bricker 
Amendment passed, but its spirit continues to control U.S. policy con-
cerning ILO conventions: no convention will be adopted that could in-
terfere with existing state or federal law.
In 1978, due mainly to disputes centered on cold war and Middle 
East politics, the United States withdrew from the ILO only to rejoin 
less than three years later. With reentry, the United States appeared to 
have made a fresh start in its relations with an organization that it had, 
over the years, treated casually at best (Galenson 1980, pp. 23–26). 
A major move was the creation of the high-level President’s Advisory 
Committee on the ILO, which is chaired by the Secretary of Labor and 
includes the Secretaries of State and Commerce as well as labor and 
business representatives. The Tri-Partite Advisory Panel on Interna-
tional Labor Standards (TAPILS) chaired by the Solicitor of Labor and 
providing legal analysis to the President’s Committee was also estab-
lished (U.S. General Accounting Office 1984, pp. 16–26).10 The job of 
both bodies is to make determinations about ILO conventions. At one 
time, both were quite busy; after ratifying no conventions for 35 years, 
the United States ratified seven between 1998 and 2001 (ILO 2002). 
However, Conventions 87 and 98 received no attention.
Momentum for new ratifications began with hearings by a Senate 
committee in 1985 (U.S. Senate 1985). Secretary of State George Schul-
tz argued that ratifications would be helpful in pressing his (anti-Soviet) 
agenda: “It is my judgment that an improved ratification record would 
have served U.S. foreign policy interests better” (U.S. Senate 1985, p. 
8). Although basic ILO principles are found in U.S. laws, Schultz be-
lieved that the United States was still vulnerable to criticism for not 
ratifying ILO conventions: “[O]ur behavior sends a message that ILO 
procedures do not apply to us. The message we send is—do as we say, 
not as we do” (U.S. Senate 1985, p. 9). 
However, shortly before Schultz’s testimony, a number of legal 
problems concerning ratification of Conventions 87 and 98 had been 
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laid out in an influential book by Edward E. Potter (1984).11 Potter’s 
findings formed the basis of the U.S. Council on International Business 
(USCIB) opposition to the ratification of these conventions.12 The prin-
cipal concerns expressed in Potter’s book echo the Bricker-era rhetoric: 
if ILO conventions were ratified, existing laws would be superseded. 
In turn, committee chair Orrin Hatch stated his concern that domestic 
labor laws “have been delicately drawn and have a delicate balance and 
which, although both sides can point to difficulties with them from time 
to time, still have worked rather well in our country” (U.S. Senate 1985, 
p. 11). According to U.S. Department of Labor and ILO officials with 
whom we spoke, the present posture of the United States is to ratify 
only conventions that conform to current U.S. law. The job of TAPILS, 
therefore, is to make sure that conventions under consideration do not 
interfere with any current statute. Hence, Conventions 87 and 98 are 
“off-the-table” for many of the reasons cited in Potter’s book.
A Critique of the U.S. Position
To reiterate, the current U.S. position against ratification of ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98 is based largely on three assertions: 1) that well-
established national labor policy supports a delicate balance between 
business and labor and should not be meddled with; 2) that under the 
recent Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
as well as the ILO constitution, the United States has a responsibility, 
based on its membership in the ILO, to conform to the spirit of Conven-
tions 87 and 98—which it already does (ILO 2000; U.S. Department 
of Labor 1997a,b; U.S. Senate 1985); and 3) that our federal system, 
which reserves certain rights to the states, makes ratification problem-
atic since the conventions would affect employees who fall outside the 
coverage of federal labor statutes.
Federal Labor Policy and the Balance of Interests
First, we address the assertion that current labor policy is well-es-
tablished and provides for a balance in labor–management relations. 
While current labor policy has its roots in statutes that are seven de-
cades old, age should not be confused with acceptance.13 Organized la-
bor, in particular, has long fought for changes in labor policy. In the late 
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1940s and early 1950s the labor movement pushed for Taft-Hartley re-
peal (Dulles and Dubofsky 1984, pp. 343–362); some years later, labor 
sought substantial changes to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
through the unsuccessful Labor Law Reform Act of 1978 (Dark 1999, 
pp. 99–124); and recently the labor movement spent considerable re-
sources in trying to pass legislation to prevent the use of permanent 
striker replacements (Gould 1993, pp. 181–203).
Employers have also signaled their displeasure with certain aspects 
of labor policy, most notably the NLRA’s restrictions on employer-dom-
inated labor organizations, which might restrict the establishment of 
employee-involvement programs. The TEAM Act attempted to amend 
the NLRA to allow employers greater latitude in establishing such pro-
grams (U.S. Senate 1995). Narrower issues, such as the use of “salting” 
as an organizing tactic by building trades unions and the so-called “gar-
ment industry provisos,” which provide exceptions to the NLRA’s “hot 
cargo” proscription, have also been criticized by employers (Bodah 
1999; U.S. House of Representatives 1999). In short, the reports of at 
least two government commissions—the Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations appointed by President Clinton (i.e., the 
Dunlop Commission) and the American Worker at a Crossroads Proj-
ect, led by Republican Representative Peter Hoekstra—are filled with 
both labor and management complaints about U.S. labor policy (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1994; U.S. House of Representatives 1999). 
This lack of consensus is also reflected in the decisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which has been criticized by 
both scholars (Cooke and Gautschi 1982; Cooke et al. 1995; Estreicher 
1985) and the federal courts (Mosey Manufacturing v. NLRB 701 F2d 
610, 1983) for its decisional oscillations. Indeed, over the years, Con-
gress has held a number of hearings concerning abrupt changes by the 
board in the application of legal standards (see Bodah [2001] for a list 
of such hearings). Clearly, the “balance” mentioned by defenders of the 
status quo has not resulted in any sense of equilibrium in national labor 
policy. Instead, we have seen wide swings in the application of labor 
statutes, accompanied by a general erosion of the legal status of collec-
tive bargaining (Gross 1995). Gross (1994, p. 53), in an article entitled 
“The Demise of National Labor Policy: A Question of Social Justice,” 
writes:
Blocketal.indb   235 3/2/2006   9:00:14 AM
236   McIntyre and Bodah
This country needs a definite, coherent, and consistent national 
labor policy. That requires more than changing NLRB case doc-
trines or amending Taft Hartley to tighten or loosen government 
regulation of the labor-management relationship. The recrafting of 
a national labor policy must begin with a precise and certain state-
ment of its purposes and objectives. Fundamental questions must 
be confronted and answered.
The Gap between U.S. Law and the Requirements of 
Conventions 87 and 98
A second assertion is that current U.S. standards generally conform 
to at least the spirit of Conventions 87 and 98. This is easily challenged. 
The U.S. government itself admitted to a lack of conformance in the 
Review of Annual Reports under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration 
on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. After beginning 
on a positive note in stating that “[t]he United States recognizes, and 
is committed to, the fundamental principle of freedom of association 
and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining” (ILO 
2000, p. 144), the report later states: “Nonetheless, the United States 
acknowledges that there are aspects of this system that fail to fully pro-
tect the rights to organize and bargain collectively of all employees in 
all circumstances” (ILO 2000, p. 153). It went on to cite evidence from 
the Dunlop Commission’s Fact-Finding Report, including the frequent 
firing of union activists, the failure of many newly organized units to 
achieve a first contract, union organizers’ lack of access to employees, 
and generally insufficient remedies available to the NLRB. The report 
also cited the United States’s lack of protection for economic strikers.
In the same report, the observations submitted by the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) were even more critical. 
Too lengthy to summarize adequately, the ICFTU’s indictment con-
tained at least two dozen specific shortcomings of U.S. labor law at each 
stage of the collective bargaining process (ILO 2000, pp. 160–163). The 
ICFTU noted the harsh treatment and insufficient remedies available to 
union activists; employers’ union avoidance strategies, such as the fre-
quent use of antiunion consultants, the failure of new units to get first 
contracts, and the restrictions on certain types of concerted activities. 
The ICFTU was also critical of U.S. labor policy in the public sector, 
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noting the severe limits on bargaining subjects in certain jurisdictions 
and broad restrictions on striking. 
Yet another source of evidence of the gap between ILO standards 
and U.S. labor policy is the findings of the ILO Committee on Freedom 
of Association (CFA). All members of the ILO have a responsibility 
to respect the freedom of association and right to bargain collectively 
(Gernigon, Odero, and Guido 2000; Hodges-Aeberhard 1989; Interna-
tional Labour Review [ILR] 1949). In 1950, the ILO set up a special 
tripartite committee to monitor compliance. Unlike other ILO commit-
tees, complaints can be lodged with the CFA even if a country has not 
ratified the corresponding conventions (Freeman 1999). Since its estab-
lishment, the CFA has issued 32 decisions involving the United States. 
Focusing only on cases since reaffiliation, the CFA has found U.S. 
labor policy at variance with ILO standards in number of cases.14 In 
Case 1557 (1993), the CFA requested the U.S. government to “ . . . draw 
the attention of the authorities concerned, and in particular in those ju-
risdictions where public servants are totally or substantially deprived 
of collective bargaining rights, to the principle that all public services 
workers other than those engaged in the administration of the State 
should enjoy such rights . . . ” In Case 1543 (1991), the CFA stated that 
“ . . . recourse to the use of labour drawn from outside the undertaking 
to replace strikers for an indeterminate period entails a risk of deroga-
tion from the right to strike, which may affect the free exercise of trade 
union rights.” In Case 1523 (1992), the CFA “requests the Government 
to guarantee access of trade union representatives to the workplace, with 
due respect to for the rights of property and management, so that trade 
unions can communicate with workers, in order to apprise them of the 
potential advantages of unionization.” In Case 1467 (1989), the CFA 
indicated its “regret” over the “excessive length of appeals procedures” 
for unfair labor practices. Case 1467 also includes: “the CFA points 
out with concern that this is the fourth recent complaint lodged—by 
different complainants—against the United States on the grounds of 
antiunion tactics and unfair labor practices . . . ” In Case 1437 (1988), 
the CFA wrote that “subcontracting accompanied by the dismissal of 
union leaders can constitute a violation of principle that no one should 
be prejudiced in his employment on the grounds of union membership 
and activities.” In Case 1074 (1982), the CFA stated that it was “of the 
view that the application of excessively severe sanctions (i.e., the ter-
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mination of air traffic controllers) against public servants on account of 
their participation in a strike cannot be conducive to the development of 
harmonious industrial relations.”15
Finally, we offer the 2000 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report Un-
fair Advantage: Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States 
under International Human Rights Standards as evidence of the short-
comings in U.S. labor policy (HRW 2000). The HRW report contains 
15 general findings of variance between U.S. and international labor 
standards, and several more concerning the rights of immigrant and ag-
ricultural workers. Most of the charges against U.S. labor policy con-
cern limits on the freedom of association resulting from inadequate pro-
tections for union activists during the organizing process—specifically, 
HRW notes, discrimination against union supporters, a lack of access 
to employees by union organizers, and imbalances in communication 
power between employers and unions.
The Federal–State Issue
Finally, we take issue with the assertion that the United States’s 
federal structure is a bar to ratification of Conventions 87 and 98. First, 
we note that there are two (somewhat contradictory) streams to this 
argument. Some argue that the ratification of Conventions 87 and/or 98 
would (or could) override certain aspects of current federal labor law 
and the prerogatives of the states; others argue that ratification would 
not be self-executing and, therefore, the United States would be out of 
compliance with conventions unless the federal government and many 
states changed their current statutes (Bradley 1998; Potter 1984; U.S. 
Senate 1985).
Starting with the latter, we recognize that the United States could be 
criticized for not being in compliance with ratified conventions based on 
the actions (or inactions) of the states—in fact, this situation has arisen 
elsewhere. For example, there have been a number of cases brought 
against Canada for the actions of its provinces (see, for example, CFA 
Case 327 [2002] and CFA Case 324 [2001]). However, typically, the 
Canadian government has forwarded the CFA’s charges to the prov-
inces for their response. We would expect that the U.S. Department of 
Labor could do the same for the states. 
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If the ratification of either Conventions 87 or 98 were self-execut-
ing, the United States could still be found out of compliance if the fed-
eral government or the states did not take effective action to see that 
the provisions of the conventions were, in fact, put into practice. Potter 
(1984. p. 81, note 258) notes that Mexico continued to be criticized by 
the ILO for not truly carrying out the requirements of Conventions 87 
and 98 after ratification. But a larger fear seems to be that Conventions 
87 and 98 would effectively override or void contrary federal or state 
statutes in the eyes of the courts. We respond by citing the comments of 
the Secretary of Labor in recommending to President Truman in 1949 
that he seek ratification of Convention 87 by the Senate, and to the com-
ments of the Solicitor of Labor in a briefing paper written in 1980.16 
In 1949 (U.S. Senate 1949, p. 9) the Secretary of Labor wrote:
It is our view that the subject matter of this convention [No. 87] is 
appropriate under our system for federal action . . . 
It is our view that this convention should be ratified by the Unit-
ed States, and we recommend that the President of United States 
transmit this convention to the Senate of the United States with a 
request for the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification. 
It is also our view that no new Federal legislation or revision of ex-
isting Federal law is necessary to effect compliance by the United 
States with the terms of this convention.
In 1980, the Solicitor of Labor (U.S. Department of Labor 1980, 
p. 1) wrote:
Although it is our conclusion that Convention 87 may unequivo-
cally be ratified by the United States without entailing any under-
taking to enact legislation or to modify existing law, we recog-
nize that some parties may still anticipate that ratification would 
unwillingly nullify domestic legislation through creative judicial 
construction. 
The solicitor went on to suggest two strategies that “would abso-
lutely preclude such a result”:
First, the Convention could be ratified with a declaration that it is 
non-self-executing. Second, the Convention could be ratified with 
an understanding that ‘all necessary and appropriate measures’ as 
provided by Article 11 means, in the context of the United States, 
that the obligations contained in the Convention have been acced-
ed to only to the extent of the Commerce Power.
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Although Convention 98 was never subjected to such analysis by 
the federal government, we believe that such provisos could also be 
used to avoid upsetting existing statutes.
It has been noted (Potter 1984, pp. 78–82) that it is the ILO and not 
a member state that ultimately determines whether a nation has met its 
obligation. The Committee of Experts, Committee on the Application 
of Conventions and Recommendations, and the CFA could all continue 
to find fault with the United States’s implementation of Conventions 87 
and 98. However, as mentioned earlier, Conventions 87 and 98 are un-
usual in that member states are subject to criticism by the CFA whether 
they have ratified the conventions or not. Hence, the United States can-
not (and has not) escaped international rebuke by simply refusing to 
ratify the conventions. 
The current powers of the CFA do not, however, mean that ratifica-
tion is superfluous. Article 19 (5) of the ILO Constitution requires mem-
ber states to seek ratification of approved conventions.17 Conformance 
is not a substitute for ratification. This remains true even after adoption 
of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have presented and critiqued U.S. policy toward 
the ratification of ILO Conventions 87 and 98. We believe that the prin-
cipal reasons for not ratifying these conventions are contradicted by a 
careful analysis of the documentary evidence and historical record. 
The current political climate would seem to preclude adoption of 
the ILO conventions on freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing. However, were the balance of power to shift in the White House 
or the Senate, we believe that these conventions should be considered 
by the President’s Committee on the ILO and TAPILS, and that hear-
ings might be held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions. Public consideration of Conventions 87 and 98 
would be both a way into clarifying labor policy in the United States 
and might also lend support to key U.S. foreign policy goals. 
As Gross (1994) writes, “The recrafting of a national labor policy 
must begin with a precise and certain statement of its purposes and 
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objectives. Fundamental questions must be confronted and answered.” 
While clearly stated in the preamble of the Wagner Act, U.S. labor pol-
icy was obfuscated by the Taft-Hartley Amendments and subsequent 
NLRB and court decisions. Is it U.S. policy to encourage collective 
bargaining or merely to provide a means for employees to vote for or 
against union representation (Gross 1985)? 
As well, we accept George Schultz’s conclusion that the lack of rati-
fication by the United States erodes its moral authority abroad. This is 
particularly important if the United States wishes—for humanitarian or 
purely pragmatic economic reasons—to urge the enforcement of labor 
standards in the developing world.
In its second report to the Secretary and the President, in December 
2002, the State department’s Advisory Commission on Labor Diplo-
macy argued strongly that the promotion of internationally recognized 
core labor rights supports current U.S. foreign policy goals:
Trade unions exist in varying degrees in Muslim countries and 
have a role to play in the struggle against terrorism and for democ-
racy. However, there is often little protection in law or practice for 
trade unionists. The Middle East stands out as the region where the 
right to organize trade unions is least likely to be protected by law. 
Where unions do exist, their independence is often threatened by 
authoritarian governments on the one hand and Islamist political 
factions on the other. A policy that aims to cultivate union leader-
ship at the enterprise and industry levels represents a promising 
approach to inculcate modern economic incentives and democratic 
political values among workers in Muslim countries. (U.S. Depart-
ment of State 2001)
Among its suggestions, the committee includes revisiting the ratifi-
cation of ILO core labor standards: 
The United States has one of the worst records of ratification of 
ILO conventions of any member state of the ILO, especially of 
the core labor conventions. This failure to ratify the core conven-
tions undermines U.S. efforts to lead the international campaign to 
eliminate child labor, forced labor, and discrimination. (U.S. De-
partment of State 2001)
As was the case during the cold war, the United States could find 
the ratification of ILO conventions expedient in advancing its foreign 
policy objectives. The ratification of either Convention 87 or 98 would 
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promote the type of moral suasion envisioned by the advisory commis-
sion.
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 1. In comparison, the number of conventions ratified by the other “Group of Eight” 
large industrialized nations is: Canada, 30; France, 116; Germany, 77; Italy, 109; 
Japan, 46; Russia, 58; and the United Kingdom, 85.
 2. The eight core conventions concern fundamental principles of human rights at 
work: the elimination of forced and compulsory labor, the elimination of em-
ployment discrimination, the abolition of child labor, and the freedom of associa-
tion and right to bargain collectively (ILO 1998). Two conventions correspond 
to each of these areas. The United States has ratified only Conventions 105 and 
182 concerning the abolition of forced labor and the abolition of the worst forms 
of child labor, respectively—with the former ratified 34 years after its adoption 
(ILOLEX 2002). 
 3. They are Armenia, Bahrain, Burma, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Gambia, 
Georgia, Iran, Kiribati, Laos, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Oman, Qatar, St. Kitts, 
Sao Tome, Sudan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, and Uzbeki-
stan.
 4. Convention 144 reaffirms the ILO’s tripartite structure by assuring that labor and 
employer associations, along with governments, may respond to ILO requests 
for information; Convention 160 pledges support for the ILO’s statistics gather-
ing activities; and Convention 150 requires nations to support labor bureaus for 
the purpose of enforcing national labor standards.
 5. The full texts of conventions are available on-line at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
english/convdisp1.htm. The critical section of Convention 87 (Article 2) states: 
“Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right 
to establish, and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join 
organizations of their own choosing without authorization.” The critical section 
of Convention 98 (Article 4) states: “Measures appropriate to national conditions 
shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development 
and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or em-
ployers’ organizations and workers’ organizations, with a view to the regulation 
of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.”
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 6. See ILO Constitution, Annex, Article III at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
about/iloconst.htm#annex.
 7. Principally, the National Labor Relations Act, Railway Labor Act, and Civil Ser-
vice Reform Act.
 8. In 1920, the Court overturned a lower court’s ruling that a federal statute pro-
tecting migratory birds (which had been passed to fulfill treaty obligations with 
the United Kingdom) violated the Tenth Amendment (which addresses powers 
reserved to the states). In Missouri v. Holland (252 U.S. 416, 1920), the Supreme 
Court held that the federal government has the authority to pass all laws “neces-
sary and proper” for carrying out its treaty-making prerogatives. Therefore, some 
argued that, based on Missouri v. Holland, the federal government’s ability to 
ratify ILO conventions is not “subject to limitations,” the necessary trigger for 
the federal–state proviso to take effect (Chamberlain 1920; Tayler 1935). Adding 
to the fears of those who thought that the UN would put the country on the road 
to world government were the Supreme Court’s decision in Oyama v. California 
(332 U.S. 633, 1948) and the subsequent adoption of the UN Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. In Oyama, the Supreme Court overturned a California law (arising 
out of anti-Japanese hysteria) that prohibited land ownership by aliens. While 
the Court relied primarily on the Fourteenth Amendment for its decision, four 
justices also cited Articles 55 and 56 of the UN charter in voiding the law. Soon 
after Oyama, the UN Declaration on Human Rights was adopted causing fear 
among conservatives that social and economic policies of the UN would, among 
other things, overturn segregation laws and interfere with the property rights of 
business (Tananbaum 1988, p. 6).
 9. Bricker portrayed the ILO as a tool of socialism largely at odds with the values 
of the American people. Such attitudes are still heard in Congress, although other 
elected representatives have sometimes seen the ILO as a bulwark of “free enter-
prise” (Hatch in U.S. Senate 1985, p. 12). McIntyre and Ramstad (2003) present 
an analysis of the ILO as embodying the commitments of Institutional Labor 
Economics. Official U.S. policy has generally been supportive of the work of 
the ILO, at least since reentry at the beginning of the 1980s. This support has not 
extended to U.S. ratification of conventions, our focus here. 
 10. Unfortunately, the business of the President’s Committee is difficult to examine, 
since it typically meets behind closed doors in the interest of national security 
and to protect the confidentiality of U.S. treaty negotiating positions.
 11. Potter argued that Convention 87 would subordinate employee rights to those of 
the union; would broaden the classes of workers covered by labor law; would re-
voke portions of the Landrum-Griffin Act, particularly those prohibiting persons 
with criminal records from holding union office; would repeal employer free 
speech provisions of the NLRA; would limit restrictions on the right to strike and 
secondary boycotts; would prohibit restrictions on union participation by mem-
bers of subversive organizations; would repeal prohibitions on hot cargo agree-
ments; would restrict the withdrawal of exclusive representation; would revoke 
limitations on the use of union monies for political purposes; and would remove 
limitations on the disaffiliation of local unions from national bodies and the dis-
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solution of multiemployer units. According to Potter, Convention 98 would have 
many of the same effects, but also would limit discretion in instituting wage/
price controls; would prohibit legislation restricting the scope of bargaining and 
distinctions between mandatory and permissive subjects; would provide union 
officials with special job protections; would modify the burden of proof and rem-
edies under NLRA Section 10(c) [which concerns NLRB remedies]; and would 
put the United States at the mercy of evolving ILO standards.
 12. The USCIB is the official U.S. employer representative to the ILO. It took over 
this role from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 1980. 
 13. The Railway Labor Act was passed in 1926 and the National Labor Relations 
Act in 1935. Elements of both acts can be found in the Erdman Act, which was 
passed in 1898 but subsequently found unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme 
Court (Millis and Montgomery 1945, pp. 731–732).
 14. CFA cases can be found on-line at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/caseframeE.
htm.
 15. According to interviews with ILO officials in Geneva, CFA filings from the Unit-
ed States tailed off in the nineties because the AFL-CIO was willing to give the 
Clinton administration the benefit of the doubt. 
 16. The secretary was speaking on behalf of the departments of labor, state, justice, 
interior, navy, and the Federal Security Agency, all of which reviewed Conven-
tion 87.
 17. The ILO Constitution is available on-line at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
about/iloconst.htm#a19p2.
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Strategies for Advancing 
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A Back-to-Basics Approach to Union Organizing 
Charles J. Morris
Southern Methodist University
My purpose and concern in this chapter is to call attention to a criti-
cal missing link in the U.S. system of industrial relations. That link is 
members-only minority-union collective bargaining, which is a natural 
preliminary stage in the development of mature, majority-based exclu-
sivity bargaining. What follows is an abbreviated version of some of the 
key elements of that thesis, which is more fully developed in my recent 
book, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the 
American Workplace.1 Minority-union bargaining was commonly prac-
ticed immediately before and after enactment of the Wagner Act2 (the 
National Labor Relations Act) in 1935, and as I demonstrate in that book, 
it was not Congress’ intent to deny protection to such bargaining under 
that act. During the early years following its passage, such bargaining 
prevailed widely. The decisive provisions of the act, which were not af-
fected by either the Taft-Hartley3 or Landrum-Griffin4 amendments, are 
still fully in effect today. Under those provisions, in workplaces where 
no exclusive bargaining agent has yet been “designated or selected . . . 
by the majority of the employees” in an appropriate bargaining unit 
pursuant to Section 9(a)5 of the act, minority employees are entitled “to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.”6 
But as the industrial relations community is well aware, latter-day con-
ventional wisdom assumes the contrary. This is so despite the absence 
of any decisional authority to support such a negative conclusion, for 
neither the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) nor the courts have 
ever held that an employer has no duty to bargain with a nonmajority 
union for its members only.7 Indeed, that conventional wisdom has be-
come so entrenched that it has not been questioned by most labor law 
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scholars, almost all of whom have assumed that the majoritarian/exclu-
sivity concept—which so uniquely characterizes U.S. labor law―im-
plies a prohibition on all minority-union bargaining even where no ma-
jority representative has been selected. Although many scholars have 
criticized that system, only two have unequivocally contended that in 
the absence of a designated majority representative, minority unions 
have legally enforceable collective bargaining rights. They are E.G. 
Latham8 and Clyde Summers,9 who expressed their views in law review 
articles separated by more than half a century.10
Immediately after passage of the act, Latham wrote that under what 
“appears to be a reasonable construction of [the pertinent] sections, 
the employer may be bound to bargain with minority groups until . . . 
‘proper majorities’ have been selected.”11 Summers, writing in 1990, 
continued where Latham had left off. After reviewing the statutory lan-
guage and the historical role of minority unions, Summers concluded 
that “[t]he plain words of section 7, section 8(1) and section 8(5) would 
seem to require an employer, in the absence of a majority union, to bar-
gain collectively with a non-majority union for its own members.”12 I 
have added my voice to that of Latham and Summers as to the intended 
meaning of the act regarding such bargaining. Statutory text provides 
that such minority bargaining is fully protected by the act, and legisla-
tive history supports that conclusion. 
My analysis begins by focusing on the 14-word phrase in Section 
7 that declares that “employees shall have the right to . . . bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing.” This simple 
but elegantly worded declaration is the substantive mandate that grants 
the right of collective bargaining to all employees covered by the act. 
Until a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit se-
lect an exclusive representative under Section 9(a), this right to bargain 
prevails, for there is no other provision in the act that diminishes that 
right. This 14-word phrase has a clear and long-established meaning, 
the evolution of which can be traced through a direct line of succession 
beginning with identical text contained in a proclamation by President 
Wilson in World War I,13 then to the preamble of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act of 1932,14 then to the corresponding phrase in Section 7(a) of the 
Depression-era National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933,15 and 
finally to the Wagner Act in 1935―the language in the statute today. 
Even the accompanying unfair-labor-practice text in Section 8(a)(1), 
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“to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [that] 
right,” is the same as the corresponding prohibitory language in those 
earlier sources.16 This juxtaposition of text in its various legislative in-
carnations confirms that the substantive law here in issue—albeit not 
its enforcement procedure—has been continuously in effect in one or 
more manifestations since 1932. Thus, when Congress passed the Wag-
ner Act it was reenacting the substantive bargaining requirements that 
had prevailed under the “Blue Eagle” of the NIRA, where the critical 
statutory language in Sections 7 and 8(1)17 had already acquired a rec-
ognized meaning.18 
Historically, including the years immediately preceding passage of 
the Wagner Act, collective bargaining as an institution was intertwined 
with the concept of union membership,19 for unions normally bargained 
only on behalf of their members.20 Union recognition by an employer 
usually occurred only after the union’s membership was strong enough 
to demand and receive recognition—which more often than not resulted 
from a strike or threat of a strike. Union membership was the sine qua 
non of collective bargaining, whereas majority selection by the employ-
ees was not a requisite for bargaining and it played little or no role in 
the process.21 
Even closed-shop agreements fitted the connection of member-
ship to collective bargaining. When a union’s membership was large 
enough to represent an effective voice for most if not all of the involved 
employees, union leaders would usually perceive a need to ensure job 
security for their members and protection for the bargaining process, 
which only a closed-shop agreement could provide. On the other hand, 
when a union was not strong enough to obtain a closed shop or even full 
recognition, it often settled for a members-only collective agreement,22 
for this was considered a logical step in an organizational process that 
would eventually lead to total employee recognition. 
During the pre-Wagner Act years, strikes and boycotts or threats of 
such activity were usually a union’s only means of securing recognition, 
for employers vigorously opposed dealing with outside unions. Under 
the NIRA, the collective bargaining process mandated by Section 7(a) 
required only three factors: 1) a union representing a group of employ-
ees, 2) a demand for recognition and bargaining, and 3) an employer 
who was expected to respond by engaging in good-faith negotiations. 
It quickly became apparent under that statute, however, that almost all 
Blocketal.indb   253 3/2/2006   9:00:16 AM
254   Morris
employers vigorously resisted union recognition unless it was forced 
upon them by strikes or boycotts. for there was no adequate enforce-
ment mechanism to require compliance with the law.23 The Wagner Act 
was designed to correct those procedural deficiencies but not to change 
the substantive law.24
In conducting my research I was fortunate to discover a reliable 
description of the essential characteristics of employer–employee rela-
tions prevailing at that stage in the nation’s labor history. In November 
1933, the National Industrial Conference Board (Conference Board)25 
conducted an extensive empirical study to determine the nature of col-
lective bargaining as it was practiced immediately following enactment 
of Section 7(a) of the NIRA.26 That study covered the fields of manufac-
turing and mining. These proved to be the most appropriate industries 
to investigate for they included the companies mainly impacted by Sec-
tion 7(a) and were also the ones that would ultimately be most affected 
by the Wagner Act. 
The data27 show that a variety of bargaining arrangements existed 
during this period. 45.7 percent of employees dealt with their employ-
ers on an individual basis, 45 percent dealt through employee-repre-
sentation plans (i.e., company unions), and 9.3 percent dealt through 
independent labor unions. 68.9 percent of the reporting companies en-
gaged in no bargaining at all—i.e., neither with an independent union 
nor a company union. The remaining 31.1 percent engaged in bargain-
ing with either an independent union or a company union or with both, 
including arrangements whereby employees in many of the companies 
also engaged in individual bargaining. This group of 31.1 percent of the 
reporting companies consisted of 1,030 of the 3,314 responding compa-
nies in a representative sample of 10,335 companies. Two hundred and 
thirty of those companies bargained with independent unions represent-
ing 189,756 employees on an exclusive basis, and 186 bargained with 
independent unions representing 51,100 employees on a nonexclusive 
basis. 
Accordingly, of the latter total of 416 companies that bargained 
with independent unions, 55 percent did so on an exclusive basis and 
45 percent bargained on a members-only-basis. The 51,110 union em-
ployees who were not involved in exclusive representation—i.e., the 
union employees in the companies that engaged in members-only bar-
gaining—were thus working, in varying combinations and job catego-
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ries, alongside 124,101 other employees who were either wholly non-
union or were represented by company unions. Together, those workers 
comprised a total of 175,211 employees, which may be compared to 
the slightly higher number of 189,756 employees covered by exclu-
sive union representation. Extrapolating from the survey group to the 
nationwide employee populations of companies in manufacturing and 
mining, one arrives at totals of approximately 189,260 union employees 
covered by members-only collective bargaining, as compared with ap-
proximately 702,800 union employees covered by exclusive collective 
bargaining. In other words, of all union members employed in manu-
facturing and mining in 1933, approximately 21 percent were repre-
sented by independent minority unions that engaged in members-only 
bargaining. And, as noted above, the percentage of companies that bar-
gained with these minority unions was considerably higher, comprising 
45 percent of all the companies that engaged in some form of collective 
bargaining. These data dramatically portray the eclectic nature of trade-
union representation in the manufacturing and mining industries when 
Section 7(a) was enacted and thus confirm that members-only bargain-
ing through independent minority unions was a common phenomenon 
in those industries; there is no reason to believe that manufacturing and 
mining were unique in this regard. Although the findings by the Confer-
ence Board may seem surprising today, that same general information 
was common knowledge at the time.28 Thus, on the eve of congressio-
nal consideration of the Wagner bill, minority-union bargaining was a 
highly visible part of the industrial relations landscape.29
Indeed, under Section 7(a) of the NIRA, majority status was not a 
prerequisite for collective bargaining. The National Labor Board, an 
executive agency that President Roosevelt had created to implement 
Section 7(a), routinely found breaches of the duty to bargain with less-
than-majority unions. That agency only used elections to determine 
majority status when there was a dispute between two unions claiming 
representation—one of which was usually a company union―or when 
an employer questioned a union’s claim of majority representation, or 
when a substantial number of employees requested it; otherwise, major-
ity status was deemed irrelevant.30
The legislative history of Wagner’s first attempt, his 1934 Labor 
Disputes bill,31 as well as his ultimately successful 1935 National Labor 
Relations bill, demonstrates that the bargaining provisions in both bills 
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were intended to protect minority-union bargaining. The 1934 bill—S. 
2926—was silent regarding majority representation,32 clearly indicating 
that an employer had a duty to bargain with any union that represented 
its employees, whether a majority union or a minority union.33 And the 
history of the enactment of the 1935 bill—S. 1958—positively indi-
cates that minority-union bargaining preliminary to mature majority-
based exclusive bargaining would be fully protected by the statutory 
text. Although many aspects of that history support this conclusion,34 
one feature not previously recognized is especially revealing—in fact, 
it is the “smoking gun” that confirms such intent behind the passage of 
Section 8(5).35
The bill Senator Wagner introduced in the Senate on February 21, 
1935, S. 1958,36 was intentionally designed to be substitute legislation 
that would correct the enforcement shortcomings of Section 7(a). It 
achieved this by codifying, clarifying, and slightly strengthening the 
substantive rights contained in Section 7(a) and by incorporating and 
giving statutory status to the majority-rule concept that the old NLRB 
had previously adopted by decision and practice; specifically, the old 
NLRB Houde37 decision required bargaining exclusivity after selection 
of a majority representative but left standing the requirement to bargain 
with minority unions prior to such majority designation.38 To adminis-
ter and enforce those rights and corresponding duties, the bill created 
a new labor board that was “styled National Labor Relations Board to 
provide continuity with the existing agency.”39 Thus, the new bill was 
not intended to create new law but rather to reestablish old law, adding 
only clarity and teeth. Recognition of that purpose is of prime impor-
tance to the construction of the act for, as Professor William Eskridge 
points out, “when Congress borrows a statute, it adopts by implica-
tion interpretation placed on that statute, absent express statement to 
the contrary.”40
It should be noted that the original Wagner bill did not contain a 
separate Section 8(5) duty-to-bargain unfair labor practice. Wagner and 
Leon Keyserling, his legislative assistant and primary author of both 
bills,41 were of the opinion that such a specific provision was unneces-
sary because the employer’s duty to bargain was adequately covered 
by the broad collective-bargaining requirement contained in Section 
7—i.e., the vintage 14-word phrase previously noted—under which a 
refusal to bargain represented an interference with the workers’ right to 
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bargain collectively, hence was enforceable under Section 8(1). Wag-
ner’s testimony to that effect, which expressly cited the Houde decision, 
was unequivocal: 
The right of employees to bargain collectively implies a duty on 
the part of the employer to bargain with their representatives. [T]he 
incontestably sound principle is that the employer is obligated by 
the statute to negotiate in good faith with his employees’ repre-
sentatives; to match their proposals, if unacceptable with counter 
proposals; and to make every reasonable effort to reach an agree-
ment.42
Section 9(a), with its specification of exclusivity when and if em-
ployees choose a majority representative, which was—and still is—the 
only limitation on the bargaining requirement, provided that 
representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropri-
ate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all 
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing . . .
The bargaining requirement, however, was contained only in Section 
7 and in the unfair-labor-practice enforcement mechanism in Section 
8(1). 
The inclusion of a separate duty-to-bargain unfair labor practice―
Section 8(5)―was an afterthought that was not intended to change the 
substantive bargaining requirements of the original bill. In fact, that 
provision was not added until two and a half months after S. 1958 had 
been introduced. Francis Biddle, chairman of the old NLRB under the 
NIRA, had lobbied long and hard for its inclusion. Although Wagner fi-
nally agreed to the inclusion, he and the Senate committee in its report, 
and later also the House committee in its report, made it expressly clear 
that all four separate unfair-labor-practice provisions following Section 
8(1)—including the new Section 8(5)—would “not . . . impose any limi-
tations or restrictions on the general guarantees of [Section 8(1)], for 
they were designed only to amplify and spell out specifically the most 
troubling unfair labor practices.”43 They were thus meant to reinforce 
those unfair labor practices, not to diminish them.
Regarding the meaning of the belated amendment, a previously un-
recognized aspect of the history of Section 8(5) shows unequivocally 
that it was not intended to exclude the requirement of a duty to bargain 
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with a minority union where there was not yet an exclusive Section 
9(a) majority union. I found this historical feature in a post-introduction 
draft of S. 1958 (third draft) that had been prepared between February 
21 and March 11, 1935. It contained various proposed amendments, 
including the one relevant to this inquiry. (This draft had been in the 
possession of Leon Keyserling and was published in 1989 by Professor 
Kenneth Casebeer.44) After S. 1958 had been introduced and referred to 
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on February 21, 1935, 
Biddle presented two versions of Section 8(5)—contained in this third 
draft—for the committee’s consideration, i.e., alternative texts of this 
proposed new unfair-labor-practice provision. They show conclusively 
that the addition of Section 8(5), which was added to S. 1958 when it 
was reported by the Senate Education and Labor Committee on May 2, 
was never intended to confine an employer’s bargaining duty to major-
ity-unions only. Here, verbatim, are the two versions from this draft: 
(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his 
employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a).
or, (5) To refuse to bargain collectively with employees through 
their representatives, chosen as provided in Section 9(a).45
By adopting the first version, Biddle, Keyserling (hence also Wagner46), 
and the Senate committee were consciously choosing language that 
would assure that the duty to bargain with a majority union would not 
exclude the duty to bargain with a minority union prior to the establish-
ment of majority representation.47 Patently, had the drafters intended 
to exclude such nonmajority bargaining they would have selected the 
second version, for it would have unequivocally limited the bargaining 
obligation under Section 8(5) to majority unions “chosen as provided in 
Section 9(a).” Here was the smoking gun.
The subject of minority-union bargaining prior to the designation of 
majority representation was not even an issue in the congressional de-
bates. Although minority-union members-only bargaining was common 
knowledge and the history of the legislative drafts demonstrates that the 
draftsmen were well aware of the need to protect such bargaining, it 
was not viewed as a controversial issue. There was, however, consider-
able controversy about the ultimate configuration of mature bargaining. 
Proponents of the bill believed that majority-rule bargaining—the bill’s 
solution to the problem of dual unionism—would mean more effective 
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bargaining, hence that was unequivocally the goal sought by Wagner 
and his supporters.48 On the other side of that debate, the employer lob-
by advocated plurality bargaining, opposed majority rule as a denial of 
the rights of minorities, and asserted that the board’s authority to deter-
mine the bargaining unit would lead to a closed shop.49 In that context, 
employers clearly defended the right of minority unions to engage in 
collective bargaining. 
The debates focused on the anticipated presence of multiple unions 
and on whether a minority union should have bargaining rights after a 
majority union had been chosen. There was no discussion about minor-
ity-union bargaining prior to the establishment of majority representa-
tion, and numerous statements by the proponents of the bill showed full 
recognition that the majority rule provided by Section 9(a) would apply 
to bargaining only after employees had selected their majority represen-
tative.50 There was never a question voiced about the nonapplicability 
of that restriction prior to majority selection. And although elections 
were looked upon as one of the best means to settle disputes over union 
representation, the disputes that were generally anticipated concerned 
the choice of which union would represent the employees, not whether 
the employees would be represented. 
Legislative history therefore confirms what the nonambiguous lan-
guage of the statute requires. That text, standing alone, establishes that 
in workplaces where employees have not yet selected a majority repre-
sentative, an employer has an affirmative duty to engage in good-faith 
bargaining with a nonmajority union that seeks to negotiate only on 
behalf of its employee members.51 This is a fundamental right of con-
stitutional proportions. As the Supreme Court characterized Section 7 
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.52 (its first case construing 
the NLRA), “the right of employees to self-organization and to select 
representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining . . . is a 
fundamental right . . . ”53 As I demonstrate in The Blue Eagle at Work, 
such right of association is protected by the First Amendment to the 
U.S Constitution.54 Indeed, the Supreme Court declared in the Gissel55 
case in a comparative reference to an employer’s freedom of expression 
under Section 8(c),56 which the Court said “merely implements the First 
Amendment,”57 “an employer’s rights cannot outweigh the equal rights 
of the employees to associate freely, as those rights are embodied in §7 
and protected by §8(a)(1) . . . ”58 Furthermore, the right of employees 
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in a less-than-majority union to engage in collective bargaining is also 
a fundamental human right that is recognized by international law to 
which the United States is a party.59
What then is the state of the currently recognized law on this issue? 
Although there have been no decisions explicitly holding that an em-
ployer has a duty to bargain with a minority union on a members-only 
basis where there is not presently a Section 9(a) representative, sev-
eral cases from both the Supreme Court and the Labor Board actually 
point in that direction. Indeed, these cases confirm the legality of such 
bargaining and resulting contracts under Sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2), and 
8(a)(3).60 Furthermore, there are no NLRB or court decisions holding 
that such minority-union bargaining is not required by the act.61 Al-
though latter-day conventional wisdom assumes that the only bargain-
ing duty countenanced by the act is bargaining with a majority union 
in an appropriate unit, such conventional wisdom, like the emperor, has 
no clothes.
Immediately after passage of the act in 1935, however, conventional 
wisdom indicated otherwise. For several years following its enactment, 
no legal questions were raised as to the scope of the act’s bargaining 
requirements, either as to members-only minority-union bargaining or 
majority-exclusivity bargaining.62 As previously noted, both types of 
bargaining had prevailed under the old NIRA and now both prevailed 
under the new NLRA. By 1938, a year after the Wagner Act was de-
clared constitutional,63 members-only contracts were perhaps as com-
mon—if not more common—than majority-exclusivity contracts,64 and 
their coverage may have been even more extensive. Both unions and 
employers in large numbers found members-only agreements prag-
matically useful. At places where unions had organized a substantial 
number—but less than a majority—of a company’s bargaining-unit em-
ployees and majority support did not seem likely or easily attainable, 
membership-based contracts were welcomed and many were signed. 
Such contracts were viewed as a preliminary stage in the organizational 
and collective bargaining process. When the unions achieved majority 
status these contracts were almost always replaced by conventional ex-
clusive-recognition agreements. Although employers generally resisted 
unionization of their employees, there seems to be no indication of any 
employer contending that it had no legal duty to bargain with a minor-
ity union for its members only. Numerous companies engaged in such 
Blocketal.indb   260 3/2/2006   9:00:16 AM
Members-Only Collective Bargaining   261
bargaining and signed members-only agreements—often readily—for 
they considered this limited form of recognition a lesser evil than ex-
clusive recognition inasmuch as the latter was usually accompanied by 
a demand for a closed shop. 
On March 2, 1937, U.S. Steel recognized the CIO’s Steel Workers 
Organizing Committee (SWOC) as bargaining agent for employees who 
were its members,65 and that agreement became the model for the steel 
industry.66 By December 15, 1937, of the 445 contracts entered into by 
the SWOC, 85 percent provided for members-only recognition,67 and 
“[o]n the basis of number of employees embraced, the model agreement 
had a coverage of 98 percent of all those working under contracts with 
the union.”68 Eventually these members-only agreements were replaced 
by exclusive agreements.69 What happened in steel was also happening 
in many other workplaces in U.S. industry.70  
General Motors (GM) was a part of this pattern, though reluctantly. 
Following a series of sit-down strikes, pressure from the White House, 
and dogged mediation by Michigan’s governor Frank Murphy, GM on 
February 11, 1937, agreed to recognize the United Automobile Work-
ers (UAW) as the representative of its members only.71 On March 24, 
Chrysler followed suit with similar recognition. The members-only 
agreement thus emerged as a critical part of the UAW organizing pro-
gram. By 1938, of the 537 auto industry contracts signed by the UAW, 
343—i.e., 64 percent—were members-only agreements.72 These agree-
ments were considered useful stepping stones on the path to majority 
membership and mature collective bargaining.73 By 1942 nearly all the 
plants where the UAW had first achieved recognition on a members-
only basis were now locked in for “sole bargaining rights.”74
Not surprisingly, however, by the early 1940s, members-only 
agreements had become increasingly rare and were soon forgotten, 
for unions were now taking the path of least resistance and bypassing 
that early bargaining stage, seeking instead—and in most cases achiev-
ing—majority-bargaining rights directly through NLRB representation 
procedures. During the board’s first decade, unions were successful in 
winning recognition in over 85 percent of their representation cases.75 
NLRB elections thus became habit-forming in a relatively short period 
of time. 
Although unions originally favored board elections out of sheer 
convenience, reliance on the election process, especially during and af-
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ter World War II, now became routine, with concomitant unawareness 
of the true scope of bargaining offered by the statute. As for employers, 
they had no reason to question dependence on the election process, for 
they were learning that elections provided an ideal forum in which to 
mount offensive campaigns against union representation. NLRB elec-
tions therefore became the centerpiece of the statute and eventually the 
established norm. In due time, the interplay of the employers’ self-in-
terest and the unions’ acquiescence in relying on elections effectively 
repressed all institutional memory of minority-union bargaining. 
Today, with the prospect of restoring that memory, it is time for 
the labor movement to return to its roots, to return to organizing on the 
basis of members-only collective bargaining, for this may be labor’s 
best opportunity to reverse the precipitous decline of union membership 
in the private sector. Such organizational efforts will of course have to 
be accompanied by appropriate legal action designed to reaffirm and 
articulate the original and correct interpretation of the law.76
How will this less-than-majority organizational process differ from 
conventional organizing usually designed to culminate in an election? 
The differences, which are substantial, concern both form and sub-
stance. From the very beginning, the emphasis in a union’s organiza-
tional campaign will be on building a union, not on winning an election. 
This process will call for a totally different mind-set. For example, a 
membership-based campaign will not seek or solicit union-authoriza-
tion cards—rather, it will seek and offer genuine union membership, 
just as unions did before they became addicted to the election process. 
Employees who join and pay dues77 to a developing union will know 
they are making a meaningful commitment to the organization. To ac-
commodate the resulting new categories of membership, unions that 
engage in member-based organizing will probably adjust their dues 
structures accordingly, perhaps by instituting a multitiered plan. Pay-
ment of union dues, even though nominal in amount, will mean that 
pro-union employees will have “put their money where their mouth is,” 
and having paid their dues there will be no doubt as to their voluntary 
choice of union representation.78 
The position of union steward in the new organization will be espe-
cially important, for that person will have an early role to play in deal-
ing with the employer. Acting pursuant to the long-standing rule in the 
Weingarten79 case, i.e., in a recognized union setting, the union steward 
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will be the person called upon to aid an employee in need of assistance at 
a potentially disciplinary interview, for since the board’s 2004 decision 
in IBM Corporation,80 an unrepresented employee in a nonunion work-
place is no longer entitled to the assistance of an ordinary coworker at 
a Weingarten interview. Accordingly, the newly organized union should 
make known to every employee in the workplace that its union steward 
is available to aid union members, both old and new, who are called 
in for investigatory interviews that might result in disciplinary action. 
The law requires that if the employer proceeds with such an interview, 
the steward must be permitted to attend and participate if the member 
requests the steward’s presence. The steward of this new union—who 
ideally will be an experienced and well-respected employee—will thus 
be the logical person to provide a targeted employee with support and 
representation in the interview. And because the Weingarten rule does 
not require the employer to give employees any notice of their right to 
representation, not even to the employee slated for the interview, for 
the “right arises only in situations where the employee requests rep-
resentation,”81 it will behoove the organizing union to make known to 
all employees that this guaranteed right is available to all represented 
employees. As a practical matter, the right can also be made available to 
any nonunion employee who takes advantage of expedited union mem-
bership that is likely to be offered by the union steward. 
This brings me to the collective-bargaining role that distinguishes 
how a developing union will henceforth operate at its organizational 
stage, as compared with the manner in which most unions presently 
conduct their organizing campaigns. Once the new union has achieved 
sufficient size and structure—and only good judgment and experience, 
and perhaps good luck in the absence of experience, will indicate when 
that has occurred—the new union will notify the employer (preferably 
in writing) of its existence, of its representational status for its mem-
bers, and of any immediate requests for negotiations on their behalf. 
This initial notification might also introduce a request to bargain about 
a limited number of general subjects that it deems urgent or worthy 
of prompt attention—for example, employee discipline and grievance 
procedures, bulletin board space, or any other pressing issue requiring 
early resolution. 
After the company has thus been notified of the union’s represen-
tational status and members-only recognition has been requested, the 
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union’s chief function will be simply to act like a union, which means 
concentrating on representing its members regarding a multiplicity of 
work-related issues. This should prove to be of assistance not only to 
existing members, but also should serve to attract new members. As 
Freeman and Rogers have pointed out, workers who experience union 
membership, especially current membership, overwhelmingly tend to 
favor union representation.82 Employees who have participated person-
ally in the developing union will be its strongest advocates, and their 
enthusiasm is likely to be contagious. The organizational process is thus 
merged with the representational process.
The raw material for the new union’s initial forays into collective 
bargaining will be the numerous changes in employment conditions 
that frequently arise in any workplace, i.e., the routine employment 
decisions that nonunion employers typically make unilaterally, though 
sometimes with nominal input from affected employees. Where em-
ployees are represented by a bargaining agent—which will now be the 
case for minority-union members—any such unilateral change in em-
ployees’ working conditions or status will almost always represent a 
per se refusal to bargain.83 Such separate potential bargaining situations 
may now be actively addressed by the new union.
As these ad hoc incidents arise concerning changes in bargainable 
subjects that might affect one or more union members, it will be the 
union’s responsibility to provide assistance and voice to the person or 
persons affected, for, as the Supreme Court stressed in Conley v. Gib-
son,84 “[c]ollective bargaining is a continuing process”85 that involves 
day-to-day adjustments in working conditions―it is not a condition that 
occurs only when a bargaining contract is being negotiated.86 Inasmuch 
as good-faith bargaining requires negotiating to impasse as a precon-
dition to unilateral implementation,87 if time is a factor the employer 
will have some legal incentive to reach a mutually satisfactory resolu-
tion of the issue. Usually, however, if a union has little or no means to 
pressure an employer—which will probably be the case for almost all 
less-than-majority unions at the organizational stage—success at ad hoc 
bargaining, if there is any, will depend largely on the reasonableness of 
the union’s proposals and the persuasiveness of its spokesperson. That 
person will probably be an outside union representative whose physical 
presence inside the workplace will in itself convey a powerful message 
to wavering nonunion employees. This mini-bargaining process may 
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thus bring its own reward even if the meetings prove to be no more than 
meet-and-confer sessions. In many cases, however, especially during 
the early stages of this unfamiliar procedure, the process will undoubt-
edly require the support—whether explicitly or implicitly—of NLRB 
enforcement; lawful economic pressure may also be required. 
Bargaining while organizing will certainly not be trouble-free. Nev-
ertheless, this direct participation by employees and their union should 
provide a more potent response to an employer’s effort to spread its an-
tiunion message through captive audiences and one-on-one contact. But 
without an election goal, and with its obligation to bargain continuing 
regardless of the union’s lack of majority, the employer may eventually 
find its antiunion presentations less effective and perhaps even counter-
productive. 
In workplaces where members-only organizing and bargaining is 
finally accepted—which will undoubtedly require considerable time, 
a good deal of patience, and pursuasive legal education― ad hoc bar-
gaining episodes will probably continue until the parties jointly decide 
to initiate serious negotiations for a comprehensive agreement or the 
union on its own feels that it has sufficient members (albeit less than a 
majority) to exercise enough bargaining clout to request full contract 
negotiations. When a collective bargaining contract is finally agreed 
upon, it will apply to union members only; but it will be a legally en-
forceable agreement.88 In all probability, the company will make the 
same economic benefits available to comparably situated nonunion em-
ployees, which will be its right and undoubtedly its preference. The 
contractual grievance procedure, however, will be applicable to union 
members only.89
When a minority union finally achieves majority membership, it 
will of course need to demonstrate that fact in order to become the em-
ployees’ exclusive bargaining representative. It may be anticipated, 
however, that many unions will have no need to resort to elections or 
other external means to prove majority status, for their visible growth 
with members-only bargaining will have achieved a fait accompli that 
convinces the employer that an election or other verification would 
serve no useful purpose. In other workplaces, however, an election may 
be needed to confirm the new union’s majority, although such a union 
may well be advised not to proceed to an election until it is actively 
functioning as a viable labor organization. This was the election pat-
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tern that commonly occurred during the early years following passage 
of the Wagner Act, especially in the steel and automobile industries.90 
That pattern may now be repeated, but not universally. Considering 
the endemic nature of most U.S. employers’ deep-seated opposition to 
unions and the aversion of some workers toward unions, it is likely that 
some minority unions will not develop into majority unions—at least 
not promptly, and in many cases never. Even so, the workers in those 
unions will be exercising their right “to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing” notwithstanding that a majority 
of their coworkers have not chosen to join with them. These minority-
union employees will at least have some degree of union protection and 
benefits―though with limited bargaining power. Yet their status need 
not necessarily be viewed as temporary or incomplete. Union members 
and nonmembers ought to be able to work side-by-side with each other 
without special problems, provided the employer does not interfere with 
the exercise of freedom of choice to belong or not to belong to a labor 
union, and provided the union in turn recognizes that its existence does 
not require absolute majority status. Minority unionism is not uncom-
mon in many other countries, especially in Europe. 
This brings to a conclusion my brief restatement of the law regard-
ing minority-union bargaining and my thumbnail descriptive forecast of 
the organizational and bargaining procedures that minority unions may 
now follow. I am not suggesting, however, that once the law recognizes 
the right of minority unions to bargain for their members only prior 
to establishment of Section 9(a) representation that union organizing 
will be easy. Nor am I predicting that employers will cease fighting 
unions and thereafter abandon their efforts to maintain a union-free en-
vironment. But when employers realize that henceforth workers will 
require neither a majority union nor an election to be entitled to engage 
in collective bargaining, a major incentive for mounting aggressive an-
tiunion campaigns will have vanished. Furthermore, employers will no 
longer have election targets with finite campaign timelines in which 
to persuade, promise, intimidate, or punish employees to discourage 
them from voting for union representation. Nevertheless, many em-
ployers will probably persist in discharging and otherwise discriminat-
ing against union employees, and undoubtedly many will continue to 
issue threats and promises-of-benefits to discourage unionization. But 
at some point in time, compliance with the NLRA may actually be-
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come the established norm. That was Senator Wagner’s intended goal. 
Despite the debilitating administrative and judicial constructions that 
have been inflicted on the act over the years, its core provisions remain 
intact. With the prospect of a resumption of members-only organizing 
and bargaining, democratic rights may finally be reclaimed in the U.S. 
workplace.
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search Director) 689 (1942)
 22.  See Richard R. Carlson, The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representation in 
American Labor Law, 30 Duq. L. Rev. 779, 804 (1992); the tWentieth Century 
fund, hoW ColleCtive Bargaining Works: a survey of experienCe in leading 
ameriCan industries (Harry A. Millis, Research Director) 689 (1942). 
 23.  Lloyd K. Garrison, The National Labor Boards, 184 annals am. aCad. pol. & 
soC. sCi. 138, 145 (1936). 
 24.  On the day of its introduction, Wagner told the Senate: “The national labor rela-
tions bill which I now propose is novel neither in philosophy nor in content. It 
creates no new substantive rights.” 2 legislative history of the nlra, 1935 
(1949), (hereinafter 2 legis. hist.) at 1312. That concept of intent behind the 
Wagner bill has been widely recognized, e.g., see Melvyn Dubofsky, the state 
and laBor in modern ameriCa 127 (1994). 
 25.  Presently known as “The Conference Board.” The organization was founded in 
1916. See http://www.conference-board.org/whoweare.
 26.  National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., individual and ColleCtive Bar-
gaining under the n.i.r.a.—a statistiCal study of present praCtiCe (1933) 
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(hereinafter Conference Board). 
 27.  Id. at 16, Table II. Senator Wagner was well aware of the Conference Board 
study, for he referenced it in a New York Times article on March 11, 1934 (made 
a part of the Congressional Record during consideration of his Labor Disputes 
bill, S. 2926, March 12, 1934), 1 legislative history of the nlra, 1935 (1949), 
(hereinafter 1 legis. hist.) at 23.
 28.  Sargent, supra note 19 at 275, 285 (1934).
 29.  A 1935 BLS study confirms that a large number of employers dealt with both 
trade unions and company unions in roughly the same proportions as found ear-
lier by the Conference Board study. Bureau of laBor statistiCs, u.s. dep’t of 
laBor, Bulletin no. 634, CharaCteristiCs of Company unions 1935 191, 203 
(1937). 
 30.  This construction of Section 7(a) was illustrated in several cases, including deci-
sions subsequent to Denver Tramway, 1 NLB 64 (1934), where the board estab-
lished the principle of majority rule applicable to a union that proves its majority 
in a board-ordered election. See National Lock Co., 1 NLB (Part 2) 15 (1934); 
Bee Bus Line Co., 1 NLB (Part 2) 24 (1934); Eagle Rubber Co., 1 NLB (Part 2) 
31 (1934). See also discussion in Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 at 37–39.
 31.  See ch. 2 in Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1.
 32.  Id. at 236.
 33.  Id.
 34.  Id. at 44–45, 56, 69–71, & 74–75. 
 35.  The present §8(a)(5).
 36.  1 legis. hist. at 1295.
 37.  Houde Engineering Corp., id. at 35.
 38.  See Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 at 48–52 & 70.
 39.  Irving Bernstein, turBulent years, a history of the ameriCan Worker 1933–
1941 326 (1971) (hereinafter Bernstein turBulent years). The reference is to 
the National Labor Relations Board, created by Exec. Order No. 6073, June 29, 
1934.
 40.  The “Borrowed statute” rule. William N. Eskridge, Jr., dynamiC statutory in-
terpretation, Appendix 3, The Rehnquist Court’s Cannons of Statutory Con-
struction, 323, 324, (1994), citing Molzof v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 711, 716 
(1992); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
 41.  See note 46 infra.
 42.  1 legis. hist. at 1419. Several weeks later Wagner reaffirmed that position. 2 
leg. hist. at 2102. For the same view reconfirmed by Keyserling in an interview 
in March, 1986, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with 
Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 u. miami l. rev. 285, 330 
(1987) (hereinafter Casebeer Holder of the Pen). These views were consistent 
with the key decision of the old NLRB, Houde Engineering Corp., 1 NLRB (old) 
35 (1934), as well as several other cases cited therein. See Blue eagle at Work, 
supra note 1 at 73, n. 86.
 43.  Senate Committee Report, 2 legis. hist. at 2309. Emphasis added. See also Wag-
ner statement and House Committee Report, id. at 2333 and 2971, respectively. 
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 44.  Kenneth Casebeer, Drafting Wagner’s Act: Leon Keyserling and the Precommit-
tee Drafts of the Labor Disputes Act and the National Labor Relations Act, 11 
indus. rel. L. J. 73, 120 (1989) (hereinafter Keyserling drafts). The proposed 
changes in this draft are reproduced by Casebeer in the Appendix to his article, 
id. at 130–131, though under the misleading heading, “NLRA Draft 2 - February 
15, 1935 - New Preamble, Amendments in Committee Annotated by L. Keyser-
ling in Margin.” The document is clearly a third draft, not the second draft (the 
second draft was S. 1958 as introduced on February 21, 1935), nor are all of 
the changes “amendments in Committee”—some were and some were not. (The 
original of this draft is in the collection of the Leon Keyserling papers in the 
Lauinger Library of Georgetown University, which graciously provided me with 
a photocopy.) In his description of the draft earlier in his text, id. at 86, Professor 
Casebeer does explain that the draft “represents the National Labor Relations Act 
as introduced February 15, 1935, together with amendments of the Committee 
on Education and Labor annotated by Keyserling as to their source or sponsor.” 
That clarification, however, is also partially inaccurate, for only some of the in-
serted proposals were ultimately adopted by the committee. The photocopy in my 
files shows that it is a revision superimposed on an officially printed version of S. 
1958 introduced on Feb. 21, 1935 (which is the calendar day, though it also bears 
the session date of Feb. 15, 1935). All of the changes on the document appear 
either in handwriting or as typed copy on inserted flaps—the latter being how the 
two versions of §8(5) noted here appear, but with the handwritten identification: 
“Biddle.” (There are also other handwritten marginal designations elsewhere in 
the document showing the sources or sponsors of the changes, except—presum-
ably—when Keyserling was himself the source or sponsor.) Comparisons of the 
proposed changes inserted in the document with the written proposals attributed 
to various sources by the Senate Committee in its March 11, 1935, Comparison 
of S. 2926 and S. 1958, 1 legis. hist. at 1319–71, and also the changes that were 
incorporated in the bill as reported by the committee on May 2, 1935, show that 
this was a preliminary and tentative committee mark-up of the original bill, i.e., 
a working draft composed during committee consideration between Feb. 21 and 
March 11, 1935. Most but not all of those changes were incorporated in the bill 
as reported, which demonstrates the preliminary nature of the draft’s mark-up 
status, and—more important—that every change or proposed change included in 
this draft occurred within the Senate committee and thus had the consideration 
of that committee.
 45.  Emphasis added. 
 46.  Although Keyserling was the primary draftsman of all of Wagner’s public state-
ments and materials—including his speeches, his legislative bills, and also key 
committee reports—the Senator was kept fully advised at all stages of the work 
and was in total agreement with the final product. Casebeer Holder of the Pen, 
supra note 42 at 295, 302–303, 341–343, and 361; Casebeer Keyserling Drafts, 
supra note 44 at 76; Bernstein turBulent years, supra note 39 at 340. See also 
Leon H. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 
geo. Wash. l. rev. 199, 215 (1960).
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 47.  It was nevertheless essential to include reference to §9(a) in order to ensure that 
where there was a majority designation in an appropriate bargaining unit, the 
representative would be bargaining exclusively on behalf of all employees in that 
unit, and an employer’s recognition or bargaining with any other union would 
not be permitted—which was the ultimate bargaining objective of the statute. 
 48.  1 Legis. Hist. 1419; Summers, supra note 9 at 539 (“[t]he history of the majority 
rule principle shows that its purpose was not to limit the ability of a non-majority 
union to represent its own members, but to protect a majority union’s ability to 
bargain collectively.”). 
 49.  Irving Bernstein, the neW deal ColleCtive Bargaining poliCy 109 (1950). See 
Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1, at 35–36 and 50–52.
 50.  E.g., see Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 at 70 and 79.
 51.  See ch. 5, id., for a detailed analysis of the statutory text.
 52.  301 U.S. 1 (1937)
 53.  Id. at 33. Emphasis added. See generally Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 at 
ch. 8. See also James A. Gross, Worker Rights as Human Rights: Wagner Act Val-
ues and Moral Choices, 4 U. Pa. J. Lab. and Emp. L. 479 (2002); Roy J. Adams, 
Choice or Voice? Rethinking American Labor Policy in Light of the International 
Human Rights Consensus, 5 employee rts. and emp. pol’y J. 521 (2001).
 54.  For treatment of the constitutional issue, see Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 
at ch. 6.
 55.  NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
 56.  29 U.S.C. §158(c).
 57.  395 U.S. at 617. 
 58.  Id. Emphasis added.
 59.  See international Covenant on Civil and politiCal rights, S. Exec. Doc. E, 
95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (adopted in 1966, entered into force in 1976, 
ratified by U.S. in 1992); 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1994); 6 I.L.M. 368; international 
laBour organization deClaration on fundamental prinCiples and rights at 
Work, International Labour Conf., 86th Sess. (June 1998), available at http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/decl/declaration/text. For details of these 
obligations, see Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 at ch. 8.
 60.  NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 52; Consolidated Edison 
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236-37 (1938); International Ladies Garment Work-
ers v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 736, 741-43 (1961); 
Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 29 (1962); NLRB v. City 
Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984); Solvay Process Co., 5 NLRB 330 
(1938); The Hoover Co., 90 NLRB 1614, 1618 (1950); Consolidated Builders, 
Inc., 99 NLRB 972, 975 (1952). In Consolidated Edison, where the board had 
previously dismissed an unfair labor practice charge under §8(2), the Supreme 
Court found that minority-union members-only bargaining and contracts did not 
violate Sections 8(1) and 8(3). And in the Solvay, Hoover, and Consolidated 
Builders cases, the board found members-only bargaining to be lawful under 
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2). See Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 at 93-97.
 61.  See Blue eagle at Work, id. at ch. 9.
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 62.  The only legal question of serious consequence raised by employers at that time 
concerned the Act’s constitutionality, which the Supreme Court put to rest in 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 52. See James A. Gross, the 
making of the national laBor relations Board 183–88 (1974).
 63.  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., id., decision rendered on April 12, 
1937.
 64.  Union Recognition as Shown in Contracts, 1-A L.R.R.M. (BNA) 781 (1938). Of 
the 23 “typical” contracts reported, 13 (57 percent) were members-only agree-
ments, whereas only 8 (35 percent) were exclusive agreements (2 were ambigu-
ous as to coverage).
 65.  Bernstein turBulent years, supra note 39 at 465.
 66.  See Robert R. R. Brooks, as steel goes,…: unionism in a BasiC industry, 166–
167 (1940) (hereinafter Brooks).
 67.  Collective Bargaining Contracts and Industrial Practices: Bargaining in the 
Steel Industry, 3 LRRM (BNA) 553 (1939).
 68.  Id.
 69.  Brooks, supra note 66 at 166; however, in 1940 the union’s contracts with U.S. 
Steel were still “for members only.” Id. at 248.
 70.  Here is a snapshot-view of union organizational status during that period: “Most 
unions seek a closed, union or preferential shop, but newly organized ones usu-
ally have difficulty in winning any one of these from employers traditionally 
opposed to unionism. Ten years ago most agreements provided for the closed 
shop. In recent years there have been more exceptions than at any time since the 
1880s; unions were willing to take what they could get in order to secure a foot-
hold in areas previously closed to them. For example, many agreements in the 
1930s with new industrial unions in the mass production industries stated that 
the union was to bargain for members only. However, as collective bargaining 
gained more general acceptance and as unions won National Labor Relations 
Board elections, these “membership” agreements were generally replaced by 
contracts designating the union as exclusive representative of all employees . . . ” 
the tWentieth Century fund, hoW ColleCtive Bargaining Works: a survey 
of experienCe in leading ameriCan industries (Harry A. Millis, Research Direc-
tor) 24 (1942). Emphasis added.
 71.  Sidney Fine, sit-doWn: the general motors strike of 1936–1937 266–312 
(1969) (hereinafter Fine). 
 72.  Bargaining in the Automobile Industry, 2 L.R.R.M. 952–53 (1938). 
 73.  For example, following NLRB election victories in 1940, the UAW was offi-
cially certified as exclusive bargaining agent for 130,000 workers at GM and for 
50,000 workers at Chrysler. 5 NLRB Ann. Rep. 18–19, 141, 151 (1941). See also 
Fine, supra note 71 at 329.
 74.  W. H. McPherson, Automobiles, in hoW ColleCtive Bargaining Works 571, 595 
(Harry A. Millis ed., 1942)
 75.  2 NLRB ann. rep. 25-26 (1937); 3 NLRB ann. rep. 39, 49 (1939); 4 NLRB 
ann. rep. 43, 53 (1940); 5 NLRB ann. rep. 17-18, n. 6, 29 (1941); 6 NLRB 
ann. rep. 37, Table 19 (1942); 7 NLRB ann. rep. 90, Table 18 (1943); 8 NLRB 
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ann. rep. 37, 38, 90, Table 18 (1944); 9 NLRB ann. rep. 88, Table 13 (1944); 
10 NLRB ann. rep. 4 (1946). See Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 at 86.
 76.  See Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 at ch. 10.
 77.  Our Canadian neighbors have long recognized that “[t]he usual method of which 
trade unions establish representativeness in order to acquire bargaining rights 
is through evidence of membership.” H.W. Arthurs, D.D Carter, H.J. Glasbeek, 
laBour laW and industrial relations in Canada 189 (2nd ed. 1984).
 78.  Compare Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
 79.  NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), in which the Supreme Court 
upheld an NLRB rule that an employee in a unionized workplace who is called 
in by management for an investigatory interview that the employee reasonably 
fears may result in disciplinary action has a statutory right to refuse to submit to 
such an interview without union representation. 
 80.  341 NLRB No.148 (June 9, 2004), which reversed Epilepsy Foundation of 
Northeast Ohio, 331 NLRB No. 92, aff’d in pertinent part, 268 F. 3d 1095 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4231 (U.S. June 10, 2002). Inasmuch 
as the Weingarten rule is based on the right to engage in concerted activity for 
“mutual aid or protection” pursuant to §7—not on the duty to engage in collec-
tive bargaining under §8(a)(5)—the Board held in Epilepsy Foundation, as it had 
previously ruled twelve years earlier in Materials Research Corp., 262 NLRB 
1010 (1982), (which was overruled three years later by a different Board in Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 274 NLRB 230 (1985)), that employees in nonunion work-
places are entitled to Weingarten-like protection. It held that “where employees 
are not represented by a union [they have a] right to have a coworker present at 
an investigatory interview” that the employee reasonably believes could result 
in disciplinary action. In reversing Epilepsy Foundation in IBM Corporation, 
the current Board distinguished between the status of a coworker and a union 
representative (steward), noting that “[t]he union representative typically is ac-
customed to dealing with the employer on a regular basis [whereas a] coworker 
is unlikely to bring such skills to an interview because he has no experience as 
the statutory representative of a group of employees.” 341 NLRB No.148, slip 
op. at 5. 
 81.  Weingarten, supra note 79 at 256. Emphasis added. 
 82.  Richard B. Freeman and Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 69 (1999).
 83.  NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). See also Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 
501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991) (“[A]n employer commits an unfair labor practice if, 
without bargaining to impasse, it effects a unilateral change in an existing term 
or condition of bargaining.”).
 84.  355 U.S. 41 (1957).
 85.  Id. at 46.
 86.  Examples of mandatory subjects of bargaining likely to arise on an ad hoc basis 
would include changes in wages and hours of work, discharges and discipline, 
work-rule changes, safety and health issues, and changes in vacation and holiday 
pay. These are but a few, for a comprehensive list of mandatory subjects would 
be lengthy. For discussion and authorities regarding these and other mandatory 
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subjects of bargaining, see Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 at 194–195.
 87.  “Upon impasse, the employer may make unilateral changes in working condi-
tions, but unilateral changes implemented before a genuine impasse has been 
reached violate the Act.” Patrick Hardin and John E. Higgins, Jr., eds. the de-
veloping laBor laW: the Board, the Courts, and the national laBor rela-
tions aCt 926 (4th ed. 2001). 
 88.  See Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
 89.  For treatment of NLRB changes in the collective bargaining process likely to 
result from members-only bargaining, see Blue eagle at Work, supra note 1 at 
211–217.
 90.  See supra at notes 69 and 73–74.
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An integral feature of today’s volatile labor markets is the perva-
sive use of temporary help and staffing firms to respond to the cycli-
cal economy’s fluctuating labor needs. Modern workplace law has not 
kept pace with this development. Federal labor law was enacted and 
developed during the middle decades of the twentieth century to gov-
ern stable, long-term employment relationships, not the vicissitudes of 
the now-ubiquitous temporary work relationship. The Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA) does not address temporary work in the 
statutory text, and it has not provided an effective regulatory regime to 
govern the operations of contemporary staffing firms and other profit-
driven labor market intermediaries (LMIs).1 Despite certain notable le-
gal breakthroughs and some exemplary efforts at creating alternative, 
nonexploitative agencies to challenge the likes of Labor Ready and 
Manpower, advocates of the rights of temporary workers have not yet 
crafted an effective legal framework that can advance the unionization 
and fair treatment of workers who are deployed by commercial, profit-
driven LMIs. In this regard, little attention has been paid to the legal 
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status of the for-profit temporary agency, the primary institution driv-
ing the expanded use of contingent workers. This chapter aims to help 
remedy this neglect by examining the history and sociolegal character 
of the temp agency, an institution which by conservative industry esti-
mates deploys more than 2.5 million workers each day—more than the 
number employed by Wal-Mart or the “Big Three” automakers com-
bined.
A central issue continually arises in the context of efforts to win 
meaningful labor rights for workers employed through commercial 
LMIs: how to legally characterize the status and obligations of the 
staffing agency that supplies “temp workers” when it is the user firm 
that actually engages these workers in productive labor. As previous re-
search has shown, determining which entity is the actual employer has 
profound repercussions for union organizing and for the application of 
a wide range of employment laws (Gonos 1997). Treating staffing agen-
cies as bona fide independent employers of agency workers, as was the 
NLRB’s accepted practice during the temp industry’s boom period in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, makes it practically impossible 
for temps to exercise their union rights. 
 It was only in 2000 that a landmark NLRB ruling offered a resolu-
tion to one aspect of this issue by recognizing the social and economic 
realities of contingent employment relationships involving temp agen-
cies. In M.B. Sturgis, Inc./Jeffboat Division2 the board reversed de-
cades-old policy on the status of temp workers, ruling that, for purposes 
of collective bargaining, the user firm is the actual employer of both the 
direct and temporary employees who are engaged in common work at 
the user firm’s place of business. Significantly, M.B. Sturgis recognized 
that in many circumstances staffing agencies have little or no claim to 
employer status and thus have no say as to whether temp workers join 
a union with workers permanently employed at the user firm’s busi-
ness. Moreover, the board indicated that the new policy driving its rul-
ing in M.B. Sturgis resulted from a significant shift in the employment 
paradigm, i.e., the “tremendous growth in the temporary help supply 
industry.”3 
Not surprisingly, whatever potential M.B. Sturgis may have had to 
advance the labor rights of temp workers was recently quashed by Pres-
ident Bush’s appointees to the NLRB. In November 2004, Chairman 
Robert J. Battista spearheaded a 3–2 decision reversing M.B. Sturgis. 
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The board’s decision in Oakwood Care Center and N&W Agency, Inc. 
revived the notion that contingent workers deployed by a temp agency 
cannot share a common bargaining unit with permanently employed 
workers without the permission of the temp agency.4 Despite the set-
back that Oakwood Care represents, M.B. Sturgis was a meaningful at-
tempt to provide a modicum of protection for temp workers’ rights and 
a laudable effort to creatively apply federal labor law to the widespread, 
but problematic, triangular employment relationship.
Yet, the analysis in M.B. Sturgis left an important question largely 
unanswered. If, as that ruling declared, the user firm is in many circum-
stances the actual employer of temp workers, then how does one legally 
characterize the temp agency? The answer offered in M.B. Sturgis—
that the user firm and the supplier firm are both employers of the temp 
workers—failed to address critical issues that arise when employers use 
temps to supplement their “regular” workforces. Consider, for example, 
what legal justification exists for the disparate wage rates often earned 
by temps and permanent workers who share a common work experi-
ence (a condition that the Sturgis decision tolerated even among those 
belonging to the same bargaining unit). Creating an effective regime of 
regulation for the commercial staffing industry requires that labor advo-
cates provide a more searching answer to the question of how to legally 
characterize commercial LMIs. 
Based on a reconsideration of their role in U.S. labor and legal his-
tory, this chapter argues that a fundamental shift in the current legal 
characterization of temporary help and staffing firms is necessary to 
effectuate a fair regime of regulation for these formidable players in the 
labor relations arena. The argument has four parts. First, we locate for-
profit employment agencies within the history of U.S. labor by present-
ing early examples of how the labor movement responded to abusive 
private staffing practices. Second, we discuss the rise and fall of the 
regulatory regime that constrained for-profit agencies for the larger part 
of the twentieth century, and, specifically, how the contemporary staff-
ing industry was able to escape effective regulation in the latter decades 
of the century by acquiring the undeserved legal status of “employer.” 
Third, we present empirical data and legal principles that call into ques-
tion staffing firms’ current de facto legal status as employers. 
Finally, informed by this sociolegal reevaluation of the staffing in-
dustry’s history and structure, we propose a legal reclassification, urg-
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ing legislative reform to assign temp agencies and staffing firms a dual 
status, that of employer and labor market intermediary, analogous to 
the legal characterization of the temp agency’s pro-worker counterpart, 
the union hiring hall. The notion of creating an explicit legal definition 
for commercial staffing agencies rests on a fundamental principle of 
U.S. labor law: parity in the legal treatment of employees by all par-
ties to the employment relationship.5 Currently, this principle is not ap-
plied to for-profit LMIs. As this chapter explains, in the last third of the 
twentieth century, the commercial staffing industry waged a successful 
national campaign to free itself of state government regulation. More-
over, certain historical factors permitted the industry to avoid express 
regulation under the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments to 
the LMRA. Given the prominent role of the private staffing industry in 
today’s labor markets, we argue that federal labor law should restore 
legal parity by subjecting for-profit temp and staffing firms to a regime 
of regulation and structural transparency similar to that which governs 
union hiring halls, their functional equivalent on the labor side of the 
employment equation.
THE TEMP AGENCy AND THE UNION HIRING HALL
Labor market intermediaries have played a prominent role in the 
U.S. economy, especially during periods of economic transition and 
high labor market volatility. This was evidenced in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, when the expansion of industrial capital-
ism spawned the rapid proliferation of private fee-charging agencies to 
supply cheap, no-frills labor to a range of industries. This era also wit-
nessed a response to this form of exploitation in the growth and insti-
tutionalization of union hiring halls in certain economic sectors. Thus, 
the union hiring hall and the commercial staffing agency arose as two 
primary kinds of labor market intermediaries, occupying—at times in 
direct competition with each other—a common socioeconomic niche, 
i.e., both organized and provided human capital to industry on a short-
term, seasonal, or cyclical basis.
Today, although both forms of LMIs operate in the labor market, 
multinational corporations such as Manpower and Adecco clearly dom-
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inate the field, with outlets in large and small communities throughout 
the United States and the world. Also ubiquitous are small ad hoc or 
specialized commercial temp operations, providing lower-cost, no-frills 
labor in industries as varied as fish processing, manufacturing, account-
ing, and law. At the same time, union hiring halls persist and continue 
to provide skilled and semiskilled labor to employers on a seasonal and 
temporary basis, most notably in the construction, maritime, and en-
tertainment industries. One thing is clear: as long as the current need 
for cyclical and temporary labor remains high, LMIs will remain an 
important feature of the economy. It remains an open historical ques-
tion, however, whether the predominant form of LMI will engage in 
the commercial exploitation of workers employed in fluid labor mar-
kets or, alternatively, some kind of pro-worker vehicle will emerge that 
can meet the flexible labor needs of our society and, at the same time, 
provide workers with labor representation, decent compensation, and 
a level of empowerment associated with the unionized sectors of the 
economy.
Disparate Legal Treatment of Two Equivalent Labor  
Market Institutions
Wilborn (1997) offers a useful functional definition of labor market 
intermediaries that explains the similarities between union hiring halls 
and temporary staffing agencies. He points out that both these kinds 
of LMIs limit frictional unemployment, i.e., the time a worker spends 
searching for work, and both have the potential to provide an institu-
tional continuity that allows workers to acquire medical/welfare cover-
age and pension benefits that otherwise would be unavailable to them 
as contingent workers.6 Further, both union hiring halls and commercial 
staffing firms are often the contractually designated gatekeepers that 
provide an exclusive vehicle by which employees gain access to jobs in 
a given industry or with a certain employer.7 In the mid-1990s, Business 
Week noted the functional similarity of temp agencies like Labor Ready 
and union hiring halls in that both provide employers with a “database 
of willing workers” (Weiss 1996). Or, as one federal appellate court re-
cently put it, an “exclusive hiring hall is akin to an employment agency 
where all employees hired by an employer are those referred by the 
union.”8
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Another key structural characteristic shared by both types of LMIs 
is crucial to our argument for subjecting commercial staffing agencies 
to strict regulation: Throughout the history of modern U.S. capitalism, 
unregulated labor market intermediaries of all kinds have been prime 
purveyors of workplace abuse and exploitation.9 On point is a recent 
article in the New York Times, titled “Middlemen in the Low-Wage 
Economy,” which reports on the inherently exploitive triangular rela-
tionship involving private labor contractors, low-wage workers, and the 
economic conglomerates that actually employ contingent labor (Green-
house 2003). This is but one of an ever-increasing number of stories 
about contingent workers brought to public attention in recent years 
by labor activists, scholars, and journalists, that makes it clear that the 
pervasive use of unregulated commercial LMIs continues to result in 
widespread abuse of a vulnerable strata of workers. Notably, at this 
historical juncture, unregulated LMIs, i.e., commercial temp and staff-
ing agencies, dominate the contingent labor market, while their highly 
regulated counterpart, the union hiring hall, is relegated to a relatively 
marginal role as a provider of labor.
The assertion that union hiring halls and commercial staffing firms 
perform common socioeconomic functions is not intended to gloss over 
their significant differences. Workers organized and dispensed by temp 
agencies experience substandard wages, nonexistent benefits, high lev-
els of alienation, and long-term economic insecurity, while workers 
organized and represented by union hiring halls are not subject to any-
thing like the same level of exploitation and uncertainty (Polivka, Co-
hany, and Hipple 2000). Indeed, rarely, if at all, are workers employed 
through union hiring halls considered “contingent” workers since they 
have acquired a level of income, job stability, and benefits that are char-
acteristic of workers in the mainstream economy. A second related but 
largely unexplored distinction separates union hiring halls and staffing 
agencies: the diametrically opposite paths that government regulation 
of these two different types of labor market intermediaries has taken. 
Today, union hiring halls are highly regulated under federal labor law, 
while staffing agencies are largely unregulated and unchecked at both 
the state and federal levels. Given their near-equivalent economic func-
tions, it is worth exploring what accounts for such disparate levels of 
government regulation.
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The Rise of a Regulatory Regime for Private Employment Agencies
From the late nineteenth century until World War II, a constant 
stream of public criticism targeted the widespread abuses fostered by 
the private employment agency business. Voluminous government re-
ports catalogued the standard industry abuses: excessive fees charged to 
workers, collusion with employers, and various forms of extortion and 
misrepresentation (see, e.g., U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 
1916). Fee-charging practices in particular became a widely recognized 
“social evil” in early twentieth century labor markets.10 Private agents 
earned the label of “employment sharks” by charging exorbitant fees 
and sending workers to nonexistent jobs. Agencies and employers col-
luded to bilk workers by intentionally promoting high turnover, hiring 
and quickly dismissing workers referred by the agency to maximize the 
number of fees collected (Gonos 2001). One of the earliest labor strug-
gles and legal battles addressing these employment agency practices 
occurred in Spokane, Washington, in 1909, led by militant workers af-
filiated with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Their orga-
nizing, soap box speechmaking, and massive civil disobedience (over 
400 arrests) inspired a successful boycott of the exploitive agencies by 
migratory workers and culminated in a statewide ballot referendum in 
which voters banned private fee-charging agencies (Foner 1965, pp. 
177–185). The battle only ended when a U.S. Supreme Court decision, 
Adams v. Tanner,11 employing the now-discredited constitutional doc-
trine of liberty of contract, held that the Fourteenth Amendment pre-
vented the Washington legislature from banning private fee-charging 
agencies. Over the course of struggles like the one in Spokane, workers 
came to favor the establishment of free public or union-operated em-
ployment offices as an alternative to mistreatment at the hand of the 
agency sharks.
Along with workers’ protests, government investigations of private 
agencies laid the basis for extensive state and municipal regulation. As 
early as 1914, 25 states had detailed employment agency laws on the 
books, and 19 had established free labor exchanges as an alternative 
to for-profit offices. State regulation typically required licensing and 
bonding of agency operators. The laws also placed ceilings on fees or 
required that fee schedules be posted or filed with the state. Agencies 
were required to keep records, open to inspection, of all placements 
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made and fees charged, and receipts had to be provided to workers. Many 
state laws made extra charges for additional “services” illegal, and also 
mandated refunds of fees when jobs were not obtained or turned out to 
be of short duration. Most states outlawed collusive fee-splitting, where 
agencies and employers shared in the fees charged to workers. Statutory 
provisions also prohibited misleading ads and required that workers be 
informed of labor disputes so as to allow them to avoid functioning as 
scabs. The laws had teeth that provided remedies for victims and crimi-
nal penalties for agents that violated the law (Moses 1971). Still, public 
outrage regularly flared up over continued gross abuses, leading to calls 
for even stricter regulation (e.g., Andrews 1929).
It was only in the “New Deal period” that public enmity toward 
private employment agencies was quieted. During this period, employ-
ers strengthened internal labor markets as a means of recruiting and 
retaining workers, aided in large measure by the growth of industrial 
unionism, which secured job stability. In external labor markets, the 
free public Employment Service was firmly institutionalized, comple-
menting the relatively strict regime of state regulation that was in place 
for private employment agencies—the precursors of the modern tempo-
rary help firm. Through the mid-1960s, state departments of labor vig-
orously pursued enforcement of employment agency laws for both per-
manent and temporary placements, and the U.S. Department of Labor 
provided strong federal support (U.S. Department of Labor 1962). As 
a result, the private employment agency became, relatively speaking, a 
marginalized actor in the labor marketplace, and its abusive practices 
became much less prevalent.
Federal Regulation of Union Hiring Halls
Union hiring halls came into existence as a means of ending the 
irregularity of work in temporary and seasonal labor markets, and to 
ameliorate employer discrimination and other abuses associated with 
the hiring process. A notable example is the celebrated West Coast long-
shoreman’s strike in 1934, which aimed to establish an independent 
union hiring hall as a response to years of abuse at the hands of a com-
pany-dominated shape-up (Yellen 1974, pp. 327–334). Widely recog-
nized as one of the labor battles that paved the way for the successes of 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the campaign was car-
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ried out by “casual” employees who sought unionism and a hiring hall 
as a means of ending the exploitation associated with their contingent 
employment status. But in the years following World War II, there was 
growing recognition that union hiring halls can also subject workers to 
unfair treatment, and their practices came under harsh criticism from 
antiunion forces. As a result of two rounds of revision to the NLRA, 
union hiring halls are now subject to an extensive set of federal regula-
tions that, however pertinent they may be, do not apply to commercial 
staffing agencies.
First, the Taft-Hartley amendments spelled an end to the closed 
shop, which was well established in many industries where hiring 
halls predominated; no longer could employees be compelled to join a 
union as a condition of seeking employment. Second, the addition of a 
new class of union unfair labor practices in Section 8(b) of the LMRA 
provided administrative and judicial remedies to workers for a host of 
unfair practices that might be committed by a union-run hiring hall. 
Hence, a union hiring hall cannot force an employer to discriminate 
against applicants or employees so as to encourage or discourage union 
membership,12 nor make access to skills programs dependent on union 
membership, or on a requirement that referral be from a union mem-
ber.13 Access to referral list information and out-of-work lists that serve 
as the basis for job referrals must be made available to all persons using 
the hiring hall.14 Failure to abide by lists that determine the order in 
which applicants are to be referred is illegal. Further, separate and apart 
from being subject to unfair labor practice claims, union hiring halls are 
also subject to suit in federal court by any user when a departure from 
established hiring hall procedures results in a denial of employment.15 
Finally, union hiring halls cannot charge fees not reasonably related to 
the cost of providing their services.
Another provision of federal labor law germane to our analysis is 
the outright ban of negotiated prehire agreements outside the construc-
tion industry. Prehire agreements that permit a union to negotiate a con-
tract without achieving majority status are considered highly suspect 
because they impose terms of employment on unrepresented workers. 
The fact that such agreements are routine business transactions in the 
commercial staffing industry reveals the glaring contrast in the scope of 
regulation between union hiring halls and for-profit LMIs. Significant-
ly, it was only after extensive debate that the Landrum-Griffin amend-
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ments to the LMRA allowed even the limited use of prehire agreements, 
and then only in accordance with specific objective guidelines (Hardin 
1998, pp. 1517–1523).16
In sum, under federal labor law, union hiring halls have become 
highly regulated LMIs. Consequently, they function transparently, their 
operations easily subject to open scrutiny by users to ensure fair, neu-
tral practices. Many of the regulations governing union hiring halls are 
analogous to state regulations, which used to govern employment agen-
cies. Yet, none of these federal regulations apply to commercial temp 
or staffing agencies. Unlike union hiring halls, the story of commercial 
staffing agencies since the post–World War II period is one of almost 
complete deregulation, as discussed next.
The Fall of Regulation Governing the Commercial 
Staffing	Industry
The last 25 years of the twentieth century saw the steady decline of 
the New Deal model of employment—based on long-term attachment 
to a single employer—and heralded the return of high velocity labor 
markets reminiscent of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
With this came a resurgence of for-profit LMIs in the U.S. economy, 
signaled by the now legendary expansion of the temporary help indus-
try that began in the 1970s. Ironically, the temporary help industry, a 
branch of the old employment agency business, was founded immedi-
ately after the close of World War II, the same time that the Taft-Hartley 
amendments weakened the position of organized labor. Nonetheless, 
consistent with the proregulatory mindset of the postwar period, tem-
porary help offices were classified as employment agencies well into 
the 1960s, and state lawmakers and regulatory agencies continued to 
regulate them under laws that, as noted earlier, were enacted early in 
the twentieth century.
Over the next several decades, however, the industry fought for and 
won exemption from these laws and fashioned an existence in what an 
earlier government study had called the “no man’s land” between state 
and federal labor regulation (U.S. Department of Labor 1943, p. 16). 
Astonishingly, the deregulation of this entire industry was achieved not 
through the searching process of judicial review, but rather by politi-
cal means. Beginning in the 1950s, the young temporary help industry 
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(later renamed the “staffing industry”) organized a low-profile, fierce, 
protracted, and ultimately successful assault on the states’ regulatory 
regimes. Largely unopposed, and without any public hearings or de-
bate, the industry managed between 1961 and 1971 to induce business-
oriented state legislatures across the country to enact relatively simple 
but far reaching statutory modifications of existing employment agency 
laws (Gonos 1997).
Through its lawmaking efforts, the industry achieved two related, 
crucial objectives. First, it evaded the classification of temporary help 
firms as “employment agencies,” thus exempting them from state regu-
lation and oversight; and second, it redefined temp firms as statutory 
“employers,” a status that was institutionalized in practice throughout 
the country in subsequent years.17
Winning employer status for temp agencies was literally the key to 
success for the emerging temp industry. Temp agencies’ newly minted 
employer status effectively shielded user firms from most legal obli-
gations toward agency workers, and ultimately, this became the temp 
industry’s unspoken raison d’etre. Importantly, this legal change facili-
tated a split workforce strategy whereby workers “employed” by the 
staffing agency were now understood as comprising a separate and dis-
tinct unit, despite the similarity in work performed by “regular” and 
“temporary” employees. Even before this so-called “core and periph-
ery” staffing strategy was sanctioned by the NLRB,18 the employer sta-
tus of temp firms made it almost impossible for temps to organize or 
join existing bargaining units at their place of work over the last three 
decades of the twentieth century. The importance of this fact was noted 
in the final report of the Dunlop Commission.19
The other aspect of the staffing industry’s political victory—avoid-
ing the classification of temp firms as employment agencies—was 
also crucial. The detailed provisions of state employment agency law, 
many parallel to those governing union hiring halls under federal law, 
were made irrelevant by the temp industry’s aggressive lobbying ef-
fort to avoid state regulation. Temp firms were no longer required to 
keep records of placements made, wages paid, and fees charged open 
to inspection, as they previously had been in 37 states. Nor were they 
subject to different forms of fee regulation, as they had been in 30 states 
where statutory provisions reflected decades of public opposition to 
widespread abuses and exploitive fee charges. In short, deregulation 
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eliminated the transparency and public scrutiny that state regulation of 
staffing agencies was intended to achieve, replacing this with secrecy in 
regard to placement practices, fees, and the wages and other terms ne-
gotiated with client companies. Thus, the temp agency—an institution 
never considered by law or popular wisdom to have fulfilled the social 
function of employer—achieved employer status politically and es-
caped the purview of state employment agency regulation under which 
its predecessors had operated for most of the twentieth century. 
Yet, ironically, due to the very fact that staffing agencies were not 
considered employers for most of the last century, they have also large-
ly passed below the radar of federal labor regulation, which has as its 
primary concern the relationship between employers, employees, and 
labor organizations. As federal labor law was being developed, employ-
ment agencies, including those handling temporary labor, were tacitly 
understood as labor market neutrals engaged in simply “matching” em-
ployees with employers. As such, they were ignored in the NLRA, and 
their regulation—or lack thereof—was left to the states. At the same 
time that industry efforts to deregulate temp firms were beginning to 
make headway, government regulation of labor unions and union hiring 
halls was being increased. With passage of the Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments in 1959, labor unions became subject to a range of reporting and 
disclosure requirements, as well as to claims for violation of an indi-
vidual member’s rights, so as to protect workers from abuses by unions 
and hiring halls run by them. 
But while the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments pur-
portedly established statutory parity between employers and labor orga-
nizations—subjecting both to claims of unfair labor practices—private 
employment agencies and their progeny, temporary help and staffing 
firms, were given no clear classification in this statutory scheme. To 
this day, their status remains largely unaddressed by federal labor law, 
despite the fact that they have formally abandoned a neutral posture.20 
Consequently, the staffing industry is free of any particular federal or 
state oversight of its operation as a labor market intermediary. As a re-
sult, widespread agency abuses of the same kinds as those encountered 
by workers early in the twentieth century have returned as a daily fea-
ture of the employment scene. 
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RECONCEPTUALIzING THE LEGAL STATUS OF TEMP 
AND STAFFING FIRMS
The presumptive employer status that staffing firms have come to 
hold in practice lacks a solid socioeconomic or legal foundation and has 
become subject to a critical reassessment. Indeed, what the NLRB con-
siders the most important factor in deciding employer status, the degree 
of control exercised over the work of employees, is usually nonexistent 
in the relationship between the staffing agency and temp worker.21 The 
legal treatment of staffing firms as “employers” rests almost entirely 
on the fact that they perform a series of ministerial acts—issuing pay-
checks, collecting withholding tax, and carrying workers’ compensa-
tion insurance.22 Hence, their employer status is increasingly seen as 
tenuous and flawed.23
Of many recent legal decisions that have effectively eroded the legal 
status of staffing firms as employers, we highlight three. Consider first 
Vizcaino v. Microsoft,24 which involved long-term “contractors” who 
worked under the direct supervision of Microsoft managers on soft-
ware products integral to the company’s core business. Because they 
were payrolled through outside staffing agencies, Microsoft officially 
treated them as “temporary” nonemployees and denied them company 
benefits and other rights and privileges enjoyed by similarly situated 
traditional employees. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
agency temps were employees of Microsoft—not the staffing firms—
and therefore entitled to participate in the company’s stock purchase 
plan. Ultimately, this case cast a bright light on the staffing industry’s 
practices and called into question temp agencies’ status as the “real em-
ployers” of temp workers.25
In the second case, Sturgis,26 the NLRB addressed the question of 
who is the employer of temp agency employees for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining. The conditions were typical of the standard staff-
ing arrangement: temps supplied by the staffing agencies performed the 
same work as unionized employees, under common work and safety 
rules, and were subject to the same user firm supervision. The board 
found “no evidence of any assignment or direction by the onsite [agen-
cy] representative.” Differences in employment conditions were lim-
ited to wage rates, availability of overtime and, presumably, the rules 
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for hiring and promotions. In its landmark decision, the NLRB held 
that the consent of both the user and supplier firms is not required in 
order to permit the temporary employees bargaining unit status at the 
user employer’s place of business.27 Pointing out that “all of the work 
is being performed for the user employer” and that “all the employ-
ees in fact share the same employer, i.e., the user employer,” the board 
concluded that staffing agencies are not “independent employers.” In 
circumstances such as this, i.e., when the locus of control rests entirely 
with the user employer, the board recognized that the supplier’s consent 
to include the temp workers in the unit is irrelevant. Instead, the tradi-
tional community of interest test should determine the composition of 
the appropriate bargaining unit.
In a subsequent case, Tree of Life, the board extended this reasoning 
by ruling that a unionized user firm was obligated to include agency 
temps in its bargaining unit and had a duty to bargain over those aspects 
of the temps’ working conditions that it controlled.28 In a modification 
of the administrative law judge’s ruling, the board backed away from 
what would have been a truly significant ruling: ordering that union 
wage rates be applied to the temps. This severely blunted the poten-
tially explosive nature of the ruling. Notably, however, in a concurring 
opinion, board member Wilma B. Leibman stated that she would have 
upheld the ALJ’s ruling applying all the terms and conditions of the 
collective bargaining agreement—including those affecting wages—to 
the temporary workers, “just as if the [user employer] had hired them 
without using an intermediary.” Although Tree of Life suggests an un-
willingness to provide a remedy for the core disparities in pay and bene-
fits experienced by temp workers, the decision nonetheless signaled the 
board’s continuing recognition of the organizational reality that staffing 
firms control virtually none of the terms and conditions of the workers 
they supply to client firms.29
Another rationale also calls into question the staffing firm’s status 
as employers. Harper (1998) argues that the test for determining who 
is an employer for purposes of collective bargaining should not hinge 
solely on supervisory control, but rather on whether a given entity is 
a “primary direct capital provider,” i.e., whether a business supplies a 
substantial proportion of the capital made productive by the employ-
ees. This formula would also exclude staffing firms from the category 
of employers, even in circumstances where a staffing agency takes on 
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a certain degree of supervisory authority over temp workers at a user 
firm’s place of business. This analysis highlights an obvious structural 
characteristic of temp and staffing agencies: these entities perform few, 
if any, of the traditional economic functions associated with bona fide 
employers that utilize labor to make their capital productive.
TOWARDS A LEGAL RECLASSIFICATION OF 
COMMERCIAL LMIs
The previous analysis calls into question the classification of temp 
and staffing firms as mere employers, and it underscores the need for a 
definition that more accurately describes their sociolegal character. In 
this regard, an important lesson can be applied from the legal treatment 
of union hiring halls. Federal labor law has long characterized union 
hiring halls as having a dual status, as nominal employers and, more 
importantly, as labor organizations, i.e., a type of LMI. As one federal 
court of appeals explained, “When a union operates a hiring hall and 
assumes a dual role of employer and representative, its obligation to 
deal fairly extends to all users of the hiring hall” (emphasis added).30 
Because temp and staffing firms perform functions equivalent to union 
hiring halls, it makes sense to craft a legal definition that assigns to 
them an analogous dual status—as nominal employers but primarily as 
LMIs. By the same logic, the law should impose on commercial staffing 
agencies the obligation of fair dealing with workers that is imposed on 
a labor union that administers a hiring hall.
Subjecting temp agencies to a set of legal obligations similar to 
those imposed on its prolabor counterpart would achieve the goal of 
restoring parity to the legal treatment of these two predominant kinds 
of LMIs. Certainly the commercial nature of temp and staffing firms 
does not change the economic realities surrounding the employment 
relationships they foster, nor does it justify a privileged legal classifica-
tion exempting them from government oversight. In fact, since labor 
unions and nonprofit organizations historically generated less suspicion 
of wrongdoing, it was these organizations that were usually exempted 
from coverage by early state employment agency laws.
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The Temp Agency as an Exploitative Labor Market Intermediary
Research has revealed an array of common abuses perpetrated by 
contemporary temp and staffing firms. Case studies by journalists, ac-
ademics, unions, and community organizations now span several de-
cades, recording a host of temp industry abuses too numerous to list 
completely in this chapter (Henson 1996; e.g., Rogers 2000). What fol-
lows is a summary of the well-documented abuses of temp workers by 
this industry.
Favoritism and the use of arbitrary criteria in making assignments 
are common complaints among temps. Moreover, pay rates can vary 
widely for the same jobs and even within the same workplace. Since no 
receipt or written agreement is provided, temps are left with no recourse 
when, through “bait and switch” tactics, they are paid at a lower rate 
than promised. And fees—measured as the temp agency’s markup over 
wages paid—are exorbitant, far beyond the levels that state regulations 
had historically permitted. This has not prevented temp agencies from 
also charging workers for safety equipment, transportation, or check 
cashing.
Misleading advertisements of “temp-to-perm” arrangements are 
widely used as a marketing technique to present temp employment as a 
stepping stone to a “real” job. But these empty promises specify no time 
period or performance criteria by which a worker will be converted to 
“permanent” worker status. Consequently, workers can be indefinitely 
strung along in “temporary” work arrangements without benefits or job 
security. Moreover, because temps are not employees of the user firm, 
they often do not benefit from handbooks or established work rules that 
provide even the bare minimum of fair treatment. As a result, temps 
are used to intensify the pace of work and perform the least desirable 
tasks. Agencies routinely require temps at all levels to sign legally dubi-
ous noncompete agreements containing restrictive covenants that put a 
“price on their head” if they accept a permanent position with the user 
employer. Long a constant complaint among temps, these agreements 
are the basis of the oft-heard charge that agency work is a modern form 
of indentured servitude. Staffing agencies deliberately obstruct work-
ers from access to unemployment insurance or workers compensation, 
and judicial decisions provide examples of how staffing agencies shield 
their client firms from claims of race or gender discrimination.
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Not surprisingly, today’s complaints are not qualitatively different 
from those expressed by agency workers a century ago, before state 
regulation of private agencies addressed the most exploitive condi-
tions of temporary employment. Simply put, they are standard to the 
unregulated operation of for-profit LMIs and more than justify a call for 
strict regulation. To date, however, community-based organizations and 
some progressive legislators have been able to enact only a piecemeal 
bundle of state laws that, for example, prohibit certain specific exploi-
tive practices, such as charges for transportation and check cashing. 




A strong case can be made for imposing a comprehensive duty of 
fair representation on temp and staffing firms, analogous to that which 
federal law now imposes on labor unions. Commercial staffing agen-
cies make their profit by negotiating an agreement with user firms to 
deploy workers in productive jobs at the user firm’s business for an 
amount greater than the wages paid the temp workers. Indeed, the temp 
agency in most respects acts as if it were representing the workers’ best 
interests in bargaining with the user firm. However, as we have pointed 
out, temp workers deployed under this arrangement are extremely vul-
nerable and subject to exploitation. Moreover, the negotiating activi-
ties of staffing agencies impede workers’ ability to engage in concerted 
activity to effectuate meaningful bargaining over the terms and con-
ditions of their employment. The nature of the triangular relationship 
itself—involving a user employer, a staffing agency, and a temporary 
employee—results in a level of abuse that in the past has justified the 
adoption of a regulatory regime that imposed on private agencies an 
obligation of fair treatment, akin to a fiduciary duty, in order to protect 
workers. Because staffing agencies, like labor unions, are both gate-
keepers to employment opportunities and representatives involved in 
setting the terms and conditions of work, imposing a legal obligation 
akin to a duty of fair representation is appropriate and necessary.
Consider the usual scenario: staffing agency personnel meet or com-
municate with representatives of the user firm to discuss costs and ex-
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change proposals concerning the agency’s billing rates and the pay rates 
of various classes of workers the agency is to send (and in some cases 
other conditions of employment, e.g., procedures for handling griev-
ances and dismissals). Hidden from workers, billing rates and wages 
are settled in private negotiations so as to allow for “cost savings” to 
the user firm and a reasonable operating margin for the agency.31 In this 
process, user firms treat an agency’s staff, for all intents and purposes, 
as the temp employees’ representatives, explicitly recognizing their au-
thority to come to agreement on wage rates, to sign contracts, and to 
take wage offers back to workers. The parties conclude what amounts to 
a prehire collective bargaining agreement, banned for unions in all but 
the construction industry because it is seen as violating workers’ right 
to choose their own representatives.
The staffing agency acts as if it were representing the workers’ in-
terests, opportunistically advertising that it provides workers with good 
wages and benefits at the user firm’s business. Staffing industry execu-
tives are careful to avoid language denoting worker representation, but 
local agency managers are less guarded. “We are the unions now,” one 
says. Or, as an industry enthusiast from the Cato Institute states, “The 
supposedly unique services of unions—bargaining on behalf of workers 
for higher wages, improving worker skills, providing access to desired 
benefits or flexibility—are being duplicated by staffing companies that 
deliver those services to individual workers more efficiently and more 
broadly” (Lips 1998, p. 31). These candid comments from those “on 
the ground” more accurately reflect social reality than staffing industry 
propaganda.
Mimicking labor unions, staffing agencies go to great lengths to 
become what amounts to the exclusive agents of workers, monopolizing 
access to certain job markets. On their application, workers are required 
to sign an agreement not to discuss wages or conditions of employment 
directly with representatives of the user firm.32 Likewise, user firms are 
expressly instructed in agency contracts not to discuss wages or any 
personnel matters directly with temp workers, to deal only through the 
staffing agency.33
Staffing agencies’ monopolistic lock on access to jobs restricts work-
ers’ mobility. Temp workers often have little or no ability to choose an 
agency to represent them, or to deal directly with employers. For exam-
ple, in “payrolling” arrangements, workers recruited directly by large 
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corporate employers are required to affiliate with a specific agency as a 
condition of being hired and must sign a noncompete agreement, even 
if they found the assignment on their own (Neuwirth 2002; van Jaars-
veld 2000, p. 130). Workers who apply directly are referred to this “pre-
ferred vendor” (Smith 1998, p. 422; Strong 2001, pp. 667–668).34 Job 
seekers in smaller communities face a similar situation, often finding 
that employment opportunities listed in the classified ads of the local 
daily newspaper are available only through particular temporary help 
agencies (McAllister 1998, p. 223).
In effect, staffing agencies having exclusive contracts with em-
ployers resemble closed-shop hiring halls, illegal for unions under the 
LMRA. Even in situations where hiring halls are lawful, the LMRA 
precludes such exclusive hiring arrangements absent certain assur-
ances that workers are hired by objective criteria (including training, 
seniority, etc.) to eliminate arbitrary and unfair practices.35 And in all 
circumstances where exclusive bargaining and representation is lawful 
for unions, the law imposes on them a duty of fair representation. There 
is good reason to treat temp and staffing agencies in the same manner. 
The words of “temps” at Microsoft speak volumes on this point:
[I]f we are truly independent, then let us choose our own agen-
cy. S&T [the agency] offers its workers poor customer service 
. . . Yet, because it is a ‘preferred vendor’ in my job category I 
could not escape their clutches when I found a new assign-
ment . . . because of their preferred status, they have no incen-
tive to improve their service. They’ll get workers no matter how 
messed up they are. When I tried to change agencies between 
assignments, an MS contingent staffing person told me twice, 
‘Microsoft reserves the right to choose your payroll agency.’ 
 I know of another agency that will compensate me more ($, 
paid health and dental) without carrying over the cost to Microsoft. 
Volt [the agency] has done nothing to re-negotiate compensation 
even though original job spec has changed . . . Volt has never con-
tacted me to ask if I’m satisfied . . . (van Jaarsveld 2000, p. 129)
Workers’ rights of self-organization and freedom to choose their 
own representatives are obviously impaired in these situations.36 They 
are not solicited for input in setting targets and have no voice in the 
negotiations. It is a common complaint among temps that when con-
tracts are renegotiated, agencies do not always request a wage increase. 
Clearly, the staffing or temp agency’s substantive bargaining relation-
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ship with the user employer is one of collusion with that employer to 
minimize workers’ wages and benefits and to maximize profits. As the 
following comments of another agency worker indicate, there is often 
a feeling of betrayal, or in legal terms what can be characterized as a 
breach of fiduciary duty, in the way temp agencies treat the workers 
they deploy:
During the negotiations for pay rate, I felt that [the agency] repre-
sented Microsoft’s best interest and not my own. I had agreed to 
a rate with the MS manager and [the agency] still tried to get me 
to accept a lower rate of pay . . . The discussions I had with [the 
agency] were limited. 
 I think it’s unfortunate that all temps are beholden to their agen-
cies, which are beholden to Microsoft . . . [M]y temp agency (and 
all the others, because they’re all in the same boat) will fight only 
so hard for me, because if they do something to tick Microsoft off, 
Microsoft can decide not to use them any more. (van Jaarsveld 
2000, p. 115–116)
Thus, the private staffing arrangement effectively precludes temp 
workers from engaging in bargaining themselves or involving labor 
unions to represent them in negotiating the terms and conditions of em-
ployment under which they work. Yet, in most everyday situations agen-
cies do not stand up for the workers they deploy. Rather, as one study 
says, major staffing firms help maintain “workplace and labor-market 
discipline . . . driving down and holding down the costs/wages of cheap 
labor” (Peck and Theodore 2001, p. 494; see also Forde 2001). 
This is also evident in the temp agency’s handling of grievances. 
In Kelly Services’ contract with a major client, for instance, we find 
that “Kelly hears and acts upon complaints from its employees about 
working conditions, etc.” Again emphasizing their exclusive represen-
tational capacity, Kelly and other firms instruct their clients never to 
discuss grievances directly with temp employees. “[H]ave Kelly in-
teract with temp employees where personnel matters arise,” the client 
agreement states.37 But workers speak about staffing agencies’ lack of 
vigor in representing their interests on these matters: “ . . . I noticed that 
most agencies, even when they knew I was being taken advantage of, 
they wouldn’t go to bat for you . . . They very often wimped out. They 
wanted to keep the accounts or whatever: ‘Just accommodate them.’ 
What does that mean, ‘accommodate them’?” (Rogers 2000, p. 105) 
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Temp workers’ grievances are typically not conveyed to the em-
ployer, but rather bottled up in the agency. In shielding the employer 
from temp employees’ actual complaints and demands, commercial 
agencies shirk the duty to fairly represent workers that their own claims 
have implied they would fulfill.
Absent the legal imposition of a duty to fairly represent temp work-
ers, it is hard to imagine how temp workers will achieve fair treatment 
by the temp industry. Moreover, the imposition of such a duty in this 
industry does no more than bring a fair measure of parity to the legal 
treatment of all labor market intermediaries, whether they are private, 
for-profit companies or bona fide labor organizations.
CONCLUSION: CORRECTING THE IMBALANCE
Forbath (1991) has forcefully argued that the descriptive language 
of the law can shape the political consciousness of those engaged in 
labor struggles, possibly enhancing the fight for workers’ rights. In this 
spirit, this chapter aims to provide labor activists and scholars with le-
gal concepts and language that better capture the actual role of the temp 
or staffing agency, so that meaningful and realistic regulation can be 
part of the program of current and future labor struggles.
The temporary help industry is certainly deserving of the atten-
tion it has received from critics of contingent work relations. Yet, with 
certain exceptions, its actual history and sociological functions have 
been sorely neglected. This is unfortunate since the issue of temporary 
and contingent work has had an important, and at times central, place 
in U.S. labor struggles since industrialization. The ever-present real-
ity of temporary work in twenty-first century labor markets makes it 
important to incorporate into our labor history and legal lexicon the 
forgotten story of how profit-driven private agencies were character-
ized by workers and regulated by proworker legislation. Awareness of 
these past labor struggles can assist in forming a new vision of how to 
craft laws and build organization to halt the spread of the contemporary 
staffing industry’s nonunion empire. This chapter employs this history 
in conjunction with established principles of workplace law to construct 
an understanding of commercial staffing agencies and to bring the legal 
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analysis of these entities into line with their actual labor market role. 
Our analysis points to the need for a legal reclassification of these for-
profit LMIs in order to create meaningful standards of regulation. 
In recent years, unions and community-based organizations have 
undertaken reform efforts to regulate some of the most egregious temp 
agency practices on a state by state basis. This, of course, is in no way 
objectionable and may indeed represent the beginnings of a more com-
prehensive reform movement. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
piecemeal legislative initiatives enacted in any state cannot effectively 
regulate the multinational staffing business. Indeed, the same conclusion 
was reached early in the twentieth century by the progressive reform-
ers who crafted state-level regulatory regimes for private employment 
agencies that were far more extensive than anything being proposed 
today. Ultimately, the reformers proposed federal regulation, which 
nearly materialized in 1941 with the introduction of “A Bill to Regulate 
Private Employment Agencies Engaged in Interstate Commerce” (U.S. 
Congress 1941). Essentially, this legislation would have required pri-
vate agencies to be licensed under the U.S. Department of Labor and to 
comply with a list of detailed provisions modeled on the most stringent 
state employment agency laws at the time. 
If not for the entrance of the United States into World War II and the 
concomitant changes in employment brought on by the war, we might 
have federal regulation of the staffing industry today. It took another 30 
years before Senator Walter Mondale and Congressman Abner Mikva 
introduced similar bills to have the U.S. Department of Labor regu-
late the temporary help industry.38 Unfortunately, these bills were intro-
duced long before organized labor recognized the temp industry as an 
expansive and exploitative purveyor of low wage work. Recent atten-
tion to the vulnerability of day laborers has resulted in a new legislative 
initiative, the Day Labor Fairness and Protection Act. The bill’s provi-
sions include a series of measures that specifically target temp agencies 
which deploy day laborers involved in construction and manufacturing. 
These include mandating wage parity with full-time permanent workers 
at a worksite, prohibitions on any restrictions on a day laborer’s right to 
accept permanent work at the employer’s workplace, health and safety 
provisions, and the registration of day labor agencies.39
This bill is in line with reform proposals that stem from our analysis 
and are aimed at incorporating the regulation of for-profit LMIs into 
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federal labor law, an approach that is far more appropriate and parsi-
monious than prior reform measures. For one, the solution we suggest 
eliminates the legal double standard that bifurcates the regulation of 
LMIs—extensive federal oversight and regulation of union-run hiring 
halls on the one hand, and a laissez-faire system for the profit-driven 
temp industry on the other. Moreover, this approach replaces the long 
list of detailed and difficult-to-administer provisions contained in the 
early state employment agency laws with an overarching and well-es-
tablished legal principle—a fiduciary-like duty of the temp or staffing 
agency to fairly represent the workers it deploys in the labor market. 
Specifically, this proposed legal reform involves two changes to federal 
labor law: first, adding a definition of for-profit LMIs to Section 2 of the 
LMRA to identify them as legal entities distinct from employers, and 
second, incorporating into the law—possibly through a revision to the 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act—a legal duty which 
requires for-profit LMIs to fully inform and fairly represent the workers 
they deploy. Fulfilling this duty might require temp agencies to, for ex-
ample, provide workers with written receipts specifying pay rates and 
other terms of employment, make known the difference between the 
wages paid a temp worker and the amount the agency is receiving from 
the user firm, and require the use of objective standards to determine 
which workers are referred to preferred jobs. 
In sum, by crafting a statutory provision defining for-profit LMIs 
and developing a concomitant set of legal obligations owed temp work-
ers, federal law would impose an enforceable level of transparency on 
temp agencies comparable to that which it requires of hiring halls and 
unions. Such a change would make it an unfair labor practice for a temp 
agency to breach its legal obligation to fairly represent the workers it 
sends to user firms.
Second, labor advocates should push to level the playing field so 
that union-run LMIs can compete in the labor market with for-profit 
agencies. Currently, commercial staffing agencies regularly enter into 
contracts with user firms that function as prehire agreements, and very 
often they enforce what are in effect exclusive “closed shop” hiring 
arrangements. The statutory text of the LMRA as currently interpreted 
turns a blind eye to these staffing industry practices, thus privileging 
for-profit LMIs over traditional union hiring halls, since the latter are 
legally precluded from using prehire agreements outside the construc-
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tion industry, and are prohibited in all cases from instituting a closed 
shop. To remedy this imbalance, Section 8(f) of the LMRA should be 
reformed to allow prehire agreements for all private sector unions in 
order to create a modicum of parity with the manner in which the com-
mercial staffing industry routinely negotiates its hiring agreements with 
employers. The logic behind this proposal becomes clearly apparent 
when it is recalled that the construction industry was allowed an exemp-
tion from the prohibition against prehire agreements in recognition of 
the short-term and transient nature of employment in that industry. To-
day, it is widely recognized that such casual labor markets are a reality 
throughout the economy, which is the very reason for the commercial 
success of the temp and staffing industry.
Most labor activists recognize that, given current political realities, 
U.S. labor law is, for the time being, relatively impermeable to revision 
in labor’s favor. The courts have been averse to providing an expansive 
judicial interpretation of federal workplace law, and labor’s needs have 
fared no better in Congress. But the mood and views of legislators and 
judges can change quickly, as demonstrated by the rapid adoption of 
legal reforms following the labor movement’s popular upsurge in the 
early 1930s. Indeed, labor and its allies are now organizing for and an-
ticipating the next working class upsurge or social movement as a means 
of shifting the balance of class forces in America (Clawson 2003). It is 
during these upsurges that fundamental legal reform becomes possible. 
We hope that this chapter provides some tools that, in the course of 
future struggles, can aid in ending the mistreatment of temp workers by 
commercial staffing agencies, and in building pro-worker alternatives.
Notes
For critical readings of earlier drafts, we thank Jamison Colburn, Ellen Dannin, Jeff 
Grabelsky, Sanford Jacoby, Tom Juravich, Debra Osnowitz, Cathy Ruckelshaus, Dani-
elle van Jaarsveld, and the editors of this volume.
 1.  The national trade association officially altered its name from “temporary help” 
to “staffing” industry in the 1990s. In this chapter we use those two terms, as well 
as “temporary help firm” and “staffing firm,” interchangeably. A version of this 
chapter appears elsewhere (see Freeman and Gonos 2005).  
 2.  331 NLRB 173 (2000).
 3.  From 1982 to 1998 the number of temporary jobs rose 577 percent, while the 
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total number of jobs in the workforce grew only 41 percent. Consequently, the 
board noted, “certain industries and communities have begun to rely heavily on 
agency temps.” From 331 NLRB 173 (2000), citing and quoting U.S. General 
Accounting Office (2000).
 4.  H.S. Care L.L.C., D/B/A Oakwood Care Center and N&W Agency, Inc. and New 
York’s Health and Human Service Union, 1199, Service Employees International 
Union, Petitioner, 343 NLRB 76 (November 19, 2004).
 5.  Since 1947, national labor policy has been guided by the principle that federal 
labor law encourages equality of bargaining power for workers by protecting 
statutorily defined employees from employer and labor union interference with 
workers rights. See Findings and Policies of the Labor Management Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1. More specifically, the parity principle is exemplified in the 
parallel provisions of Sections 8(a) and 8(b) of the LMRA, which, respectively, 
subject employers and unions to charges of unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. 
§8(a) & (b). 
 6.  Of course, as Wilborn (1997) also points out, even though both union hiring halls 
and staffing firms are in a position to institute multi-employer benefits plans, 
such plans are only routinely provided by union hiring halls.
 7.  Union hiring halls, of course, are designated as an exclusive representative and 
provider of labor pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 159(a); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Assoc. Local Union No. 6, 
493 U.S. 67, 87 (1989). But staffing firms also routinely enter into agreements 
with employers that preclude workers’ abilities to secure jobs with a certain em-
ployer except through the agency (van Jaarsveld 2000).
 8.  Lucas v, NLRB, 333 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2003).
 9.  The agricultural labor contractor is a third conspicuous type of LMI, which de-
spite attempts at regulation, remains another prime source of exploitation of low-
wage workers.
 10.  See generally Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917). 
 11.  244 U.S. 590 (1917). But see Justice Brandeis’s dissent, which would have up-
held the “Abolishing Employment Offices Measure,” and which details the ex-
ploitive practices which, in his view, justifiably permitted the state to ban exploi-
tive hiring agency practices. 
 12.  See David J. Oliveiri, “Unions Discriminatory Operation of Exclusive Hiring 
Hall as Unfair Labor Practice Under Section 8(b) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,” Section 3, 73 American Law Reports Fed. 171 (1985).
 13.  IBEW Local 99 (Crawford Electric Construction Co)., 214 NLRB 723 (1974); 
NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 549 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922.
 14.  NLRB v. Local 139, IUOE, 796 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Int’l.Assoc., 491 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1974).
 15.  Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l. Assoc. Local 6, 493 U.S. 67, 78 n. 3 
(1989). 
 16.  See 29 U.S.C. §8(f).
 17.  See, e.g., Private Employment and Information Agencies, Conn. Gen. Stat. ch. 
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564. Section 129(e) defines a temporary help service as a “business which con-
sists of employing individuals directly for the purpose of furnishing part-time or 
temporary help to others” (emphasis added). Section 130(c) states that the provi-
sions of chapter 564, the employment agency law, do not apply to any temporary 
help service.
 18.  Lee Hospital, 300 NLRB 947 (1990).
 19.  Technically, temps could always legally organize unions vis à vis their agency 
employer, but for practical reasons this proved a non-viable strategy. See All-
Work, Inc. and Warehouse and Mail Order Employees Union, Local 743 IBT, 
193 NLRB No. 137 (1971). See also Mehta and Theodore (2000–2001, 2003–
2004).
 20.  Temp firms still characterize themselves as labor market neutrals when it suits 
their purposes, e.g., in public relations where they claim to serve workers and 
client firms equally. Inappropriately, some academic studies are still prone to 
understand them as neutral “matching” institutions, despite their clear alliance 
with employers.
 21.  Grounded in the common law precept, the NLRB has stated that an employer-
employee relationship exists “where the person for whom the services are per-
formed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but also the 
means to be used in reaching such end.” Deaton Truck Line, 143 NLRB 1372 
(1963). 
 22.  While the question of withholding taxes and social security payments from 
workers is a relevant factor, it has not been considered determinative. Frederick 
O. Glass 135 NLRB 217, enforced in part 317 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1963). See also 
Hardin (1998, p. 1595).
 23.  One reaches the same conclusion applying the “hybrid test” that combines the 
right of control and economic realities tests (Rahebi 2000).
 24.  Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997).
 25.  The immediate ramifications of the decision for other companies were limited 
due to the fact that the court’s ruling was based on specific pension plan language 
that other major user firms could learn to avoid, and also because other circuits 
were unlikely to follow the 9th Circuit’s lead.
 26.  331 NLRB 173 (2000).
 27.  Prior Board decisions had established a bargaining unit rule which, in effect, 
precluded temporary workers from joining or accreting into a bargaining unit 
comprised of the user employer’s workers without the consent of both the tem-
porary agency and the user firm. Greenhoot, Inc., 205 NLRB 250 (1973); Lee 
Hospital, 300 NLRB 947 (1990).
 28.  Tree of Life, Inc. d/b/a Gourmet Award Foods, N. E., 336 NLRB 77 (2001). 
 29.  Oakwood Care Center, the board’s new, regressive ruling on the temp agency 
work relationship, reserves a good deal of indignation for what it labels the 
“anomalous” Tree of Life ruling because it extended what it calls “the strained 
logic of Sturgis” by ordering the accretion of the temp workers into the user em-
ployer’s bargaining unit and mandating that the temps be subject to terms of the 
user employer’s collective bargaining agreement with its union. See Oakwood 
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Care Center, 343 NLRB 76 (2004). Tree of Life is, of course, in the direct lineage 
of the M.B. Sturgis decision and, therefore, is implicitly overruled by Oakwood 
Care. See note 4.
 30.  See Plumbers and Pipe Fitters Local Union No. 32 v. NLRB, 50 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) citing, inter alia, Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l. Ass’n. Local 
Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 89 (1989). 
 31.  The “settlement range” within which this bargaining takes place is sometimes 
quite narrow. Some employers set their “purchase price” for specific classes of 
labor which is then marked down by the agency to arrive at the workers wage 
(van Jaarsveld 2000, p. 115). In other cases a simple “cost-plus” formula is used, 
as when staffing agencies engaged in “payrolling” add their standard mark-up to 
the hourly wage paid at the time of the agreement.
 32.  A typical “employees’ agreement” states, “I understand that all matters relating 
to wages and rates are necessarily confidential and will never discuss same with 
clients or others” (Lewis and Schuman 1988, p. 62).
 33.  “Do not discuss pay rates with Kelly employees; Kelly is their employer and 
should handle all pay rates.” From the Users Guide for Ordering & Managing 
Contract Labor—Johnson & Johnson/Kelly Services.
 34.  By 1994, Manpower reportedly controlled 330 client sites, up from just 15 in 
1992 (Feder 1995, 37).
 35.  Sec. 8(f)(4). See Rep. No. 187 on S.1555, 86th Cong., 1st Session 27–29 (1959), 
Legislative History of the Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the LMRA.
 36.  Responding to criticism, Microsoft announced in 1999 that it would open up 
competition among agencies to allow temporary software testers a choice from 
among three “approved” agencies. Washington Alliance of Technology Workers, 
“Microsoft Revises Contingent Worker Policies” (April 2, 1999).
 37.  Users Guide for Ordering & Managing Contract Labor—Johnson & Johnson/
Kelly Services, n.d , 26–27.
 38.  See H.R. 10349, “A Bill to Establish and Protect the Rights of Day Laborers” 
(1971) and H.R. 9298, “The Temporary Help Employee Protection Act” (1977). 
Although somewhat different in nature, there were also legislative efforts to ob-
tain fairness for temp workers introduced the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, by 
Congresswoman Pat Schroeder (“Part-Time and Temporary Workers Protection 
Act,” 1987) and Senator Howard Metzenbaum (“Contingent Workforce Equity 
Act,” 1994).
 39. 2003 Cong. U.S. HR 2870, introduced July 24, 2003.
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No More Business as Usual
Using Pension Activism to Protect Workers’ Rights 
Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein
Western Carolina University
Exporting jobs, reincorporating in off-shore tax havens, rewriting 
the bottom line, defrauding shareholders, polluting the environment, 
paying sky-rocketing executive compensation, and overinvesting 
401(k) assets in employer stock—it is all business as usual for U.S. 
corporations. But the international outcry that erupted after the stock 
market reached a five-year low post-Enron has caused organized labor 
to rally under the slogan “No more business as usual.” Corporate cam-
paigns aimed at law-evading corporations are becoming increasingly 
common. Shareholder proposals on corporate governance issues have 
proliferated, and activists have taken the drastic step of petitioning the 
State of California to revoke Unocal’s corporate charter. These actions, 
once seen as radical, are now being accepted by a public that has lost 
faith in the ability of corporations to restrain management greed.
This chapter will discuss the duties of pension fund trustees as uni-
versal owners, the role of trustees in ensuring corporate accountability, 
the potential of pension fund activism to encourage corporations to re-
spect workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively, and the tac-
tics being used by pension fund activists to encourage good corporate 
citizenship.
UnIVeRSAL	oWneRS
Workers have over $10 trillion invested in their pension funds: $2.2 
trillion in defined contribution plans, $4.5 trillion in defined benefit 
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plans, $2.3 trillion in individual retirement accounts, and $1.2 trillion in 
annuities (Schneyer 2003). Of this amount, $302 billion is jointly man-
aged by workers and employers through Taft-Hartley funds (Jacobius 
2003)—collectively bargained funds which, under the Taft-Hartley Act, 
must be managed by equal employer and employee representatives. The 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has reported that stock ownership 
is concentrated among two groups: individuals and institutions. As of 
1998, individuals directly own 41.1 percent of U.S. corporate stock 
(NYSE 2000, Table 16). Institutional investors hold the remaining 58.9 
percent of corporate stock through mutual funds (16.3 percent), state 
and local government retirement plans (11.4 percent), defined contribu-
tion private pension funds (8.9 percent), defined benefit private pension 
plans (5.6 percent), banks (3.8 percent), life insurance companies (3.5 
percent), other institutional investors (2.2 percent) and foreign inves-
tors (7.2 percent) (NYSE 2000, Table 16).
As the owners of nearly 26 percent of U.S. equity (PR Newswire 
Association 2000), pension funds are in a position to influence corpo-
rate and public policy. The largest pension funds, such as TIAA-CREF, 
California Public Employees Retirement System, and New York City 
Employees’ Retirement System, hold such large concentrations of com-
pany stock that they cannot sell off stock of poorly performing or irre-
sponsible corporations without suffering a loss caused by their divest-
ment.  
The solution to this catch-22—that pension fund investors are too 
large to sell off poorly performing stock without taking a loss caused by 
their own sale—is the exercise of universal ownership rights. Hawley 
and Williams (2000, p. xv) describe the universal owner as “a large 
institutional investor that holds in its portfolio a broad cross section 
of the economy, holds its shares for the long term, and on the whole 
does not trade except to maintain its index.” Most large pension funds 
are universal owners: as long-term investors, they invest in diversified 
index funds and patiently hold on to corporate stock while meeting with 
corporate executives to encourage corporate reform. 
As permanent holders of a large segment of U.S. and foreign cor-
porations, pension funds must look beyond the financial performance 
of individual stock holdings to the performance of the economy as a 
whole. When a corporation dumps the cost of doing business onto an 
unsuspecting third party (called “externalities” in economic terms), the 
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universal owner has a stake in that third party and will suffer a loss. 
For example, the profit made by a pension fund that owns shares of a 
corporation that produces tobacco will be offset by significant increases 
in health care costs and decreases in worker productivity. Likewise, a 
pension fund that invests in corporations that engage in financial ma-
nipulation will suffer financially when the entire stock market declines 
because of loss of investor confidence in the efficiency of the markets. 
The cost of the externality is simply shifted to another entity owned by 
the pension fund. Thus, it is in the financial interest of a universal owner 
to support public policy initiatives that reward corporations who pay for 
the damage caused by their actions (i.e., corporations who internalize 
costs). Hawley and Williams (2000) observe that “a universal owner 
that really wants to maximize the shareholder value of its portfolio . . . 
need[s] to develop a public policy-like position and monitor regulatory 
developments and legislation on a number of key issues [important] 
to the economy as a whole (p. 170).” Such issues include the health 
and well-being of corporate employees, the impact of corporate actions 
on the ecology and the environment, respect for diversity and human 
rights, and the economic impact on the community in which the com-
pany operates (Grayson and Hodges 2002). The emphasis will thus shift 
from maximizing short-term profits to maximizing long-term value. 
THE ROLE OF PENSION FUND FIDUCIARIES
Pension fund trustees must act solely in the interest of plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of provid-
ing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries. (29 U.S.C. § 1104 
(a)(1)(A)).1 Trustees must also act prudently, that is, “with the care, 
skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing” 
that a prudent trustee would use (29 U.S.C.§1104 (a)(1)(B)). This pru-
dence rule extends to the trustees’ duty to vote on management and 
shareholder proposals in their capacity as stockholders. The U.S. De-
partment of Labor (USDOL) has stated that trustees have a fiduciary 
duty to vote on corporate proxy issues2 and actively monitor corpo-
rate management. (USDOL 1994). According to a 1988 letter from the 
USDOL to Helmuth Fandl, chairman of the retirement board of Avon 
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Products, Inc., a trustee should vote on proxies that may affect the value 
of stock held by the plan.
Where proxy voting decisions may have an effect on the value of a 
plan’s underlying investment, plan fiduciaries should make proxy vot-
ing decisions with a view to enhancing the value of the shares of stock, 
taking into account the period over which the plan expects to hold such 
shares. 
However, the trustee may not subordinate the interest of plan partic-
ipants to unrelated goals. A trustee may engage in shareholder activism 
if the trustee concludes that the activism is likely to “enhance the value 
of the plan’s investment in the corporation, after taking into account the 
costs involved” (USDOL 1994). Shareholder activism is particularly 
appropriate where a stock portfolio such as an index fund is being held 
on a long-term basis or where the plan cannot easily dispose of the 
stock without affecting the stock’s value (USDOL 1994). 
The USDOL suggests ways that trustees can engage in shareholder 
activism: by corresponding and meeting with corporate directors, vot-
ing on proxies, sponsoring shareholder proposals, and filing shareholder 
litigation. The purpose of the activism, however, must be to enhance the 
value of corporate stock held by the pension fund. Where the costs of 
activism outweigh the potential increase in shareholder value, activism 
should not be undertaken. It may be more appropriate, therefore, for a 
large public fund to engage in shareholder activism rather than a small 
welfare fund. 
EFFECTS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT ON STOCk PRICE
Studies have shown that corporate conduct, both positive and nega-
tive, has an effect on stock price. Such conclusions seem obvious in light 
of the stock market’s clear reaction to recent events such as Merck’s de-
ception about the safety of Vioxx, Safeway’s antiunion campaign, the 
collapse of Enron, the announcement of widespread corporate account-
ing fraud, the shredding of documents by Anderson, the bankruptcy fil-
ing of WorldCom, the indictment of Adelphia’s corporate officers, and 
the criminal indictment of Tyco’s chief executive. Likewise, the recent 
$9.8 million settlement against Dow Corning and the court’s decision to 
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permit a nationwide, punitive damage class-action lawsuit against the 
tobacco industry impact stock prices as corporations are forced to pay 
for their externalities. 
On the other hand, laudable conduct also affects share price over 
the long run.3 For example, Enterprise Rent-A-Car’s reputation was 
enhanced when, after September 11, it made an exception to its round-
trip requirement and allowed stranded airline travelers to rent cars to 
return home. Alexis Hocevar, vice president and general manager of an 
Enterprise regional office, said, “We knew we had to do the right thing 
and worry about the rest later” (Reichheld 2002). As a result, Enterprise 
suffered losses from displaced and stolen cars. But it decided to live its 
philosophy to “put customers first, and employees second, and profit 
will take care of itself” (Reichheld 2002).
According to a 2001 Hill & Knowlton survey, called “Corporate 
Citizen Watch,” “79 percent of Americans take corporate citizenship 
into account when deciding whether to buy a particular company’s 
product, with 36 percent considering it an important factor” (Business 
Wire 2001). The results are surprising, given that most Americans don’t 
appear to boycott products. The survey was conducted in Spring 2001 
and consisted of 2,594 people participating in an on-line interview. The 
survey also found that 71 percent consider corporate citizenship in their 
investment decisions. However, less than 2 percent of those surveyed 
believe that U.S. companies are excellent corporate citizens, and about 
25 percent believe corporations are “above average” citizens. Harlan 
Teller, executive vice president and director of Hill & Knowlton’s 
Worldwide Corporate Practice says, “There is no question that Ameri-
cans believe companies have a responsibility to their communities. But 
our survey findings suggest that corporations need to do more than sim-
ply give away dollars. They need to act in ways that are meaningful to 
their stakeholders—consumers, investors, employees, and members of 
the local community—and that genuinely demonstrate their core corpo-
rate values” (Business Wire 2001).
According to Hill & Knowlton’s “Corporate Reputation Watch 
2002” survey of more than 600 chief executive officers, 94 percent of 
CEOs believe corporate reputation is very important (Hill & Knowlton 
2002, p. 6). The survey found that CEOs rank the top three influences 
on corporate reputation as customers, employees, and the reputation 
of the CEO (Hill & Knowlton 2002, p. 8). CEOs of corporations with 
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revenues greater than $500 million are also strongly influenced by in-
dustry analysts, financial analysts, print media, and shareholders (Hill 
& Knowlton 2002, p. 25). CEOs of companies in the energy, utilities, 
financial services, and health care fields noted that they are strongly in-
fluenced by regulators. Overall, however, the responding CEOs ranked 
customers, employees, and CEO reputation as the top three motiva-
tors.
Empirical studies show that corporations on Fortune magazine’s 
annual list of most admired corporations are shrouded in a financial 
halo (Brown and Perry 1994; Black, Carnes, and Richardson 1999). 
Edvinsson and Malone (1997) note, “Somehow, if only by hunches 
and intuitions, the market is putting a value on invisible assets [such as 
reputation]. And some of these qualitative assets seem to hover in the 
ether almost indefinitely, converting to line items on the balance sheet 
years after the market has accounted for them.” Some researchers have 
verified that a correlation exists between high returns and good reputa-
tion (Black, Carnes, and Richardson 1999). Even though the financial 
literature does not unanimously conclude that good corporate citizen-
ship results in better firm performance, shareholders have seized this 
intuitive concept and are lobbying corporations to act responsibly. 
For example, shareholder activist Robert Monks has spearheaded 
the ExxonMobil Campaign, which charges that “ExxonMobil’s attitude 
toward climate change is fraught with ‘unneccessary risks and missed 
opportunities’ that could put at risk more than $100 billion in long-term 
shareholder value in the company” (Campaign ExxonMobil 2002). 
Monks, the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies and 
Campaign ExxonMobil commissioned a report entitled, Risking Share-
holder Value? ExxonMobil and Climate Change: An Investigation of 
Unnecessary Risks and Missed Opportunities (Campaign ExxonMo-
bil 2002). The report concludes that, “While ExxonMobil continues 
to gain respect in many quarters for its financials, it has also marched 
into a potential minefield of reputational risk, future shareholder losses, 
exposure to litigation, and policy costs on the issue of climate 
change . . . We find real and increasingly serious risks to sharehold-
ers that have arisen from the way ExxonMobil has stood out from the 
crowd and let itself become the obvious chief ‘climate change villain’ ” 
(Campaign ExxonMobil 2002, p. 4). The report provides justification 
for shareholders who wish to challenge ExxonMobil to act responsibly 
Blocketal.indb   310 3/2/2006   9:00:21 AM
No More Business as Usual   311
on climate change issues so as to avoid a decline in share value because 
of reputational harm.
Human rights violations are also increasingly affecting multination-
al corporations’ reputations and shareholder value. For example, in 2002 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 11 Burmese villagers could 
sue Unocal for its complicity in forced labor, murder, rape, and torture 
at the company’s construction of a Burmese pipeline (Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp., 395 F. 3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), dismissed on reh. en banc, 403 F. 
3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005)). Paul Hoffman, the villagers’ attorney stated: 
“This decision is important not only because it allows a U.S. company 
to be held liable for abuses committed overseas, but also because it 
tells other multinational corporations that go into business with repres-
sive dictatorships that they are responsible if they assist their partners’ 
abuses” (Earthrights 2002). Co-counsel added: “This ruling puts the 
plaintiffs one step closer to having their day in court. We are confident 
that a jury reviewing the facts of this case will be horrified. We expect 
a huge verdict on their behalf” (Earthrights 2002). Such corporate con-
duct has an effect on the corporation’s reputation and its bottom line. 
Unocal settled the lawsuit three years later for an undisclosed amount, 
which is estimated to exceed $15 million.4 Katie Redford, a lawyer for 
Earthrights, announced “Companies have been able to mislead them-
selves and the public that human rights concerns would not affect their 
bottom line. That’s just not the case anymore” (Eviatar 2005).
TACTICS TO ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE  
CORPORATE CITIzENSHIP
Richard Ferlauto, Director of Pension and Benefit Investment Poli-
cy with AFSCME, has developed a continuum of pension fund activism 
(Table 14.1). We will look at the various tactics along this continuum, 
starting with the most passive and proceeding to the most aggressive 
tactics.
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Trustees who  
focus on corporate 
governance issues
Trustees who encourage 
corporate accountability Pension fund activists
No effort to comply 
with fiduciary standards 
relating to proxy voting
Votes in support of 
management proposals
Drafts and adopts own 
proxy voting guidelines
Adopts principles such 
as the CERES and 
McBride principlesa
Engages corporate 
directors in a dialog 
about corporate 
governance issues
Has not adopted proxy 
voting guidelines
Votes for management 
slate of directors
Monitors executive pay Encourages corporations 
to comply with basic 
workplace standards 
such as ILO standards
Sponsors shareholder 
proposals
Uses policy guidelines 




Considers social impact 
of board decisions













Uses litigation to remedy 
unlawful corporate 
conduct
Does not monitor proxy 
voting by professionals
Encourages pay for 
performance
Works toward legislative 
reform on corporate 
accountability and 
financial transparency
Table 14.1  Continuum of Pension Fund Activism
a The CERES Principles were created by the Coalition of Environmentally Responsible Economies, a group of investors and environmental 
activists. Corporations may endorse these principles to show their commitment to environmental protection, including emissions reduction, 
environmental restoration, environmental sustainability, and responsible waste reduction. The principles can be found at http://www.
ceres.org/coalitionandcompanies/principles.php. The McBride Principles are a code of corporate conduct designed to prevent religious 
discrimination by employers in Northern Ireland. Many pension funds have adopted investment policies that prohibit investment in a 
corporation that does business in Northern Ireland unless the corporation has adopted the McBride Principles.
B
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Silence of the Funds
The right to vote proxies is a plan asset. In Interpretive Bulletin 
94-2, USDOL stated that trustees have a fiduciary duty to develop 
proxy voting guidelines and vote in accordance with those guidelines 
on proxy issues that are likely to have a financial impact on shares held 
by the pension fund. Common examples of proposals that affect stock 
value include reincorporation,5 poison pills,6 antitakeover devices,7 
and greenmail8,9 (Securities and Exchange Commission 1984, 1985; 
Pound 1987, p. 362). Since most shareholder and management propos-
als would likely affect stock value if adopted, a strong argument can be 
made that trustees must vote on all proxies, or must delegate their au-
thority to vote to investment professionals who will vote on the proxies 
in accordance with the fund’s guidelines. 
Many trustees delegate this activity to mutual funds that consis-
tently vote with management but refuse to disclose their vote.10 Van-
guard Group founder John Bogle calls this phenomenon “Silence of the 
Funds” (Brown 2002). For example, mutual fund Fidelity Investments 
is the largest institutional holder of Nabors Industries and holds over 
$537 million (10.55 percent) of Nabors’ shares. Fidelity also holds 7.6 
percent (over $266 million) of Stanley Works and 5.33 percent ($1.4 
billion) of Tyco International. These corporations held votes on reincor-
porating in Bermuda to avoid U.S. taxes. Tyco and Nabors have already 
reincorporated in Bermuda, as did Fidelity in the 1960s. In that 1988 
letter to Helmuth Fandl, chairman of the retirement board of Avon, the 
USDOL clearly stated that trustees have a duty to vote on reincorpora-
tion issues. Yet, until recently it appears that not only has Fidelity voted 
in support of management and against the interests of shareholders, but 
it has refused to inform the shareholders of the nature of its vote (AFL-
CIO 2002).
Fidelity, which manages assets of $859.8 billion, or 12.5 percent 
of the market share (AFL-CIO 2002), excuses its conduct by saying 
that disclosure of proxy voting guidelines and votes could impact the 
company’s stock price. That’s precisely the point that pension activists 
have been making, and it is the basis for the USDOL’s mandate that 
trustees vote on proxies that may affect stock value. Instead, Fidelity 
used this argument to support its refusal to disclose its proxy voting 
records to the beneficial owner of the stock. Fidelity said that its voting 
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records are “proprietary information” and thus, not disclosable (Lau-
ricella and Schroeder 2002). Fidelity’s argument, however, flies in the 
face of USDOL’s Interpretive Bulletin, which implies that delegation 
of proxy voting authority without monitoring to make sure the proxy is 
voted in such a manner as to increase shareholder value is a breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
Investment managers and mutual fund managers such as Fidelity 
often face a conflict of interest in voting proxies. Fidelity has 9,600 cli-
ents and manages 7.8 million 401(k) accounts (Kirchhoff 2002). As the 
largest provider of 401(k) plans, Fidelity has an incentive to vote with 
management so that management will continue to offer Fidelity as one 
of their 401(k) vendors (AFL-CIO 2002). Reporter Steven Syre calls Fi-
delity the “ultimate fund management fee machine” (Syre 2002). Fees 
for Fidelity’s largest mutual fund alone totaled $556.3 million in 2001 
(Syre 2002). According to Mercer Bullard, founder of Fund Democ-
racy, mutual funds “serve two masters” and “may avoid taking a stand 
against company management for fear of losing pension plan business” 
(Friedman 2002; Day 2002). At the urging of the AFL-CIO, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission voted to require mutual fund managers 
to disclose publicly how they cast proxy votes on behalf of their inves-
tors (Securities and Exchange Commission 2003). In September 2004, 
the AFL-CIO released a report entitled, Behind the Curtain: How the 
10 Largest Mutual Fund Families Voted when Presented with 12 Op-
portunities to Curb CEO Pay Abuse in 2004. According to the report, 
Fidelity ranked 9th out of 10 in the survey, voting to curb CEO pay only 
25 percent of the time (AFL-CIO 2004).
Meeting with Management
Not only does USDOL believe that trustees must vote proxies, it has 
stated that trustees should meet with management on corporate gover-
nance issues whenever “the responsible fiduciary concludes that there is 
a reasonable expectation that such monitoring or communication with 
management, by the plan alone or together with other shareholders, is 
likely to enhance the value of the plan’s investment in the corporation, 
after taking into account the costs involved” (USDOL 1994). USDOL 
acknowledges that where a pension fund is a long-term investor in an 
index fund, “the prudent exercise of proxy voting rights or other forms 
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of corporate monitoring or communication may be the only method 
available for attempting to enhance the value of the portfolio” (USDOL 
1994). Other issues that USDOL considers appropriate topics of con-
versation with management include “the appropriateness of executive 
compensation, the corporation’s policy regarding mergers and acquisi-
tions, the extent of debt financing and capitalization, the nature of long-
term business plans, the corporation’s investment in training to develop 
its work force, other workplace practices, and financial and non-finan-
cial measures of corporate performance” (USDOL 1994). Workplace 
practices would include the corporation’s attitude toward unionization.
Management meetings work. For example, in the 2003 proxy sea-
son, pension funds and unions negotiated settlement of shareholder 
resolutions with 105 corporations. Thirty-one corporations, including 
Halliburton, Caterpillar, and Reebok, negotiated agreements on expens-
ing stock options. Although a small number, it is quite remarkable that 
in light of the AFL-CIO/AFSCME/CalPERS “Come Home to Ameri-
ca” campaign, three corporations (Transocean, Schlumberger, and Mc-
Dermott) agreed to discuss reincorporation in the United States. Seven 
leading underwriting firms including J.P. Morgan & Chase, Goldman 
Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, and Citigroup 
agreed to analyst independence. And because shareholder votes are not 
binding, two corporations agreed, at the request of NYCERS, to adopt 
proposals supported by majority vote. The AFL-CIO reached agree-
ment with four corporations on chairman independence. Twenty-three 
corporations settled shareholder resolutions requesting performance-
based options (Georgeson 2003; Investor Responsibility Research Cor-
poration 2003). 
While fund-sponsored corporate governance proposals frequently 
pass, the success rate for social proposals is infrequent. A common 
shareholder proposal calls for the targeted corporation to adopt Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) standards:
•  RESOLVED: The shareholders request that the board of direc-
tors of the Coca-Cola Company . . . adopt an enforceable policy 
to be followed by the company, its subsidiaries, bottlers, and 
distributors with respect to operations in Columbia, said policy 
to be based on ILO’s declaration on fundamental principles and 
rights at work and to include the following:
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• All workers have the right to form and join trade unions and bar-
gain collectively (Conventions 87 and 98).
• There shall be no discrimination or intimidation in employment 
. . . (Conventions 100 and 111).
• Employment shall be freely chosen. There shall be no use of 
forced, including bonded or voluntary prison, labor or of child 
labor (Conventions 29 and 105, 138 and 182) (Coca-Cola Com-
pany 2003). 
In the 2003 proxy season, unions and funds filed shareholder pro-
posals at seven companies, calling for adherence to the ILO standards. 
Agreements were reached at Sears and Unocal. Although the other pro-
posals did not pass, the resolution at Hudson’s Bay received a stunning 
36.8 percent.
Perhaps the most important event in the 2003 proxy season occurred 
in May 2003, when competing slates of directors for El Paso, an energy 
company that provides natural gas and other energy-related products, 
met with pension fund investment managers at the headquarters of the 
AFL-CIO to explain their corporate philosophy and long-term corporate 
goals. As a result of the meeting, pension funds endorsed the competing 
slate of directors. The insurgents lost by a narrow margin and tabulators 
recounted the vote (Perin 2003). Even though the final tally declared 
the incumbents victors, the pension fund shareholders were truly the 
victors since they garnered enough votes to make them influential in 
the shareholder vote.
Using Pension Fund Activism to Encourage Organizing
The most common tactic pension fund activists use to create union 
jobs is the Responsible Contractor Policy. The Service Employees In-
ternational Union (SEIU), CalPERS, and the New York State Common 
Retirement Fund have adopted Responsible Contractor Policies which 
require all fund real estate holdings, loans, or maintenance contracts, 
to contain an agreement that all work performed on the fund property 
will be done in accordance with all applicable labor laws. As the SEIU 
policy puts it, 
[i]n order to ensure a competitive return on its real estate invest-
ments, the Fund seeks to invest in properties that are well-run and 
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maintained where tenants receive high quality services . . . Assur-
ing the availability of a qualified staff and avoiding labor disrup-
tion and costly employee turnover requires employers to pay fair 
and reasonable compensation, to treat workers fairly and abide by 
applicable labor laws. (SEIU 1998) 
Similarly, the New York Common Retirement Fund has a contrac-
tor selection program that emphasizes the fund’s “deep interest in the 
condition of workers employed by the fund and its advisors” (New York 
Common Retirement Fund 1998). The policy requires investment man-
agers to hire program contractors who pay “workers a fair wage and 
a fair benefit as evidenced by payroll and employee records, and who 
compl[y] with the fund’s minority and women business policy” (New 
York Common Retirement Fund 1998). Although these policies do 
not literally require union representation of building and maintenance 
workers, they have had this effect. 
Responsible contractor policies give hiring preferences to employ-
ers who pay their workers a fair wage and provide employer-paid health 
insurance, pension benefits, and training opportunities. By adopting a 
responsible contractor policy, pension funds can meet their fiduciary 
duty to achieve a competitive rate of return while ensuring the fair treat-
ment of employees working on their properties. 
Building trade unions use another tactic: they buy raw land, build 
the project union, and sell the property with a responsible contractor 
clause. This tactic is not limited to the building trade unions, however, 
because pooled real estate funds such as the AFL-CIO Housing Invest-
ment Trust (HIT) and Building Investment Trust (BIT) accomplish the 
same result by offering commingled funds that guarantee union work. 
During the 10-year period from 1993–2003, BIT has generated over 11 
million hours of union construction as well as union jobs for the mem-
bers of 17 AFL-CIO unions in the construction, servicing, and mainte-
nance of properties. As of March 31, 2003, BIT’s net assets exceeded 
$1.5 billion and were invested in nearly 12 million square feet of com-
mercial development in the communities where union members live 
and work (HIT 2003). 
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Sponsoring Shareholder Proposals
The USDOL also encourages trustees to sponsor shareholder pro-
posals where the proposal may affect the corporation’s stock value (US-
DOL 1994). In the 2003 proxy season, trustees of pension funds and 
union representatives filed approximately 381 shareholder proposals, 
more than double the proposals filed in 2002. Sixty-nine labor-spon-
sored proposals passed and settlements were reached on 105 proposals. 
The AFL-CIO won majority support for its resolutions on executive 
pensions at U.S. Bancorp (52 percent), golden parachutes11 at Alcoa 
(65 percent), and shareholder approval of severance plans at Tyco (57.7 
percent). Although its proposal at United Technologies only garnered 47 
percent of the vote, the company agreed to review its policy on golden 
parachutes. The Culinary Workers scored big at The Cheesecake Fac-
tory, winning proposals to submit stock option plans12 to shareholder 
vote (66 percent), require annual election of directors (72 percent), sub-
mit a poison pill to shareholder vote (67 percent), and eliminate the 80 
percent supermajority voting requirement13 (81 percent). The Teamsters 
won stock option expensing14 proposals at Coke Enterprises, PPG In-
dustries, and Weyerhauser, and the Carpenters won 78 percent support 
for a similar resolution at Exxon Mobil. AFSCME settled a proposal on 
golden parachutes at Electronic Data Systems. Other victories include 
BellTel Retirees’ proposal for shareholder approval of severance plans 
at Verizon (59 percent) and Connecticut Retirement Plans’ proposal to 
declassify the board at Reebok (63 percent) and Stanley (55 percent). 
Certainly, it was a successful year for shareholder activists.
Table 14.2 lists pension fund and related shareholder proposals that 
passed in 2003. This table may understate the funds’ success rate be-
cause it does not include the 105 resolutions that corporations agreed 
to in principle and, therefore, were withdrawn. Also, fund-sponsored 
shareholder proposals at 35 corporations that did not pass received 
votes in excess of a third of shareholders (a stunning amount, especially 
for first-time proposals). 
Encouraging Legislative Reform
Pension funds have been among the prime movers in the fight to 
enact legislation that addresses corporate accountability and transpar-
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ency. For example, as part of its legislative agenda, CalPERS will do 
the following: 
1)  Actively oppose the election of any director who, while sit-
ting on the company’s audit committee, approved retaining an 
external audit firm when that firm also provides consulting or 
internal audit services to a company.
 2) Publicly oppose shareholder approval of any auditor that has 
been retained by the company for more than five years, or also 
performs consulting or internal audit services to the company. 
CalPERS believes that current moves by the accounting indus-
try to separate their consulting relationships from their audit-
ing relationships is too late and too narrowly defined to accom-
plish the overall goal of restoring confidence in the industry.
 3) Join forces with other significant users of financial statements 
to provide concrete and responsible proposals for account-
ing standards reform to Congress, the Securities & Exchange 
Commission, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the 
International Accounting Standards Board and the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
 4) Form a commission made up of regulators, legislative repre-
sentatives, and investors to examine ways in which conflicts 
of interests (by investment banks, equity analysts, rating agen-
cies, lending institutions, outside attorneys and other consul-
tants) can be identified, disclosed and managed.
 5) Immediately prepare, promote, and pursue proposals within 
Congress, the SEC and Exchanges that truly strengthen and 
clarify the meaning and importance of an “independent” direc-
tor (CalPERS 2002b).
Many of CalPERS’ legislative proposals were adopted as part of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (CalPERS 2002a).
Shareholder Litigation
In conventional shareholder litigation, the plaintiff typically claims 
that the corporate issuer violated federal securities law by engaging 
in fraud with respect to SEC filings. For example, CalPERS, the Cali-
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Company Proposal Sponsor Vote
AK Steel Approval of severance Longview Fund 59.2
Alcoa, Inc. Approval of severance AFL-CIO 64.7
Apple Computer Expense stock options UBC 56.4
Arden Realty Submit poison pill to 
shareholder (SH) vote
SEIU 83.0
Avon Industries Expense stock options IBEW 56.4
Black & Decker Expense stock options UBC 52.0
Boston Scientific Performance-based exec. 
comp.
Sheet metal workers 90.1
Capital One 
Financial
Expense stock options UBC 55.0
Calpine Repeal classified board IBEW 62.8
Calpine Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
Plumbers, Pipefitters 66.3
CenterPoint Energy Performance-based exec. 
comp.
Sheet metal workers 75.5
The Cheesecake 
Factory





Annual election of directors Culinary workers 62.0
The Cheesecake 
Factory





Eliminate supermajority vote Culinary workers 69.6
Circuit City Stores Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
AFSCME 79.3
Citrix Systems Expense stock options LIUNA 54.8
Coke Enterprises Expense stock options IBT Majority
Covance Declassify board NYCERS 72.3
Crescent Real 
Estate Equities
Declassify board SEIU 72.7
Delta Airlines Expense stock options Delta pilots 61.4
Delta Airlines Approval of severance Delta pilots 54.3
Eastman Kodak Expense stock options LIUNA 56.3
Table 14.2  Pension Fund and Related Shareholder Proposals That 
Passed in 2003 as of November 14, 2003, Tally
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Company Proposal Sponsor Vote
Equifax Expense stock options UBC 60.7
Exxon Mobil Expense stock options UBC 78.0
Fluor Expense stock options UBC 79.7
Genzyme Corp. Expense stock options UBC 63.2
Georgia Pacific Expense stock options IBT General Fund 65.0
Hercules Authorize written consent NYC Firefighters 63.1
Hewlett-Packard Approval of severance SEIU 52.4
International Paper Approval of severance AFL-CIO 61.0
Kilroy Realty Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
SEIU 87.1
Kimberly-Clark Expense stock options UBC 53.0
Kohl’s Expense stock options UBC 50.6
Lowe’s Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
BAC 70.2
Manor Care Declassify board NYC Firefighters 71.8
Massey Energy Approval of severance Longview Fund 72.5
MBNA Expense stock options AFSCME 52.1
McKesson Approval of severance IBT 68.1
Mercury Interactive Expense stock options UBC 52.3
Mirant Expense stock options IBEW 61.7
NCR Expense stock options LIUNA 53.2
J.C. Penney Expense stock options LIUNA 52.0
Office Depot Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
BAC 78.7
PPG Expense stock options IBT General Fund 52.4





Expense stock options SMWIA 54.5
Raytheon Approval of severance AFL-CIO 66.4
Reebok Declassify board Connecticut 
Retirement Plans
63.0
RyderSystems Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
AFSCME 76.6
Safeway Expense stock options Plumbers, Pipefitters 62.7
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Company Proposal Sponsor Vote
Safeway Declassify board Longview Fund 61.0
Sprint Approval of severance Longview Fund 63.7
Stanley Works Declassify board Connecticut 
Retirement Plans
55.0
Starwood Hotels Expense stock options IBEW 60.5
Supervalu Expense stock options UBC 64.3
Tellabs Declassify board Longview Fund 68.3
Thermo Electron Expense stock options SMWIA 59.7
Tyco International Approval of severance AFL-CIO 57.7
U.S. Bancorp Executive pensions AFL-CIO 51.6
U.S. Bancorp Expense stock options UBC 59.9
Union Pacific Approval of severance Longview Fund 56.8
United Technologies Approval of severance AFL-CIO 54.0
Veritas Software Expense stock options Plumbers, Pipefitters 64.3
Verizon Approval of severance BellTel Retirees, Inc. 59.0
VF Declassify board Longview Fund 56.7
Wells Fargo Abolish stock option AFL-CIO 56.3
Weyerhauser Expense stock options Teamsters 50.0
Whole Food 
Markets
Declassify board Longview Fund 60.5
Yahoo! Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
Longview Fund 56.2
Table 14.2  (continued)
NOTE: AFL-CIO = American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions; AFSCME = American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; 
BAC = Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers; IBEW= International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers; IBT = International Brotherhood of Teamsters; LIUNA= Labor-
ers’ International Union of North America; NYCERS = New York City Employees’ 
Retirement System; SEIU = Service Employees International Union; SMWIA = Sheet 
Metal Workers International Association; UBC = United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
and Joiners of America.
SOURCE: Compiled from various sources including Georgeson Shareholder, Annual 
Corporate Governance Review: Shareholder Proposals and Proxy Contests (2002) 
and Investor Responsibility Corporation 2003 Vote Results. This table was originally 
published in Zanglein and Clark (2004).
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fornia Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), and the Los Angeles 
County Employees Retirement Association recently sued WorldCom 
for losses exceeding $300 million with respect to fraudulent statements 
made in the prospectus issued for the sale of corporate bonds in May 
2001 (CalPERS 2002c). Likewise, the law firm of Milberg Weiss, a 
class-action specialist, filed a class-action lawsuit against Enron seek-
ing to recover losses relating to Enron’s fraudulent statements.
An example of an innovative use of securities litigation can be found 
in the action brought against Phelps Dodge by the Steelworkers. The 
lawsuit, filed during impasse of the union’s collective bargaining agree-
ment, alleged that Phelps Dodge violated federal securities laws when 
it understated environmental liability in its reports to shareholders. (In 
re Phelps Dodge, Inc., SEC File No. 001-00082 (undated circa 1998)). 
ICEM General Secretary Vic Thorpe stated “Phelps Dodge has contin-
ued to show its disdain for its stakeholders. It’s time they realize that 
bad corporate behavior is bad for business.”15 At the company’s annual 
shareholder meeting USWA President Leo Girard said, “Phelps Dodge’s 
environmental clean-up obligations hang like a sword of Damocles 
over the investing public.”16 While the lawsuit was later dropped, it did 
influence other groups to propose expanded environmental and social 
disclosure requirements to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Revocation of Corporate Charters
Perhaps the most aggressive action taken against a corporation is 
the attempted revocation of Unocal’s corporate charter. In 1998, Rob-
ert Benson, on behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, filed a petition 
with the Attorney General for the State of California to revoke Unocal’s 
charter. Petitioners contended that the charter should be revoked be-
cause, among other things, Unocal
• has been identified as a potentially responsible party at 82 “Su-
perfund” or similar toxic sites;
• has committed hundreds of Occupational Safety and Health Act 
violations in the last 12 years; 
• has treated U.S. workers unethically and unfairly; and
• carries on ventures with foreign business partners in a fashion 
that makes the company complicit in and legally liable for their 
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partners’ unspeakable human rights violations against women, 
gays, laborers, villagers, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peo-
ple (Benson 1999).
While the petition has been unsuccessful, it has heightened public 
awareness that a corporate charter is granted by the state and can be 
revoked by the state. It has also increased political pressure on Unocal, 
which has been targeted by activists for its human rights violations in 
Burma. 
CONCLUSION
In the 12 years since the USDOL issued Interpretive Bulletin 94-2 
encouraging pension funds to become shareholder activists, many trust-
ees have taken the lead. However, far more trustees are lagging behind 
because they have neither the resources nor the education to implement 
these strategies. Additionally, most plans do not have worker represen-
tatives who can promote these issues.17
Trustees should take comfort in the fact that the USDOL has encour-
aged shareholder activism and has stated that trustees are not required 
to take the “quick buck” but may base their decisions on the long-term 
best interests of the corporation. Trustees can use this statement in sup-
port of their increased demands for corporate accountability. In addi-
tion, trustees should take advantage of the public’s current demand for 
corporate transparency and accountability to compel directors to adopt 
measures that will increase the long-term value of the corporation. 
In a 1999 survey of the most respected companies, CEOs listed “in-
creased pressure from stakeholder groups” as the second most impor-
tant upcoming business challenge (Grayson and Hodges 2002, p. 74). 
Corporations are facing increased attention in the form of shareholder 
resolutions, and pressure from institutional investors, nongovernmental 
organizations, regulatory agencies, consumers, and the public (Grayson 
and Hodges 2002, pp. 217–218). As one author put it, “Customers and 
employees care. That means the equity markets care. And that means 
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CEOs care” (Grayson and Hodges 2002, p. 78). And if they don’t care, 
pension trustees and activists can motivate them through tactics such as 
shareholder resolutions, corporate dialogue, corporate campaigns, and 
litigation.
Notes
Portions of this chapter are adapted, with permission, from Zanglein and Clark (2004).
 1.  Although public funds are excluded from ERISA coverage, these standards are 
still applicable as they are contained in the Internal Revenue Code, the Uniform 
Management of Public Employees Retirement System Act, and state laws, which 
incorporate these duties.
 2.  Trustees may delegate their proxy voting authority, but if they do, the trustees 
should adopt proxy voting policies for their investment managers to follow and 
must monitor the managers’ votes.
 3.  Interbrand, a research company, estimates that 96 percent of Coca-Cola’s stock 
value is in intangibles such as reputation, knowledge, and brand. Kellogg’s stock 
value is 97 percent in intangibles, American Express 84 percent, and IBM 83 
percent. Rita Clifton, CEO of Interbrand, says “Brand equity is now a key as-
set.” Brand alone, accounts for 59 percent of Coke’s stock value, 64 percent of 
McDonald’s, and 61 percent of Disney’s value (Grayson and Hodges 2002).
 4.  Unocal sued its reinsurer for reimbursement for claims in excess of $15 million, 
leading experts to conclude that Unocal’s costs were significantly higher than 
$15 million (Eviatar 2005).
 5.  By reincorporating, a corporation chooses to reincorporate in another state or 
country (most notably the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands) that has less restric-
tive corporate laws and lower (or nonexistent) corporate taxes.
 6.  Poison pills are shares issued to current shareholders at extremely low prices to 
encourage shareholders to buy the new shares, with the result that the raider must 
buy more shares at a higher price. 
 7.  Antitakeover devices are charter and bylaw amendments that make it more dif-
ficult for a corporation to be taken over.
 8.  Greenmail is money paid to a corporate raider to “go away.” 
 9. Letter from the Department of Labor to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Retire-
ment Board of Avon Products, Inc. February 23, 1988.
 10.  Letter from Harvey Pitt, Chair, Securities and Exchange Commission to John 
Higgins, President of Ram Trust Services. Feb. 12, 2002.
 11.  Golden parachutes are severance payments made to management employees on 
termination or change of control and are designed to “soften the landing” by 
providing gold. 
 12.  Stock option plans are generally provided to upper management and grant the 
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employee the right to buy company stock at a stated exercise price. In the event 
the stock price rises, the employee can profit by purchasing stock at the lower 
exercise price. Stock options are subject to abuse when the board of directors 
agree to reprice the stock options so that the executives can profit even when the 
corporation is not profiting.
 13.  Supermajority voting requirements are usually placed on changes of corporate 
control such as mergers and acquisitions. 
 14.  Funds have been lobbying corporations to expense stock options as this requires 
the corporation to include the costs of issuing stock options in their financial 
reports.
 15.  “Showdown at Phelps Dodge.” Available at http://www.icemna.org/ephelps3.
htm (accessed December 1999).
 16.  See note 14.
 17.  Legislative proposals, such as the Visclosky bill, H.R. 323 (108th Congress) 
which would provide joint trusteeship for single employer plans, would signifi-
cantly enhance the ability of workers to become pension activists and push for 
policies such as responsible contractor policies.
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